D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THE questions: reference was sought to be made on the following three questions:"1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the tribunal was justified in holding that the business carried out in the Allahabad Unit did not constitute a part and parcel of a single business carried out by the assessee? 2. Whether oh the facts and in the circumstances of the case the tribunal had no material to hold that there was no interconnection, interlacing and interdependence between the various units of the assessee including the Allahabad Unit and accordingly its decision was perverse? 3. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the tribunal was justified in upholding the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax directing the Assessing Officer to disallow the sum of Rs. 18,40,250/-?"respondent's objection: ( 2 ) IN the statement of case the Tribunal had referred only the third question. Relying on this Mr. Shome wanted to contend that the entire argument of Dr. Pal is wholly misplaced. Therefore, the Court should rely upon only to the argument advanced by Dr. Pal in relation to the third question and there is no scope for this Court to intervene with regard to the questions contained in the first and second ones. 2. 1. The learned Tribunal records that the assessee could not produce anything to show that there was interconnection and interlacing between the various units of business of the assessee. According to Mr. Shome, the accounts are kept separately and maintained separately. The Head Office is at Delhi. The registered office is at Calcutta and the units are scattered in different parts of india. Therefore, in the absence of establishment of interconnection and interlacing, the burden of proof whereof lies on the assessee, having not been established, the benefit and deduction cannot be allowed in respect of the closure compensation paid to the employees by the assessee, particularly when the authorities under the Industrial disputes Act denied approval to the closure. Appellant's submission: ( 3 ) DR. Pal, however, disputed the contention on the ground that it is too technical a point. It is pointed out by Dr. Appellant's submission: ( 3 ) DR. Pal, however, disputed the contention on the ground that it is too technical a point. It is pointed out by Dr. Pal from page 34 of the paper Book that the learned Tribunal in its decision after considering the materials placed before it had come to the conclusion that the allahabad unit was under the same control and management as the other units, which continued to do business even after closure of the allahabad unit. After having so held, the final conclusion to the contrary made in paragraph 13 of the said decision cannot but be perverse. 3. 1. According to Dr. Pal the observation made in paragraph 13 is in effect an approach of the learned Tribunal towards its own finding earlier that this Allahabad unit was part of the same business under one control and management and which continued even after the closure. Dr. Pal further submits that this approach or appreciation is contrary to the settled principles of law and is in effect a wrong inference drawn from the earlier finding for the purpose of application of the principle of law in the established facts and circumstances of the case. According to him, once it is established by the assessee that there is a unity of control and management the interconnection and interlacing is established. He relies on the decision in B. R. Ltd. v. V. P. Gupta, Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay, 113 ITR 647; CIT, Madras v. Prithvi Insurance Co. Ltd. , 63 itr 632 and Produce Exchange Corporation Ltd. v. CIT (Central), Calcutta, 77 ITR 739. 3. 2. Therefore, the third question is to be answered on the basis of the finding of the learned Tribunal with regard to the unity and control of management. The scope: ( 4 ) HOWEVER, we do not think that the first point raised by Mr. Shome is too technical. These two questions had not been referred to for our opinion. Therefore, we are not supposed to dilate on that. But we are supposed to deal with the question No. 3. If incidentally while dealing with question No. 3, it seems that the findings of the learned Tribunal with regard to question Nos. Shome is too technical. These two questions had not been referred to for our opinion. Therefore, we are not supposed to dilate on that. But we are supposed to deal with the question No. 3. If incidentally while dealing with question No. 3, it seems that the findings of the learned Tribunal with regard to question Nos. 1 and 2 are to be gone into and dealt with, in that event the Court is not powerless to dilate on those questions as may be found to have been decided by the learned Tribunal as the last court of finding of facts. The third question is dependent on the principle of perversity in relation to the inference drawn from the finding of the learned Tribunal with regard to the first and second questions. 4. 1. The question is not dependent on the denial of the approval to the closure. The third question since referred to is of wide amplitude. The justification of the disallowance is to be answered. In order to find out the answer to the justification the only question we are to look into is as to whether this expenditure was incurred for the purpose of business or not; if it is held to be a business expenditure, in that event the deduction was allowable. 4. 2. According to Mr. Shome, the closure compensation was aimed at payment to the workers after the closure was declared. The intention of the closure is to close down the business. Therefore, it cannot be treated to be an expenditure for carrying on the business but for closing down the business. Therefore, it is not allowable. But, in our view, the question would be different if this business is part of the other business and closure of this business would not amount to closing of the business of the assessee but would be a closure of one of the units of the business carried on by the assessee for the purpose of preventing incurring of loss from this particular unit so that the assessee, in its business expediency might think, can carry on the rest of the business profitably. Then it is surely deductible. Whether the decision of the assessee is correct or incorrect would be immaterial. While deciding such questions the Court cannot put itself into the chair of the assessee and decide what is expedient or not. Then it is surely deductible. Whether the decision of the assessee is correct or incorrect would be immaterial. While deciding such questions the Court cannot put itself into the chair of the assessee and decide what is expedient or not. It is the assessee itself, which can decide in its own wisdom and discretion as to what would be expedient for his own business. The test, that the decision was taken in business expediency, is to find out whether the expenditure was actually incurred bona fide in pursuit and for the purpose of the business. Whether the expenditure was incurred bonafide: ( 5 ) SO far as this expenditure is concerned, this is not in dispute that the payment was made to the workers as closure compensation. Whether it was closure compensation or not is immaterial. But this expenditure was incurred by the assessee for the purpose of getting rid of some of its workers in order to close down one unit. The denial of approval by the authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act has nothing to do with the question to be determined in the process of assessment of Income Tax. Whether the expenditure was incurred legally or not and whether it was necessity or not or whether it was made voluntary or not are not questions, which are to be looked into. What is of prime importance is as to whether it was spent or the expenditure was incurred bona fide for the purpose of the business or not. 5. 1. At the same time, by reason of denial of approval of closure, the unit cannot be closed and shall deem to continue. Therefore, there was no closure of the business. From the materials disclosed that this very unit carried on trading activities even in subsequent years. 5. 2. In this case, as was found by the learned Tribunal, the assessee was carrying on business through 21 units. Such business consisted of different kind of business but all were being assessed at the hands of the assessee as one business or in other words the assessee was being assessed for the income of all the different units together at the hands of the assessee as one assessee though the accounts may be kept separately for each unit. Such business consisted of different kind of business but all were being assessed at the hands of the assessee as one business or in other words the assessee was being assessed for the income of all the different units together at the hands of the assessee as one assessee though the accounts may be kept separately for each unit. Admittedly, in the business expediency accounts are kept for each unit separately so as to enable the assessee to find out or keep track of the fact as to whether the particular unit was running at a loss or profit; and instead of constituting separate business in its wisdom the assessee might carry on all the units as one business. As soon it was found that there was unity of control and management the interconnection and interlacing is to be presumed and would be apparent. The very finding, that even after the closure of the Allahabad Unit the business was carried on by the assessee, was itself a pointer to the oneness of the business. When the unit was under the control of one management, the interconnection, interlacing and interdependence is a fait accompli. In fact, after the above finding the learned Tribunal had approached the question altogether on a misapprehension with regard to its own conception of the principle of law as laid down by various decision. 5. 3. In K. Ravindranathan Nair v. CIT, 247 ITR 178 (SC) the Apex court had occasion to hold that the ten units run by the assessee constituted a single business, that the four units in Kerala did not constitute a separate business and that, therefore, the payment that was made was not on account of closure of business, as such would be allowable under section 37. It had recorded that the Tribunal had found that there was unity of control and management. For the purpose of continuing the business the assessee had to reduce the number of units from ten to six. Any incidental expense in reducing those units was an expenditure incurred in the course of conducting the business bona fide and allowable under section 37. It was further held that the Tribunal is the ultimate fact finding authority and therefore on the basis of the finding the question has to be answered. 5. 4. Any incidental expense in reducing those units was an expenditure incurred in the course of conducting the business bona fide and allowable under section 37. It was further held that the Tribunal is the ultimate fact finding authority and therefore on the basis of the finding the question has to be answered. 5. 4. In the decision in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of income Tax, Madras, 63 ITR 207 (SC), the Apex Court held that if the object was put restrictions upon the right of the company to carry on its business in the manner in which it was accustomed to do and to prevent enforcement of such order in order to enabling the business to be carried on without interference, then the amounts expended by the company in that behalf were expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of its business and were deductible under section 10 (2) (xv) of the 1922 Act. 5. 5. In the case at hand the payment was made for the purpose of closing down the loosing unit so as to run the business profitably bona fide even though ultimately the approval was denied and the assessee could not get the denial reversed in Courts where the assessee took the proceedings. In view of the ratio laid down in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. (supra), such an expenditure could not be denied to be an expenditure made bona fide for the purpose of the business. The learned Tribunal, however, has not returned a finding of lack of bona fide in the expenditure incurred or that the amount was not so expended for the closing of the business. In our view, therefore, the expenditure was bona fide and eligible to be construed to have been made for the purpose of the business. 5. 6. However, now, the question remains that whether an amount paid for closure of a unit can be treated to be an expenditure incurred for the business. Surely, it would not if the business is closed. But if the unit is part of a business and only a unit is closed not the business then it would surely be a business expenditure. In order to establish this, we may now examine whether the Allahabd unit was a part of the one business of the assessee or a separate one. But if the unit is part of a business and only a unit is closed not the business then it would surely be a business expenditure. In order to establish this, we may now examine whether the Allahabd unit was a part of the one business of the assessee or a separate one. Whether the business was one or separate: ( 6 ) MR. Shome had relied on a decision in L. M. Chhabda and Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat, 64 ITR 638 (SC) to contend that if some business is carried on at different places, the same would not constitute a single business. If the assessee carries on several distinct and independent business, and one of such business is closed before the previous year, he cannot claim allowance, under section 10 of the income Tax Act, 1922, of an outgoing attributable to the business which is closed against the income of his other business. If one business carries different business and one business is closed down the expenditure on account of closing down the business would not be eligible for deduction. On facts in the said decision it was found that two business though on the same line and/or same character did not constitute one single business but were two different ventures. Therefore, on facts this decision is distinguishable and does not apply in the present facts and circumstances of this case. 6. 1. Whether two or more lines of business can be regarded as same or different business, does not depend upon the special methods prescribed by the Income Tax Authority for computation of taxable income. It depends upon the nature of the business, the nature of organisation, management, source of capital, fund utilised, method of book keeping and a host of other related circumstances that a business can be carried on after the closure of the other is not the decisive factor. It is dependent on the interconnection, interlacing, interdependence and utility apparent from the existence of common management, common business organisation, common administration, common fund and common place of business {commissioner of Income Tax v. Prithui Insurance co. Ltd. , 63 ITR 632 ). 6. 2. It is not necessary that all these ingredients must be present. One or other of the ingredients may be absent, but it is the totality of the materials, which will determine the factor. Ltd. , 63 ITR 632 ). 6. 2. It is not necessary that all these ingredients must be present. One or other of the ingredients may be absent, but it is the totality of the materials, which will determine the factor. It is the overall approach by the company with regard to the different lines of business that would clinch the issue. But the fact remains that majority of these ingredients must be present in order to arrive at a conclusion of interconnection, interlacing and interdependence. Keeping of separate accounts for each line of business would not be a determining factor. Absence of one or two ingredients would not stand in the way. When there are sufficient materials to show that there is oneness and that the tax is being assessed for the assessee for a considerable period of time as one assessee comprising of several line of businesses, then it would be an overwhelming evidence to hold in favour of the assessee about the oneness of the business. Same view with regard to the unity of management and control was taken by the Supreme Court in B. R. Ltd. v. V. P. Gupta, Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, 113 ITR 647. 6. 3. It is the unity of control and not the nature of the different lines of business, which is the concluding factor [produce Exchange Corporation ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Calcutta, 77 ITR 739]. Admittedly, the finding arrived at by the learned Tribunal is final finding of fact. Normally, the High Court cannot interfere with such finding of the Tribunal which is the last fact finding Court. But there are certain exceptions when finding of facts can be interfered with. Let us now examine the situation where finding of fact can be interfered with in exercise of the power under section 256 by the High Court and whether such circumstances do exist in the present case. Whether the finding of facts arrived at by the learned Tribunal can be interfered with by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under section 256: ( 7 ) THE jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under section 256 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is advisory in nature; the High Court is supposed to give its opinion on the question of law referred to it. It is a settled proposition of law that the Tribunal is the last Court of finding of facts. The High Court is not empowered to interfere with the finding of facts. But it cannot be said that there is an absolute bar on the High court with regard to finding of facts while exercising jurisdiction under section 256 of the Act. There are exceptions to this rule. The exceptions are related to questions involving mixed question of law and facts. On established facts inferences drawn are question of law. the High Court can look into the established fact and examine whether the inference drawn from the established facts conforms to law and the legal principles. If it appears that based on established facts the inference drawn is contrary to the settled principles of law, in such case the High Court can interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal on the established facts. 7. 1. Where the principle of law is not properly appreciated and applied, then a decision can be interfered with. Where the expenditure does not conform to one character even then it might be allowable. (Malabar industrial Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 243 ITR 83 ). 7. 2. Applying the principle in the present case, we may now examine whether the learned Tribunal has come to a correct conclusion; whether the inferences drawn from the facts found conform to the settled principle of law. In order to examine this question, we may refer to the relevant portions of the decision of the learned Tribunal as hereafter. 7. 3. In order to appreciate the question, we may refer to the finding of the learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal had found (P-34 of the pb):"of course, the Allahabad unit closed down during the previous year under consideration belonged to the assessee company just as various other units of business and thus, it can safely be assumed that this unit was under the same control and management as the other units which have continued to do business even after closure of the Allahabad unit with effect from 2nd of November, 1986. "7. 4. However, this finding is preceded by an observation that "thus there was unity of control and according to the learned counsel for the assessee there was also inter-connection and interlacing between these various units of business. "7. 4. However, this finding is preceded by an observation that "thus there was unity of control and according to the learned counsel for the assessee there was also inter-connection and interlacing between these various units of business. But, the learned counsel for the assessee has not brought any material before us to show as to whether and, if so, what inter connection/interlacing existed between Jayshree Tea and rubber Products, Allahabad on the one hand and various other units of the assessee-company. 7. 5. On this observation in paragraph 13 of the decision at page 39 the learned Tribunal had observed the following:"taking into consideration the legal position explained in the judgments as mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, it is clear to us that the rest of unity of control i. e. , common management, common administration, common fund and common Head Office in itself will not signify that various lines of business carried on by an assessee constitute a single indivisible business. There have to be in addition the other tests such as, interconnection, interlacing and interdependence. As already noticed by us, the computation in this case has been made separately in respect of 21 units of the assessee as separate Profit and Loss Accounts were drawn up. It is also seen that these units have been scattered at diverse places throughout the country and dealt in diverse product or lines of business. During the course of hearing before us, the assessee has filed a detailed Paper book which, inter alia, contained the assessee's submissions before the CIT during the course of proceedings under section 263. Though the learned counsel of the assessee argued that there was considerable interconnection amongst various units of the assessee, no material in this behalf has been produced before us. On perusal of the assessee's submission during the course of proceedings under section 263 also we do not find any specific details of any inter-connection, interlacing and interdependence prevailing between the discontinued unit of the assessee, Jayshree Tyre and Rubber Products, Allahabad on the other hand and various units of the assessee-company so as to constitute a single integrated business. We have already mentioned that in the case of H. M. Chhabda and Sons v. CIT 65 ITR 639, the hon'ble Supreme Court have clearly held that it is for the assessee to establish that the different ventures constitute parts of the same business. We have already mentioned that in the case of H. M. Chhabda and Sons v. CIT 65 ITR 639, the hon'ble Supreme Court have clearly held that it is for the assessee to establish that the different ventures constitute parts of the same business. The Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court have reiterated this position in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Mohan Enterprises 208 ITR 146 that the burden is on the assessee to establish the unit v of control and interrelation of the business or the possibility of one after being closed affecting the other business and sufficient evidence is to be produced. "7. 6. Applying the above test in the context of the present case, it appears that the learned Tribunal had found on facts that there was unity of management. After having so found it had purported to hold that interlacing, interconnection and interdependence was not proved. As discussed above, the conclusion is not dependant on this test alone. It is the totality of the facts that will determine the question. Once control and management is found to be same the unity is established and interconnection, interlacing and interdependence is a fait accompli. The conclusion arrived at by the learned Tribunal on the facts established does not seem to conform to the principles of law as discussed above. On the materials disclosed, it is clear that the business was one and the same. Whether payment of closure compensation would be an admissible deduction: ( 8 ) IF after closure, any amount is paid, in that event, such amount is paid for the purpose of closure of the business not for the purpose of running the business. But in case it is found that the business had closed down a particular part of it or an unit and the rest of the part is continuing or the other units are functional and the business is carried on, in that event, if closure compensation is paid to the employees in business expediency, bona fide for the purpose of preventing loss and earning profit, in that event, the same, would be eligible as admissible deduction under section 37. The test is whether the expenditure was incurred for the carrying on of the business. It was so held in commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala v. Gemini Cashew Sales Corporation, (1967)65 ITR 643 cited by Mr. Shome. The test is whether the expenditure was incurred for the carrying on of the business. It was so held in commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala v. Gemini Cashew Sales Corporation, (1967)65 ITR 643 cited by Mr. Shome. In the said case, it was held that the liability to pay retrenchment compensation under section 25ff of the Industrial Disputes Act arose for the first time after the closure of the business; it did not arise so long the business continued. In other words, there cannot be any liability to pay retrenchment compensation if the business continues. But in the case at hand the facts are distinguishable from those involved in Gemini Cashew Sales Corporation (supra ). Inasmuch as here in this case the retrenchment liability was not paid after the closure of the business but before the closure was permitted by the authority. The permission to close down the business was denied by the Appropriate Authority, which was confirmed by the judicial Authority. Therefore, there was no closure of the business but the amount was spent to get rid of the employees in order to ensure prevention of loss and earning profit. By reason of such payment the manufacturing part of the unit ceased to function while the trading part of the unit continued even for the subsequent years. These facts are not in dispute. It is not in dispute that this unit was running at a loss. In order to make the other lines of business or units or the business as a whole viable, the assessee attempted to reduce the working force which the assessee had done by easing out some of its employees through such payment termed as closure compensation. As soon the closure was denied by the Appropriate Authority, the compensation cannot be termed as closure compensation but a payment made to make the business viable. In fact, the expenditure was incurred for the purpose of carrying on the business and this payment was made when the business was being carried on and was ultimately continued. The expenditure was not a contingent one and as such the ratio decided in Gemini Cashew sales Corporation (supra) does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 8. 1. The expenditure was not a contingent one and as such the ratio decided in Gemini Cashew sales Corporation (supra) does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 8. 1. In the said decision we may note that the Supreme Court had held that where a liability to make a payment arises not in the course of the business, not for the purpose of carrying on the business, but springs from the transfer of the business, it is not a properly debitable item in its profit and loss account as a revenue outgoing. But where the liability is, during the whole of the period that the business is carried on, wholly contingent and does not arise from any definite obligation during the time that the business is carried on, it cannot fall within the expression "expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively" for the purpose of the business. Therefore, it lays down the test, which in the present context has to be tested or examined. In any event, where the expenditure incurred was not contingent, that it was not from any obligation but for the purpose of business as the assessee might think in his own experience, then the expenditure is allowable. 8. 2. Mr. Shome had also relied upon a decision in Binani Printers (P)ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, wherein it was held that an amount paid on the closure of the business, such a payment could not be considered to be a payment necessary for carrying on the business, and was not an allowable deduction while dealing with a close down falling under section 25fff of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. We have already found that the denial of approval is wholly immaterial. On facts where the whole business was closed was held inallowable. While dealing with Commissioner of Income Tax v. Gemini Cashew Sales Corporation, 65 ITR 643 the Tribunal had observed that a contingent liability after the closure of the business is not an allowable deduction on the analogy that liability was incurred by the employer for the purpose of closure of the business. While dealing with the case reference was made to a case by Mysore High Court in Mysore Standar Bank Ltd. v. C/t, (1962)46 ITR 278 where payments made for termination of business as compensation, were held to be inallowable. 8. 3. While dealing with the case reference was made to a case by Mysore High Court in Mysore Standar Bank Ltd. v. C/t, (1962)46 ITR 278 where payments made for termination of business as compensation, were held to be inallowable. 8. 3. It is now settled by law that for the purpose of business means for the purpose of enabling the assessee to carry on the business [liquidators of Pursa Ltd. v. CIT, (1954)25 ITR 2651. Retrenchment compensation and pay in lieu of notice were not payments made for the purpose of carrying on the business but for winding up or closing down the business. Therefore, such expenditure cannot be regarded as business expenditure. It must be a pre-existing liability. 8. 4. In Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. (supra) the Apex Court held that the deductibleness of expenditure incurred in prosecuting a civil proceeding depends upon the nature and purpose of the legal proceeding in relation to the assessee's business and cannot be affected by the final outcome of that proceeding. However, wrong-headed, ill-advised, unduly optimistic or over-confident in his conviction the assessee might appear in the light of the ultimate decision, expenditure in starting and prosecuting a civil proceeding cannot be denied as a permissible deduction in computing the taxable income merely because the proceeding had failed, if otherwise the expenditure was laid out for the purpose of the business wholly and exclusively, that is, reasonably and honestly incurred to promote the interest of the business. Persistence of the assessee in launching the proceeding and carrying it from Court to Court and incurring expenditure for that purpose is not a ground for disallowing the claim. In order that an expenditure may be admissible as a deduction under section 10 (2) (xv) (1922 Act), it is not necessary that the primary motive in incurring it must be directly to earn income thereby. 8. 5. In Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal-II v. Health and co. (Calcutta) P. Ltd. , 114 ITR 605, it was held that the decisions of the Courts could not close the controversy where in a particular case the expenditure is allowable or not. The general tests applied in such cases have since been enumerated in various decisions. There is no difficulty in enumerating these tests, but difficulty arises when the courts are called upon to apply these tests. The general tests applied in such cases have since been enumerated in various decisions. There is no difficulty in enumerating these tests, but difficulty arises when the courts are called upon to apply these tests. In a particular case when the expenditure is incurred without contractual or statutory liability, it has to be examined whether the assessee had incurred the expenses for securing the prospects of its future profit. Relying upon J. K. Cotton Manufacturers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1975) 101 ITR 221, where the Supreme Court had reviewed several previous decisions, it was held that an expenditure though not out of necessity but incurred voluntarily and for indirectly facilitating the carrying on or the trading of business would definitely be allowable expenditure. This finding was sought to be supported by the observation of Viscount Cave in Atherton DM. Inspector of Taxes v. British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd. , (1925) 10 TC 155 (HL ). Relying on the said decision, it was pointed out that payment made to remove the possibility of recurring disadvantage cannot be considered as a payment made to acquire an enduring advantage so as to be considered as a capital expenditure. Reliance was also placed on the observation of Mr. Justice Rowlat in B. W. Noble Ltd. v. Mitchell, (1927)11 TC 372 (CA) in that case. 8. 6. In Heath and Co. (Calcutta) P. Ltd. (supra), it was held further that the assessee had a disadvantageous arrangement with Lyons (India)pvt. Ltd. The assessee was incurring losses. The assessee wanted to get rid of the arrangement and thereby get rid of the recurring disadvantage and as a result whereof to earn profits. The amount in question was paid to the employees, who had worked in part for the assessee. If they were the employees of the assessee then in case of termination or retrenchment, the assessee would have been liable to pay them retrenchment compensation and such payment would have been indisputably allowable as deduction. Therefore, in the perspective of a prudent businessman for facilitating carrying on of its business and for having a smooth running of the work and maintaining the goodwill for the business, if the assessee as a trader thought it fit to incur this expenditure by sharing retrenchment compensation paid by Lyons (India) pvt. Ltd. , such payment could not be disallowed. 8. 7. Ltd. , such payment could not be disallowed. 8. 7. Applying the tests as laid down in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. (supra), Heath and Co. (Calcutta) P. Ltd. (supra), J. K. Cotton Manufacturers ltd. (supra) and British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd. (supra), in the present case, we find that the assessee in its business wisdom attempted to avoid incurring loss by reducing the workforce of one of the units running at loss for earning profit from the other units, which the assessee deemed fit for the purpose of carrying on the business. Therefore, the said payment was allowable deduction. Conclusion: ( 9 ) IN view of the above discussion, we find that the Tribunal did not err in holding that there was a unity of control and management. But while appreciating the same it had detracted itself from the said finding and endeavoured to find out whether despite being one single business with unity of control and management, whether the interlacing, interconnection and interdependence was established. This approach seems to be erroneous having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Once it is held that one single business this interlacing, interdependence and interconnection which are factors to decide whether the business is a single business or not, are a fait accompli If it is held that the business is a single one, the factors cannot be gone into. Therefore, the approach of the learned Tribunal in paragraph 13 of the decision (page 39 of the Paper Book) seems to be misplaced and misapprehended. Therefore, on the basis of the finding arrived at by the learned Tribunal itself at page 34 about the unity of control and management, the Tribunal could not have denied deductibility of the amount even though it might have been made voluntarily or exgratia when made for easing out some of the work-force to get rid of the incurring of loss and for earning profit, and for which under the law retrenchment compensation was payable, and were so paid as a prudent businessman. Order: ( 10 ) IN the result, the reference succeeds. We answer the third question in favour of the assessee and against the department. This reference is, thus, allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Xerox certified copy of the Judgment be made available to the parties, if applied for. Reference allowed