A. K. BASU, J. ( 1 ) AN interesting point of law has been raised through this application filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the said point of law relates to the question as to whether the principle of concurrent lease is applicable in India notwithstanding the provisions of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. ( 2 ) THE background of the present hearing may be briefly narrated in this way: one Sanjib Shaw alias Saha filed Ejectment Suit No. 222 of 2000 in the Small Causes Court, Calcutta against the present opposite parties. During pendency of that Ejectment suit the present petitioner Swapan Kr. Dutta filed an application before the trial Court under Order 22 Rule 10 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for impleading his name as plaintiff in place of original plaintiff Sanjib Shaw alias Saha on the ground that during the pendency of the suit said Sanjib Saha has executed a deed of lease regarding the entire property including the suit property and hence on the basis of the said deed petitioner has become 'landlord' of the tenant opposite parties and she is entitled to proceed with the eviction suit now pending for disposal. ( 3 ) THE tenant opposite parties contended the said petition of Swapan Kr. Dutta before the trial Court on the ground that said Swapan Kr. Dutta could not acquire any right, title or interest over the suit property during the continuation of their tenancy right and hence, Swapan Kr. Dutta cannot be termed as 'landlord' within the meaning of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and naturally, he cannot be substituted in place of original plaintiff. ( 4 ) THE learned Judge, 6th Bench, Small Causes Court, Calcutta by his order dated 4th July 2000 accepted the contention of the opposite parties and held that petitioner Swapan Kr. Dutta did not acquire the status of 'landlord' on the basis of lease deed and hence, he was not entitled to be substituted in place of original plaintiff and to proceed with the Eviction suit. Dutta did not acquire the status of 'landlord' on the basis of lease deed and hence, he was not entitled to be substituted in place of original plaintiff and to proceed with the Eviction suit. ( 5 ) SWAPAN Kumar Dutta being dissatisfied with the order of the learned trial Judge preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No. 11 of 2000 in the City Civil Court, Calcutta and the learned Judge 12th Bench, City Civil Court dismissed that appeal by His order dated 10th June, 2003 thereby confirming the observation of the trial Judge. Swapan Kr. Dutta has not challenged the legality and validity of the order passed in connection with Misc. Appeal as well as by the learned trial Court through this appeal application filed under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 6 ) IT is pertinent to mention that according to the direction of this Court petitioner duly served notice of the present application upon the opposite parties and in spite of service nobody has come forward on behalf of the opposite parties to contest this application. ( 7 ) MR. Arindam Banerjee, appearing for the petitioner submits that the concept of concurrent lease although somewhat alien in the legal arena of this country had been very much in force in England and this concept of concurrent lease made it clear that even during continuation of an earlier lease, the lesser was entitled to create a subsequent lease covering the earlier lease also and thereby the subsequent lessee can be authorized in law to collect rent from the earlier lessee and if required to file suit for eviction of the earlier lessee. Mr. Arindam Banerjee in support of his contention has referred to the decision reported in ILR 49 Calcutta page 412 (Jahar Lal Bhutra v. Bhupendra Nath Basu), AIR Madras page 100 (Rathnaswami Mooppanar and Ors. v. R. C. Nagaraja Mooppanar) and 55 CWN page 86 (S. Mansingka v. Durga Dutta Misra and Ors.) Mr. Banerjee contends that in the case of Jahar Lal Bhutra (supra), this Court held that a 'landlord' who has earlier created a tenancy is still competent to curb out another tenancy and in the case of Rathnaswami Mooppanar and Ors. v. R. C. Nagaraja Mooppanar) and 55 CWN page 86 (S. Mansingka v. Durga Dutta Misra and Ors.) Mr. Banerjee contends that in the case of Jahar Lal Bhutra (supra), this Court held that a 'landlord' who has earlier created a tenancy is still competent to curb out another tenancy and in the case of Rathnaswami Mooppanar and Ors. (supra) it was held by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court that there is nothing in the Transfer of Property Act to precluded a 'landlord' to grant subsequent lease of a property already leased out and the subsequent lessee would be entitled by reversion to recover rent due and payable under the former lease. Mr. Banerjee submits that in the later judgment of this High Court rendered in the case of S. Mansingka (supra) the earlier decision of this Court rendered in the case of Jahar Lal Bhutra (supra) and the decision of the Madras High Court rendered in the case of Rathnaswami Mooppanar and Ors. (supra) was affirmed and reiterated by their Lordship and it was held that there is nothing in section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act to prohibit the leasing out of a reversion. ( 8 ) MR. Banerjee submits that all the decisions indicated above were mentioned before the learned Judge of the City Civil Court in connection with hearing of the Misc. Appeal, but, the learned Judge, as would appear from the order, declined to take note of those decisions and pleaded his inability to act upon those decisions in view of a judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court given in the case of Swapan Kr. Dutta v. Dharam Chand Jaiswal and Anr. (C. O. No. 2654 of 2001) as reported in 2000 (2) CHN 627. Mr. Banerjee contends that the learned single Judge in the said judgment did not take into account the Division Bench judgment of this High Court and of the Madras High Court in view of a Full Bench decision of the Privy Council in the case of M. E. Mulla Sons Ltd. (In liquidation) v. The Official Assignee of the High Court of Judicature at Rangoon and Ors. , reported in 55 CLJ page 275 where the Full Bench of the Privy Council expressed the view that concurrent lease or for that matter reversion of interest is not permissible in view of specific provision of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 17 of the Indian Registration Act and hence, during continuation of an earlier lease, the 'landlord' cannot transfer his interest in the property in dispute by executing a subsequent lease deed. The Privy Council was very much specific in its observation that the subsequent lessee can only acquire interest and step into the shoe of the original owner only through a valid registered sale deed executed by the owner. ( 9 ) MR. Banerjee contends that it would appear from the judgment of the learned single Judge as indicated above that the learned single Judge was impressed by the Full Bench decision of the Privy Council rendered in the M. E. Mulla Sons Ltd. (supra) and the learned Judge expressed his view that earlier decisions of this High Court as well as of the Madras High Court did not consider the ratio of decision rendered in the case of M. E. Mulla Sons Ltd. (supra ). ( 10 ) MR. Banerjee contends that the judgment of the learned single Judge must be considered to be a judgment per incuriam as the learned Judge placed his reliance on a Full Court decision of the Privy Council when by coming into force of the Constitution of India and particularly in view of section 8 of the abolition of the Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949, the reasons arrived at by the Full Court of the Privy Council could not have operated as a precedent on Indian Courts and naturally, the learned Judge should have considered the Division Bench decision of this High Court operating in the filed. In support of this contention Mr. Banerjee has referred to another Division Bench judgment of this High Court reported in AIR 1955 Calcutta page 282 (Corporation of Calcutta v. Director of Rationing and Distribution ). ( 11 ) MR. Banerjee concludes his submission by expressing his view that the ratio of decision of the learned single Judge rendered in the case of Swapan Kr. Dutta v. D. C. Jaiswal and Anr. ( 11 ) MR. Banerjee concludes his submission by expressing his view that the ratio of decision of the learned single Judge rendered in the case of Swapan Kr. Dutta v. D. C. Jaiswal and Anr. , (supra) was not probably the correct exposition of law and having regard to three earlier Division Bench decisions of this High Court and Madras High Court and in view of the fact that Full Bench decision of the Privy Council cannot have any binding effect on Indian Courts since coming into force of the Indian Constitution, the learned single Judge ought not have placed his reliance on that Full Bench decision of the Privy Council to ignore the decision of the earlier Division Bench of this High Court and the Madras High Court. Mr. Banerjee, therefore, submits that the order recorded both in connection with Misc. Appeal and also by the trial Court rejecting the claim of substitution should be set aside. ( 12 ) I have heard and considered the submission of Mr. Banerjee in the light of all the decisions referred to by him including the decision of the learned single judge reported in 2000 (2) CHN pager 627. It is very much clear that all the decisions of Mr. Banerjee placed before the learned Judge of City Civil Court in connection with Misc. Appeal were considered by the learned single Judge in his judgment and after making a detailed discussion regarding those judgments the learned single Judge relied on the decision of the Full Bench of the Privy Council reported in 65 CLJ page 275 (supra ). The learned single Judge expressed his view that the full bench of the Privy Council correctly clarified the legal position regarding concurrent lease and its non-application in India in view of provision of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act read with section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. The learned Judge also recorded that the Full Bench decision of the Privy Council was not at all considered by the earlier Division Bench judgment of either this Court of the Madras High Court. The learned Judge also recorded that the Full Bench decision of the Privy Council was not at all considered by the earlier Division Bench judgment of either this Court of the Madras High Court. ( 13 ) ON examination of all the decision including that of the Full Bench of the Privy Council, I am of clear opinion that the Full Bench judgment of the Privy Council correctly decided the issue and the learned single Judge rightly placed his reliance on the Full Bench judgment of the Privy Council. Now, the crucial issue for consideration would be whether in view of the abolition of the Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949, the learned single Judge was to follow the decision of the Privy Council or to follow the decision of this High Court. Mr. Banerjee is of the view that when it was clarified in the judgment of this High Court reported in AIR 1955 Calcutta page 282 that since abolition of the Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949 except judgment and order no decision of the Privy Council shall have any binding effect or operate as a precedent for the Indian Courts, it would have been proper to ignore the decision of the Privy Council rendered in the case of M. E. Mulla Sons Ltd. (supra ). ( 14 ) I have examined the judgment of the Division Bench of this High Court reported in AIR 1955 Calcutta page 282 dealing with the effect of decision of the Privy Council after independence with special reference to the abolition of the Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949. I find from para 7 of the said judgment that jurisdiction of the Privy Council was abolished with effect from 10. 10. 1949 while the latest judgment of this Court on the point at issue was delivered on 18th March, 1949 which clearly indicates that the decision of the Privy Council was very much alive in the field and that decision should have been considered while rendering the judgment in the case of S. Mansingka v. Durga Dutta Misra and Ors. (supra) and the learned single Judge correctly expressed his view that none of the decision of this High Court or that of the Madras High Court can operate in the field since the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Privy Council and which was totally ignored by those decisions. (supra) and the learned single Judge correctly expressed his view that none of the decision of this High Court or that of the Madras High Court can operate in the field since the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Privy Council and which was totally ignored by those decisions. ( 15 ) ACCORDINGLY, in view of what has been stated above, I am not inclined to share the view expressed by Mr. Banerjee that the judgment of the learned single Judge given in the case reported in 2002 (2) CHN page 627 should be treated as a judgment per incuriam and this Court relying on earlier Division Bench judgments of this High Court and Madras High Court should hold that the lease executed in favour of the petitioner empowers and authorizes the petitioner for substitution in case of the original plaintiff and to proceed with the Eviction Suit against the opposite parties. ( 16 ) THUS, having regard to the submissions made by Mr. Banerjee on behalf of the petitioner and after considering the decisions relied on by Mr. Banerjee, I am of clear view that there is no merit in the contention of Mr. Banerjee and accordingly, the present application is liable to be dismissed without having any substance behind it. The present application is accordingly dismissed, however, without any order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, may be supplied expeditiously after complying with all necessary legal formalities. Application dismissed