Judgment J.S.Khehar, J. 1. It is not a matter of dispute that the controversy in question relates to village Rupowali Chagwan in District Amritsar, wherein consolidation took place in 1964. On account of consolidation separate lands were assigned to the petitioner on the one hand, and to respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh on the other. Eighteen years after consolidation of lands in village Rupowali Chagwan, respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh filed an application under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Act), seeking a passage to his land by alleging that during the process of consolidation no passage had been provided to him for access to his land. 2. The competent authority examined the controversy raised by Hardial Singh and after issuing notice to the petitioner Ganda Singh arrived at the conclusion that no passage had beet) provided to connect the land of Hardial Singh to the metalled road. A passage connecting the land of respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh to the metalled road was ordered to be carved out from over the land of the petitioner Ganda Singh. In lieu of the land, which would be taken away on account of providing a passage to the land of Hardial Singh, he (Hardial Singh) surrendered an equal area of land so as to compensate Ganda Singh. 3. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the competent authority under Section 42 of the 1948 Act through the instant writ petition. Three contentions have been advanced on behalf of the petitioner. 4. Firstly, it is contended that there is an existing passage connecting the land of Hardial Singh with the metalled road, and therefore, there was no justification in providing a second passage to Hardial Singh. In so far as the instant contention is concerned, the written statement filed on behalf of respondent No. 2 reveals an express denial to the aforesaid factual averment. The issue projected by the petitioner therefore, assumes the status of a disputed question of facts. It is not possible for this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India to adjudicate upon the issue based on disputed question of facts. In view of the above, it is not possible for this Court, to answer the aforesaid query, in favour of the petitioner. 5. It is not possible for this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India to adjudicate upon the issue based on disputed question of facts. In view of the above, it is not possible for this Court, to answer the aforesaid query, in favour of the petitioner. 5. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the brother of respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh had earlier moved an application under Section 42 of the 1948 Act for grant of passage to him, and that the same was declined. Additionally, it was pointed out that khata of respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh being joint with his brother (who had made the aforesaid application) the claim raised by respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh before the authorities under Section 42 of the 1948 Act, must be deemed to have been finalised with the rejection of the claim raised by his brother. As against the aforesaid contention, the Courts has been invited to the pleadings contained in para 4 of the written statement, wherein it has expressly been mentioned, that when the brother of respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh had sought a passage by moving an application under Section 42 of the 1948 Act, he was not willing to surrender land equal to the land that would be taken away from the petitioner. The contention of the brother of respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh, had been that the required land should be taken from the Gram Panchayat. It is pointed out that since the brother of respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh did not agree to surrender land to the petitioner, equal to the land he would have to forego while providing a passage to him, the earlier application moved by his brother had been declined. The factual averments made in para 4 of the written statement have not been disputed or controverted by filing a replication. The same must, therefore, be taken to be correct for the purposes of adjudication of the instant issue. The factual averments made in para 4 of the written statement have not been disputed or controverted by filing a replication. The same must, therefore, be taken to be correct for the purposes of adjudication of the instant issue. That being so, in view of the position expressed in the impugned order, namely, that respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh had willingly accepted to surrender, land equal to the land taken from the petitioner Ganda Singh for purposes of providing a passage to him, depicts that the controversy earlier decided by the authorities while adjudicating upon a claim raised by the brother of respondent No,2 Hardial Singh under Section 42 of the 1948 Act, was clearly distinguishable from the present controversy. In view of the above, it is not possible for me to accept the second contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner. 6. The third and last contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that consolidation proceedings were conducted in village Rupowali Chagwanin 1964, whereas, the application under Section 42 of the 1948 Act for providing a passage so as to connect the land of respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh with the metalled road was made in 1982 i.e. after a passage of eighteen years. It is submitted that respondent No. 1 could not have entertained the claim of respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh under Section 42 of the 1948 Act after a passage of eighteen years from the consolidation proceedings. In order to support the aforesaid contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Gram Panchayat Kakran v. Addl. Director of Consolidation and Ors., J.T. 1997(8) S.C. 430=(Civil Appeal No. 7221 of 1997, decided on 3.10.1997) wherein on account of delay in challenge to the consolidation scheme, wherein a claim for repartition was made, it was held that the application made under Section 42 of the 1948 Act, after an unreasonable long time, despite the fact that there was no prescribed period of limitation should not have been entertained. Reliance has also been placed on the decision rendered by this Court in Gram Panchayat of Village Mahadian v. The Additional Director, Consolidation Punjab and Ors., (1999-3)123 P.L.R. 632, wherein this court relying on the decision rendered in Gram Panchayat Kakrans case (supra), in a case pertaining repartition of land, which was entertained by the Additional Director, Consolidation after a long delay of 37 years quashed the same. It is therefore, submitted that the claim raised by respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh after a passage of eighteen years from the consolidation proceedings conducted in Village Rupowali Chagwan, should not have been entertained at all. It is not possible for me to accept the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In both the cases cited on behalf of the petitioner, the controversy related to repartition of land. When the parties accepted the partition in terms of the consolidation proceedings for a number of years, Courts viewed a challenge made after a long delay with disfavour. So far as the present controversy is concerned, it does not claim repartition of the property. The only contention of respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh before the competent authority under Section 42 of the 1948 Act was that there is no existing passage connecting his land with the metalled road. The competent authority while adjudicating upon the controversy arrived at the conclusion that it was mandatory to provide a passage to every piece of land, so as to connect the same with a metalled road. It was also concluded that the action of the authorities in not connecting the respondents land to the metalled road was an act of oversight at the hands of the consolidation authorities. In order to correct the mistake committed by the authorities themselves in not providing a passage to respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh so as to connect his land with the metalled road, the impugned order dated 8.2.1983 was passed. I find no infirmity therein. 7. In fact, the petitioner should not be aggrieved with the impugned order, in view of the fact that an equal area of land taken away from him to carve out a passage to connect the land of respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh with the metalled road, has been provided to him by taking land from respondent No. 2 Hardial Singh. 8. 8. For the reasons recorded above, I find no merit in this petition. The same is accordingly dismissed. No costs.