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2004 DIGILAW 410 (GAU)

Bakul Bora v. State of Assam

2004-06-21

I.A.ANSARI, P.G.AGARWAL

body2004
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. By the impugned judgment and order, dated 30.11.99, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jorhat, in Sessions Case No. 43(J) of 1995, the accused-Appellants, namely, Bakul Bora (A1) and Bup Bora (A2) stand convicted under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC and sentenced to suffer, for their conviction under Section 302 IPC, imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each and, in default of payment of fine, suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of one month and to suffer, for their conviction under Section 201 IPC, rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years each with fine of Rs. 500/- and, in default of payment of fine, rigorous imprisonment for a further period of one month, both the sentences having been directed to run concurrently. 2. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded at the trial, may, in brief, be stated as follows: On 01.08.92 at about 5 pm, Putu Bora (since deceased) went to have his bath at Aathubhanga rivulet and, thereafter, he was found missing. On an information lodged, in this regard, by Jitu Bora, elder brother of Putu Bora, with the police, at Pulibor police station, G.D. Entry No. 93/92 was made and on the following day, i.e., on 02.08.92 at about 4 a.m., Putu's dead body was found floating in the said rivulet. On being informed of the same, police registered U.D. Case No. 13/92, dated 02.08.92, and during the course of a preliminary enquiry, police arrived there and held inquest over the said dead body. The post mortem examination, conducted on the said dead body, revealed that Putu's death was homicidal in nature. Thereafter, on the basis of a written Ejahar, lodged at the said Police Station, by Sub Inspector of Police Bhupen Sharma, Pulibor P.S. case No. 81/92 under Sections 302/34 IPC was registered against unknown culprits treating the said Ejahar as the First Information report. During the course of investigation, accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora (A1) also produced before the police a piece of wood, which was allegedly used as an instrument of killing the said deceased, Putu Bora, and the same was seized. The two accused-Appellants, namely, Bakul Bora and Bup Bora (A1 and A2) made judicial confessions, which were recorded under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure. The two accused-Appellants, namely, Bakul Bora and Bup Bora (A1 and A2) made judicial confessions, which were recorded under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure. On completion of the investigation, police submitted charge sheet not only against the two accused-Appellants, namely, Bakul Bora and Bup Bora, but also against two others, namely, Pranab Bora and Bipul Barman. The accused, Bipul Barman, however, absconded. 3. During trial, the three accused persons, namely, Pranab Bora (since acquitted) as well as the present two accused-Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges framed against them under Sections 302 and 201 IPC read with Section 34 of the IPC. 4. In all, prosecution examined 14 witnesses. All the accused were, then, examined under Section313 Code of Criminal Procedure and in their examinations aforementioned, they denied that they had committed the offences alleged to have been committed by them, the case of the defence being that of total denial. Both the accused-Appellants pleaded that their respective judicial confessions were made by them as a result of threats given to them by the police. No evidence was, however, adduced by the defence. On conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court held accused Pranab Bora not guilty of the charges framed against him and accordingly acquitted him; but the present two accused-Appellants were found guilty of the charges framed against them and were convicted accordingly. The sentences, as mentioned hereinabove, were accordingly passed against them. Hence, the present appeal. 5. We have carefully perused the records. We have heard Ms. Minakshi Bujarbaruah, learned Amicus Curiae, appearing for the Appellants, and Mr. F.H. Laskar, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, for the State-Respondent. 6. While considering this appeal, it is pertinent to note that there is no eye witness to the alleged occurrence of assault on, and killing of, Putu Bora. The conviction of the accused-Appellants rests basically on the judicial confessions and some other incriminating circumstances. 7. F.H. Laskar, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, for the State-Respondent. 6. While considering this appeal, it is pertinent to note that there is no eye witness to the alleged occurrence of assault on, and killing of, Putu Bora. The conviction of the accused-Appellants rests basically on the judicial confessions and some other incriminating circumstances. 7. The evidence on record discloses that according to Jitu Bora (P.W. 2), elder brother of deceased Putu Bora, on the day Putu was noticed missing, Putu had gone, in the evening, to the nearby stream known Khorgorajan (i.e. a kind of rivulet) but did not return home, whereupon he (P.W. 2) and his other co-villager looked for Putu, but could found no trace of him and, on the following day, in the morning, when they, again, searched for Putu, they found his dead body floating in the said stream, whereupon the police was informed accordingly, police came and held inquest over the dead body, Ext. 2 being the inquest report. It is also in the evidence of P.W. 2 that during the search, they found a gamocha (i.e. a country towel) lying on a path and the same, on being shown to the police, was also seized by a seizure list (Ext. 3) P.W. 2 has further deposed that during the investigation, police arrested the accused persons and, on being led by accused Bokul Bora, police came to the house of the Bokul Bora and seized, vide seizure list (Ext. 4), two pieces of wood and a gamocha. In his cross-examination, P.W. 2 has, however, clarified that he was standing on the road, when the police came out of the house of accused Bokul Bora and showed him the two pieces of wood and the gamocha, which were seized. This shows that so far as this witness is concerned, he does not know the complete circumstances and the exact place from where the two pieces of wood and the gamocha were recovered and seized by the police. 8. Close on the heels of the above evidence of P.W. 2, P.W. 4 (Latu Bora) has deposed that accused Bokul Bora and Bup Bora (A1 and A2) are the neighbours of the said deceased. 8. Close on the heels of the above evidence of P.W. 2, P.W. 4 (Latu Bora) has deposed that accused Bokul Bora and Bup Bora (A1 and A2) are the neighbours of the said deceased. As regards the occurrence, P.W. 4 has deposed that deceased Putu Bora went to take bath in Khagagarua Jan (i.e. a local stream) having two gamochas with him, but as Putu did not return back home till 7 p.m., they searched for him, but found no trace. P.W. 4 has also deposed that on the next day, when the search for Putu was on, they found his dead body lying in the said stream and the police were informed. It is in the evidence of P.W. 4 (Latu Bora) that some days prior to the occurrence, accused Bokul Bora's sister had eloped with P.W. 4, which had given rise to a dispute between the families of accused, bakul Bora, on the one hand, and Putu Bora, on the other, and following his sister's elopement, accused Bakul along with other accused had threatened P.W. 4 (Latu Bora) and at the time, when the threat was so given by accused Bakul to P.W. 4, Puto Bora (since deceased) was also present there. 9. So far as P.W. 9 (Sarupai Neog) is concerned, his evidence is that he is a member of the local Gaon Panchayat and on 02.08.92, police came to Athubhagajan and held inquest over the dead body of Putu Bora in his presence, Ext. 2 being the inquest report. 10. Coupled with the above, P.W. 12 (Sub Inspector Bhupen Sharma) has deposed that on 01.08.92 at 8.30 a.m., Jitu Bora (P.W. 2) lodged a missing report, at Pulibor Police Station, informing the police that his brother, Putu Bora, had gone to take bath at about 5 p.m. at Athubhagajan, but he had not returned home and was missing. This information was entered as U.D. Case No. 13/92 and during investigation of the said U.D. case, when Putu's dead body was found at Athubhagajan by the side of the boundary wall of the Air Force Authority, he (P.W. 12) held inquest over the said dead body, Ext. 2 being the inquest report. P.W. 12 has also deposed that on receiving the post mortem report and on finding that Putu had died due to injuries sustained by him by blunt weapon, he filed a written Ejahar (Ext. 2 being the inquest report. P.W. 12 has also deposed that on receiving the post mortem report and on finding that Putu had died due to injuries sustained by him by blunt weapon, he filed a written Ejahar (Ext. 9) at Pulibor Police Station. 11. Before proceeding any further, it needs to be noted that though the said written Ejahar (Ext. 9) filed by Sub Inspector Bhupen Sarma has been treated by the police as the FIR of this case, the fact remains that on the basis of the oral information given by Jitu Bora (P.W. 2), on 01.08.92, that his brother, Putu, was missing, the police had made G.D. Entry No. 93/92 and when, on the following day, i.e., on 02.08.92, the dead body of Putu was found, police registered U.D. Case No. 13/92, dated 02.08.92 aforementioned, and it was during the investigation of the said U.D. Case that the inquest was held on the said dead-body and after having received post mortem examination report (Ext. 1) that the Ejahar (Ext 9) was formally lodged by P.W. 12 (i.e., the Investigation Officer). 12. From what have been discussed above coupled with the contents of the said Ejahar (Ext. 9), it becomes clear that the said Ejahar was lodged after the investigation to determine the question as to how putu Bora had died and who was responsible for his death had made great headway. Hence, the contents of the said Ejahar were nothing but constituted statements made by P.W. 12 during the investigation of the case. It logically follows that the said Ejahar (Ext. 9) could not have been treated as the FIR of the case. It is, as a matter of fact, the missing report entry given by Jitu Bora which had set the machinery of law into motion and was, in law, the FIR. 13. Bearing in mind the above features of the evidence on record, when we turn to the evidence of P.W. 1 (Dr. B. Dutta), we find that he performed post mortem examination on the dead body of Putu Bora on 03.08.92 and found as follows: A healthy dead body. Rigor mortis present. The dead body was putrefied and blotted up with gas. Laceration present over the right ear lobule. No bruise could be seen due to putrefaction and gas formation. B. Dutta), we find that he performed post mortem examination on the dead body of Putu Bora on 03.08.92 and found as follows: A healthy dead body. Rigor mortis present. The dead body was putrefied and blotted up with gas. Laceration present over the right ear lobule. No bruise could be seen due to putrefaction and gas formation. Thorax: Multiple rib fracture present over the chest involving right 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th ribs and on the left side from 3rd to 8th ribs. Pleurae: Found congested and contained dark colour blood. Right and left lungs were found congested and lacerated underlying the broken ribs. Abdomen: Liver shows rupture over the right lobe with full of blood in peritoneal cavity. Spleen also found ruptured. Peritoneum found congested. 14. In the opinion of P.W. 1, all the injuries were ante mortem in nature, the cause of death being shock and haemorrhage as a result of the injuries sustained by the deceased. P.W. 1 has proved Ext. 1 as his post mortem report. 15. P.W. 1 has clarified, in his evidence, that after rupture of liver, spleen and laceration of lungs, a person can survive only for a few minutes and medical aid would be of no help to such a patient. P.W. 1 has also clarified in his evidence that the fracture of the right side and left side of the ribs were identical and that such injuries could be caused by compressing force from outside with heavy object. It is in the evidence of P.W. 1 that if a piece of wood is placed on the chest and sufficient pressure is given, such type of injuries can be caused, but unless the victim is incapacitated, a single person cannot cause such injuries by standing on the piece of wood placed on the chest of the victim. 16. P.W. 1 has further clarified in his evidence that since the said dead body was decomposed with formation of gas, external injuries on the decomposed body could not be detected, but the injuries were caused by blunt object and that since the whole chest was crushed, there must have been several strokes with a blunt object to cause such injuries and that the blunt object could have been a lathi or a piece of wood. 17. 17. The medical evidence given by P.W. 1 was not challenged by the defence at the trial nor is it challenged before us in this appeal. Thus, me findings of the P.W. 1 and his opinion with regard to the nature of the injuries sustained by the said deceased, cause of death and also the nature of the weapon, which could have been used are all undisputed. 18. What emerges from the above discussion of the evidence of P.W. 2 (Jitu Bora), P.W. 4 (Latu Bora), P.W. 9 (Sarupai Neog), P.W. 12 (S.I. Bhupen Sharma) and P.W. 1 (Dr. B. Dutta) is that on 01.08.92, at about 5 p.m., Putu Bora went to have his bath at Aathubhanga rivulet and did not return home. As he was found missing, an information was lodged, in this regard, with the police, at Pulibor police station, by Putu's elder brother, Jitu Bora. Some days prior to the disappearance of Putu Bora, the accused Bokul Bora's sister had eloped with Latu Bora (P.W. 4) and this elopement had given rise to a dispute between the families of accused Bokul Bora, on the one hand, and Putu Bora (since deceased), on the other hand, and following his sister's elopement, accused Bokul Bora along with the other co-accused had issued threats to Latu Bora (P.W. 4) and at the time, when the threats were so given to Latu by Bakul, deceased Putu was also present there. On the following day of the disappearance of Putu Bora, i.e., on 02.08.92, at about 4 a.m., Putu's dead body was found in the said rivulet and on being informed of the same, police arrived there, held inquest over the said dead body and also got conducted post mortem examination on the said dead body, which revealed that Putu's death was not natural, but homicidal in nature. 19. From the oral as well as the medical evidence on record, the learned trial Court concluded that Putu Bora died as a result of the injuries found over his dead body. We have no reason to differ from the conclusion so reached by the learned trial Court and we have no hesitation in holding that Putu Bora had met with homicidal death. 20. We have no reason to differ from the conclusion so reached by the learned trial Court and we have no hesitation in holding that Putu Bora had met with homicidal death. 20. Having concluded that Putu Bora had met with homicidal death, let us, now, determine if the present two Appellants and/or any of them had put to death Putu and/or had removed his dead body with intent to shield the offenders). 21. The questions poised above bring us to the evidence of P.W. 7, who is a Judicial Magistrate. According to the evidence of P.W. 7, on 6.8.92, at 11.30 a.m., while he was functioning as a Judicial Magistrate, at Jorhat, three accused persons, namely, Bup Bora, Bakul Bora and Pronob Bora (since acquitted) were produced before him for recording their confessional statements under Section 164Code of Criminal Procedure, he cautioned them and told them that they were not bound to make any confession and if they made any confessional statement, then, the same would be used against them as evidence and, after so cautioning them, he allowed them time for more than three hours for reflection and kept them in his chamber under the custody of his peon, Naser Hussain. P.W. 7 has also deposed that during this period of reflection given to the accused, no police personnel were allowed to enter his chamber and no police officer was also present within the view of the accused persons. P.W. 7 has further deposed that after expiry of the period of reflection, the accused persons were brought back before him, he, again, cautioned them as per Para 5 and 6 of the confessional statement form and also put some questions to them to the effect that they would not be sent to police, again, even if they refused to make any confession, that if they made any confession, it would be used against them as evidence and it was, thereafter, that all the accused persons expressed their willingness to make confession, whereupon he proceeded to record the confessional statements of the accused persons individually one after the other. P.W. 7 has clarified that each time, he cautioned the accused persons separately, one after the other, before recording their confession. 22. P.W. 7 has clarified that each time, he cautioned the accused persons separately, one after the other, before recording their confession. 22. It is in the evidence of P.W. 7 that after recording the confessional statement made by accused Bup Bora, (A2) he read over the same to accused Bup Bora, whereupon accused Bup Bora put his signature on his confession, Ext. 5 being the confessional statement form, Ext. 5(1) being the confessional statement of accused Bup Bora and Exts. 5 (2), 5(3), 5(4) and 5(5) being also the signatures of the said accused given in his presence. It is also in the evidence of P.W. 7 that he gave a certificate, in his own hand, regarding recording of voluntary nature of the confession, Ext. 5(13) being the said certificate and, thereafter, accused Bup Bora was sent to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jorhat, at 3-45 P.M. 23. P.W. 7 has also given evidence to the effect that in the similar manner, he recorded the confessional statement of accused Bokul Bora (A1) and, then, the confessional statement of accused, Pranob Bora recorded Ext. 6(1) and and 7(1) being the confessional statements of accused Bokul Bora and Pranob Bora respectively. 24. In his cross-examination by the defence, P.W. 7 has clarified that to the questions put by him to the effect as to why they wanted to make confessional statements, the accused persons had replied by saying that they were repenting for the crime they had committed. It is also clarified by P.W. 7, in his cross-examination, that before recording the confessions, the accused persons were assured by him that they would not be sent back to police custody. 25. Coupled with the above evidence, we also have on record Ext. 5, (Form No. M 84) which contains the judicial confession of accused Appellant, Bup Bora (A2), recorded under Section 164Code of Criminal Procedure and Ext. 6 (Form No. M 84), which contains the judicial confession of accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora, (A1) recorded under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure. We, first, consider the judicial confession made by the accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora. 26. Apart from the fact that P.W. 7 has asserted in his evidence that he had questioned the two accused-Appellants as to why they wanted to make confession and that he had assured them that they would not be sent to police custody, we find that Ext. We, first, consider the judicial confession made by the accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora. 26. Apart from the fact that P.W. 7 has asserted in his evidence that he had questioned the two accused-Appellants as to why they wanted to make confession and that he had assured them that they would not be sent to police custody, we find that Ext. 6 (which contains the confessional statement of accused Bakul Bora) reveals a note by P.W. 7 that accused made no complaint of torture by the police and he was found repenting for the crime. This noting clearly indicates that in response to the questions put to him by P.W. 7 the accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora, made no complaint regarding any torture made by the police. 27. Coupled with the above, we also notice from Ext. 6 that when P.W. 7 had informed the accused that he was not to make confession out of fear from the police or others, the accused-Appellants had clearly replied by saying to the effect that they would make the confession of their own. The accused was also told by P.W. 7, we find, that he was not a police officer, that the accused were not bound to make any confession and if the accused made any confession, the same could be used against him. 28. In the face of the elaborate precautions, which P.W. 7 so took in recording the confession, we find no reason to hold that the confession made by the accused Appellants, Bakul Bora and/or Bup Bora, were in voluntary by nature. 29. While considering the voluntary nature of the judicial confession mentioned hereinabove, it is also imperative to note that it is, admittedly, P.W. 14, who had arrested both the accused-Appellants, namely, Bakul and Bup Bora (A1 and A2) but it was not even suggested to P.W. 14 by the defence, when P.W. 14 was under cross-examination by the defence, that the police had, while the two accused-Appellants were in their custody, tortured the accused or forced them to make the judicial confessions. 30. Thus, both the accused-Appellants did not even hint at the time of the cross-examination of P.W. 14 that they were tortured, beaten, harassed, coerced or unduly influenced by the police to make the judicial confessions. 30. Thus, both the accused-Appellants did not even hint at the time of the cross-examination of P.W. 14 that they were tortured, beaten, harassed, coerced or unduly influenced by the police to make the judicial confessions. As a matter of fact, even in his examination under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, accused Bup Bora (A1 and A2) gave no indication that he was threatened, tortured and/or, in any way, unduly influenced by the police to make the confession. Same was the situation in the case of accused Bakul Bora. Curiously enough, neither at the time of cross-examination of P.W. 7, it was suggested to P.W. 7 that the confessions made by the two accused-Appellants were involuntary nor while cross-examining P.W. 14, it was asserted, on behalf of the two accused-Appellants, that the police had beaten, threatened or tortured them to make the confession. It was only at the time of his examination under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure that the accused-Appellant, Bokul Bora (A1), for the first time, claimed that when he had made the confession, he was not in a sound state of mind as he had been threatened by the police that he would be beaten up if he did not make the confession. 31. In the face of the discussion of the materials on record including the said remarks made in column 8 of the judicial confession forms by P.W. 7, the complete omission, on the part of the accused-Appellant, Bokul Bora, to even suggest to P.W. 7 and P.W. 14 that the police had beaten, tortured, coerced and/or threatened him to make the concession, the assertion made by accused, Bakul Bora, at the stage of his examination under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, merely to the effect that he had been threatened that he would be beaten if he would not make the confession, can be given no credence and/or weightage at all. Implicit even in this assertion under Section 313Code of Criminal Procedure was an admission by the accused-Appellant that he had not been beaten by the police and/or tortured by the police, but that he was threatened. This threat was not accompanied by any assault and/or torture by the police. Implicit even in this assertion under Section 313Code of Criminal Procedure was an admission by the accused-Appellant that he had not been beaten by the police and/or tortured by the police, but that he was threatened. This threat was not accompanied by any assault and/or torture by the police. In such a situation, without any foundation having been laid for making such an assertion under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, while P.W. 7 and P.W. 14 were being cross-examined by the defence, such vague assertions, which have nothing to receive support from the evidence on record, can be given no importance and/or credence at all. 32. Situated thus, we find no reason to hold that the judicial confessions made by the accused-Appellants are in voluntary. 33. Coming to the contents of the judicial confession made by the accused-Appellant, Bokul Bora (A1), we find that this accused, in his confessional statement, has stated as follows: Accused Bup Bora is my father's elder brother's son. Bipul Barman lives in our house. Julu Hazarika and Pranab Bora are my friends. On 22.6.92, Putu Bora's elder brother, Latu Bora, had secretly taken away my sister, Shrimati Rupa Bora. 3/4 days after that Bipul Barman, Pranab Bora, Julu Hazarika and I went to Latu Bora's house and asked for Rs. 10,000/-. Latu refused to give the money. Putu did not say anything. Bup Bora instigated us to take revenge. Bup was a witness on the road, when Latu had secretly taken away my sister. He was instigating us, possibly because he had not got money from them. First, I was unaware of that. Putu Bora was seen going to take bath at Athubhanga rivulet at evening on Saturday last and we were informed accordingly. Then Bipul Barman, Bup Bora, Julu Hazarika, Pranab Bora and I went near to the rivulet at about 6 O'clock. There we saw Putu Bora applying mehendi' on his hair. At the time of our leaving for the place, Bup Bora had carried along two pieces of wood. Pranab tied Putu's mouth with the gamocha that I had taken with me and made him unable to speak. Bup and I was pressing Putu's legs. Julu Hazarika was pressing Putu's shoulder with a piece of wood. Holding Putu I was kicking him. Putu was finished. Pranab tied Putu's mouth with the gamocha that I had taken with me and made him unable to speak. Bup and I was pressing Putu's legs. Julu Hazarika was pressing Putu's shoulder with a piece of wood. Holding Putu I was kicking him. Putu was finished. Thereafter the five of us carried him and threw him across' the Air Force wall and came back home. Thereafter, at about 2 a.m., Bipul Barman, Bup and I crossed the Air Force wall and threw the dead body of Putu in the Athubhanga rivulet. In the morning, the villagers found the dead body of Putu floating on water. I had brought along the gamocha and had kept the same at my house. I had brought along one of the pieces of the wood. Yesterday, I produced before the police the piece of wood we had killed Putu with. Today morning, I produced before the police the gamocha from my house. There was no bleeding injury in Putu's body. He had sustained a minor injury on his shoulder. I am very much sorry now. All these happened, because of Bup Bora. He had arranged everything. Now, I have come to know that he is a rogue. 34. From the above confessional statement, we find that the accused Appellant, Bokul Bora (A1), not only incriminated himself as a person, who had killed the deceased, Putu Bora, but that he had also implicated his co-accused, Bup Bora (A2), in the killing of Putu Bora as well as in the disposal of the deadbody. 35. The question, now, is if the judicial confession of the accused Appellant Bakul Bora, was true? How to ascertain if a voluntarily made judicial confession can be relied upon as true too, one can recall the decision in Shankaria v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1978 SC 1248 , wherein the Apex Court observed thus: If the first test is satisfied, the Court must, before acting upon the confession, reach the finding that what is stated therein is true and reliable. For judging the reliability of such a confession, or for that matter of any substantive piece of evidence, there is no rigid cannon of universal application. Even so, one broad method, which may be useful in most cases for evaluating a confession may be indicated. For judging the reliability of such a confession, or for that matter of any substantive piece of evidence, there is no rigid cannon of universal application. Even so, one broad method, which may be useful in most cases for evaluating a confession may be indicated. The Court should carefully examine the confession and compare it with the rest of the evidence, in the light of the surrounding circumstances and probabilities of the case. If on such examination and comparison, the confession appears to be a probable catalogue of events and naturally fits in with the rest of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances, it may be taken to have satisfied the second test. 36. In the present case, in order to determine if the judicial confessions made by the two accused-Appellants, Bakul Bora and Bup Bora, are true, let us, now, in the light of the law laid down in Shankaria (supra), ascertain if the confessional statements made by the two accused-Appellants receive necessary corroboration from the remaining evidence on record. 37. For the moment, let us consider the case against the accused-Appellant. Bokul Bora. While considering this aspect of the matter, it is of immense importance to note that in his evidence, the Investigating Officer (P.W. 14) has deposed that during the investigation, he seized two pieces of timber on being led by three accused persons, namely, Bakul Bora, Bup Bora and Bipul Barman (since absconded). 38. Apart from the fact that it was denied by the accused-Appellants that they had produced any of the allegedly seized articles, it is important to note that no statement was recorded, in writing, by the police before the alleged recovery of the pieces of timber. This apart, the evidence of P.W. 14 does not even indicate as to who had actually pointed out, first, the pieces of timber/wood, which were seized by the police. The present one is, thus, a classic case of joint statement leading to alleged discovery of certain facts and/or pointing out of an incriminating object by more than one accused and seizure thereof. The present one is, thus, a classic case of joint statement leading to alleged discovery of certain facts and/or pointing out of an incriminating object by more than one accused and seizure thereof. In such a situation, the recovery of the seized materials is of no value inasmuch as it is the duty of the prosecution to show as to who was the accused, whose statement had actually led to the discovery of the facts, and/or who was the accused, who had actually, first, pointed out the articles, which were, eventually, seized. In the present case, there is no recorded statement of any of the accused and nothing to indicate as to which one of the accused had, first, made the statement, which led to the recovery and seizure of articles aforementioned nor is there any clear and clinching evidence as to who had, first, pointed out the articles, which were, eventually, seized by P.W. 14. The factum of recovery of the said pieces of timber/wood and/or gamocha is, therefore, of no value at all. 39. However, a dispassionate analysis of the confession made by the accused, Bakul, vis-a-vis the materials on record, it clearly transpires that the description given by the accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora (A1), in his confessional statement, as to how Putu Bora died is substantially corroborated by the medical evidence on record inasmuch as the medical evidence on record, as reflected from the evidence of P.W. 1, shows that 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th ribs on the right side of the chest of the said deceased and the 3rd to 8th ribs of the deceased sustained multiple fractures, both lungs were congested and laceration were found under the broken ribs. This apart, the liver stood ruptured over the right lobe with full of blood in peritoneal cavity, spleen was also ruptured. In no uncertain words, the doctor opined that if a piece of wood is placed on the chest and sufficient pressure is given, the kind of fractures, which the deceased sustained, could have been caused. This apart, the liver stood ruptured over the right lobe with full of blood in peritoneal cavity, spleen was also ruptured. In no uncertain words, the doctor opined that if a piece of wood is placed on the chest and sufficient pressure is given, the kind of fractures, which the deceased sustained, could have been caused. The medical evidence also rules out the possibility that unless the victim was incapacitated, one person could not have stood on a piece of wood placed on the chest of the victim and caused such injury, in short, medical evidence on record substantially corroborates the manner of assault on Putu Bora as the judicial confession of the accused Appellant, Bakul Bora, (A1) reflects and proves beyond doubt that Putu Bora was put to death by more than one person in the manner as indicated by the confessional statement of the accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora (A1). 40. Caupled with the above, the evidence of P.W. 4 clearly shows that Rupa Bora, sister of Bakul Bora, eloped with P.W. 4 and following this elopement, accused Bakul had threatened P.W. 4 and at that point of time, the deceased, Putu Bora, was also present there. Thus, the reason assigned in the judicial confession by the accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora, as to why they had killed Putu also receives corroboration from the evidence on record. Further-more, as reflected from this judicial confession, Putu's deadbody was found in Aathubhanga stream, where the said dead-body was, according to this judicial confession, thrown. 41. What logically follows from the above discussion is that the confessional statement of the accused is not only voluntary, but also true. 42. When the prosecution seeks conviction of an accused on the basis of the confession of the accused himself, there is no impediment in basing the conviction of the accused on his own confession if the Court finds such a confession voluntary and true, yet, as a rule of practice, it is unsafe to rely upon a confession, particularly, if the confession stands retracted, unless the Court is satisfied that the retracted confession is voluntary and true and the same has been corroborated in material particulars. We may refer to Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 637 , wherein the Apex Court laid down as follows: It is, however, true that Sarwan Singh has made a confession and in law, it is always open to the Court to convict an accused on his confession itself though he has retracted it at a later stage. .... Nevertheless usually Courts require some corroboration to the confessional statement before conviting an accused person on such statement. What amount of corroboration would be necessary in such a case would always be a question of fact to be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case. 43. We may also refer to Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1963 SC 1094 wherein the Apex Court laid down as follows: A retracted confession may form the legal basis of a conviction if the Court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntarily made. But it has been held that a court shall not base a conviction on such a confession without corroboration. It is not a rule of law, but is only a rule of prudence. It can not even be laid down as an inflexible rule of practice or prudence that under no circumstances such a conviction can be made without corroboration, for, a court may, in a particular case, be convinced of the absolute truth of a confession and prepared to act upon it without corroboration; but it may be laid down as a general rule of practice that it is unsafe to rely upon a confession, much less on a retracted confession, unless the Court is satisfied that the retracted confession is true and voluntarily made and has been corroborated in material particulars. 44. That there is no impediment in law in conviction an accused solely on his own confession, even if retracted, provided that the Court believes such a confession as true has been made clear, by the Apex Court in Kehar Singh v. The State (Delhi Administration) reported in AIR 1988 SC 1883 . 44. That there is no impediment in law in conviction an accused solely on his own confession, even if retracted, provided that the Court believes such a confession as true has been made clear, by the Apex Court in Kehar Singh v. The State (Delhi Administration) reported in AIR 1988 SC 1883 . That no Court can throw away confession merely because the confession is retracted has been clearly laid down in State of Tamil Nadu v. Kutty alias Lakshmi Narashinhan 2001 CRI L.J. 4168, wherein the Apex Court has observed and held as follows: Learned Judges of the High Court declined to act on the said confession mainly for two reasons. First is that the confession was retracted by the maker thereof and second is that the recovery of articles was made prior to the confession. We may state at the outset itself that both reasons are too insufficient for overruling the confession. It is not the law that once a confession was retracted the Court should presume that the confession is tainted. As a matter of practical knowledge we can say that non-retracted confession is a rarity in criminal cases. The retract from confession is the right of the confessor and all the accused against confessions were produced by the prosecution have invariably adopted that right. It would be injudicious to jettison a judicial confession on the mere premise that its maker has retracted from it. The Court has a duty to evaluate the evidence concerning the confession by looking at all aspects. The twin test of a confession is to ascertain whether it was voluntary and true. Once these tests are found to be positive the next endeavour is to see whether there is any other reason, which stands in the way of acting on it. Even for that, retraction of the confession is not the ground to throw the confession overboard. 45. In K.I. Parunny v. Asstt. Collector (HQ), Central Excise collectors, Cochin, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 721 , the Apex Court has, in no uncertain words, clarified that in a criminal trial punishable under the provisions of the IPC, it is, now, well settled legal position that confession can form the sole basis of conviction. 46. 45. In K.I. Parunny v. Asstt. Collector (HQ), Central Excise collectors, Cochin, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 721 , the Apex Court has, in no uncertain words, clarified that in a criminal trial punishable under the provisions of the IPC, it is, now, well settled legal position that confession can form the sole basis of conviction. 46. After taking into consideration a number of its own decisions, the Apex Court, in R.I. Parunny (supra), has laid down succinctly the law with regard to basing of conviction of an accused, on his own confession, in the following words: It would thus be seen that there is no prohibition under the Evidence Act to rely upon the retracted confession to prove the prosecution case or to make the same basis for conviction of the accused. Practice and prudence require that the court could examine the evidence adduced by the prosecution to find out whether there are any other facts and circumstances to corroborate the retracted confession. It is not necessary that there should be corroboration from independent evidence adduced by the prosecution to corroborate each detail contained in the confessional statement. The court is required to examine whether the confessional statement is voluntary; in other words, whether it was not obtained by threat, duress or promise. If the court is satisfied from the evidence that it was voluntary then it is required to examine whether the statement is true. If the court on examination of the evidence finds that the retracted confession is true, that part of the inculpatory portion could be relied upon to base the conviction. However, prudence and practice require that court would seek assurance getting corroboration from other evidence adduced by the prosecution. 47. What follows from the above discussion, if we may reiterate, is that there is no legal bar in basing the conviction of an accused on his own confession if the confession is found to be voluntary and true, but safer it is, as a rule of general practice and prudence, that the Court seeks some corroboration from other materials on record and if such corroboration is received, conviction can be safely based on the confession of the accused. We may also point out that when a confession is found to be voluntary and true, the same cannot be refused to be acted upon merely on the ground that the confession stands retracted, for, even a retracted confession can form legal basis for conviction if the Court is, as observed in Pyare Lal Bhargava (supra), satisfied that the confession is true and voluntary. 48. In the case at hand, we have already indicated hereinabove, that the retraction of the confession made by the accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora,(A1) at the time of his cross-examination under Section313 Code of Criminal Procedure carries, for the reasons we have already assigned, no credibility at all and in the face of the fact we are satisfied, that the confession of this accused-Appellant is voluntary and true and since the same receives, as we have noticed above, corroboration in its material particulars from the other evidence on record, we have no hesitation in holing that Putu Bora was put to death in the manner as the confessional statement of this accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora (A1), discloses. 49. Coupled with the above, it is also of immense importance to note that in the present case, the accused-Appellant, Bup Bora, (A2) has also made judicial confession, which we have already held to be voluntary. This confessional statement reads as follows: Accused Bakul Bora is my brother, son of my uncle. Latu Bora, the elder brother of deceased Putu Bora, had secretly taken away Smti. Rupa Bora, the sister of accused Bakul Bora. Bakul and Putu were not in good terms because of that. Bakul had wanted to marry his sister off to Bipul Barman. But Rupa did not agree to get married with him. On 22.6.92, Bakul, Bipul Barman and two young men from civil gate (One was Juli Bora, the name of the other is not known) went to Latu Bora's house and demanded Rs. 10,000/- Latu refused to give money. An altercation started. Then Latu's brother, Putu, told that they would not give the girl and the money either. Following that Bakul and Bipul Barman said that they would kill Putu. Since then Bakul, Bipul and two young men from Jail road held discussions with me to murder Putu Bora. Last Saturday, Putu Bora had gone to Athubhanga rivulet to take bath there. The time was 5 P.M., when he used to take bath there. Following that Bakul and Bipul Barman said that they would kill Putu. Since then Bakul, Bipul and two young men from Jail road held discussions with me to murder Putu Bora. Last Saturday, Putu Bora had gone to Athubhanga rivulet to take bath there. The time was 5 P.M., when he used to take bath there. Going near Athubhanga rivulet, I saw that he was applying shampoo on his head. He was wearing a gamocha and (illegible word). Asking him to take bath, I came back from there. After that before I reached my home, Bakul, Bipul Barman and the two young men from civil gate went to the rivulet near their residence. Following them, when I reached there, the two young men from Jail road undid the gamocha that Putu was wearing, tied his mouth with the gamocha that Bakul and Barman were carrying with them and make him unable to speak and placing the two pieces of wood on his belly and chest, pressed him by their feet with shoes on. After that they four took Putu Bora inside Air-field across the rivulet and keeping him there, they came back home. I did not tell any body about this. At about 7.30 p.m. when Putu Bora's family members searched for him, I too went with them fearing that they might suspect me. At about 2 A.M., Barman, Bakul and the two young men from Jail Road came and awake me. But I did not accompany them. I told them that they were at liberty to throw the dead body of Putu Bora at any place of their choice. Putu Bora had no grudge against me. Bakul is my brother, the son of my uncle. After Putu Bora's death, Bakul took away the gamocha and kept the same at his house. Later, Bakul produced the gamocha and the two pieces of wood. My house and the house of Bakul are contiguous. I was aware of the plan made by Bakul and Bipul Barman to kill Putu Bora. I pray to be pardoned for the first time. 50. The law with regard to the use of confession of a co-accused is also self settled. 51. My house and the house of Bakul are contiguous. I was aware of the plan made by Bakul and Bipul Barman to kill Putu Bora. I pray to be pardoned for the first time. 50. The law with regard to the use of confession of a co-accused is also self settled. 51. The present one is one of those very few cases, where two accused persons have made judicial confessions and while confession of an accused is relevant under Sections 24 to 29 of the Evidence Act against himself, it is Section 30 of the Evidence Act, which makes the confession of a co-accused relevant. There is a marked difference between the probative values of the confession of an accused vis-a-vis the confession of a co-accused and this difference appears to have, quite often, created confusion and incorrect approach, though the law on the use of the two kinds of judicial confessions is very well settled. The confession made by an accused, if found voluntary and true, can be made basis for his own conviction. Though corroboration of such a confession is not a condition precedent for making use of the confession as basis for conviction, prudence requires that some corroboration of the material particulars of the confession is received from the evidence on record. As against such use of confession against the maker of the confession, the confession of a co-accused is no evidence at all and it cannot be used as a foundation for conviction of the accused, who is not maker thereof, though the same can, indeed, be used as a supporting piece of evidence against the accused, who is not the maker thereof. 52. The reasons for not treating the confession of a co-accused as evidence are, broadly speaking, that the confession of a co-accused is not given on oath, it is neither given in the presence of the accused against whom the confession is sought to be relied upon nor is the maker's version is tested by cross-examination. 52. The reasons for not treating the confession of a co-accused as evidence are, broadly speaking, that the confession of a co-accused is not given on oath, it is neither given in the presence of the accused against whom the confession is sought to be relied upon nor is the maker's version is tested by cross-examination. I fact, such a confession is a weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approve, for the approved is cross-examined by the accused, whereas the confession of a co-accused is not subjected to cross-examination and brought on record without allowing the accused against whom such a confession is sought to be proved any opportunity of cross-examining the co-accused and testing the veracity or otherwise of the confession of the co-accused. A confession is relevant against the maker, because the maker implicates himself in a crime, but the confession of the co-accused differs in this regard inasmuch as it is some one else's confession, which is sought to be used against a person, who never owned up the guilt or the truth of the confession of his co-accused. (See Bhuboni Sahu v. The King 76 Ind. App. 147 and Emperor v. Lalit Mohan 12 CRI LJ 2 (Cal) 53. A co-accused, who confesses his guilt, stands on no better footing than an accomplice. The law insists that the accomplice's evidence be not used without corroboration. Prudence demands that when such an accomplice implicates another, then, the person, who is so implicated, has a right to test the evidence given against him by his co-accused; but no such opportunity is available in law to the person so implicated by his co-accused. The resultant effect is that the confession of a co-accused is used against another accused without giving him any opportunity of testing the veracity of the confession by cross-examining the maker thereof. No wonder, therefore, that the Apex Court has laid down that the confession of the co-accused is not really 'evidence' in its strict sense and cannot be made foundation for conviction of the person, who did not make the confession, though such confession can be used as an additional reason for believing the evidence on record provided that the evidence on record, independent of the confession of the co-accused, convinces the Court of the guilt of the accused against whom such a confession is relied upon. A reference, in this regard, may be made to Kashmira Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1952 SC 159 , wherein the Apex Court observed and laid down as follows: The confession of an accused person is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the term as defined in Section 8. It cannot be made the foundation of a conviction and can only be used in support of other evidence. The proper way is, first, to marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then, of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise, where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event, the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and, thus, fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept. 54. Thus, the above observations made in Kashmira Singh (supra) were in respect of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, that is, for using the confession of a co-accused and, hence, the decision in Kashmira Singh (supra) becomes relevant, when the confession of a co-accused is sought to be used as basis for conviction. In short, Kashmira Singh (supra) lays down the law with regard to use of the confession of a co-accused. 55. Drawing the distinction between the use of confession against its maker under Section 24 of the Evidence Act and the use of the confession against a co-accused under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, the Apex Court in K.I. Pavunny (supra) observed and held as follows: 21. In Kashmira Singh case the co-accused, Gurcharan Singh made a confession. The question arose whether the confession could be relied upon to prove the prosecution case against the Appellant Kashmira Singh. In that context, Bose, J. Speaking for a Bench of three Judges laid down the law that the court requires to marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration. The question arose whether the confession could be relied upon to prove the prosecution case against the Appellant Kashmira Singh. In that context, Bose, J. Speaking for a Bench of three Judges laid down the law that the court requires to marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration. If the evidence dehors the confession proves the guilt of the Appellant, the confession of the co-accused could be used to corroborate the prosecution case to lend assurance to the Court to convict the Appellant. The Court considered the evidence led by the prosecution, dehors the confession of co-accused and held that the evidence was not sufficient to bring home the guilt of Appellant Kashmira Singh of the charge of murder. The Appellant was acquitted of an offence under Section 302 IPC but was convicted for the offence under Section 201 IPC for destroying the evidence of murder and sentenced him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. .... 23. In Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar a Constitution Bench was to consider as to when the confession of co-accused would be used as evidence under Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It was held that the confession of a co-accused can not be treated as substantive evidence. If the court believed other evidence and felt the necessity of seeking an assurance in support of its conclusion deductible from the said evidence, the confession of the co-accused would be used. It was, therefore, held that the court would consider other evidence adduced by the prosecution. If the court on confirmation thereof forms an opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of the guilt of the accused. It is, thus, seen that the distinction has been made by this Court between the confession of an accused and uses of a confession of the co-accused at the trial. 56. It is, thus, seen that the distinction has been made by this Court between the confession of an accused and uses of a confession of the co-accused at the trial. 56. Thus, what emerges from the above discussion is that before using the confession of a co-accused, the Court has to, first, marshal the evidence against the accused, who is sought to be roped in with the help of the confession of the co-accused, and if, on such marshalling of evidence, the Court finds that independent of the confession of the co-accused, the evidence on record reveals sufficient incriminating materials for believing the complicity of the accused in the offence, then, in such an event, the confession of the co-accused can be used as a supporting piece of evidence for lending assurance to the other evidence on record and in order to fortify the Court in believing that the conclusion that it had reached that the accused is guilty is correct. In short, the confession of a co-accused is not such substantive piece of evidence on which can rest the entire foundation for conviction of the accused, who is not the maker of the confession. Far from this, confession of a co-accused can be used merely for the purpose of lending assurance to the conclusion already reached by the Court that the accused against whom the confession of a co-accused is sought to be used already stands proved to have committed the offence. It is in this context that the decisions in Kashmira Singh (supra) and Haricharan Kurmi need to be read. There is no impediment, we feel impelled to clarify, in basing the conviction of an accused on his own confession if the confession is found to be voluntary and true, though, generally, corroboration of such a confession is desirable. 57. In the case at hand, the confession made by the accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora, coupled with the corroboration both oral as well as medical, which this confession receives, there can be no escape from the conclusion that Putu Bora was put to death by the accused-Appellant in the manner as revealed by the accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora (A1), himself. 57. In the case at hand, the confession made by the accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora, coupled with the corroboration both oral as well as medical, which this confession receives, there can be no escape from the conclusion that Putu Bora was put to death by the accused-Appellant in the manner as revealed by the accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora (A1), himself. That apart, even the judicial confession of the accused, Bup Bora (A2), is an additional circumstance against the accused, Bakul Bora, and the confession of the co-accused, Bup Bora (A2), lends assurance to the conclusion, which we, unhesitatingly, reach and the conclusion is that the accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora (A1), was one of the persons, who had intentionally caused the death of Putu Bora and threw away his dead body in order to screen themselves from punishment. 58. What is, now, imperative to note is that we have already held that the confession made by the accused-Appellant, Bup Bora (A2), too is voluntary. When the confession made by this accused-Appellant is carefully scrutinised, it transpires that even this Appellant's confession has received credible corroboration from the medical and other oral evidence on record inasmuch as even this Appellant's description of the occurrence shows that the description of the occurrence leading to the death of Putu Bora is, generally, in tune with the version of the occurrence given by accused Appellant, Bakul Bora, including the fact that the dead-body of Putu Bora was, first, taken to the air field, located nearby, and, then, was thrown into the rivulet. Though the accused-Appellant, Bup Bora (A2), does not state that he was one of the persons, who had thrown the said dead-body to the rivulet, the fact remains that he, according to his own confession, associated with the other accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora, in throwing the said dead-body to the air field. This apart, even before Putu Bora was put to death, this accused-Appellant, Bup Bora (A2), as his confession reveals, did hold discussions with the accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora, and others as regards their plan for killing of Putu Bora. 59. What is important to note is that there must be general corroboration of the confession by the materials on record and the corroboration need not be with mathematical accuracy. 59. What is important to note is that there must be general corroboration of the confession by the materials on record and the corroboration need not be with mathematical accuracy. This aspect of the matter is easily discernible from the decision in Pyare Lal Bhargava (supra), wherein it was contended that the accused-Appellant No. 2, in his confession, did not own up that he too had stabbed, at least, one of the two deceased. The Apex Court did not pay any importance to this aspect of the matter on the ground that when the confession is read as a whole, the same leave no doubt that the accused Appellant No. 2 had admitted the complete role played by him in association with other assailant for causing death of their two victims, the relevant observations of the Apex Court in Pyare Lal Bhargava (supra) run as follows: 17. Shri Vishwanathan then contended that A-2 in his confession did not own that he also stabbed at least one of the two deceased. That does not matter much, because a reading of the confession as a whole leaves no doubt that A-2 has admitted the full length role played by him in association with the other two assailants for murdering the two ladies. Hence, the very fact that he did not say in so many words that he also inflicted one stab injury on the deceased is of no consequence. In a way, this aspect is a further assurance to us that his confession was not what the police wanted him to say to the Magistrate. 60. In Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216 , when it was suggested that the confession of the two accused should be read together in order to condemn both, for, both the confession were inconsistent with, and contrary to, each other, the Apex Court held and observed as follows: So far as the confessional statement of Jagir Singh is concerned, it may be taken into consideration against the Appellant if it fulfils the conditions laid down in Section 30 of the Evidence Act. One of the conditions is that the confession must implicate the maker substantially to the same extent as the other accused person against whom it is sought to be taken into consideration. One of the conditions is that the confession must implicate the maker substantially to the same extent as the other accused person against whom it is sought to be taken into consideration. On reading Jagir Singh's confession as a whole, it appears that he was really trying to throw the main blame on the Appellant, though he admitted that he entered into the house of Mst. Chinti, brought out a Kirpan lying there, and took some silver ornaments from that house. He denied that he had anything to do with the murder of the two boys; he more or less tried to make out that he was an unwilling spectator of the crime committed by the Appellant. In these circumstances, the utmost that can be submitted on behalf of the Appellant is that the confession of Jagir Singh should not be used at all against the Appellant. At one stage of his argument Mr. Sethi did submit that the confession of Jagir Singh should be excluded altogether from consideration against the Appellant; later, however, he submitted that both the confessions should be read together in order to condemn both as untrue on the ground of the difference between the two confessions. We are unable to accept this submission of Mr. Sethi. We have pointed out that some of the differences are immaterial, some are due to the desire of Jagir Singh to throw the blame on the Appellant-a circumstance of which the benefit has been given to the Appellant, and some other differences are clearly resolved by other evidence on the record. We do not think that in these circumstances the confessional statements can be condemned out of hand or in limine as untrue. (15) In this case, both the confessions were retracted subsequently, and the proper approach in case of this nature is to consider each confession as a whole on its merits and use it against the maker thereof, provided the Court is in a position to come to an unhesitating conclusion that the confession was voluntary and true; and though a retracted confession, if believed to be true and voluntarily made, may form the basis of a conviction, the rule of practice and prudence requires that it should be corroborated by independent evidence. 61. 61. Referring to the decision in Balbir Singh (Supra), the Apex Court, in its later decision in K.I. Pavunny (Supra), observed thus, This Court upheld the conviction and held that it is no necessary that each item of fact or circumstances mentioned in the confessional statement required to be corroborated separately and independently. It would be sufficient if there is general corroboration. The ratio in Kashmira Singh case was referred to. 62. Thus, the principle deducible from the decision in Balbir Singh (Supra), Pyare Lal Bhargava (Supra) and K.I. Pavunny (Supra) is that a confession made by an accused can be relied upon if the Court is satisfied that the same is voluntary and true. Such a confession can be treated as true if it receives general corroboration from the evidence on record and it is unwise for the court to read together two confessions made by two accused persons and condemn both even though both the confessions are found to be voluntary and the inculpatory parts thereof receive general corroboration from the remaining evidence on record, 63. On a careful and dispassionate reading of the confession of the accused-Appellant, Bup Bora (A2), it is abundantly clear that not only that this Appellant, Bup Bora, played an important, integral and inseverable role in the planning of the murder, but that he also shared with the other accused Appellant, Bokul Bora (A1), common intention as regards actual execution of their plan and in causing, in furtherance of their common intention, death of Putu Bora and in disposing of the dead-body of Putu Bora till the stage of throwing of the said dead-body at the air field and he is as much responsible as co-accused-Appellant, Bokul Bora, is in destroying the evidence in order to screen themselves from punishment. Though this confession, in itself, convincingly satisfies this Court of the complicity of this accused Appellant in the killing of Putu Bora and the initial removal of his dead-body, we also have on record the confession of the co-accused, namely, Bakul Bora. Though this confession, in itself, convincingly satisfies this Court of the complicity of this accused Appellant in the killing of Putu Bora and the initial removal of his dead-body, we also have on record the confession of the co-accused, namely, Bakul Bora. The confession of the accused-Appellant, Bakul Bora, lends substantial support to the conclusion that we have reached, namely, that the accused-Appellant, Bup Bora, is liable, along with the accused Appellant, Bokul Bora, in causing, in furtherance of their common intention, death of Putu Bora and also in initial removal of his dad-body in order to screen the offenders from punishment and that both the accused-Appellants are, thus, liable for conviction under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 64. We, therefore, uphold the conviction of the two accused-Appellants under Sections 302 and 201read with Section 34 IPC and we see no reason at all to interfere with the sentences passed against them. 65. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 66. Send back the L.C.Rs. Appeal dismissed