Dilip Kumar Pandey v. State Of Jharkhand Through Secretary, H. R. D. D.
2004-04-15
TAPEN SEN
body2004
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER Tapen Sen, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. The petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 27.2.2003 as contained in Annexure-34 by which the respondent No. 5 terminated the services of the petitioner. The petitioner has further prayed that after quashing of the aforementioned order, he be reinstated in service with full back wages. 3. One of the most important points argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that after having spent 14 years in a regular and in a confirmed position in the Department of Education, the respondents could not have terminated his service without following the elaborate procedure laid down for that purpose. The other points which have been argued with equal emphasis are that the petitioner was in fact appointed in a regular manner and in accordance with the rules and/or Circulars that were prevalent at that time and that there was no occasion for the respondents to come to a conclusion that his initial appointment was bad. It has further been urged that the respondents have not only dispensed with the procedure but have also totally ignored all principles of natural justice and/or equity and fair play. 4. Mr. Raj Nandan Sahay, learned Sr. Standing Counsel No. II on the other hand, submitted that while making appointment of the petitioner, his name was not called from the Local Employment Exchange and this itself was a contravention of the policy decision and/or the Circular that was prevalent at that period and since this elementary requirement was not met while making the appointment in favour of the petitioner, it must be deemed that there has been a total departure from the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In the backdrop of the arguments of the respective counsels, it would be necessary to notice the facts as pleaded and/or as is evident from the documents brought on record. 5. It has been stated that pursuant to the nationalization and take over of the Primary and Secondary Education in the erstwhile State of Bihar and in order to maintain the spread of education, the State Government took a policy decision that in each Block there would at least be four Government High Schools which would include one Girls High School in addition to the existing taken over High Schools (Rajkiya Krit Uchch Vidyalaya).
It has further been stated that by these decisions dated 27.5.1981, 22.1.1982, 15.3.1982, 25.3.1982 and 12.10.1982, the Government, on principle, took a decision that these Project Schools would be necessary for purposes of spreading education all over the State. One of the documents brought on record by the Writ Petitioner which is included in Annexure-1 series (relevant at page 62) is the Letter No. 705 dated 12.10.1982. At Clause 10 of that letter a guideline has been given in relation to appointment of teachers and it speaks, inter alia, that since appointment of teachers in a regular manner would take some time therefore they would be appointed on an ad hoc basis from amongst the trained teachers to be selected by a Committee under the Chairmanship of the Regional Deputy Director of Education and this would be without any advertisement. So far as non-teaching staffs are concerned, the Government came out with a Letter/Circular No. 749 dated 19.11.1982 (Annexure-2 at page 65) which inter alia stated that the Letter/Circular Nos. 16440 and 16441 would be applicable in the case of non- teaching staffs, It is relevant to mention that while Letter/Circular No. 16441 relates to the procedure to be followed in relation to Grade-IV employees, Letter/Circular No. 16440 however relates to mode and procedure to be followed in relation to Grade-III employees.
16440 and 16441 would be applicable in the case of non- teaching staffs, It is relevant to mention that while Letter/Circular No. 16441 relates to the procedure to be followed in relation to Grade-IV employees, Letter/Circular No. 16440 however relates to mode and procedure to be followed in relation to Grade-III employees. Although the writ petitioner has not brought on record the Circular No. 16440 as an annexure appended to the writ petition but a copy thereof was placed in Court and upon , perusal thereof it is evident that the relevant Clauses are 1 (k) and (d)(ii) which read as follows :-- 1 d lHkh dk;kZy;ksa esa oxZ 3 ds inksa ij fu;qfs fy, vkosndksa dks fdlh izdkj dh fyf[kr ;k ekSf[kd ijh{kk esa lfEefyr ugha gksuk gksxk] vkSj Ldwy RkFkk dkWyst dh ijh{kkvksa esa muds }kjk izkIr vadksa ds vk/kkj ekudj esjhV fyLV rS;kj fd;k tk;sxk ,oa blh esfjV fyLV ls mi;ZqadYi ds lkFk layXu vuqnskdksa ds vuqlkj fjnksa ij fu;qf dh tk;saxh A M+ (ii) ftyk Lrj ij esjhV fyLV rS;kj djus ds fy, xfBr p;u lfefr ds v/;{k lac) LFkkiuk ds ftykLrjh; izeq[k fMlfVDV gsM gksaxs vkSj mlh LFkkiuk ds dksbZ ofj"B inkf/kdkjh ftUgsa muds ftykLrjh; izeq[k euksuhr djsa blds lnL; gksaxs A nwljs lnL; jgsaxs ftyk dY;k.k inkf/kdkjh rkfd vuqj{k.k laca/kh ljdkjh vknsk dh esfjV fyLV rS;kj djrs le; vogsyuk u gksus ikos A** From the first clause, it is evident that for purposes of making appointments on Grade-Ill posts, the applicants were not required to go through the process of any written or oral examination and on the contrary all that was required was their marks obtained by them in school and colleges for purposes of being included in the Merit List. Once such a Merit List was prepared, the vacant posts would be filled up. The other Clause makes it specific to the effect that for purposes of preparing the Merit List, the same would be prepared by a Selection Committee at the District level headed by the District Head meaning thereby the Deputy Collector or the Deputy Commissioner of the District concerned. The aforementioned Circular No. 16440 was issued on 3.12.1980.
The other Clause makes it specific to the effect that for purposes of preparing the Merit List, the same would be prepared by a Selection Committee at the District level headed by the District Head meaning thereby the Deputy Collector or the Deputy Commissioner of the District concerned. The aforementioned Circular No. 16440 was issued on 3.12.1980. On 15.6.1981, the Government came out with a fresh Circular No. 7605 wherein they inserted below 1(g), a fresh instruction which was required to be read as (g)(i) and the same reads as follows :-- funskkuqlkj bl foHkkx ds mi;qZo"k;d i= la[;k 16440 fnukad 3-12-80 ds izlax esa eq>s dguk gS fd dafMdk&1 x ds uhps x 1 ds :i esa ljdkjh dk;kZy;kssa esa oxZ 3 ds inksaa ij fu;qfs iz;kstukFkZ fuEufyf[kr izfk dh O;oLFkk dh tkrh gS&& 1- fu;qfnkf/kdkjh vius Lrj ls [kqys foKkiu ls vkosnu i=ksa dh ekax dj ldrs gSa A vkosnd fu/kkZfjr frfFk ds vUrxZr viuk vkosnu i= lh/ks inkf/kdkjh ds ikl fu;kstuky; esa ntZ fuca/ku la[;k dks mn~/k`r djrs gq, fu;kstyky; ls fuca/ku la[;k laca/kh fuxZr izek.k i= dh vfHkizekf.kr izfrfyfi ds lkFk ns ldsaxs A vxj ,slk ik;k tkrk gS fd vkosnd us xyr fucaf/kr la[;k mn~/k`r dj vkosnu fd;k gS vFkok fuca/ku la[;k laca/kh izek.k i= >qBk] tkyh ;k udyh gS rks ,sls vkosnd fu;qfs fy, v;ksX; djkj fd, tk,axs A vxj lq;ksX; O;fsa ds iSuy dh izrh{kd lwph esa mudk uke lfEefyr gks x;k gS VkSj ckn esa ,slk ik;k tkrk gS fd muds }kjk nh xbZ fuca/ku la[;k xyr Fkh vFkok mudk izek.k i= tkyh ,oa udyh Fkk rks mudk uke lwph ls gVk fn;k tk;sxk vkSj vU; dkuwuh dk;Zokgh ds vfrfjs ljdkjh lsok esa fu;qfs fy, v;ksX; djkj fn, tk;saxs ;g ftyk inkf/kdkjh vFkok laca) LFkkiuk ds izeq[k dk Hkh drZO; gksxk fd fu;qf djkus ds iwoZ os ns[k ysa fd lacaf/kr vkosnd fuca/ku dk;kZy; esa fucaf/kr gS vFkok ugha A 2- m;oLFkk rRdkfyd izHkko ls izHkkoh gksxk A** 6. Mr. Raj Nandan Sahay, learned ST. Standing Counsel No. II submitted that by reason of the aforementioned insertion brought into effect by Circular No. 7605 it became mandatory on the part of the authorities to consider applications which had been received only through open advertisement and not otherwise. 7. Before proceeding with the merits of the case, it would be relevant to first reject this submission of Mr. Raj Nandan Sahay, learned Sr.
7. Before proceeding with the merits of the case, it would be relevant to first reject this submission of Mr. Raj Nandan Sahay, learned Sr. Standing Counsel No. II lest it creates complications later on in the subsequent paragraphs. The reason why the argument of Mr. Sahay does not appeal this Court is because had it been the intention of this Circular to restrict applications through open advertisement only, then in that event Clause 1(k) and (d)(ii) of Circular No. 16440 would have been referred to and would have been superseded but that has not been done and on the contrary, what has been inserted is an additional feature giving an option to the Appointing Authority that he "may also" ask for applications through open advertisement. This therefore does not mean that the Appointing Authority was restricted to insist that he would consider only applications received through open advertisement and not through other processes which are indicated in the main Circular No. 16440 dated 3.2.1980. 8. Since these two Circulars have not been brought on record either by the petitioner or by the respondents but since they were produced by both of them during the course of hearing and since the merit of this case depends very much on the interpretation of these two Circulars, it would be apt and appropriate to direct that these two Circulars shall form part of this order and that the office shall make appropriate number of photo copies which will be attached along with this judgment and which will be marked as Enclosure-I and Enclosure- II hereto. 9. The other facts in relation to opening of Project Schools as narrated in Paragraphs-8 to 11 of the writ petition may not be relevant because these are all admitted facts. However the Project School of Narayanpur after having become functional, took steps for filling up the only post of a Clerk. The District Education Officer, Dumka approached the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Dumka for getting the name of one person from the panel of Class III employees prepared in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka. It is stated that the name of the petitioner was at Serial No. 14 of that list and upon a requisition having been made in the manner stated above, the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka recommended the name of the petitioner.
It is stated that the name of the petitioner was at Serial No. 14 of that list and upon a requisition having been made in the manner stated above, the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka recommended the name of the petitioner. It has further been stated that while preparing the panel of Class III employees, the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka had adhered to procedure laid down in Circular/Letter No. 16440 by circulating notice inviting applications from all eligible candidates. This notice was circulated in different officers under the Collectorate enabling the petitioner to know and to have knowledge about the same. It was thereafter that he filed the application giving details in relation to his marks obtained at the matriculate level, at the intermediate level and at the graduation level. It was after at this, that his name was placed at Serial No. 14 in the Merit List of Class III in the District of Dumka. 10. Thereafter by an office order dated 23.5.1989. the petitioner was appointed on an ad hoc post of Grade-Ill clerk in the Project Girls High School, Narayanpur, Dumka. The aforesaid office order of appointment of the petitioner is at Annexure-10 appended to the writ petition. 11. Mr. Rajnandan Sahay, learned Sr. Standing Counsel No. II, with reference to Paragraph 24 of the counter-affidavit, has submitted that the very language used in the letter of appointment goes to show that the appointment was political and therefore it was an irregular appointment. In this context, it would therefore perhaps be relevant to quote and take into consideration the language of the order of appointment as brought on record by Annexure-10.
In this context, it would therefore perhaps be relevant to quote and take into consideration the language of the order of appointment as brought on record by Annexure-10. The said office order reads as follows :-- Jh fnyhi dqekj ik.Ms;] firk LoxhZ; nsokj.k ik.Ms;] eksgYyk&MaxkyikM+k] ftyk & nqedk] tks fdlh ljdkjh lsok esa ugha gS rFkk ftudk uke nqedk ftyk ;qok dkaxszl b- ds yscj lsy ds ek/;e ls mik;q nqedk dh izkfIr lwph ds kad 14 esa oxZ r`rh; Js.kh ds in ds fy, i`"Bkafdr gS vkSj {ks=h; fk{kksifunskd laFkky ijxuk] nqedk ds i=kad&1330 fnukad 17&4&89 ds fu;qfs fy, izkIr gS] dks r`rh;&oxZ fyfid ds in ds osrueku 580&10&620&15&770 n- v- 15&860 esa ljdkjh egaxkbZ Hkk ds lkFk iw.kZ vLFkk;h rFkk vkSifucaf/kr O;oLFkk ds :i esa izkstsDV dU;k mPp fo|ky; ukjk;.kiqj] iz[k.M&&ukjk.kiqj] ftyk&&nqedk ds l`ftr r`rh; oxZ in fyfid ij ;ksxnku djus dh frfFk ls fu;qj ek= rhu ekg ds fy, inLFkkfir fd;k tkrk gS A budh lsok fdlh Hkh le; fouk iwoZ lwpuk ds lekIr dh tk ldrh gS A g-@&vLi"V ftyk fk{kk inkf/kdkjh nqedk A** It is evident upon reading the contents of the aforementioned office order that the petitioners name had been sent to the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka through the District Youth Congress (I). This by itself cannot be said that it is a political appointment because mere transmission of the name of a person who happens to be a member of a political party cannot be said to be political because the act of sending the name was not to coerce appointment but only to include the petitioners name in a panel. The inclusion was made at the discretion of the person who was supposed to be incharge of the Committee as prescribed by Circular/Letter No. 16440 dated 3.12.1980. It is in this context that the Circular/Letter No. 142 dated 23.2.1985 (Page 67) becomes relevant and which clearly lays down that the selection of non-teaching staff for appointment will be made by the Deputy Development Commissioner from amongst the panel prepared in the office of the Deputy Commissioner. These Circulars are prior to the appointment of the petitioner by Annexure-10 i.e., on 23.5.1989. His services were extended by order dated 28.8,1989 (Annexure-11) whereafter it was again extended on 26.7.1996 till further orders by Annexure-13.
These Circulars are prior to the appointment of the petitioner by Annexure-10 i.e., on 23.5.1989. His services were extended by order dated 28.8,1989 (Annexure-11) whereafter it was again extended on 26.7.1996 till further orders by Annexure-13. There are other documents to show that the petitioner continued to function on the basis of extended orders issued from time to time but what is most important is that on 30.12.1998 the service of the petitioner was finally confirmed by Officer Order dated 30.12.1998 (Annexure-19) which was issued pursuant to and on the basis of a decision taken by the District Establishment Committee. But before this happened, another relevant factor which necessarily needs to be taken note of is that on 8.8.1998 (Annexure-17), an office order was issued from the office of the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Santhal Pargana, Dumka by which the service of the petitioner was adjusted on the vacant post of a Clerk and he was transferred from the Project School ,to a High School, namely, Harishankarpur High School. Sarmapur, Barharwa at Sahebganj. 13. These are two important features of this case which shows that after appointment in the year 1989, the petitioner continuously and uninterruptedly worked as a Clerk in a Project School up to August 1998 i.e., for 9 (nine) years, whereafter he was transferred to a High School and thereafter his services were confirmed on 30.12.1998. All this had happened and after about 13 (thirteen) years from the date of his appointment, the respondent, by letter dated 11.9.2002 (Annexure-29) issued the first "show-cause" letter asking the petitioner to explain as to why his services be not terminated. This first "show- cause" notice was initiated by the Regional Deputy Director of Education through his letter addressed to the District Education Officer, Sahebganj directing him to ask an explanation on the one hand and on the other take steps for terminating the services of the petitioner. The language used in this letter dated 11.9.2002 (Annexure-29) is itself suggestive of the fact that the respondents had already taken a decision to terminate the service of the petitioner and with that predetermined mind, they directed the District Superintendent of Education, Sahebganj to issue a "show-cause" letter which therefore, must be deemed to be a mere formality.
The language used in this letter dated 11.9.2002 (Annexure-29) is itself suggestive of the fact that the respondents had already taken a decision to terminate the service of the petitioner and with that predetermined mind, they directed the District Superintendent of Education, Sahebganj to issue a "show-cause" letter which therefore, must be deemed to be a mere formality. The relevant portion of this letter reads as follows :-- 1 Jh fnyhi dqekj ik.Ms] fyfid dh fu;qfRdkyhu ftyk fk{kk inkf/kdkjh] nqedk Jh O;krksj dsjdsV~Vk ds }kjk vfu;fer rjhds ls dh xbZ izrhr gksrh gS A budh fu;qfh izfk dk ikyu ;Fkk&foKkiu] p;u lfefr ds xBu] vUrohZ{kk ds ipkr~ izrh{kd lwph dk fuekZ.k vkfn izfkvksa dk ikyu ugha fd;k x;k A vr% bl la[;k esa Jh fnyhi dqekj ik.Ms ls Li"Vhdj.k iwNrs gq, fu;ekuqlkj lsok lekIr djus dh dkjZokbZ dh tk, A** 14. On 7.12.2002, the Regional Deputy Director of Education, by Annexure-32/1, apparently became annoyed with the District Education Officer, Sahebganj and the cause of his annoyance was that even by that time, no "show- cause" letter had been issued to the petitioner. Consequently, the Regional Deputy Director of Education by Annexure-32/1 informed and directed the District Education Officer to send compliance report and reminded him that in two similar matters, services had already been terminated. It was further stated that if the services of the petitioner was not terminated, then this would become a factor in favour of those persons and for which the District Education Officer, Sahebganj would be held responsible.
It was further stated that if the services of the petitioner was not terminated, then this would become a factor in favour of those persons and for which the District Education Officer, Sahebganj would be held responsible. The language used in the Letter dated 7.12.2002 read as follows :-- mijkso"k; ij vafdr djuk gS fd dk;kZy; i=kad 826 fnukad 11902 }kjk Jh fnyhi dqekj ik.Ms ds laca/k esa dfri; funsk fn, x, Fks A vius vHkh rd munsk dk ikyu ugha fd;k A ;k dk;kZy; i=kad 826 fnukad 11&9&02 }kjk fn, x, funsk dk voyksdu djsa ,oa munsk dj kh?kz lwfpr djsa A vkius i=kad 751 fnukad 27&11&02 }kjk tks lwpuk Hksth gS ml lwpuk dh ekax esjs }kjk ugha dh xbZ gS A vkidks m= }kjk Li"V funsk nsus ds ckotwn Hkh funsk ds foijhr vfHkys[k Hkstk gS tcfd esjs }kjk dksbZ vfHkys[k dh ekax dh xbZ gS A vr% kh?kzrkkh?kz funsk dk vuqikyu dj dk;kZy; dks lwfpr djsa A KkrO; gS fd blh rjg ds nks vU; ekeyksa esa lsok lekIr dh tk pqdh gS A vxj buds lsok lekIr ugha dh tkrh gS rks bldk ykHk mu nksuksa lsokeq fyfid ds ekeys esa iM+sxk] ftldh tckcnsgh vkidh gksxh A** 15. After all this happened, a show cause notice was issued against which the petitioner filed his explanation but that explanation was obviously not found to be satisfactory because this Court has taken note of the fact that the respondents had already decided to terminate the services of the petitioner and therefore, the act of asking a "show-cause" and saying that his explanation received was not satisfactory, was an empty formality. Obviously therefore, on 27.2.2003 (by Annexure-34), after having said that his explanation was not satisfactory, the District Education Officer straightaway dismissed the petitioner from service. This order has therefore been challenged by the writ petitioner in the instant case. 16. This Court, after having perused the documents brought on record is of the opinion that Circular No. 16440 in so far as it relates to Clause 1(k) and (d)(ii) are fully applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. That being the position the inclusion of the name of the petitioner in the panel of the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka was a proper inclusion based on the marks that he had obtained at the matriculate stage, at the intermediate stage as also at the graduation level.
That being the position the inclusion of the name of the petitioner in the panel of the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka was a proper inclusion based on the marks that he had obtained at the matriculate stage, at the intermediate stage as also at the graduation level. Merely because he happened to be a member of a political party and merely because his name was transmitted and/or sent by that party does not mean that there was political interference in his appointment. This Court has already said that even if the name was transmitted by a political party, it was only for purposes of inclusion of the name of the petitioner in a panel and there is nothing on record to show that the panel was prepared in an improper manner and that the panel itself was illegal. That being the position, once the name of the petitioner was included in that panel, then as per Clause (d)(ii), it is specific that appointments of non-teaching staff would be made from amongst that panel. This was done. 17. The aforementioned two Clauses of Circular No. 16440, did not insist at that relevant time, that the names would necessarily have been called from the Employment Exchange or through open advertisement. The matter does not end there. After about 9 (nine) years, the petitioner stood confirmed in service. Therefore, on and from the date of his confirmation in service, the petitioner became a regular employee with effect from 30.12.1998. Once he became a regular employee, his services could not have been terminated by following a summary procedure. The respondents were bound to follow a procedure relating to proceedings which include departmental proceedings which are to be initiated and which includes, amongst others, the drawing up of a charge-sheet, serving it to the delinquent and thereafter proceeding in accordance with the well known procedure of holding departmental proceedings. None of these have been adhered to in the case of the petitioner, who although being a confirmed employee, has been treated like an unconfirmed staff and his services have been dispensed with in a manner that is alien to service laws applicable to such confirmed employees. 18. In support of the aforesaid proposition, reference may be had from the Constitution Bench Judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the Case of Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors., AIR 1991 SC 101 . 19.
18. In support of the aforesaid proposition, reference may be had from the Constitution Bench Judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the Case of Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors., AIR 1991 SC 101 . 19. That apart, facts which cry out loud and clear in this case is that the petitioners appointment made on 23.5.1989 not only stood confirmed on 30.42.1998, but after about 13 (thirteen) years, the respondents suddenly came out with the plea that his initial appointment was bad. This Court has already held that there was nothing wrong in the appointment of the petitioner and in any event, allowing the respondents to attempt to open a matter after having allowed the petitioner to continue in service for such a long time and thereafter confirming him in that service, would amount to be a travesty of justice. 20. In the case of Direct Recruit Class XI Engineering Officer Association and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in AIR 1990 SC 1607 , a Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court of India has held that when initial appointment is not made according to the Rules but the appointee continues in service uninterruptedly for a long period till regularization of his service, the entire period as the period spent in service for the purposes of consequential benefits will be counted: Taking a cue from the judgment of the Apex Court there is no option but to hold that in this case also the entire service of the petitioner till he was confirmed will be treated as a period spent on regular employment and as a consequence thereof he would be entitled to all benefits accruing thereunder. To that extent therefore that period cannot now be rendered meaningless. That apart another judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Jacob M. Puthuparambil and Ors. v. Kerala Water Authority and Ors. reported in AIR 1990 SC 2230, it has been held that employees who have been working on the establishment since long, and who possess the requisite qualifications for the job as obtaining on the date of their employment must be allowed to continue on their jobs and their services should be regularised. It is unfair and unreasonable to remove people who have been rendering service since sometime as such removal has serious consequences.
It is unfair and unreasonable to remove people who have been rendering service since sometime as such removal has serious consequences. The family of the employee which has settled down and accommodated its needs to the emoluments received by the bread winner will face economic ruination if the job is suddenly taken away. Besides, the precious period of early life devoted in the service of the establishment will be wholly wasted and the incumbent may be rendered "age barred" for securing a job elsewhere. It is indeed unfair to use him, generate hope and a feeling of security in him, attune his family to live within his earnings and then suddenly to throw him out of job. Such behaviour would be an affront to the concept of job security and would run counter to the constitutional philosophy, particularly the concept of right to work in Article 41 of the Constitution. In yet another judgment being a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Braj Kishore Singh and Ors. v. The State of Bihar and Ors., reported in 1997 (1) PLJR 509 , relating to consideration of the case of regularization of daily wage earners appointed on the basis of staffing pattern, the said Court held at Paragraph 32 that after so many years it would not be appropriate to allow the Government to reopen the matter after a long lapse of time and thereafter held that these employees were entitled to be regularized against the posts within the staffing pattern as applicable to the College. Paragraph 32 of that judgment reads as follows :-- "In the above premises, the judgment of the learned single Judge rejecting the claim of the appellants on the ground that they were appointed without prior approval of the State Government as contemplated under Section 35 of the Act cannot be sustained. In the ordinary course, in view of my conclusion that it is open to the State Government to consider the validity of appointments already made for the purpose of granting or refusing post facto approval. I would have considered asking the State Government to look into the claim of the appellants afresh.
In the ordinary course, in view of my conclusion that it is open to the State Government to consider the validity of appointments already made for the purpose of granting or refusing post facto approval. I would have considered asking the State Government to look into the claim of the appellants afresh. However, having regard to the fact that the appellants have contented in service for more than 17 years, I do not think it would be appropriate exercise of discretion to re-open the matter after such a long lapse of time. In Direct Recruit Class -II Engineering Officers Associations v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1990 SC 1607 , a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has held that where initial appointment is nor made according to the rules but the appointee continues in service uninterruptedly for long period till regularisation of his service, the entire period as the period spent in service for the purpose of consequential benefits will be counted. The appellants are accordingly entitled to have their services regularised against the posts within the staffing pattern as applicable to the college." 21. Mr. Rajnandan Sahay, learned Sr. Standing Counsel No. II insisted that the guidelines circulated by the letter No. 142 dated 4.2.1989 (Annexure-7) have not been followed. 22. The aforementioned argument of Mr. Rajnandan Sahay, does not appeal to this Court because the said Circular relates to the payment of salary to those teaching and non-teaching employees who, after having been selected for appointment in the Project Schools in 1984-85, had been appointed within the sanctioned posts by the Managing Committee and who were not being paid. This Circular therefore is not applicable to this case. 23. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the opinion that the instant writ petition deserves to succeed and it is accordingly allowed to do so. The impugned order of termination dated 27.2.2003 is set aside and quashed. The matter is remanded to the respondent No. 2 to pass a fresh order in accordance with law after taking into consideration the observations made herein. The respondent No. 2 shall pass orders as expeditiously as possible but not later than a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.