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2004 DIGILAW 392 (PNJ)

Punjab State v. Gopi Chand

2004-03-31

JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR

body2004
JUDGMENT J.S. Khehar, J. - The land of the claimant i.e. the respondent herein, was sought to be acquired on the basis of a notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on 19.3.1981. Having taken a final decision to acquire the land, the Land Acquisition Collector by his award dated 25.2.1982 determined the compensation payable to the respondent/claimant as under :- "Class of Land Rates awarded Rs. Cho, Khad, Abadi, School, Adda/Minar 24/- per marla. Barani, Sarak, Rasti & Cho 16/- per marla. Bagh Barani 32/- per marla. Banjar Jadid 12/- per marla. Khad, Pahar, Banjar Qadim and Mandir 8/- per marla." Dissatisfied with the determination of the Land Acquisition Collector, the respondent/claimant moved an application under Section 18 of the Act seeking enhancement of compensation. 2. The Reference Court by its order dated 7.12.1987 ordered enhancement of the compensation payable to the respondent/claimant as under :- "Class of Land Rates awarded Ghair Mumkin, Cho, Abi, Abadi, School, Adda and Minar Rs. 50/- per marla. Barani Rs. 30/- per marla. Banjar Rs. 24/- per marla. Khad and Pahar Rs. 16/- per marla. Bagh Barani Rs. 60/- per marla." It would be pertinent to mention that the determination of the Reference Court was primarily based on its decision rendered in case titled "Jamna Dass v. State of Punjab." Learned counsel for the appellants very fairly invited the attention of this Court to the fact that the decision rendered by the Reference Court in Jamna Dass v. State of Punjab was the subject matter of challenge before this Court in a number of Regular First Appeals including RFA No. 2272 of 1985, titled as State of Punjab v. Barkat Devi. It is further pointed out that the aforesaid RFA No. 2272 of 1985 has since been decided on 23.7.2003, wherein this Court has upheld the determination of compensation by the Reference Court in Jamna Dass v. State of Punjab. In view of the decision rendered by this Court on 23.7.2003 in RFA No. 2272 of 1985, learned counsel for the appellants states that she does not wish to press her claim for modification of the compensation awarded by the Reference Court to the land owners. 3. In view of the above, the compensation determined as payable by fixing the market price of the acquired land, by the Reference Court, is hereby affirmed. 3. In view of the above, the compensation determined as payable by fixing the market price of the acquired land, by the Reference Court, is hereby affirmed. 4. The solitary contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the respondent/claimant is not entitled to the benefit of the amended provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Act. In this behalf, pointed attention of this Court has been invited to the fact that the Land Acquisition Collector determined the compensation payable to the respondent through an award dated 25.2.1982, well before the date of proposed amendment i.e. 30.4.1982. In this behalf reliance has been placed on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala and others, JT 1994(6) SC 182, wherein the Supreme Court observed as under :- "........ We find no merit in this contention. It was open to Parliament to apply the provisions of Section 23(1-A) only to awards whether of the Collector or the Court made after the commencement of the amendment Act. .... Merely because Parliament has decided to give a limited retrospectivity so as to cover awards that were made by the Collector during the period from April 30, 1982, when the original Bill was introduced in Lok Sabha till the date of the commencement of the amending Act would not result in the said provisions being infected with the vice of arbitrariness. The choice of April 30, 1982, the date on which the original Bill was introduced in Parliament, cannot be said to be arbitrary and confining the ambit of retrospectivity so as to exclude awards made by Collector prior to April 30, 1982, would not render the provisions of Section 30(1) of the amending Act unconstitutional. The question of expanding the field of retrospectivity so as to cover all the awards made by the Collector prior to the commencement of the amending Act irrespective of the date when they were made, therefore, does not arise. For the reasons aforementioned it must be concluded that in respect of acquisition proceedings initiated prior to date of commencement of the Amending Act the payment of the additional amount payable under Section 23(1- A) of the Act will be restricted to matters referred to in Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Amending Act. For the reasons aforementioned it must be concluded that in respect of acquisition proceedings initiated prior to date of commencement of the Amending Act the payment of the additional amount payable under Section 23(1- A) of the Act will be restricted to matters referred to in Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Amending Act. Zora Singh (supra) insofar as it holds that the said amount is payable in all cases where the reference was pending before the Reference Court on September 24, 1984, irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector, does not lay down the correct law." Since the Land Acquisition Collectors award dated 25.2.1982 precedes April 30, 1982 i.e. the date when the original bill for amending the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act so as to introduce Section 23(1-A) of the Act was proposed, the respondent/claimant would not be entitled to the benefit conceived of under Section 23(1-A) of the Act. Accordingly, the order passed by the Reference Court allowing the benefit of the amended provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Act to the respondent/claimant, is hereby set aside. 5. In addition, learned counsel for the appellants has also raised a challenge against the award of the benefit of the amended provisions of Section 23(2) of the Act. The pointed contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the benefit of the amended provisions of Section 23(2) of the Act was to be given only to such claims wherein the award of the Collector was rendered between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984. In this behalf, learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on a decision rendered by the Apex Court in Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh, AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1933, wherein the Apex Court recorded that enhanced solatium must be confined to an award of the Collector or of the Court rendered between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984 in respect of the pendency of proceedings by way of reference under Section 18 of the Act. The Court in that context had observed as under : "..... The Court in that context had observed as under : "..... The learned Judges proceeded to apply the principle that and appeal is a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section 18 but, in our opinion, the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself. Learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously relied on the general principle that the appeal is a re-hearing of the original matter, but we are not satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking that principle. Learned counsel for the respondents points out that the word or has been used in Section 30(2) as a disjunctive between the reference to the award made by the Collector or the Court and an order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal and, he says, properly understood it must mean that the period 30 April, 1982 to 24 September, 1984 is as much applicable to the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the award made by the Collector or the Court. We think that what Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of Section 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates. The word or is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under Section 30(2) is sought to be extended. If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates, if the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates, if the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984." The applicability of the amendment to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 relating to the introduction of Section 23(2) again came up for consideration before the Apex Court in K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala and others, AIR 1995 SC 581 (supra), wherein the Supreme Court expressed the legal position as under :- "The conflict of decision as to whether Section 23(2) as amended by Section 15(b) of the Amendment Act through Section 30(2) of the transitory provisions would be applicable to the pending appeals in the High Court and the Supreme Court was resolved in the Raghuvir Singhs case, AIR 1989 SC 1933 by the Constitution Bench holding that the award of the Collector or the Court made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 would alone get attracted to Section 30(2) of the transitory provision. The restricted interpretation would not be understood to mean that Section 23(2) would not apply to the awarded decree of the Civil Court pending at the time when the Act has come into force or thereafter. In this case, admittedly the award of the Civil Court was after the Act has come into force, namely, February 28, 1985. Therefore, if the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation, is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the Court shall direct to pay interest on such excess at the rate of 9% per annum from the date on which the Collector took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into the Court. By operation of the proviso, if such excess or any part thereof is paid into the Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which compensation is taken, interest at the rate of 15% per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into the Court before the date of such expiry. Accordingly, the appellant is entitled to the enhanced interest @ 9% from the date of taking possession, namely, January 15, 1981 and March 11, 1981 respectively for one year @ 9% and thereafter @ 15% till the date of the deposit made by the Collector. Admittedly, the deposit of the enhanced compensation was made on October 20, 1986 and December 3, 1986, therefore, the interest shall be calculated at the enhanced rates for the aforesaid record (period ?)." Since in the present case, the civil Court decided the application moved under Section 18 of the Act on 7.12.1987, it is evident that the respondent/claimant is entitled to the benefit of the amended provision of Section 23(2) of the Act. Accordingly, it is not possible for me to accept the claim if the appellants relating to the grant of solatium in terms of the amended provisions under Section 23(2) of the Act. In view of the above, the compensation determined by the Reference Court is upheld, the determination of the Appellate Court in so far as the grant of benefit of the amended provisions of the Act are also upheld, except to the extent of Section 23(1-A) of the amended provisions of the Act. It is hereby clarified that the respondent/claimant shall not be entitled to the benefit of the amended provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Act. Disposed of in the aforesaid terms. Order accordingly.