Judgment : (Per B. Sudershan Reddy, J) The common question of law that arises for consideration in these matters is: 'Whether the claimants are entitled to payment of compensation under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') when the assigned lands are resumed by the Government for a public purpose?' A Full Bench of this Court in State of A.P. v. P. Peda Chunnayya 1997 (1) ALT 498 (F.B.) held: 'Where the Government resorts to the provisions of the Act for acquisition of the patta lands without resorting to the terms of the grant for resumption, it is liable to pay compensation under the Act, but such compensation will be only the market value of the interest of the owner or the assignee of the land, subject to the clog. In such cases of acquisition, the claimant would also be entitled to consequential reliefs, such as those of solatium and interest etc., under the Act. In a case where the patta lands are resumed by the Government, the assignees cannot claim compensation under the Act, but can claim compensation equal to the market value of their interest in the land, subject to the clog. In such cases, no solatium may be payable but interest may be claimed on the amount of compensation from the date of dispossession and till the date of payment of compensation. In a case where the assignees are dispossessed from their patta lands without resuming the lands in terms of the grant and/or initiation of proceedings under the Act, the Government may be directed to initiate proceedings under the Act and to pay compensation under the Act as indicated.' The same issue once again came up for consideration before another Full Bench of this Court on a reference made by a Division Bench and the Full Bench in its turn considered it appropriate to refer the matter to a Larger Bench by order dated 20-9-2001, the relevant portion of which reads thus: 'Furthermore, we are prima facie of the opinion that part of the law laid down by the judgment of the Full Bench that the plaintiffs would be entitled to the market value together with interest may not be correct, particularly, in view of that fact that the right of assignees of the Government land is subordinate to the State. The lands assigned under such patta are resumable. The lands assigned under such patta are resumable. In that view of the matter, they may not be treated to be owners of the lands so as to claim entire compensation calculated at the market value for acquisition thereof under the Land Acquisition Act.' That is how the matter once again came up for consideration before a Larger Bench in State of A.P. v. Bondapalli Sanyasi 2002 (1) ALT 543 (L.B.), wherein it is held: '. The Full Bench committed error insofar as it held that where patta lands are resumed by the Government, the assignee would be entitled to compensation which would be equal to the market value of their interest in the land subject to the clog. Quantum of damages has to be ascertained having regard to the fact situation of each case. The right of the State to resume land is conditional only to the extent referred to in D-Form patta. Once such conditions are fulfilled, which have been done in the instant case, no grant of compensation would be payable towards resumption of land. Compensation may, however, be payable if lands have not been resumed by following due process of law. The act of the State in such cases would be tortuous in nature. The views of the Larger Bench are summarized in the following manner: 'Where the assigned land is taken possession of by the State in accordance with the terms of the grant or patta the right of the assignee to any compensation will have to be determined in accordance with the conditions in patta itself and where the State does not resort to the covenant of the grant and resorts to the Land Acquisition Act the assignee shall be entitled to compensation in terms of the Land Acquisition Act not as an owner but as an interested person for the interest he held in the property.' Dr. Motilal B. Naik, J., sitting with G. Rohini, J., while dealing with W.A.No.170 of 2002, in which more or less similar issue had arisen for consideration, opined thus: 'Though the assignees are entitled to get benefits on the basis of the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the decision cited (2) supra ( 1997 (1) ALT 498 (FB), in view of the later decision of the Larger Bench of this Court cited (1) supra (2002 (1) ALT 543 (LB), such benefit is denied to them in spite of the fact that the larger bench in the decision (1) supra has not examined the correctness of the view of the Full Bench decision cited (2) supra in correct perspective having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case and in the light of the implications arising out of various G.Os. issued by the Government from time to time on the question of payment of compensation to the assignees on resumption of lands by the Government. It is in this background, we are of the considered view, the decision of the larger bench in the decision cited (1) supra, requires reconsideration in the light of the State's obligation arising out of Chapter-IV of the Constitution of India and in the light of the G.Os. issued by the Government from time to time meeting the contingency of payment of compensation in case of resumption of assigned lands. We, therefore, direct the Registry to place the matter before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for referring this issue relating to payment of compensation to the assignees of Government lands in the light of the larger Bench decision and full bench decision cited (1) ands (2) respectively to a larger bench for its decision, at an early date so that the controversy in this regard could be put to rest.' The matter was accordingly placed before a Larger Bench consisting of five Judges after obtaining the orders from the Honourable the Chief Justice. When the matter was taken up for hearing by the Larger Bench, objections were raised by the learned Government Pleader inter alia contending that the Division Bench is bound by the Larger Bench judgment in Bondapalli Sanyasi (2 supra) and, therefore, it was not correct to make a reference to a Bench of five Judges. When the matter was taken up for hearing by the Larger Bench, objections were raised by the learned Government Pleader inter alia contending that the Division Bench is bound by the Larger Bench judgment in Bondapalli Sanyasi (2 supra) and, therefore, it was not correct to make a reference to a Bench of five Judges. The Larger Bench of five Judges having regard to the fact that the subject matter that arises for consideration is of a very great public importance required the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice to constitute a Larger Bench of seven Judge to resolve the issue in public interest. That is how the matter is placed before this Larger Bench. Before we proceed further to consider the question that had fallen for consideration, we are required to make it clear that the learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State did not raise any objection whatsoever about the reference made at the instance of the Division Bench, which doubted the correctness of the judgment of the Larger Bench of five Judges. The learned Advocate General submitted that the Honourable the Chief Justice has prerogative to constitute a Larger Bench and, therefore, it would be unnecessary to go into that question. The learned Advocate General submitted that the issue relating to payment of compensation to the assignees of government lands is required to be considered in proper perspective by duly taking into consideration that alienation of government lands even in favour of weaker sections of the society is not in derogation of ownership of the government in the land. The acquisition of land by the State is invariably for a public purpose. Where the State possesses interest in the land acquired, a notification takes effect in regard to the remainder of the interest held by private parties. The compensation will be payable for the interest held by the private parties ignoring the interest held by the Government, which is already vested in the Government. The acquisition relates to the quantum of interest of the D-Form pattedar. In such cases, quantum of interest is required to be determined with reference to the conditions of the grant itself. The compensation will be payable for the interest held by the private parties ignoring the interest held by the Government, which is already vested in the Government. The acquisition relates to the quantum of interest of the D-Form pattedar. In such cases, quantum of interest is required to be determined with reference to the conditions of the grant itself. In cases of enforcement of terms of the grant and if the grant itself is cancelled for violation of the terms of the grant no compensation is payable to the grantee irrespective of the length of the period during which the assignee remained in possession of the land. Where no action has been taken to cancel the grant prior to acquisition and taking possession of the land, the grantee's right will have to be computed taking into account the vulnerability of the grant to cancellation if there be any violation of the terms of the grant. Where compensation is required to be determined under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 logically all the reliefs available under the said Act would be available, though such reliefs may have to be computed with reference to the limited interest of the grantee. The sum and substance of the submission of the learned Advocate General was that the assignee who is deprived of his property should only be compensated to the extent of the value of his right and interest in such property. The fact that the assignee's right in the land is limited cannot be ignored and compensation in excess of his rights cannot be granted. The learned Advocate General further submitted that in case of resumption of the land by the Government for a public purpose under the terms of the grant, no compensation is liable to be paid except in accordance with the terms of the grant itself. A writ of Mandamus does not lie compelling the State to acquire its own land and pay compensation to the assignee. Sri Challa Sitaramaiah, learned amicus curiae submitted that the entire issue relating to assignment of the land by the Government to the landless poor farmers and weaker sections of the society is required to be considered in a broader perspective. The assignment is not a gratis but is a constitutional obligation imposed upon the State. It is in the nature of public assistance. The assignees are constitutional claimants. The assignment is not a gratis but is a constitutional obligation imposed upon the State. It is in the nature of public assistance. The assignees are constitutional claimants. While interpreting the provisions relating to grant of assignment of land by the Government to the vulnerable sections of the society, this Court has to bear in mind the constitutional commands enshrined in Part-IV of this Constitution of India. It was urged that the restraint imposed on alienation of the assigned land is not in derogation of ownership and title, but the same is as a protective measure. That whenever the State acquires such land, the condition of non-transferability pales into insignificance and disappears and such condition cannot be considered as a clog. Whenever such land is either resumed or acquired by the State even for a public purpose, the assignees are entitled to payment of compensation equivalent to the market value of the land. 'No compensation clause' incorporated, as one of the conditions of grant of patta/assignment, is unconstitutional. The recipient of a welfare measure and public assistance cannot be deprived of his livelihood. The provisions including the Government Grants Act, 1895 must be read subject to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Sarvasri P. Sri Raghu Ram and M. Laxman, adopted the submissions made by the learned amicus curiae. Legal environment relating to assignment of government land to the landless poor persons: The State Government in discharge of its constitutional obligations launched special programs from time to time for assignment of government wastelands to landless poor persons and weaker sections of the society. The policy for assignment of governments, wastelands is evident from various Board Standing Orders and the rules framed under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli so far as the Telangana area is concerned. The rules regarding assignment of lands and the conditions incorporated in D-Form pattas as well as other forms of pattas not only prohibit alienation of such lands but also provide for its resumption as well as re-grant to eligible persons. The Board Standing Orders as well as the rules provide for assignment of lands to landless poor and weaker sections of the society both for the purpose of providing house sites and agricultural lands. A landless poor person is one who owns not more than one acre of wet or five acres of dry land and is also poor. The Board Standing Orders as well as the rules provide for assignment of lands to landless poor and weaker sections of the society both for the purpose of providing house sites and agricultural lands. A landless poor person is one who owns not more than one acre of wet or five acres of dry land and is also poor. The lands at the disposal of the Government shall be assigned only to landless poor persons who the Government shall be assigned only to landless poor persons who directly engage themselves in cultivation. The maximum extent of land which may be assigned to a single individual shall be limited to one acre wet or five acres dry, subject to the proviso that in computing the area lands owned by the assignee shall be taken into account, so that the lands assigned to him together with what is already owned by him does not exceed the total extent of one acre of wet or five acres of dry land. (i) The assignment of lands shall be free of market value; (ii) lands assigned shall be heritable but not alienable; (iii) lands assigned shall be brought under cultivation within three years; (iv) no land tax shall be collected for the first three years except for the extent if any, which has already been brought under cultivation. Water rate shall, however, be charged if the lands are irrigated with Government water; and (v) cultivation should be by the assignee or the members of his family or with hired labour under the supervision of himself or a member of his family. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, which provides for the imposition of a ceiling on agricultural holdings and taking over of the surplus land, further provides that the surplus lands taken over are to be allotted for use as house-sites for agricultural labourers and village artisans or transferred to the weaker sections of the people dependent on agriculture, one-half of the lands being set apart as far as practicable for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. In respect of the surrendered land in the occupation of a protected tenant in the Telangana area, the right of purchase of such protected tenant is saved subject to certain conditions. In respect of the surrendered land in the occupation of a protected tenant in the Telangana area, the right of purchase of such protected tenant is saved subject to certain conditions. Section 14 of the said Act mandates that the lands vested in the Government under this Act shall be allotted for use as house-sites for agricultural labourers, village artisans or other poor persons owning no houses or house sites, or transferred to the weaker-sections of the people dependent on agriculture for agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, in such manner as may be prescribed. Any transfer of the land shall be subject to: (i) the condition that the land shall not be alienated by the transferee by way of sale, gift, mortgage, lease or in any manner whatsoever otherwise than by way of mortgage in favour of the Government, a bank or a Cooperative society, including a land mortgage back; and (ii) such other conditions as may be prescribed. Any alienation effected or other act done in respect of any land in violation of the conditions specified shall be null and void and the Revenue Divisional Officer shall resume the land after giving an opportunity to the persons effected of making a representation in that behalf. The Act itself has been brought into existence for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Article 39 of the Constitution of India. The Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 is another piece of legislation, which is protective in its nature, with a view to prevent transfers and alienations of assigned lands. The Act further provides for restoration of such lands to the assignees. Section 3 of the Act declares that notwithstanding to the contrary in any other law for the time being in force no land assigned to a landless poor person for the purpose of cultivation or as a house site shall be transferred and shall be deemed never to have been transferred; and accordingly no right or title in such assigned land shall vest in any person acquiring the land by such transfer, however, such transfer of assigned land, if any, in favour of another landless poor person in good faith for a valuable consideration is saved. The competent authority is assigned with the duty to take possession of the assigned land after evicting the purchaser in possession and restore the assigned land to the original assignee or his legal heir, or where it is not reasonably practicable to do so to resume the same to government for assignment to landless poor persons in accordance with the rules. The orders of granting house sites in villages under Board Standing Order 21 inter alia contain the following condition: 'If without the previous approval of the Revenue Divisional Officer, in writing the land is alienated by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease of any kind within a period of ten years from the date of the grant, or ceases to be owned by the original grantee or his legal heirs owing to sale by process of law or otherwise for a like period, the grant will be resumed by the Government, who will be entitled to re-enter and take possession of the site without compensation either for any improvements made to it or for any buildings constructed on it. This prohibition does not, however, apply to the hypothecation of the site together with any buildings erected on it to Government under the Land Improvements and Agricultural Loans Act or to a Co-operative Society. The power or resuming the grant and ordering the re-entry referred to above will vest in the Revenue Divisional Officer.' The patta certificate issued under the Louni Rules contained in G.O.Ms.No.1406, dated 26-7-1958 inter alia contains the following conditions of assignment: 1. The lands shall be heritable but not assignable. 2. The lands shall be brought under direct cultivation within three years from the date of the order. 3-11 ……. 12. In the event of the land being required for any other public purpose, the land will be resumed and no compensation shall be paid to the assignee (The decision of the Government or the other authority empowered by them in this behalf shall be final on the question, whether the purpose for which the land is to be resumed is a public purpose or not). 13. In the event of resumption of the land assigned market value of the purchase money or such share of it as is proportionate to the area resumed will be repaid. 14. 13. In the event of resumption of the land assigned market value of the purchase money or such share of it as is proportionate to the area resumed will be repaid. 14. The Government will not however, be liable to pay compensation for any improvement, which may have been effected on the land before such resumption. 15-19 ….. The Government having examined the question relating to payment of compensation in respect of the government lands assigned on D-form pattas may come under submergence of any projects i.e., major, medium and minor irrigation and Power Projects, issued instructions from time to time. The sum and substance of the instructions issued is that the assignees are entitled to be paid only the market value of the land, as the resumption of assigned lands for public purpose is not in the nature of compulsory acquisition. It is further clarified that the assignees are entitled only to compensation of the variable improvements made on the assigned lands. They are not entitled to market value as fixed by Courts in respect of similar patta lands and the amount payable thereof is to be treated as ex-gratia. It is in the light of t he conditions of patta and the instructions issued by the Government from time to time and various provisions in law putting restriction on right to alienate the assigned land, the learned Advocate General contended that the acquisition only relates to the quantum of interest of the D-Form pattedar and the quantum of interest is to be determined with reference to the conditions of the grant. Even where the compensation is determinable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the same will be computed with reference to the limited interest of the grantee. The condition of non-transferability is relevant for the purpose of estimating the quantum of right of the grantee, which he is being deprived of by the procedure of the land acquisition. Directive Principles of State Policy and concept of Distributive Justice: Whether recipients are constitutional claimants? In order to consider these submissions, it becomes just and necessary to address ourselves to the main question, what is the purpose and object of the assignment of land by the Government to the weaker sections of the society? Directive Principles of State Policy and concept of Distributive Justice: Whether recipients are constitutional claimants? In order to consider these submissions, it becomes just and necessary to address ourselves to the main question, what is the purpose and object of the assignment of land by the Government to the weaker sections of the society? We have noticed the relevant provisions of the Board Standing Orders and the Rules framed under Section 172 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli called 'Land Assignment/Revised Assignment Policy'; the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 and the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 while dealing with the nature and scope of the Government's power to grant assignment and conditions thereof imposing restriction on alienation of assigned lands and the State converting the patta into ryotwari tenure (land for cultivation). The land reforms legislations have been enacted by the State in discharge of its obligation under Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India, which inter alia commands the State that it shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to sub serve the common good; and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production of the common detriment. Likewise, Article 41 of the Constitution of India commands the State that it shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of underserved want. The assignment policy itself is the result of unending struggle over allocation of collective resources. It was the egalitarian promise of a welfare State sought to do away with the vestiges of feudalism and unequal social order. Allocation of collective resources to the weaker sections of the society is an aspect of distributive justice. Social Justice is the signature tune of the Indian constitution. The struggle for freedom has been not only political but also economic and social. Allocation of collective resources to the weaker sections of the society is an aspect of distributive justice. Social Justice is the signature tune of the Indian constitution. The struggle for freedom has been not only political but also economic and social. Chandrachud, C.J., in Minerva Mills Ltd., v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625 highlighted the significance of the perception that Part III and IV together constitute the core commitment to social revolution and they, together, are the conscience of the Constitution. 'Granville Austin's observation brings out the true position that Parts III and IV are like two wheels of a chariot, one no less important than the other. You snap one and the other will lose its efficacy. They are like a twin formula for achieving the social revolution, which is the ideal, which the visionary founders of the Constitution set before themselves. In other words, the Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between Parts III and IV. … This harmony and balance between fundamental rights and directive principles is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. … It is in this sense that Parts III and IV together constitute the core of our Constitution and combine to form its conscience. Anything that destroys the balance between the two parts will ipso facto destroy an essential element of the basic structure of our Constitution. … It is not possible to fit fundamental rights and directive principles in two distinct and strictly defined categories, but it may be stated broadly that fundamental rights represent civil and political rights while directive principles embody social and economic rights. Both are clearly part of the broad spectrum of human rights. … The only distinguishing feature, to my mind, between fundamental rights and directive principles is that whereas the former are enforceable in a court of law, the latter, are not. And the reason for this is obvious.' The learned Chief Justice approvingly referred to the view expressed by the Planning Commission that merely because the directive principles are non-justiciable, it does not follow that they are in any way subservient or inferior to the fundamental rights. And the reason for this is obvious.' The learned Chief Justice approvingly referred to the view expressed by the Planning Commission that merely because the directive principles are non-justiciable, it does not follow that they are in any way subservient or inferior to the fundamental rights. It is further observed, 'the directive principles therefore, impose an obligation on the State to take positive action for creating socio-economic conditions in which there will be an egalitarian social order with social and economic justice to all, so that individual liberty will become a cherished value and the dignity of the individual a living reality, not only for a few privileged persons but for the entire people of the country.' It is further observed, 'the directive principles are not excluded from the cognizance of the Court, as under the Irish Constitution; they are merely made non-enforceable by a court of law….' In State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy (1977) 4 SCC 471 , Krishna Iyer, J., observed that each word used in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India has a strategic role and the whole article a social mission. It is further observed: 'A directive to the State with a deliberate design to dismantle feudal and capitalist citadels of property must be interpreted in that spirit and hostility to such a purpose…. Two conclusions strike us as quintessential. Part IV, especially Article 39 (b) and (c), is a futuristic mandate to the State with a message of transformation of the economic and social order. Firstly, such change calls for collaborative effort from all the legal institutions of the system: the legislature, the judiciary and the administrative machinery. Secondly and consequentially, loyalty to the high purpose of the Constitution, viz., social and economic justice in the context of material want and utter inequalities on a massive scale, compels the Court to ascribe expansive meaning to the pregnant words used with hopeful foresight, not to circumscribe their connotation into contradiction of the objectives inspiring the provision. Secondly and consequentially, loyalty to the high purpose of the Constitution, viz., social and economic justice in the context of material want and utter inequalities on a massive scale, compels the Court to ascribe expansive meaning to the pregnant words used with hopeful foresight, not to circumscribe their connotation into contradiction of the objectives inspiring the provision. To be Pharisaic towards the Constitution through ritualistic construction is to weaken the social-spiritual thrust of the founding fathers' dynamic faith.' In Pathumma v. State of Kerala (1978) 2 SCC 1 the Supreme Court observed: 'Article 39 (b) contains a direction to secure that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to sub serve the common good. Indisputably, the object of the Act is to eradicate rural indebtedness and thereby to secure the common good of people living in abject poverty.' John Rawls in his 'A Theory of Justice' says: '. The aim of the branches of government is to establish a democratic regime in which land and capital are widely though not presumably equally held. Society is not so divided that one fairly small sector controls the preponderance of productive resources. When this is achieved and distributive shares satisfy the principles of justice…' In Goldberg v. Kelly 25 L Ed (2) 287 an interesting question had fallen for consideration in the Supreme Court of the United States. Residents of New York City who were receiving financial aid under state or federally assisted welfare programs instituted actions in the District Court alleging that state and city welfare officials had terminated, or were about to terminate, such aid without prior notice and hearing in violation of due process. After the commencement of such actions, the welfare authorities adopted procedures whereby the recipient, after informal discussion, was given at least 7 days' notice of proposed termination of payments, of his right to have the proposed termination reviewed by a higher official, and of his right to submit a written statement for purpose of such review, and whereby the recipient, after an adverse decision by the reviewing official and termination of payments, could obtain a post termination hearing before an independent hearing officer, at which hearing one could appear personally, offer oral evidence etc. The constitutional adequacy of such procedure was put in issue. The constitutional adequacy of such procedure was put in issue. The District Court held that only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing would satisfy due process. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. In an opinion by Brennan, J., while considering the nature of the right to receive public assistance, observed: 'From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty. This perception, against the background of our traditions has significantly influenced the development of the contemporary public assistance system. Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community. At the same time, welfare guards against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to 'promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.' (Emphasis is of ours). While adverting to the contention that pre-termination evidentiary hearing are out weighted by countervailing governmental interests in conserving fiscal and administrative resources, the Court observed, 'these governmental interests are not overriding in the welfare context.;' The task of distribution branch is to preserve an approximate justice in distributive shares by means of taxation and the necessary adjustments in the rights of property. It impose and sets restrictions on the property rights with a view to gradually and continually to correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity. It is an economic arrangement based on social choice devised with a view to advance the good of the body politic as a whole by invoking some discernable criterion for the just division of social advantages. The policy of the State government as is evident from the provisions of the statutes referred to hereinabove and various Governmental Orders issued from time to time relating to the assignment of government lands in favour of weaker and vulnerable sections of the society is obviously to empower them and to secure the larger interest of the community. The policy of the State government as is evident from the provisions of the statutes referred to hereinabove and various Governmental Orders issued from time to time relating to the assignment of government lands in favour of weaker and vulnerable sections of the society is obviously to empower them and to secure the larger interest of the community. They are designed to bring about the social and economic revolution that remained to be fulfilled. The policy to assign the government land is to prevent perpetuation of injustice and feudal order and to prevent concentration of material resources of the government land to the weaker sections of the society is in furtherance of the constitutional obligation imposed upon the State of secure the citizens an adequate means of livelihood. More than 50 per cent of the population in India lives in village and below poverty line. The average agricultural holding of a farmer is hardly enough to sustain himself and his large family. The landless labourers who constitute the bulk of village population are deeply mired in poverty. The State in discharge of its obligation to take positive action for creating socio-economic conditions in which there will be an egalitarian social order with social and economic justice to all, tailored its policies and accordingly provided public assistance to the weaker and vulnerable sections of the society by assigning the lands for cultivation purpose as well as for house sites to have a roof over the head. It is not a charity, but means to provide general welfare to secure the Blessings of Liberty to one and all. The cornerstone of the land reforms policy is the acceptance of the principle that land must belong to the tiller and exploitation of all sorts must be eliminated. The assignment of lands in favour of vulnerable sections of the society was made for the purpose of securing to such sections of the society a life of basic human dignity and in compliance with the directive principles of the State policy. It must follow as a necessary corollary that the assignees acquire the status of constitutional claimants. About the ownership of the assigned land: What is ownership? The next question that may fall for consideration is whether the ownership rests in the assignee? This question is inevitably linked and intertwined with the restriction on the right to alienate the assigned land by the assignee. About the ownership of the assigned land: What is ownership? The next question that may fall for consideration is whether the ownership rests in the assignee? This question is inevitably linked and intertwined with the restriction on the right to alienate the assigned land by the assignee. The essence of the ownership of a thing is that aid which organized society will, through the courts as its agents, give one individual, to the exclusion of all others, to take or keep possession of it … but ownership is not a privilege conferred by government but a right which the government is organized to protect. Blackstone defines 'title to land' as the means whereby the owner of lands has the just possession of his property, and further states that there are several stages or degrees requisite to form a complete title to land, which are actual possession, right of possession, and right of property. (See: Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume LXXIII) Salmond says ownership 'denotes the relation between a person and any right that is vested in him.' A definition of ownership in law will not be easy. In an interesting article 'Some Reflections on Ownership in English Law', by J.W. Cecil Turner, published in the Canadian Bar Review it is observed that the words 'owner', 'ownership', are not strictly terms of art: they are merely descriptive words. Ownership, as stated, is a relation between persons; it is a social institution. As the history of law shows it is a convention of society at any given moment that the privileges termed ownership shall be granted to certain persons and that they shall be protected by law in their enjoyment of them. This convention will not necessarily be the same in all countries at the same time, because their social systems may be different; therefore the relations between its members in respect of property, which each society enforces, will vary accordingly. In Jodha Mal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1972) 1 SCR 639 the Supreme Court while considering the question as to who is the owner referred to in Section 9 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 observed that Section 9 brings to tax the income from property and not the interest of a person in the property. In Jodha Mal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1972) 1 SCR 639 the Supreme Court while considering the question as to who is the owner referred to in Section 9 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 observed that Section 9 brings to tax the income from property and not the interest of a person in the property. 'A property cannot be owned by two persons, each one having independent and exclusive right over it… the word 'owner' has different meanings in different contexts. Under certain circumstances a lessee may be considered as the owner of the property leased to him… The meaning that we give to the word 'owner' in Section 9 must not be such as to make that provision capable of being made an instrument of oppression.' In Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax 1986 (Supp.) SCC 700, the Supreme Court referred to Salmond's definition of 'ownership': (a) the owner will have a right to possess the thing which he owns; (b) the owner normally has the right to use and enjoy the thing owned: the right to manage it, i.e., the right to decide how it shall be used; and the right to the income from it; (c) the owner has the right to consume, destroy or alienate the thing; (d) ownership has the characteristic of being indeterminate in duration; and (e) ownership has a residuary character. Legal ownership is that which has its origin in the rules of the common law, while equitable ownership is that which proceeds from rules of equity different from the common law. The courts of common law in England refused to recognize equitable ownership and denied the equitable owner as an owner at all. The question that may inevitably arise is whether the restrictions on the right to alienate the assigned land in any manner operates as a clog and makes the assignee less than a full owner? We have already noticed that the rights in land granted under patta are heritable. That assignee is entitled to be in perpetual possession and enjoyment of the assigned land and such rights devolve upon the legal descendants of the assignee. The possession of the land forever continues to be with the assignee and after his death with his legal heirs. We have already noticed that the rights in land granted under patta are heritable. That assignee is entitled to be in perpetual possession and enjoyment of the assigned land and such rights devolve upon the legal descendants of the assignee. The possession of the land forever continues to be with the assignee and after his death with his legal heirs. The restriction on the right to alienate obviously, has been imposed with the hope that the family of assignee will improve the land and enjoy the benefits arising there from. The restriction is imposed in the nature of protection in order to secure the perpetual enjoyment of the land for the benefit of the family of the assignee. The restriction has been imposed in order to prevent alienation of the lands assigned in favour of well to do persons. The legislature having considered that a protective legislation is necessary so as to prescribe the punishment to persons who have purchased such lands made suitable provisions in various enactments referred to hereinabove against the transfers and alienations of assigned lands. The object of the legislation is not to deprive the assignees their right, title and interest in the land. The provisions and the conditions in the pattas were not incorporated to deprive the legitimate ownership rights of the assignees. On the other hand, such provisions were enacted to protect the ownership of the assignees. The legislation is for the benefit of weaker sections of the society, who by themselves are not in a position to hold their property to themselves in the absence of protection. Such alienations by the assignees are not only declared to be null and void, but a further provision also has been incorporated to restore the assigned land to the original assignee or to his legal heir provided that such restoration shall not be more than once. In Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka (1984) 3 SCC 301 the Supreme Court observed that the legislature no doubt is perfectly competent to provide that such transactions will be null and void and not merely void able. 'Even under the Contract Act any contract which is opposed to public policy is rendered void. In Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka (1984) 3 SCC 301 the Supreme Court observed that the legislature no doubt is perfectly competent to provide that such transactions will be null and void and not merely void able. 'Even under the Contract Act any contract which is opposed to public policy is rendered void. The State, consistently with the directive principles of the Constitution, has made it a policy and very rightly, to preserve, protect and promote the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes which by and large form the weaker and poorer sections of the people in our country … the provisions seeking to nullify such transfers is quite in keeping with the policy of the State which may properly be regarded as public policy for rendering social and economic justice to these weaker sections of the society … The condition imposed against the transferor a particular period of such granted lands which were granted essentially for the benefits of the grantees cannot be said to constitute any unreasonable restriction.' (Emphasis is of ours). In Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra (1985) 1 SCC 479 the Supreme Court while considering the constitutional validity of the provisions of Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974, a law relating to transfers and alienations of agricultural lands by members of Scheduled Tribes in the State to persons not belonging to Scheduled Tribes and restoration of possession thereto to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, observed: 'The present legislation is a typical illustration of the concept of distributive justice, as modern jurisprudence knows it … Our Constitution permits and even directs the State to administer what may be termed 'distributive justice'. The concept of distributive justice in the sphere of law-making connotes, inter alia, the removal of economic inequalities and rectifying the injustice resulting from dealings or transactions between un equals in society … Distributive justice comprehends more than achieving lessening of inequalities by differential taxation, giving debt relief or distribution of property owned by one to many who have none by imposing ceiling on holdings, both agricultural and urban, or by direct regulation of contractual transactions by forbidding certain transactions and, perhaps, by requiring others. It also means that those who have been deprived of this properties by unconscionable bargains should be restored their property…. It also means that those who have been deprived of this properties by unconscionable bargains should be restored their property…. It is axiomatic that a contract is liable to be set aside due to inequality of bargaining power, if someone without independent advice, enters into a contract on terms which are very unfair or transfers property for a consideration which is grossly inadequate when his bargaining power is grievously impaired by reason of his own need or circumstances, or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue influence or pressures brought to bear on him by or for the benefit of the other.' (Emphasis is added). Judgment : (Per B. Sudershan Reddy, J) The common question of law that arises for consideration in these matters is: 'Whether the claimants are entitled to payment of compensation under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') when the assigned lands are resumed by the Government for a public purpose?' A Full Bench of this Court in State of A.P. v. P. Peda Chunnayya 1997 (1) ALT 498 (F.B.) held: 'Where the Government resorts to the provisions of the Act for acquisition of the patta lands without resorting to the terms of the grant for resumption, it is liable to pay compensation under the Act, but such compensation will be only the market value of the interest of the owner or the assignee of the land, subject to the clog. In such cases of acquisition, the claimant would also be entitled to consequential reliefs, such as those of solatium and interest etc., under the Act. In a case where the patta lands are resumed by the Government, the assignees cannot claim compensation under the Act, but can claim compensation equal to the market value of their interest in the land, subject to the clog. In such cases, no solatium may be payable but interest may be claimed on the amount of compensation from the date of dispossession and till the date of payment of compensation. In such cases, no solatium may be payable but interest may be claimed on the amount of compensation from the date of dispossession and till the date of payment of compensation. In a case where the assignees are dispossessed from their patta lands without resuming the lands in terms of the grant and/or initiation of proceedings under the Act, the Government may be directed to initiate proceedings under the Act and to pay compensation under the Act as indicated.' The same issue once again came up for consideration before another Full Bench of this Court on a reference made by a Division Bench and the Full Bench in its turn considered it appropriate to refer the matter to a Larger Bench by order dated 20-9-2001, the relevant portion of which reads thus: 'Furthermore, we are prima facie of the opinion that part of the law laid down by the judgment of the Full Bench that the plaintiffs would be entitled to the market value together with interest may not be correct, particularly, in view of that fact that the right of assignees of the Government land is subordinate to the State. The lands assigned under such patta are resumable. In that view of the matter, they may not be treated to be owners of the lands so as to claim entire compensation calculated at the market value for acquisition thereof under the Land Acquisition Act.' That is how the matter once again came up for consideration before a Larger Bench in State of A.P. v. Bondapalli Sanyasi 2002 (1) ALT 543 (L.B.), wherein it is held: '. The Full Bench committed error insofar as it held that where patta lands are resumed by the Government, the assignee would be entitled to compensation which would be equal to the market value of their interest in the land subject to the clog. Quantum of damages has to be ascertained having regard to the fact situation of each case. The right of the State to resume land is conditional only to the extent referred to in D-Form patta. Once such conditions are fulfilled, which have been done in the instant case, no grant of compensation would be payable towards resumption of land. Compensation may, however, be payable if lands have not been resumed by following due process of law. The act of the State in such cases would be tortuous in nature. Once such conditions are fulfilled, which have been done in the instant case, no grant of compensation would be payable towards resumption of land. Compensation may, however, be payable if lands have not been resumed by following due process of law. The act of the State in such cases would be tortuous in nature. The views of the Larger Bench are summarized in the following manner: 'Where the assigned land is taken possession of by the State in accordance with the terms of the grant or patta the right of the assignee to any compensation will have to be determined in accordance with the conditions in patta itself and where the State does not resort to the covenant of the grant and resorts to the Land Acquisition Act the assignee shall be entitled to compensation in terms of the Land Acquisition Act not as an owner but as an interested person for the interest he held in the property.' Dr. Motilal B. Naik, J., sitting with G. Rohini, J., while dealing with W.A.No.170 of 2002, in which more or less similar issue had arisen for consideration, opined thus: 'Though the assignees are entitled to get benefits on the basis of the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the decision cited (2) supra ( 1997 (1) ALT 498 (FB), in view of the later decision of the Larger Bench of this Court cited (1) supra (2002 (1) ALT 543 (LB), such benefit is denied to them in spite of the fact that the larger bench in the decision (1) supra has not examined the correctness of the view of the Full Bench decision cited (2) supra in correct perspective having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case and in the light of the implications arising out of various G.Os. issued by the Government from time to time on the question of payment of compensation to the assignees on resumption of lands by the Government. It is in this background, we are of the considered view, the decision of the larger bench in the decision cited (1) supra, requires reconsideration in the light of the State's obligation arising out of Chapter-IV of the Constitution of India and in the light of the G.Os. issued by the Government from time to time meeting the contingency of payment of compensation in case of resumption of assigned lands. issued by the Government from time to time meeting the contingency of payment of compensation in case of resumption of assigned lands. We, therefore, direct the Registry to place the matter before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for referring this issue relating to payment of compensation to the assignees of Government lands in the light of the larger Bench decision and full bench decision cited (1) ands (2) respectively to a larger bench for its decision, at an early date so that the controversy in this regard could be put to rest.' The matter was accordingly placed before a Larger Bench consisting of five Judges after obtaining the orders from the Honourable the Chief Justice. When the matter was taken up for hearing by the Larger Bench, objections were raised by the learned Government Pleader inter alia contending that the Division Bench is bound by the Larger Bench judgment in Bondapalli Sanyasi (2 supra) and, therefore, it was not correct to make a reference to a Bench of five Judges. The Larger Bench of five Judges having regard to the fact that the subject matter that arises for consideration is of a very great public importance required the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice to constitute a Larger Bench of seven Judge to resolve the issue in public interest. That is how the matter is placed before this Larger Bench. Before we proceed further to consider the question that had fallen for consideration, we are required to make it clear that the learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State did not raise any objection whatsoever about the reference made at the instance of the Division Bench, which doubted the correctness of the judgment of the Larger Bench of five Judges. The learned Advocate General submitted that the Honourable the Chief Justice has prerogative to constitute a Larger Bench and, therefore, it would be unnecessary to go into that question. The learned Advocate General submitted that the issue relating to payment of compensation to the assignees of government lands is required to be considered in proper perspective by duly taking into consideration that alienation of government lands even in favour of weaker sections of the society is not in derogation of ownership of the government in the land. The acquisition of land by the State is invariably for a public purpose. The acquisition of land by the State is invariably for a public purpose. Where the State possesses interest in the land acquired, a notification takes effect in regard to the remainder of the interest held by private parties. The compensation will be payable for the interest held by the private parties ignoring the interest held by the Government, which is already vested in the Government. The acquisition relates to the quantum of interest of the D-Form pattedar. In such cases, quantum of interest is required to be determined with reference to the conditions of the grant itself. In cases of enforcement of terms of the grant and if the grant itself is cancelled for violation of the terms of the grant no compensation is payable to the grantee irrespective of the length of the period during which the assignee remained in possession of the land. Where no action has been taken to cancel the grant prior to acquisition and taking possession of the land, the grantee's right will have to be computed taking into account the vulnerability of the grant to cancellation if there be any violation of the terms of the grant. Where compensation is required to be determined under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 logically all the reliefs available under the said Act would be available, though such reliefs may have to be computed with reference to the limited interest of the grantee. The sum and substance of the submission of the learned Advocate General was that the assignee who is deprived of his property should only be compensated to the extent of the value of his right and interest in such property. The fact that the assignee's right in the land is limited cannot be ignored and compensation in excess of his rights cannot be granted. The learned Advocate General further submitted that in case of resumption of the land by the Government for a public purpose under the terms of the grant, no compensation is liable to be paid except in accordance with the terms of the grant itself. A writ of Mandamus does not lie compelling the State to acquire its own land and pay compensation to the assignee. A writ of Mandamus does not lie compelling the State to acquire its own land and pay compensation to the assignee. Sri Challa Sitaramaiah, learned amicus curiae submitted that the entire issue relating to assignment of the land by the Government to the landless poor farmers and weaker sections of the society is required to be considered in a broader perspective. The assignment is not a gratis but is a constitutional obligation imposed upon the State. It is in the nature of public assistance. The assignees are constitutional claimants. While interpreting the provisions relating to grant of assignment of land by the Government to the vulnerable sections of the society, this Court has to bear in mind the constitutional commands enshrined in Part-IV of this Constitution of India. It was urged that the restraint imposed on alienation of the assigned land is not in derogation of ownership and title, but the same is as a protective measure. That whenever the State acquires such land, the condition of non-transferability pales into insignificance and disappears and such condition cannot be considered as a clog. Whenever such land is either resumed or acquired by the State even for a public purpose, the assignees are entitled to payment of compensation equivalent to the market value of the land. 'No compensation clause' incorporated, as one of the conditions of grant of patta/assignment, is unconstitutional. The recipient of a welfare measure and public assistance cannot be deprived of his livelihood. The provisions including the Government Grants Act, 1895 must be read subject to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Sarvasri P. Sri Raghu Ram and M. Laxman, adopted the submissions made by the learned amicus curiae. Legal environment relating to assignment of government land to the landless poor persons: The State Government in discharge of its constitutional obligations launched special programs from time to time for assignment of government wastelands to landless poor persons and weaker sections of the society. The policy for assignment of governments, wastelands is evident from various Board Standing Orders and the rules framed under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli so far as the Telangana area is concerned. The policy for assignment of governments, wastelands is evident from various Board Standing Orders and the rules framed under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli so far as the Telangana area is concerned. The rules regarding assignment of lands and the conditions incorporated in D-Form pattas as well as other forms of pattas not only prohibit alienation of such lands but also provide for its resumption as well as re-grant to eligible persons. The Board Standing Orders as well as the rules provide for assignment of lands to landless poor and weaker sections of the society both for the purpose of providing house sites and agricultural lands. A landless poor person is one who owns not more than one acre of wet or five acres of dry land and is also poor. The lands at the disposal of the Government shall be assigned only to landless poor persons who the Government shall be assigned only to landless poor persons who directly engage themselves in cultivation. The maximum extent of land which may be assigned to a single individual shall be limited to one acre wet or five acres dry, subject to the proviso that in computing the area lands owned by the assignee shall be taken into account, so that the lands assigned to him together with what is already owned by him does not exceed the total extent of one acre of wet or five acres of dry land. (i) The assignment of lands shall be free of market value; (ii) lands assigned shall be heritable but not alienable; (iii) lands assigned shall be brought under cultivation within three years; (iv) no land tax shall be collected for the first three years except for the extent if any, which has already been brought under cultivation. Water rate shall, however, be charged if the lands are irrigated with Government water; and (v) cultivation should be by the assignee or the members of his family or with hired labour under the supervision of himself or a member of his family. Water rate shall, however, be charged if the lands are irrigated with Government water; and (v) cultivation should be by the assignee or the members of his family or with hired labour under the supervision of himself or a member of his family. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, which provides for the imposition of a ceiling on agricultural holdings and taking over of the surplus land, further provides that the surplus lands taken over are to be allotted for use as house-sites for agricultural labourers and village artisans or transferred to the weaker sections of the people dependent on agriculture, one-half of the lands being set apart as far as practicable for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. In respect of the surrendered land in the occupation of a protected tenant in the Telangana area, the right of purchase of such protected tenant is saved subject to certain conditions. Section 14 of the said Act mandates that the lands vested in the Government under this Act shall be allotted for use as house-sites for agricultural labourers, village artisans or other poor persons owning no houses or house sites, or transferred to the weaker-sections of the people dependent on agriculture for agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, in such manner as may be prescribed. Any transfer of the land shall be subject to: (i) the condition that the land shall not be alienated by the transferee by way of sale, gift, mortgage, lease or in any manner whatsoever otherwise than by way of mortgage in favour of the Government, a bank or a Cooperative society, including a land mortgage back; and (ii) such other conditions as may be prescribed. Any alienation effected or other act done in respect of any land in violation of the conditions specified shall be null and void and the Revenue Divisional Officer shall resume the land after giving an opportunity to the persons effected of making a representation in that behalf. The Act itself has been brought into existence for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Article 39 of the Constitution of India. The Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 is another piece of legislation, which is protective in its nature, with a view to prevent transfers and alienations of assigned lands. The Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 is another piece of legislation, which is protective in its nature, with a view to prevent transfers and alienations of assigned lands. The Act further provides for restoration of such lands to the assignees. Section 3 of the Act declares that notwithstanding to the contrary in any other law for the time being in force no land assigned to a landless poor person for the purpose of cultivation or as a house site shall be transferred and shall be deemed never to have been transferred; and accordingly no right or title in such assigned land shall vest in any person acquiring the land by such transfer, however, such transfer of assigned land, if any, in favour of another landless poor person in good faith for a valuable consideration is saved. The competent authority is assigned with the duty to take possession of the assigned land after evicting the purchaser in possession and restore the assigned land to the original assignee or his legal heir, or where it is not reasonably practicable to do so to resume the same to government for assignment to landless poor persons in accordance with the rules. The orders of granting house sites in villages under Board Standing Order 21 inter alia contain the following condition: 'If without the previous approval of the Revenue Divisional Officer, in writing the land is alienated by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease of any kind within a period of ten years from the date of the grant, or ceases to be owned by the original grantee or his legal heirs owing to sale by process of law or otherwise for a like period, the grant will be resumed by the Government, who will be entitled to re-enter and take possession of the site without compensation either for any improvements made to it or for any buildings constructed on it. This prohibition does not, however, apply to the hypothecation of the site together with any buildings erected on it to Government under the Land Improvements and Agricultural Loans Act or to a Co-operative Society. The power or resuming the grant and ordering the re-entry referred to above will vest in the Revenue Divisional Officer.' The patta certificate issued under the Louni Rules contained in G.O.Ms.No.1406, dated 26-7-1958 inter alia contains the following conditions of assignment: 1. The power or resuming the grant and ordering the re-entry referred to above will vest in the Revenue Divisional Officer.' The patta certificate issued under the Louni Rules contained in G.O.Ms.No.1406, dated 26-7-1958 inter alia contains the following conditions of assignment: 1. The lands shall be heritable but not assignable. 2. The lands shall be brought under direct cultivation within three years from the date of the order. 3-11 ……. 12. In the event of the land being required for any other public purpose, the land will be resumed and no compensation shall be paid to the assignee (The decision of the Government or the other authority empowered by them in this behalf shall be final on the question, whether the purpose for which the land is to be resumed is a public purpose or not). 13. In the event of resumption of the land assigned market value of the purchase money or such share of it as is proportionate to the area resumed will be repaid. 14. The Government will not however, be liable to pay compensation for any improvement, which may have been effected on the land before such resumption. 15-19 ….. The Government having examined the question relating to payment of compensation in respect of the government lands assigned on D-form pattas may come under submergence of any projects i.e., major, medium and minor irrigation and Power Projects, issued instructions from time to time. The sum and substance of the instructions issued is that the assignees are entitled to be paid only the market value of the land, as the resumption of assigned lands for public purpose is not in the nature of compulsory acquisition. It is further clarified that the assignees are entitled only to compensation of the variable improvements made on the assigned lands. They are not entitled to market value as fixed by Courts in respect of similar patta lands and the amount payable thereof is to be treated as ex-gratia. It is in the light of t he conditions of patta and the instructions issued by the Government from time to time and various provisions in law putting restriction on right to alienate the assigned land, the learned Advocate General contended that the acquisition only relates to the quantum of interest of the D-Form pattedar and the quantum of interest is to be determined with reference to the conditions of the grant. Even where the compensation is determinable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the same will be computed with reference to the limited interest of the grantee. The condition of non-transferability is relevant for the purpose of estimating the quantum of right of the grantee, which he is being deprived of by the procedure of the land acquisition. Directive Principles of State Policy and concept of Distributive Justice: Whether recipients are constitutional claimants? In order to consider these submissions, it becomes just and necessary to address ourselves to the main question, what is the purpose and object of the assignment of land by the Government to the weaker sections of the society? We have noticed the relevant provisions of the Board Standing Orders and the Rules framed under Section 172 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli called 'Land Assignment/Revised Assignment Policy'; the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 and the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 while dealing with the nature and scope of the Government's power to grant assignment and conditions thereof imposing restriction on alienation of assigned lands and the State converting the patta into ryotwari tenure (land for cultivation). The land reforms legislations have been enacted by the State in discharge of its obligation under Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India, which inter alia commands the State that it shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to sub serve the common good; and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production of the common detriment. Likewise, Article 41 of the Constitution of India commands the State that it shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of underserved want. The assignment policy itself is the result of unending struggle over allocation of collective resources. It was the egalitarian promise of a welfare State sought to do away with the vestiges of feudalism and unequal social order. The assignment policy itself is the result of unending struggle over allocation of collective resources. It was the egalitarian promise of a welfare State sought to do away with the vestiges of feudalism and unequal social order. Allocation of collective resources to the weaker sections of the society is an aspect of distributive justice. Social Justice is the signature tune of the Indian constitution. The struggle for freedom has been not only political but also economic and social. Chandrachud, C.J., in Minerva Mills Ltd., v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625 highlighted the significance of the perception that Part III and IV together constitute the core commitment to social revolution and they, together, are the conscience of the Constitution. 'Granville Austin's observation brings out the true position that Parts III and IV are like two wheels of a chariot, one no less important than the other. You snap one and the other will lose its efficacy. They are like a twin formula for achieving the social revolution, which is the ideal, which the visionary founders of the Constitution set before themselves. In other words, the Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between Parts III and IV. … This harmony and balance between fundamental rights and directive principles is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. … It is in this sense that Parts III and IV together constitute the core of our Constitution and combine to form its conscience. Anything that destroys the balance between the two parts will ipso facto destroy an essential element of the basic structure of our Constitution. … It is not possible to fit fundamental rights and directive principles in two distinct and strictly defined categories, but it may be stated broadly that fundamental rights represent civil and political rights while directive principles embody social and economic rights. Both are clearly part of the broad spectrum of human rights. … The only distinguishing feature, to my mind, between fundamental rights and directive principles is that whereas the former are enforceable in a court of law, the latter, are not. And the reason for this is obvious.' The learned Chief Justice approvingly referred to the view expressed by the Planning Commission that merely because the directive principles are non-justiciable, it does not follow that they are in any way subservient or inferior to the fundamental rights. And the reason for this is obvious.' The learned Chief Justice approvingly referred to the view expressed by the Planning Commission that merely because the directive principles are non-justiciable, it does not follow that they are in any way subservient or inferior to the fundamental rights. It is further observed, 'the directive principles therefore, impose an obligation on the State to take positive action for creating socio-economic conditions in which there will be an egalitarian social order with social and economic justice to all, so that individual liberty will become a cherished value and the dignity of the individual a living reality, not only for a few privileged persons but for the entire people of the country.' It is further observed, 'the directive principles are not excluded from the cognizance of the Court, as under the Irish Constitution; they are merely made non-enforceable by a court of law….' In State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy (1977) 4 SCC 471 , Krishna Iyer, J., observed that each word used in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India has a strategic role and the whole article a social mission. It is further observed: 'A directive to the State with a deliberate design to dismantle feudal and capitalist citadels of property must be interpreted in that spirit and hostility to such a purpose…. Two conclusions strike us as quintessential. Part IV, especially Article 39 (b) and (c), is a futuristic mandate to the State with a message of transformation of the economic and social order. Firstly, such change calls for collaborative effort from all the legal institutions of the system: the legislature, the judiciary and the administrative machinery. Secondly and consequentially, loyalty to the high purpose of the Constitution, viz., social and economic justice in the context of material want and utter inequalities on a massive scale, compels the Court to ascribe expansive meaning to the pregnant words used with hopeful foresight, not to circumscribe their connotation into contradiction of the objectives inspiring the provision. Secondly and consequentially, loyalty to the high purpose of the Constitution, viz., social and economic justice in the context of material want and utter inequalities on a massive scale, compels the Court to ascribe expansive meaning to the pregnant words used with hopeful foresight, not to circumscribe their connotation into contradiction of the objectives inspiring the provision. To be Pharisaic towards the Constitution through ritualistic construction is to weaken the social-spiritual thrust of the founding fathers' dynamic faith.' In Pathumma v. State of Kerala (1978) 2 SCC 1 the Supreme Court observed: 'Article 39 (b) contains a direction to secure that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to sub serve the common good. Indisputably, the object of the Act is to eradicate rural indebtedness and thereby to secure the common good of people living in abject poverty.' John Rawls in his 'A Theory of Justice' says: '. The aim of the branches of government is to establish a democratic regime in which land and capital are widely though not presumably equally held. Society is not so divided that one fairly small sector controls the preponderance of productive resources. When this is achieved and distributive shares satisfy the principles of justice…' In Goldberg v. Kelly 25 L Ed (2) 287 an interesting question had fallen for consideration in the Supreme Court of the United States. Residents of New York City who were receiving financial aid under state or federally assisted welfare programs instituted actions in the District Court alleging that state and city welfare officials had terminated, or were about to terminate, such aid without prior notice and hearing in violation of due process. After the commencement of such actions, the welfare authorities adopted procedures whereby the recipient, after informal discussion, was given at least 7 days' notice of proposed termination of payments, of his right to have the proposed termination reviewed by a higher official, and of his right to submit a written statement for purpose of such review, and whereby the recipient, after an adverse decision by the reviewing official and termination of payments, could obtain a post termination hearing before an independent hearing officer, at which hearing one could appear personally, offer oral evidence etc. The constitutional adequacy of such procedure was put in issue. The constitutional adequacy of such procedure was put in issue. The District Court held that only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing would satisfy due process. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. In an opinion by Brennan, J., while considering the nature of the right to receive public assistance, observed: 'From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty. This perception, against the background of our traditions has significantly influenced the development of the contemporary public assistance system. Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community. At the same time, welfare guards against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to 'promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.' (Emphasis is of ours). While adverting to the contention that pre-termination evidentiary hearing are out weighted by countervailing governmental interests in conserving fiscal and administrative resources, the Court observed, 'these governmental interests are not overriding in the welfare context.;' The task of distribution branch is to preserve an approximate justice in distributive shares by means of taxation and the necessary adjustments in the rights of property. It impose and sets restrictions on the property rights with a view to gradually and continually to correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity. It is an economic arrangement based on social choice devised with a view to advance the good of the body politic as a whole by invoking some discernable criterion for the just division of social advantages. The policy of the State government as is evident from the provisions of the statutes referred to hereinabove and various Governmental Orders issued from time to time relating to the assignment of government lands in favour of weaker and vulnerable sections of the society is obviously to empower them and to secure the larger interest of the community. The policy of the State government as is evident from the provisions of the statutes referred to hereinabove and various Governmental Orders issued from time to time relating to the assignment of government lands in favour of weaker and vulnerable sections of the society is obviously to empower them and to secure the larger interest of the community. They are designed to bring about the social and economic revolution that remained to be fulfilled. The policy to assign the government land is to prevent perpetuation of injustice and feudal order and to prevent concentration of material resources of the government land to the weaker sections of the society is in furtherance of the constitutional obligation imposed upon the State of secure the citizens an adequate means of livelihood. More than 50 per cent of the population in India lives in village and below poverty line. The average agricultural holding of a farmer is hardly enough to sustain himself and his large family. The landless labourers who constitute the bulk of village population are deeply mired in poverty. The State in discharge of its obligation to take positive action for creating socio-economic conditions in which there will be an egalitarian social order with social and economic justice to all, tailored its policies and accordingly provided public assistance to the weaker and vulnerable sections of the society by assigning the lands for cultivation purpose as well as for house sites to have a roof over the head. It is not a charity, but means to provide general welfare to secure the Blessings of Liberty to one and all. The cornerstone of the land reforms policy is the acceptance of the principle that land must belong to the tiller and exploitation of all sorts must be eliminated. The assignment of lands in favour of vulnerable sections of the society was made for the purpose of securing to such sections of the society a life of basic human dignity and in compliance with the directive principles of the State policy. It must follow as a necessary corollary that the assignees acquire the status of constitutional claimants. About the ownership of the assigned land: What is ownership? The next question that may fall for consideration is whether the ownership rests in the assignee? This question is inevitably linked and intertwined with the restriction on the right to alienate the assigned land by the assignee. About the ownership of the assigned land: What is ownership? The next question that may fall for consideration is whether the ownership rests in the assignee? This question is inevitably linked and intertwined with the restriction on the right to alienate the assigned land by the assignee. The essence of the ownership of a thing is that aid which organized society will, through the courts as its agents, give one individual, to the exclusion of all others, to take or keep possession of it … but ownership is not a privilege conferred by government but a right which the government is organized to protect. Blackstone defines 'title to land' as the means whereby the owner of lands has the just possession of his property, and further states that there are several stages or degrees requisite to form a complete title to land, which are actual possession, right of possession, and right of property. (See: Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume LXXIII) Salmond says ownership 'denotes the relation between a person and any right that is vested in him.' A definition of ownership in law will not be easy. In an interesting article 'Some Reflections on Ownership in English Law', by J.W. Cecil Turner, published in the Canadian Bar Review it is observed that the words 'owner', 'ownership', are not strictly terms of art: they are merely descriptive words. Ownership, as stated, is a relation between persons; it is a social institution. As the history of law shows it is a convention of society at any given moment that the privileges termed ownership shall be granted to certain persons and that they shall be protected by law in their enjoyment of them. This convention will not necessarily be the same in all countries at the same time, because their social systems may be different; therefore the relations between its members in respect of property, which each society enforces, will vary accordingly. In Jodha Mal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1972) 1 SCR 639 the Supreme Court while considering the question as to who is the owner referred to in Section 9 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 observed that Section 9 brings to tax the income from property and not the interest of a person in the property. In Jodha Mal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1972) 1 SCR 639 the Supreme Court while considering the question as to who is the owner referred to in Section 9 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 observed that Section 9 brings to tax the income from property and not the interest of a person in the property. 'A property cannot be owned by two persons, each one having independent and exclusive right over it… the word 'owner' has different meanings in different contexts. Under certain circumstances a lessee may be considered as the owner of the property leased to him… The meaning that we give to the word 'owner' in Section 9 must not be such as to make that provision capable of being made an instrument of oppression.' In Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax 1986 (Supp.) SCC 700, the Supreme Court referred to Salmond's definition of 'ownership': (a) the owner will have a right to possess the thing which he owns; (b) the owner normally has the right to use and enjoy the thing owned: the right to manage it, i.e., the right to decide how it shall be used; and the right to the income from it; (c) the owner has the right to consume, destroy or alienate the thing; (d) ownership has the characteristic of being indeterminate in duration; and (e) ownership has a residuary character. Legal ownership is that which has its origin in the rules of the common law, while equitable ownership is that which proceeds from rules of equity different from the common law. The courts of common law in England refused to recognize equitable ownership and denied the equitable owner as an owner at all. The question that may inevitably arise is whether the restrictions on the right to alienate the assigned land in any manner operates as a clog and makes the assignee less than a full owner? We have already noticed that the rights in land granted under patta are heritable. That assignee is entitled to be in perpetual possession and enjoyment of the assigned land and such rights devolve upon the legal descendants of the assignee. The possession of the land forever continues to be with the assignee and after his death with his legal heirs. We have already noticed that the rights in land granted under patta are heritable. That assignee is entitled to be in perpetual possession and enjoyment of the assigned land and such rights devolve upon the legal descendants of the assignee. The possession of the land forever continues to be with the assignee and after his death with his legal heirs. The restriction on the right to alienate obviously, has been imposed with the hope that the family of assignee will improve the land and enjoy the benefits arising there from. The restriction is imposed in the nature of protection in order to secure the perpetual enjoyment of the land for the benefit of the family of the assignee. The restriction has been imposed in order to prevent alienation of the lands assigned in favour of well to do persons. The legislature having considered that a protective legislation is necessary so as to prescribe the punishment to persons who have purchased such lands made suitable provisions in various enactments referred to hereinabove against the transfers and alienations of assigned lands. The object of the legislation is not to deprive the assignees their right, title and interest in the land. The provisions and the conditions in the pattas were not incorporated to deprive the legitimate ownership rights of the assignees. On the other hand, such provisions were enacted to protect the ownership of the assignees. The legislation is for the benefit of weaker sections of the society, who by themselves are not in a position to hold their property to themselves in the absence of protection. Such alienations by the assignees are not only declared to be null and void, but a further provision also has been incorporated to restore the assigned land to the original assignee or to his legal heir provided that such restoration shall not be more than once. In Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka (1984) 3 SCC 301 the Supreme Court observed that the legislature no doubt is perfectly competent to provide that such transactions will be null and void and not merely void able. 'Even under the Contract Act any contract which is opposed to public policy is rendered void. In Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka (1984) 3 SCC 301 the Supreme Court observed that the legislature no doubt is perfectly competent to provide that such transactions will be null and void and not merely void able. 'Even under the Contract Act any contract which is opposed to public policy is rendered void. The State, consistently with the directive principles of the Constitution, has made it a policy and very rightly, to preserve, protect and promote the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes which by and large form the weaker and poorer sections of the people in our country … the provisions seeking to nullify such transfers is quite in keeping with the policy of the State which may properly be regarded as public policy for rendering social and economic justice to these weaker sections of the society … The condition imposed against the transferor a particular period of such granted lands which were granted essentially for the benefits of the grantees cannot be said to constitute any unreasonable restriction.' (Emphasis is of ours). In Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra (1985) 1 SCC 479 the Supreme Court while considering the constitutional validity of the provisions of Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974, a law relating to transfers and alienations of agricultural lands by members of Scheduled Tribes in the State to persons not belonging to Scheduled Tribes and restoration of possession thereto to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, observed: 'The present legislation is a typical illustration of the concept of distributive justice, as modern jurisprudence knows it … Our Constitution permits and even directs the State to administer what may be termed 'distributive justice'. The concept of distributive justice in the sphere of law-making connotes, inter alia, the removal of economic inequalities and rectifying the injustice resulting from dealings or transactions between un equals in society … Distributive justice comprehends more than achieving lessening of inequalities by differential taxation, giving debt relief or distribution of property owned by one to many who have none by imposing ceiling on holdings, both agricultural and urban, or by direct regulation of contractual transactions by forbidding certain transactions and, perhaps, by requiring others. It also means that those who have been deprived of this properties by unconscionable bargains should be restored their property…. It also means that those who have been deprived of this properties by unconscionable bargains should be restored their property…. It is axiomatic that a contract is liable to be set aside due to inequality of bargaining power, if someone without independent advice, enters into a contract on terms which are very unfair or transfers property for a consideration which is grossly inadequate when his bargaining power is grievously impaired by reason of his own need or circumstances, or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue influence or pressures brought to bear on him by or for the benefit of the other.' (Emphasis is added).