Judgment 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner has claimed for grant of entire retirement benefits, including the family pension to her and her unmarried daughter and one minor son. 2. The petitioner is the widow of Late Rajbanshi Ram, who was in the service of the respondent-Ayudhgar Ordnance Depot at Alipore as Tentmender (T/No.-186). According to the case of the petitioner, in January, 1985 her husband came to his native village Narharpore, P.S. Marhowrah in the district of Saran on leave from Ordnance Depot, Alipore, Calcutta. On 7.2.1985 her husband returned back to work, but did not reach there as she learnt later. The petitioner on 25.6.1990 filed a written report about missing of her husband with the Officer-in-Charge of Marhowrah Police Station, vide Annexure 1, which was registered as Sanha no. 456 dated 25.6.1990. On 3.7.1991 the Officer-in- Charge gave a missing certificate, vide Annexure 2. After getting a copy of the said Sanha and certificate, the petitioner approached the authority concerned for payment of all dues, including family pension. The Personnel Officer of Ordnance Depot, vide his letter no. 0697/RBR/EST dated 7th August, 1991, contained in Annexure 3, intimated her that since her husband was removed from service due to prolonged absence from duty for more than five years, she is not entitled for family pension or any other financial assistance. However, he further informed her that under the existing provision, she may be entitled for family pension in case her husband is declared missing by the appropriate police authorities of her State and advised her to fulfil the following requirements and forward/intimate the depot to take further action on the subject: "(a) F.I.R. No. in case you have lodged any F.I.R. to your nearest police station stating missing of your husband Shri Raj Bansi Ram. (b) Report regarding missing of your husband to be obtained from the missing squad of Bihar State. (c) Any other information such as T.V./Radio broadcasting or publication regarding missing of Shri Raj Bansi Ram made by the Police authorities." 3. It appears that thereafter the petitioner got a letter of the Sub-Inspector of Police, Marhowrah dated 11.9.1991 (Annexure 4) intimating to the Personnel Officer regarding lodging of Sahna/F.I.R. no. (c) Any other information such as T.V./Radio broadcasting or publication regarding missing of Shri Raj Bansi Ram made by the Police authorities." 3. It appears that thereafter the petitioner got a letter of the Sub-Inspector of Police, Marhowrah dated 11.9.1991 (Annexure 4) intimating to the Personnel Officer regarding lodging of Sahna/F.I.R. no. 456 on 25th June, 1990 and that the missing person Rajbanshi Ram could not be traced out despite all possible efforts and sent the same along with her application dated 2nd October, 2001. However, on 16th October, 2001 the Personnel Officer with reference to her said application dated 2nd October, 2001 again wrote to the petitioner, as contained in Annexure 5, reiterating for submission of the aforementioned documents for taking necessary action on the subject. 4. The petitioner claims to have filed the certificate granted by the Mukhiya of Gram Panchayat Raj, Narharpur dated 8.1.2002, contained in Annexure 6, about her husband being traceless since 7.2.1985, but finally her claim was rejected on the plea that a dismissed employee is not entitled for any pensionary award, vide Annexure 8. The petitioner thus filed the present writ petition on 8.8.2003 after service of notice on 29.7.2003 upon the learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents. 5. This Court vide order dated 19.9.2003 considering the nature of grievance raised in the writ petitions relating to retiral dues/death-cum-retiral dues and the delay caused for redressal of such sad grievance and corresponding duties/liability of the concerned authority considered it expedient to dispose of all the writ petitions, including the present writ petition, ith a general direction that the sanctioning authority/concerned authority/respondents must fully redress the grievance of the petitioner raised in the writ petition and file two paragraphs affidavit personally sworn by the concerned authority by 20th October, 2003 and also annex the details about redressal in the format placed below into the said order after serving copy on the learned counsel for the respective petitioners, which was directed to be placed on the respective records of the case. The authorities were also directed to attach Photostat copy of the sanction order/ authority/authorization/receipts of payments made with respect to the redressal of the grievance, failing which the said authority was made liable to pay cost of Rs.5,000/- (five thousand) from his pocket to the petitioner and the respective petitioners were given liberty to file two pages affidavit, upon which this Court is to take serious view of the matter and may consider to initiate suo motu contempt proceeding as well against such authority. On filing of two pages affidavit by the petitioner, the matter was directed to be listed for orders. 6. Accordingly, when the said order was not complied, the widow-petitioner filed affidavit, upon which the matter was listed on 14.1.2004 when on the prayer made on behalf of the petitioner, the matter was adjourned for listing after one week. Thereafter the matter was passed over on the request of the learned counsel for the respondents to take instruction as regards full compliance. On 5.2.2004, on instruction learned counsel for the respondents submitted that cheque with respect to entire dues shall be produced on Monday next (9.2.2004) with details of calculation and accordingly, as a last indulgence, the matter was adjourned for listing on 9.2.2004 on the prayer made by the learned counsel for the respondents. 7. As there was no response from the Personnel Officer (respondent no. 3) till 9.2.2004 despite repeated indulgences granted, this Court suo motu initiated contempt proceeding against him and he was directed to personally appear and file his show cause on 23rd February, 2004. The said contempt was registered as M.J.C. No. 302 of 2004. On 23rd February, 2004 the respondent no. 3 personally appeared and filed his show cause. However, no details of the dues payable to the widow- petitioner was furnished and the matter on the request of the learned counsel for the respondents was adjourned, as a matter of last indulgence, for listing on 9th March, 2004 with the direction that respondent no. 3 shall personally appear on the date with full details of the dues payable to the widow of the deceased employee and also pay the admitted amount. 8. On 9th March, 2004, respondent no.3 who on that date stated that he is Assistant Personnel Officer, personally appeared and produced two cheques; one for Rs. 2,633/- for payment towards G.P.F. and another for Rs. 8. On 9th March, 2004, respondent no.3 who on that date stated that he is Assistant Personnel Officer, personally appeared and produced two cheques; one for Rs. 2,633/- for payment towards G.P.F. and another for Rs. 312/- for payment towards CGEGIS, which were handed over to the learned counsel for the petitioner. As regards family pension and other retiral dues, he contended that the same is not admissible in view of the order of dismissal of the deceased employee which though was sent to the petitioner but returned undelivered. He, however, submitted that since the order of dismissal could not be communicated, the matter was referred to the appellate authority, namely, the Director General, but the Director General also rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that her husband was dismissed from service. 9. This Court in the order dated 9.3.2004 took notice of the fact that the order of dismissal was never communicated to the petitioner and thus never became effective in the eye of law and that the petitioner reported the authority concerned about missing of her husband since 1985 and in support thereof produced the copy of the F.I.R. and Sanha/police report above which the Superintendent of Police, district Siwan at Chapra (respondent no, 6) also admitted in paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit filed on his behalf and considering the provisions, contained in section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which provides for burden of proving that person is alive who has not been heard of for seven years, held that the petitioner cannot be denied of the relief sought for in the writ petition on the plea that her husband was dismissed from service. Thus, it was held that the order dated 19th September, 2003 was not complied and respondent no. 3 was liable to pay a cost of Rs. 5,000/- from his pocket, which was also not complied. 10. However, after the said order, respondent no. 3 assured to produce the necessary sanction order/payment with respect to family pension and also the amount of cost and accordingly again as a matter of last indulgence, the matter was adjourned for listing on 12.3.2004 with the direction to all the concerned authorities, including the Director General, Ordnance Services, Army Headquarters, New Delhi to report this Court about the compliance of the order. 11. 11. In the supplementary show cause filed on behalf of respondent no. 3 on 9th March, 2004, it was again reiterated that the petitioners husband has been dismissed from service vide order dated 5th August, 1991 on disciplinary grounds and thus is not entitled for any other pensionary benefits until and unless the said order is set aside or challenged before the competent court and in that view of the matter, according to the said respondent, the order passed by this Court has been fully complied. 12. Thereafter a supplementary affidavit was filed on behalf of respondents no. 1, 3 and 4 on 15.3.2004 through another Additional Standing Counsel Mr. Ajay Kumar Tripathi in which the respondents have ventured to take objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition itself. According to them it is barred under section 14 of the Administrative Tribunal Act as the husband of the petitioner was a civilian employee under the defence establishment and did not belong to uniformed service. Thus, it is contended that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is ousted and barred under law. 13. Mr. Tripathi, learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents has thus argued that there is no question of violation of the order of this Court as the very order of this Court was passed in a proceeding which is not maintainable in this Court in view of the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 [1997(1) PLJR (SC) 84]. He submitted that according to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) it was not open for the petitioner to directly approach this Court. At the first instance the petitioner ought to have moved the Tribunal. 14. I am unable to appreciate as to how such objection/plea has now been taken by the respondents. It is true that in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) the Apex Court held that the Tribunal created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules and that all decisions of these Tribunal will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal falls. Further it has been held that the Tribunal will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted and that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. But the Apex Court has not held that the High Court will not have the power to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. On the contrary, the Supreme Court struck down the provision to the extent they excluded the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution as being unconstitutional. However, the litigants were, of course, debarred from directly approaching the High Courts by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 15. However, the respondent never took any such objection either at the time of disposal of the writ petition by the general order nor they ever filed any petition for recall of the said order, which usually this Court entertains. It is only after the contempt proceeding has been initiated and above mentioned order dated 9.3.2004 has been passed that now such plea has been raised to defeat the compliance of the order of the Court. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Subodh Gopal v. Dalmia Jai & Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 1951 Patna 266, has held that the party against whom an order of injunction is made cannot disregard the order on the ground that it is erroneous in any particular. Right or wrong, the injunction order binds him and he disregards it at his peril and that a party to an order of injunction cannot with impunity, disobey the order by assuming or taking on, a different capacity in respect of the act or acts which constitute a breach of the order of injunction. 16. In the case of Sukhdev Singh v. Teja Singh, reported in AIR 1954 S.C. 186 , the Apex Court held that no Act of a Legislature could take away the jurisdiction conferred upon under Article 215 of the Constitution of India by virtue of its amendment. 16. In the case of Sukhdev Singh v. Teja Singh, reported in AIR 1954 S.C. 186 , the Apex Court held that no Act of a Legislature could take away the jurisdiction conferred upon under Article 215 of the Constitution of India by virtue of its amendment. The Division Bench in the case of Manmati Kuer v. Ramgopal Singh, reported in AIR 1976 Patna 240, relying upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of The State of Bihar v. Sonabati Kumari, reported in AIR 1961 SC 221 , held that if disobedience could go unchecked, it would result in orders of Courts ceasing to have any meaning and judicial power itself becoming a mockery. 17. In the supplementary affidavit, referred to above, it is, however, alleged that to meet the requirements of the authorities, the petitioner created a false and fabricated document dated 11.9.1991 to give the impression to the authorities as well as the Court that an F.I.R. was lodged prior to dismissal. The fact is that till date no F.I.R. has been recorded nor was one lodged on 25.6.1990. It is alleged that the Sanha entry by virtue of Annexure 4 was sought to be given the status of F.I.R. under the signature of Sub-Inspector of Police Station in question. It is contended that the genuineness of Annexure 4 has been seriously questioned in the report of the Officer-in-Charge to the S.P.Saran, contained in Annexure D. 18. Mr. Tripathi, thus, submitted that the petitioner cannot derive benefit on the basis of Sanha entry and Annexure 4, the authenticity of which has been seriously questioned by the Officer-in-Charge in his report dated 13.3.2004, contained in Annexure D, that too so long the petitioner does not challenge the order of dismissal passed against her husband and the same is set aside by the court of competent jurisdiction. 19. I am unable to appreciate the said submission of the learned Additional Standing Counsel. In the supplementary affidavit filed on 15.3.2004 the respondents have themselves stated that the order of termination may or may not be effective against the petitioner obviously because this Court in the order dated 9.3.2004 held that the order of dismissal never became effective in the eye of law as it was admittedly never communicated. In the supplementary affidavit filed on 15.3.2004 the respondents have themselves stated that the order of termination may or may not be effective against the petitioner obviously because this Court in the order dated 9.3.2004 held that the order of dismissal never became effective in the eye of law as it was admittedly never communicated. The genuineness of Sanha entry is admitted by the Officer-in-charge also in his report dated 13.3.2004 (Annexure D) and also by the Superintendent of Police (respondent no.6) granted by the Mukhiya of Gram Panchayat Raj, Narharpur about the husband of the petitioner being trace- less since 7.2.1985 is not disputed. 20. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kalyani Devi v. State of Bihar, reported in 2003(3) PLJR 691 , while dealing section 108 of the Evidence Act, 1972 which provides that if a person has not been heard of for 7 years by those who would have heard of him if he had. been alive, the burden to prove that he is alive is upon the person who affirms it, held that the circumstances in the said case exist that the Assistant Teacher concerned has not been heard and has otherwise not attended to his duty so as to be presumed that he is dead and thus his widow would be entitled to post retirement benefits. The case of the present petitioner is squareiy covered by the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench. 21. This Court, thus, finds that the whole attempt of respondent no. 3 is to harass the widow and children of the deceased employee and keep them deprived of their legitimate claim even after the order of this Court. This Court, thus, holds respondent no. 3 guilty of contempt of this Court for gross wilful violation of the order of this Court. 22. However, considering the fact and circumstances, respondent no. 3 is given a chance to purge himself of the contempt by 16th April, 2004, failing which he is directed to personally appear before this Court on the said date when this Court shall consider to award appropriate punishment.