A. GOPAL REDDY, J. ( 1 ) ON State government notifying the abandoned area to an extent of Ac. 16-23 cents in Pamapalli (v) District as being available for re-grant on 22-12-1988 under Section 59 of the mineral Concession Rules, 1960, the petitioner in WP No. 14774/1999 (hereinafter referred to as "the petitioner") submitted its application on 23-1-1989 for grant of mining lease for lime stone mineral over an extent of Ac. 14. 93 cents. Respondent No. 5 and two others also made their applications for grant of mining lease on the said date i. e. , 23-1-1989. On evaluation of the applications made by the petitioner, respondent No. 5 and two others, the State government in its Memo No. l41/m. III/91-3 dated 28-9-1991 directed the petitioner to file mining plan duly approved by the Indian bureau of Mines for an extent of Ac. 14. 93 cents in S. Nos. 137/1, 174/1 and 176/1 in parnapalli Village for a period of 20 years within six months from the date of receipt of the communication. The Respondent No. 5 and two others filed revision under Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and development) Act, 1957 and Rule 55 of mineral Concession Rules, 1960 questioning the rejection of their applications by the state Government through their Order no. l41/miii/91-2 dated 11-6-1993 before the first respondent, which was allowed on 14-12-1993 setting aside the order of rejection of the applications made by them with a direction to the second respondent to consider afresh all applications in accordance with law. On allowing the revision petition, third Government after evaluating the claims of all applicants as per Section 11 (3) of the Act recommended the application made by the petitioner for grant of mining lease through his proceedings dated 7-7-1994. The second respondent in its letter dated 19-8-1994 requested the first respondent for its approval as contemplated under Section 5 (1) of the Act. The first respondent sought clarification through its letter dated 19-12-1994, which was duly clarified by the second respondent in its letter dated 20-1-1995, On receipt of approval by the first respondent vide its letter dated 13-6-1995 the second respondent granted mining lease in favour of the petitioner in G. O. Ms. No. 171 Industries and Commerce (M. III) Department, dated 4-11-1995. No. 171 Industries and Commerce (M. III) Department, dated 4-11-1995. Mining lease was executed in favour of the petitioner by the second respondent on 28-11-1995 on deposit of required amount, to which fifth respondent is also a signatory. On complying with all formalities, the second respondent issued proceedings dated 28-11-1995 authorizing the petitioner to commence the mining operations by delivering possession of the site. Since then the petitioner is conducting mining operations. The Respondent No. 5 and two others filed revision petition challenging the granting of mining lease in favour of the petitioner by the State government in G. O. Ms. No. 171 dated 4-11-1995 before the first respondent. The first respondent by its order dated 14-8-1998 set aside the grant of mining lease in favour of the petitioner and remanded the matter back to the State government for providing an opportunity of hearing and take into account the observations made by it in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Final Order No. 165/93 dated 14-12-1993. Questioning the same, the petitioner filed WP No. 26221/98 and obtained interim orders to conduct mining operations in respect of the area which was leased out to it. Aggrieved by the interim orders passed in the said writ petition, the fifth respondent carried the matter in WA no. 495/99, which was disposed of along with WP. No. 26221/98 directing the second respondent to reconsider the matter as directed by the first respondent observing that there was no lease in favour of the petitioner, which was subsequently clarified in Review WPMP No. 31156/99 in WP no. 26221/98 dated 12-2-2001 preferred by the petitioner. In the light of the directions issued by the Division Bench of this Court while disposing of WA No. 495/98 and WP no. 26221/98, State Government through the impugned G. O. Ms. No. 200 Industries and Commerce (M. III) Department dated 21-6-1999 revoked the orders issued earlier granting mining lease in favour of the petitioner through G. O. Ms. No. 171 dated 4-11-1995 observing that it has decided that revision application of the fifth respondent is to be allowed and all other three applications submitted by the petitioner and two others stand for rejection on the basis of relative merits. No. 171 dated 4-11-1995 observing that it has decided that revision application of the fifth respondent is to be allowed and all other three applications submitted by the petitioner and two others stand for rejection on the basis of relative merits. Challenging the same, the present writ petition has been filed contending that lease granted in favour of the petitioner and given effect to cannot be set at naught by revoking G. O. Ms. No. 171 dated 21-6-1999 sanctioning the lease unless the lease is terminated in accordance with law. No reasons were assigned in the impugned GO though it is specifically directed by the central Government in its order dated 14-8-1998 to pass a speaking order in the light of the observations made by it earlier in paras 9 and 10 of Final Order No. 1195/ 93 dated 14-12-1993 and then take a view on all remaining four applications after due consideration strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Mineral concession Rules, 1960. ( 2 ) RESPONDENTS 2 to 4 in their counter-affidavit while admitting the facts leading from issuance of notification till issuance of impugned G. O. stated that petitioner if aggrieved by the impugned G. O. can file revision under Section 30 of the Act and without exhausting the alternative remedy, the present writ petition cannot be maintainable. In the light of the directions issued by the Government of India dated 14-8-1998, State Government after considering the merits of applicants and after giving an opportunity of being heard passed the impugned G. O. revoking the grant of lease in favour of the petitioner through G. O. Ms. No. 171 dated 14-11-1995 and also rejecting the applications of 5th respondent and Smt. B. Anuradha. The state Government evaluated the applications based upon the information furnished in the original applications filed by the applicants keeping in view Section 11 (3) of the Act and found that the fifth respondent emerged as most suitable applicant for grant of mining lease over the other applicants fulfilling all the facts listed out in Section 11 (3) of the Act. Thus, it (State government) decided to grant lease in favour of the fifth respondent. Thus, it (State government) decided to grant lease in favour of the fifth respondent. ( 3 ) THE fifth respondent filed its counter-affidavit stating that the petitioner who is unsuccessful challenged the order of government of India dated 14-8-1998 in wp No. 26221/98, it is not open for the petitioner to challenge the consequential order passed by the State Government after evaluating the relative merits of the applicants seeking grant of lease in the light of remand order. Earlier lease was granted in individual capacity by name CM. Ramanatha Reddy who excavated the limestone and subsequently his application for renewal was rejected and the same was confirmed in revision and writ petition filed by CM. Ramanatha Reddy was dismissed as infructuous. Since the fifth respondent being a registered partnership company it applied for grant of mining lease, and rejection of the application was challenged in revision petition before the first respondent, who allowed the revision petition and set-aside the grant of lease in favour of the petitioner and remanded the matter to the State Government which resulted in passing the impugned order and the same do not suffer from any manifest illegality. Pending writ petition, as the impugned G. O. was suspended, the petitioner was issued Form "b" notice. Aggrieved by the same, the fifth respondent in WP no. 14774/99 filed WP No. 19722/2000. In view of the same, both the writ petitions are heard together and disposed of by this common order. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner sri Y. N. Lohitha submitted that the government of India approved the grant of mining lease in favour of the petitioner under Section 5 (1) of the Act which resulted in issuance of G. O. Ms. No. 171 sanctioning lease for a period of 20 years. Accordingly lease deed was executed in favour of the petitioner and it commenced the mining operations and continues to do the mining operations which is evident from the order passed in Rev. WPMP No. 31156/99 in WP No. 26221/2001. No. 171 sanctioning lease for a period of 20 years. Accordingly lease deed was executed in favour of the petitioner and it commenced the mining operations and continues to do the mining operations which is evident from the order passed in Rev. WPMP No. 31156/99 in WP No. 26221/2001. When the Central government allowed the revision petition filed by the fifth respondent and others by setting aside the grant of mining lease in favour of the petitioner and remanded the matter to the State Government with a specific direction to pass a speaking order, no reasons were assigned by the State government except stating that fifth respondent emerged as most suitable applicant as per Section 11 (3) of the Act for grant of mining lease from among other applicants and ordered for revocation of the lease granted in favour of the petitioner in g. O. Ms. No. 171. The impugned G. O. do not indicate consideration of relative merits of all the four applicants. The petitioner was granted a mining lease and by mere revoking G. O. Ms. No. 171 lease granted cannot be set at naught and the official respondents simply glassed over the facts including that of conveying the approval for grant of mining lease in favour of the petitioner earlier by the Central government and execution of the mining lease. In such cases, alternative remedy available cannot be a bar for invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution. When the revisional authority specifically directed to consider the relative merits of all applicants and directed to give reasons by a speaking order, the State government failed to consider the said directives issued by the Central Government, therefore the petitioner once again need not invoke the revisional jurisdiction but this Court can set aside the order and compel the State Government by issuing a mandamus to pass a speaking order in the light of the remand orders passed by the revisional authority. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on the following judgments:1. Raghunath Reddy v. Government of India, 1982 (2) An. WR 163. 2. Union of India v. Anglo Afghan agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718 . 3. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills company Limited v. State of U. P. , air 1979 SC 621 . 4. Barium Chemicals Limited v. Government of India, AIR 1987 AP 267 . Raghunath Reddy v. Government of India, 1982 (2) An. WR 163. 2. Union of India v. Anglo Afghan agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718 . 3. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills company Limited v. State of U. P. , air 1979 SC 621 . 4. Barium Chemicals Limited v. Government of India, AIR 1987 AP 267 . ( 5 ) PER contra, learned Government pleader for Industries and Commerce contended that the petitioner has got a right of revision under Section 30 of the Act, therefore the present writ petition cannot be entertained. After orders passed by the central Government approving the mining lease G. O. Ms. No. 171 was issued. Once the same is set-aside and directed to reconsider the matter afresh, the State government after taking into consideration the relative merits of the applicants in the light of Section 11 (3) of the Act found that the fifth respondent is more meritorious than other applicants and accordingly it revoked the lease granted in favour of the petitioner, there is no arbitrariness or illegality in issuing the impugned G. O. and placed reliance on judgment of the Apex court in Indian Charge Chrome Limited v. Union of India, 2003 (1) ALD 91 (SC) = 2003 (2) SCC 533. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the fifth respondent contended that on issuance of re-notification, applications will be received within 30 days of the notification and all applications were received were on the same day i. e. , on 23-1-1999 and same have to be evaluated in the light of Section 11 (3) of the Act. Against grant of mining lease in favour of the petitioner, the fourth respondent carried the matter in revision before the central Government, and the Revisional authority disposed of the revision by its order dated 14-8-1998 observing that while granting lease in favour of the petitioner, the State Government has committed error in not taking into consideration the factors listed out in Section 11 (3) and the same cannot be sustainable. Accordingly, set aside the G. O. Ms. No. 171 with a direction to dispose of the applications in the light of the directions issued by it earlier in paragraphs 9 and 10 of Final Order No. 175/93 dated 14-12-1993 in the revision filed by the fifth respondent against rejection of their applications. Accordingly, set aside the G. O. Ms. No. 171 with a direction to dispose of the applications in the light of the directions issued by it earlier in paragraphs 9 and 10 of Final Order No. 175/93 dated 14-12-1993 in the revision filed by the fifth respondent against rejection of their applications. Since the petitioner who was unsuccessful challenged the order passed by the Central Government and the appeal filed by fifth respondent against the interim order granted, in favour of the petitioner was allowed the petitioner will not have any right to continue mining operations in view of the observations made by the Division Bench. Since the petitioner is having an effective alternative remedy of revision against the impugned order, the present writ petition cannot be maintainable and placed reliance on the following judgment: ( 7 ) STATE of Goa v. A. F. Jaffar and sons, AIR 1995 SC 333 , when the order passed by the State Government granting mining lease in favour of the fifth respondent is A well considered order and State government exercised its discretion rightly, the petitioner will not have any vested right to claim any grant of mining lease as held by the Apex Court in Dharambir singh v. Union of India, 1997 (2) ALD (SCSN) 2 = 1997 (5) Supreme 303 = 1996 (6) SCC 702 , which do not warrant interference and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. ( 8 ) IN view of the rival contentions, the issues that fall for consideration are: (1) whether the impugned G. O. Ms. No. 200 dated 21-6-1999 issued by the State government is in accordance with the remand order passed by the Central government dated 14-8-1998; (2) Whether in view of alternative remedy of revision available to the petitioner this Court is precluded to exercise writ jurisdiction. ( 9 ) THE Central Government while allowing the revision petition on 14-12-1993 filed by the fifth respondent and others, whose applications were rejected earlier, directed the State Government to evaluate all the applications in terms of provisions contained in Section 11 (3) of the Act. In view of allowing of the said revision petition, the State Government once again evaluated the applicants under Section 11 (3) of the act and recommended the application of the petitioner for grant of mining lease in its favour under Section 5 (1) of the Act. In view of allowing of the said revision petition, the State Government once again evaluated the applicants under Section 11 (3) of the act and recommended the application of the petitioner for grant of mining lease in its favour under Section 5 (1) of the Act. On government of India receiving certain clarifications from the second respondent approved the proposal for grant of mining lease in favour of the petitioner and on such approval, lease was granted in favour of the petitioner by the second respondent in G. O. Ms. No. 171 and accordingly lease deed was executed in its favour and the petitioner commenced the mining operations. Though the petitioner who filed WP challenging the order of the Central Government dated 14-8-1998 and unsuccessful, the fact remains that he continues to do mining operations which is evident from the orders passed by the Division Bench in Review in Rev. WPMP no. 31156/99 in WP No. 26221/98 dated 12-2-2001. Though Central Government while remanding the matter to the State government directed to give an opportunity of hearing to the revision petitioner by taking into account the observations of the tribunal in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the final Order No. 165/93 dated 14-12-1993 and then take a view of all the four remaining applications and after due consideration strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Mineral Concession Rules and shall pass a speaking order. State government examined the applicants as per section 11 (3) of the Act and observed as per the experience and special knowledge in the field of mining financial resources of the applicant, the nature and quality of the technical staff employed or to be employed as per Section 11 (3) of Mines and Minerals (Randd) Act, 1957 among all the applications, m/s. C. M. Ramanatha Reddy Mining exports (P) Limited emerged most suitable applicant for the grant of mining lease from among the other applicants in every aspect and fulfilled all the factors listed out in Section 11 (3) of the Act, 1957 and Mineral concession Rules, 1960 when compared with the other applicants in experience, financial status and employment of technical staff and allowed the revision application filed by the fifth respondent dated 12-3-1996 which clearly indicates the non-application of its mind to the facts. In fact the revision application dated 12-3-1996 which was filed by the fifth respondent questioning the grant of mining lease in favour of the petitioner in G. O. Ms. No. 171, was allowed by the Central Government. When the central Government remanded the matter to consider all the applications afresh while allowing revision by the fifth respondent in the light of Section 11 (3), no reasons were assigned by the State Government nor order indicates about consideration of relative merits of the applicants who have applied for mining lease including that of lease granted in favour of the petitioner on approval by the Central Government except reiteration of preferential claim possessed as indicated in Section 11 (3 ). The petitioner asserted that the fifth respondent abandoned the mining lease earlier. Whereas the fifth respondent asserts abandonment was in individual capacity but not by the company. Impugned orders do not indicate consideration of the above facts. It is well settled that when a decision affecting a person is based upon enquiry when it implies quasi-judicial function which required to record reasons for its decision except in case where such requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication. If that be the case, the impugned G. O. bereft of reasons cannot be sustainable as the same is not in tune with the remand order passed by the Central Government and is liable to be set-aside. ( 10 ) THE second question that falls for consideration is whether in view of effective alternative remedy, this Court is precluded to exercise the writ jurisdiction. It is well settled that in spite of availability of alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 1998 (8) scc 1 ). (See Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 1998 (8) scc 1 ). ( 11 ) THOUGH there was a faint attempt to canvass the position that in view of the alternative remedy available under section 30 of the Act, this Court cannot maintain the writ petition unless the said remedy is exhausted, it is well settled that existence of alternative remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court and is only a rule of convenience and discretion, self imposed restraint on the Court rather than a rule of law but that would be a good ground for refusing to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Alternate remedy is certainly an elusive factor capable of being judged very differently from different angles, or by, applying varying test, at different time. The High Court can refuse to exercise jurisdiction at the threshold. But the fact remains this Court admitted the writ petition and granted interim orders in favour of the petitioner, and it is pending for adjudication since last five years. Relegating the parties to avail alternative remedy at this distance of time does not appear to be sound exercise of discretion and would be injustice to the parties (See: Shambhu prasad Agarwal and others v. Bhola Ram agarwal, 2000 (9) SCC 714 ; Dr. Bal krishna Agarwal v. State of U. P. , 1995 (1) SCC 614 and Kerala State Electricity board and another v. Kurien El. Kalaihil and others, 2000 (6) SCC 293 ), in the light of the following factors: ( 12 ) AS already observed the jurisdiction exercised by the State Government is quasi-judicial in nature which required to record reasons for its decision in the light of the remand order passed by the Central government. Speaking orders are necessary if the judicial review is to be effective. The party affected must know why and on what grounds an order has been passed against him. This is one of the cardinal principles of natural justice. So it is necessary for the quasi judicial authority to record reasons, as it is the "only visible safeguard against possible injustice and arbitrariness" and affords protection to the person adversely affected. Reasons are the links between the material on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. The reasons should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Reasons are the links between the material on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. The reasons should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. ( 13 ) IF the order passed by the adjudicating authority over rival claims is subject to appeal or revision, the appellate or revisional Court will not be in a position to understand what weighed with the authority and whether the grounds on which the order was passed were relevant, existent and correct, and the exercise of the right of appeal would be futile. The Courts insist upon disclosure of reasons in support of the order on three grounds. (1) The party aggrieved has the opportunity to demonstrate before the appellate or revisional Court/ authority that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case were erroneous; (2) The obligations to record reasons operate as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by executive authority invested with judicial power, and (3) It gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made. ( 14 ) THE Supreme Court in Siemens engineering v. Union of India, 1976 (2) scc 981 , held that the rule requiring reasons to be recorded by quasi judicial authorities in support of order passed by them is a basic principle of Natural Justice. Justice bhagwati speaking for the Court observed:"if Courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and Tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and Tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alterant partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alterant partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. " (Para 6) failure to record reasons will amount to violation of principles of natural justice and the applicant is deprived of right to challenge the said order since no reasons were recorded. The present case attracts the applicability of second contingency as mentioned in the case of Whirlpoorl Corporation, 1998 (8) SCC 1 . In view of the same, the impugned G. O. is set aside and the matter is remitted to the second respondent to dispose of the same by recording reasons in the light of the remand order passed by the Central Government dated 14-8-1998 afresh after due notice to the parties. ( 15 ) THE Writ Petition No. 14774/99 is accordingly allowed. ( 16 ) IN view of the fact that by virtue of Order passed by the Division Bench in rev. WPMP No. 31156/99 in WP No. 26221/ 98 dated 12-2-2001, issuance of "b" form licence in favour of the petitioner cannot be faulted with. ( 17 ) THE WP No. 19722/2000 is accordingly dismissed.