ORDER Tapen Sen, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. This is an application filed by Mahalaxmi Fibres and Industries Limited [The petitioner of Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 3438 of 1997 (R) for review of the judgment delivered by this Court on 28.04.2003. Accordingly to Mr. K.N. Prasad, learned Senior Advocate, at paragraph-4 infra of the judgment, since it was admitted by both the parties that the respondent No. 2 (meaning thereby the workman) was not connected with reference case No. 16 of 1991 therefore the Award itself was bad because it did not give a finding as to whether that workman was the concerned workman in the pending dispute. 3. Let it be recorded that this case relates to miscellaneous case No. 2 of 1992. It is evident from language of reference case No. 16 of 1991 (Annexure-1 to the counter affidavit herein) that the same was as follows :-- "Whether workman of Mahalaxmi Fibres and Industries Ltd., Ormanjhi, Ranchi are entitled wages for the period of lock-out from 22.12.1989 to 25.1.1990? If not what relief are the workmen entitled?" 4. It is evident also from Annexure-2 which was brought on record in the writ petition itself and which was the application under Section 33(2)(b) filed by the Management that they themselves mentioned in the heading of that petition that the same arose out of reference case No. 16 of 1991 as it was mentioned as "Arising out of reference, case No, 16 of 1991". That apart, the order passed in the aforementioned miscellaneous case No. 2 of 1992 which was the subject matter of challenge in the writ petition, the fact that the workman was an active member and that a number of cases were pending in different Courts was also duly noticed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court in as much as he recorded the submission of the opposite party at paragraph-4 which reads as follows :-- "4. Opposite party appeared and filed show cause stating that applicants petition is not maintainable. The management in fact has victimized the concerned workman by way of the dismissal for the simple reason that he was an active member of the trade union which always oppose the illegal activities of the management. A number of cases are pending in different Courts including one before this Court and the other before the Industrial Tribunal. The management in fact has victimized the concerned workman by way of the dismissal for the simple reason that he was an active member of the trade union which always oppose the illegal activities of the management. A number of cases are pending in different Courts including one before this Court and the other before the Industrial Tribunal. Both the Industrial Disputes are of general nature in which the opposite party is directly connected. Opposite party was always pressurized to influence the union so that the dispute could be decided in favour of the Management without giving any benefit to the workmen. The opposite party refused to oblige the Management. There were other demand also pending before the management which were not settled. On the contrary the management tried to settle the matter illegally and without giving any benefit to the workman with the help of the pocket union. Since the opposite party was the member of the union Mahalakshmi Sharmik Mazdoor Sangh which always opposed the illegal activities and unfair labour practice of the Management therefore the opposite party was victimized by way of dismissal from his service. In course of his service the opposite party rendered onerous and efficient services. There was no reasonable cause for terminating the services of the opposite party. The punishment inflicted upon the opposite party was disproportionate to the alleged charges. The opposite party was charged on flimsy and false ground. In fact he was not guilty of any charges leveled against him." (underlining supplied) 5. In a judgment of the Honble Supreme Court of India in the case of "New India Motors (Private) Ltd. v. K.T. Morris" reported in 1960 (1) LIJ page 551 it has been held that while interpreting the meaning of the word Industrial Dispute, the words "concerned workmen" cannot be limited, only to such of the workmen who are directly concerned with the dispute. Their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court were of the view that these words include all workmen on whose behalf a dispute has been raised as well as those who would be bound by the award which may be made in the said dispute. The relevant portion of the said judgment is quoted here-in-below :-- "in this connection the object of Section 33 must also be borne in mind. The relevant portion of the said judgment is quoted here-in-below :-- "in this connection the object of Section 33 must also be borne in mind. It is plain that by enacting Section 33 the legislature wanted to ensure a fair and satisfactory enquiry of the industrial dispute undisturbed by any action on the part of the employer or the employee which would create fresh cause for disharmony between them. During the pendency of an industrial dispute, status quo should be maintained and no further element of discord should be introduced. That being the object of Section 33, the narrow construction of the material words used in Section 33(1)(a) would tend to defeat the said object. If it is held that the workmen concerned in the dispute are only those who are directly or immediately concerned with the dispute, it would leave liberty to the employer to alter the terms and conditions of the remaining workmen and that would inevitably introduce further complication which it is intended to avoid. Similarly, it would leave liberty to the other employees to raise disputes and that again is not desirable. Thus the main object underlying Section 33 would be inconsistent with such narrow construction. Even as a matter of construction pure and simple there is no justification for assuming that the workmen concerned in such disputes must be workmen directly or immediately concerned in such disputes. There is no justification for adding the further qualification of direct or immediate concern which the narrow construction necessarily assumes. In dealing with the question as to which workmen can be said to be concerned in an industrial dispute we have to bear in mind the essential condition for the raising of an industrial dispute itself, and if an industrial dispute can be raised only by a group of workmen acting on their own or through their union, then it would be difficult to resist the conclusion that all those who sponsored the dispute are concerned in it. Such construction would be harmonious with the definition prescribed by Section 2(s) and with the provisions of Section 18 of the Act. Such construction would be harmonious with the definition prescribed by Section 2(s) and with the provisions of Section 18 of the Act. Hence the expression "workmen concerned in such dispute" could not be limited only to such of the workmen who are directly concerned in the dispute in question but would include all workmen on whose behalf the dispute has been raised as well as those who would be bound by the award which may be made in the said dispute." 6. Obviously therefore, Reference Case No. 16 of 1991 cannot oust the workman herein if an award is passed in that case. Although, Mr. K.N. Prasad has submitted that reference case No. 16 of 1991 has been set aside by this Court, that by itself will not render this judgment inoperative because at the time when the order under Section 33(2)(b) was passed, that reference was in existence. 7. Mr. K.N. Prasad next submits that Annexure-A at this stage cannot be looked into at this stage because the Labour Court did not find as to whether this workman was connected or concerned in that reference case. 8. The aforementioned submission of Mr. K.N. Prasad is fit to be rejected because it has already been noticed that the Labour Court, while passing the order in miscellaneous case No. 2 of 1992 (impugned order in the writ petition) did take into notice the arguments of the workman to the effect that a number of cases were pending in different Courts including the one before that Court and/or before other Industrial Tribunal. In that view of the matter, there is no merit in this application. It is, accordingly dismissed. There shall however be no order as to costs.