Judgment :- 1. Marayammal, the contemner herein filed a Civil Revision Petition before this Court in C.R.P.(PD). No. 1952 of 2002 challenging the dismissal order passed in I.A. No. 922 of 2002 in O.S. No. 603 of 1999. While disposing the said C.R.P., this Court, by order dated 5.12.2002, observed that the petition before the trial Court at the fag end of the trial and the civil revision petition before this Court, are purely an abuse of process of law and so holding, this Court directed the respondent-contemner (petitioner in C.R.P.) to pay a sum of Rs. 7,500/- as costs to the plaintiffs, within two weeks from 5.12.2002. This order has not been complied with. Hence, this contempt petition. 2. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, since the costs of Rs. 7,500/- has not been paid within two weeks from the date of the order in the civil revision petition, namely 5.12.2002, the petitioners herein issued a lawyers notice on 17.3.2003, asking the contemner to pay the amount of costs by obeying the order of this Court and even though the contemner has received the said notice on 19.3.2003, she did not care to respond the same, nor to comply with the direction of this Court, and as such, the respondent-contemner has committed contempt of this Court. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decisions reported in AIR 1956 Allahabad 79 (Shyam Sunder v. Daw Dayal) and AIR 1967 Allahabad 93 (E.T. Mazdoor Union v. Aligarh Municipality). 3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-contemner would cite number of authorities, namely (i) AIR 2002 SC 1405 - Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh ), (ii) AIR 1982 Karnataka 182- Rudraiah v. State , (iii) AIR 1966 Madras 21 = (1965) 78 L.W. 314 ( Ramalingam v. Mahalinga Nadar ), (iv) AIR 1981 Allahabad 309 - Indu v. Ram Bahadur Chaudhari and (v) 2000 (4) SCC 400 - R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik , to show that this contempt petition is not maintainable, as there is an effective alternative remedy for collecting the said amount of costs. 4. 4. The gist of the rulings relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent-contemner is as follows: (a) Mere disobedience of an order may not be sufficient to amount to a “civil contempt” within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The element of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act. (b) When special provisions are contained in the Civil Procedure Code itself for taking action for the disobedience of an order of the Court, the general law of contempt of Court cannot be invoked. (c) When the matter relates to an infringement of a decree or decretal order, it is clearly inexpedient to invoke contempt jurisdiction. (d) When a person who has got an effective alternative remedy under the Civil Procedure Code, he should not be permitted to skip over that remedy and take resort to initiate contempt proceedings. (e) The decree-holder who does not take steps to execute the decree according to the procedure prescribed by law, should not be encouraged to invoke contempt jurisdiction of the Court for non-satisfaction of the money decree. 5. Arguing contra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, on the strength of the decisions cited supra, would submit that the contempt petition is maintainable. The crux of the principles laid down in the decisions relied on by learned counsel for the petitioners is as follows: (a) Contempt proceedings are neither civil nor criminal, but sui-generis. An order awarding costs to the party against the other in contempt proceedings, cannot be enforced under either of the Codes. To power to enforce it must be deemed to have been implied in the power to pass it. There are no limits to its power to enforce it. It can be enforced in any manner it deems proper. (b) A person who has obtained an order in his favour from a Court is entitled to instant relief and its delayed implementation would discredit the administration of justice. 6. I have carefully considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. 7. It can be enforced in any manner it deems proper. (b) A person who has obtained an order in his favour from a Court is entitled to instant relief and its delayed implementation would discredit the administration of justice. 6. I have carefully considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. 7. At the outset, it shall be stated that after service of contempt notice, when the matter was taken up on 12.12.2003, learned counsel for the respondent-contemner submitted that the respondent-contemner is prepared to pay the costs immediately to the petitioners and he may be permitted to argue the contempt applications maintainability. Accordingly, the respondent-contemner was permitted to pay the costs and the same was also paid on the same day to the petitioners counsel. As such, the costs imposed on the civil revision petition has not been paid within the time limit prescribed by this Court, but the same was paid only after receipt of contempt notice. 8. There is no dispute that the orders of this Court are to be implemented and acted upon with promptitude. If their implementation is unduly delayed, it would amount to showing scant respect to the Court concerned and its judicial process, which would obviously be a serious contempt of that Court. Disclaimer: The text is computer generated. The user must verify the authenticity of the extracted portion with the certified copy of the judgment. ace="Times" ; C p This extract is taken from K. Kamalathal v. Marayammal, (2004) 2 LW 316 , at page 319: 9. In this case, the order has been passed in the civil revision petition on 5.12.2002, directing the respondent-contemner to pay the costs of Rs. 7,500/- within two weeks from that date. The petitioners having waited for more than two months, sent a lawyers notice reminding the contemner about the order of this Court, asking them to obey the same, indicating that they would be constrained to resort to contempt proceedings, if it is not complied with. Even then, there was no response either through reply or by complying with the order of this Court. The petitioners waited for further four months and at last, only in July, 2003, the petitioners have resorted to file this contempt petition. As such, it can be safely stated that the contemner has not shown any interest in obeying the order of this Court. The petitioners waited for further four months and at last, only in July, 2003, the petitioners have resorted to file this contempt petition. As such, it can be safely stated that the contemner has not shown any interest in obeying the order of this Court. As a matter of fact, even the delayed implementation of the order, it is held by various Courts, would discredit the administration of justice. 10. Further, though there are some observations by the Supreme Court that when an effective alternative remedy is available, the contempt proceedings may not be resorted to, the said observations would not help the contemner, in view of the fact that there is no blanket bar on the contempt jurisdiction of this Court, especially when this Court feels that there is clear disobedience of the order of this Court and that too, when there is no attempt to explain the delay in complying with the order of this Court, whereby this Court prescribed the time schedule asking the party to pay the amount of costs within a particular date. 11. Under those circumstances, I am to hold that this contempt petition is maintainable. However, I do not propose to punish the respondent-contemner, in view of the fact that even on the first day of the contempt proceedings, the respondent-contemner has paid the amount of costs to the petitioners. The contempt petition is accordingly closed.