JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order, dated 29.6.98, passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Dibrugarh, in Session Case No. 63/97, convicting the accused-Appellant, Laghu Majhi alias Bharat, under Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of one year. 2. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded at the trial, may, in brief, be stated as follows: On 14.1.95, which was the day of Magh Bihu (i.e., a social festival in Assam) at about 5.30 p.m., when the accused-Appellant, Laghu Majhi @ Bharat, came to the house of his co-villager, Lila Mech, to make a courtesy call, on the occasion of Bihu, he was served with rice beer by Subhadra Mech, wife of Lila Mech. While the accused-Appellant was present there, Anil Mech's nephew, Babai (since deceased) also came there and he too was offered cake, etc. After a short while, their co villagers, Anil Mech and Nipen Konwar, also arrived there and they too were served with rice beer, etc. After sometime, the accused-Appellant went out side the house telling that he was going to make water and, shortly after him, Babai too went out. When Lila Mech, Anil Mech and Nipen Konwar were involved in their conversation inside Anil Mech's house, Nipen heard the cries of Babai saying, "I am dying, I am dying. Laghu has killed me, catch him, catch him." On being told by Nipen that something had happened outside, Lila Mech, Anil Mech and Nipen hurriedly came out of the house and saw Babai lying at the courtyard and the accused-Appellant Laghu fleeing away. On reaching near Babai, these persons found that he had already breathed his last and he had three cut injuries on his chest. On a First Information Report regarding the occurrence having been lodged, on the following day, i.e., on 15.1.95, at about 8.30 a.m., at Rajgarh police out post, a G.D. entry was made in this regard, police visited the place of occurrence and held inquest over the dead body. When the investigation was on, the accused-Appellant, on 16.1.95 at 3.30 p.m., surrendered at the police out post and was accordingly put under arrest. When the investigation was on, the accused-Appellant, on 16.1.95 at 3.30 p.m., surrendered at the police out post and was accordingly put under arrest. On completion of the investigation, police laid charge sheet against the accused-Appellant under Section 302 IPC. 3. During trial, the accused-Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge framed against him under Section 302 IPC. In support of their case, the prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses. The accused-Appellant was, then, examined under Section 313 Code of Criminal procedure and in his examination aforementioned, the accused-Appellant denied that he had committed the offence alleged to have been committed by him, the case of the defence being that of total denial. No evidence was, however, adduced by the defence. 4. On conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court, on finding the accused-Appellant guilty of the charge framed against him under Section 302 IPC, convicted him accordingly. Hence, this appeal. 5. We have heard Mr. P.J. Saikia, learned Counsel appearing for the accused-Appellant, and Mr. F.H. Laskar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam. 6. We may point out, at this stage, that initially, an appeal was preferred by the accused - Appellant from jail against the conviction and sentence passed in Sessions Case No. 63/97. The appeal was accordingly registered as Criminal Appeal No. 179(J)/98. Subsequently, the accused-Appellant preferred another appeal before this Court and the same came to be registered as Criminal Appeal No. 187(J)/99. The two appeals are, therefore, in effect, against the conviction and sentence of the accused Appellant passed in Sessions Case No. 63/97 aforementioned and are being disposed of by this judgment and order. 7. In the present case, there is, admittedly, no eye witness to the alleged occurrence and the prosecution's case rests on allegedly made oral dying declaration of the said deceased and other circumstantial evidence on record. 8. Bearing in mind the above aspect of the matter, let us, first, come to, and deal with, the evidence of P.W. 7 (Dr. M.N. Gogoi). According to his evidence, he held postmortem examination on the dead body of the said deceased on 18.1.95, at about 3.30 p.m. and found as follows: (i) One incised wound in the left upper chest wall above the left nipple horizontally placed 5cm × 1cm cutting the muscle and left lung. M.N. Gogoi). According to his evidence, he held postmortem examination on the dead body of the said deceased on 18.1.95, at about 3.30 p.m. and found as follows: (i) One incised wound in the left upper chest wall above the left nipple horizontally placed 5cm × 1cm cutting the muscle and left lung. (ii) One incised wound in the left upper chest wall below the left nipple horizontally placed of size 7cm × 1cm, cutting the muscle and left lung. (iii) One incised wound in the left chest wall below wound No. 2 of size 6cm × 1cm, muscle cut and left lung cut. Cranium and spinal canal: All were healthy. Thorax: Left chest wall had injuries described under the wound No. 1 to 3. Left lung cut and haemorrhage from it, blood about one litre in the left thoracic cavity. Heart was empty and healthy. Liver, spleen and kidneys all were healthy. Stomach was healthy and empty. 9. In the opinion of the doctor (P.W. 7), all the injuries were ante mortem in nature and the death was caused due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of the ante mortem injuries sustained by the said deceased, the said injuries having been caused by sharp cutting weapon and the same were homicidal in nature. It is also the opinion of P.W. 7 that all the injuries were individually fatal. 10. The findings of P.W. 7 and his opinion with regard to the nature of the injuries sustained by the said deceased, the type of weapon, which could have caused the said injuries and the cause of death have not been disputed by the defence at the trial nor are the same under challenge in this appeal. This apart, the clear and undisputed evidence of P.W. 1 (Lila Mech), P.W. 2 (Anil Mech), P.W. 3 (Nipen Konwar) and P.W. 5 (Sic Mech) is that they all found Babai lying, at the courtyard of P.W. 1, dead with injuries on his person. The fact that Babai was so found lying at the said courtyard with injuries on his person has not been disputed by the defence. 11. From a combined reading of the medical evidence as well as the oral evidence on record, we have no hesitation in concluding that Babai met with homicidal death. The fact that Babai was so found lying at the said courtyard with injuries on his person has not been disputed by the defence. 11. From a combined reading of the medical evidence as well as the oral evidence on record, we have no hesitation in concluding that Babai met with homicidal death. The questions, which remain to be answered, are as to whether it was the accused-Appellant, who had caused the injuries to Babai and if so, what offence, if any, the accused-Appellant had committed? 12. In the present case, there is, admittedly, as indicated hereinabove, no eye witness to the occurrence. In support of their case that it was the accused-Appellant, who had caused the death of Babai, prosecution relied on the evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 2, P.W. 3, P.W. 5 and P.W. 6. 13. In the light of what we have pointed out above, we, now, come to the evidence of P.W. 3. According to his evidence, one day in the evening, at the time of Magh Bihu, Dipak (P.W. 1), son of (Lila Mech), called him (P.W. 3) and P.W. 2 (Anil Mech) to their house to enjoy 'Bihu' with them and upon arriving at the house of Lila (P.W. 1), he (P.W. 3) found Babai and the accused taking 'jad' (i.e. home made rice beer) at the house of P.W. 1. It is in the evidence of P.W. 3 that after some time, Babai went out for urinating, the accused also followed him and a little while thereafter, Babai raised an alarm from outside saying, "I am dying, I am dying: Raghu has killed me. Catch him, catch him." It is also in the evidence of P.W. 3 that on hearing Babai's cries, he (P.W. 3), Anil (P.W. 2), Dipak and all of them, hurriedly, came out of the house and saw Babai lying at the courtyard and accused Raghu fleeing and, on reaching near Babai, they found that Babai had already died. P.W. 3 has clarified in his evidence that he saw stab wound below the chest of Babai. 14. P.W. 3 has clarified in his evidence that he saw stab wound below the chest of Babai. 14. We have carefully scrutinized the cross-examination of P.W. 3 at the hands of the defence and we find that nothing has been elicited from his cross-examination to show that what he deposed in the Court was, contrary to what he had stated before the police nor do we notice from his cross-examination anything indicating that what he has deposed, at the trial, was false or untrue. 15. Broadly in tune with the evidence of P.W. 3, the host, Lila (P.W. 1), has deposed that on the day of occurrence, which was Magh Bihu, the accused came to his (P.W. 1 s) house at about 6 O'clock in the evening and said, "Bihu Kham" (meaning thereby that he will take something on the occasion of Bihu), whereupon his wife (P.W. 5) gave the accused some Bihu 'jaj' (home made rice beer) and after some time, his nephew, Babai (since deceased) came in and his (P.W. 1 s) wife gave some cake, etc., to Babai also and, thereafter. Anil Mech (P.W. 2) and Nripen Konwar (P.W. 3) came to enjoy 'Bihu' and they too were served with cake, etc. It is in the evidence of P.W. 1 that the accused went outside the house saying that he was going to urinate and a little while thereafter, Babai, too, went out saying that he was also going to urinate and a little while later, Nripen (P.W. 3) told, "Something has happened outside; you are unmindful," and, then, on going out of the house, he (P.W. 1) saw Babai lying on the ground at the ciyrtyard and the accused running away from there. It is also in the evidence of P.W. 1 that he (P.W. 1) raised alarm, Nripen (P.W. 3) and Anil (P.W. 2) chased the accused, but after covering some distance, they returned. It is also in the evidence of P.W. 1 that on reaching near Babai, he (P.W. 1) found three cut injuries just below the right chest of Babai, but, in the meantime, Babai had breathed his last and could not say anything. From the evidence of P.W. 1, it also transpires that he (P.W. 1) had written an Ejahar, put his signature thereon and sent the same to the thana, Ext. 1 being the said Ejahar, police came and held inquest. From the evidence of P.W. 1, it also transpires that he (P.W. 1) had written an Ejahar, put his signature thereon and sent the same to the thana, Ext. 1 being the said Ejahar, police came and held inquest. Ext. 2 being the inquest report. 16. The evidence of the Investigating Officer (P.W. 8) coupled with the contents of Ext. 1 indicate that the written Ejahar was lodged by the informant, Lila Mech (P.W. 1), at Rajgarh police out post and the same was received there, vide GD Entry No. 326, dated 15.1.1995, at 8.30 a.m. This FIR reveals that the name of the accused Appellant was disclosed, on the following morning of the day of the occurrence, to the police as the assailant of Babai. No delay, in lodging of the FIR, was alleged by the defence either at the trial Court or before this Court. 17. Lending substantial support to the evidence of P.W. 3 and P.W. 1, P.W. 2 (Anil) has deposed that on the day of occurrence, in the evening, Nripen Konwar (P.W. 3) and he (P.W. 2) went to the house of P.W. 1 along with Lila Mech's son, Dipak, to enjoy 'bihu' at their house and, on reaching there, he (P.W. 2) found the accused and Babai Gogoi (i.e. the deceased) inside the house of P.W. 1, they were seated and served with tiffin (i.e., light refreshment) P.W. 2 has also deposed that when they were talking, the accused went out to urinate and a short while thereafter, Babai also went out and after a little while, Babai raised a cry saying," Raghu has killed me. Catch him, catch him." P.W. 2 has further deposed that they, immediately, came out and found Babai lying at the courtyard. In his cross-examination, P.W. 2 has asserted and his assertion has been supported by the Investigating Officer (P.W. 8) that he (P.W. 2) told the police that he (P.W. 2) had seen Laghu Majhi (i.e. the accused-Appellant) running away by taking dagger in his hand after murdering Babai Gogoi with the same. 18. Before preceding any further, we may also take into account the evidence of P.W. 5. 18. Before preceding any further, we may also take into account the evidence of P.W. 5. This witness's evidence is that on the day of occurrence, the accused came to their house, at about 6 p.m., to enjoy 'Bihu' at their house, her husband was at home, she (P.W. 5) gave the accused some 'Bihu' food and after a little while, Babai came, she (P.W. 5) gave some home made liquor to Babai and also to the accused and, sometime thereafter, Anil (P.W. 2) and Nripen (P.W. 3) too came in, she (P.W. 5) served them too with 'Bihu' food on the occasion of 'Bihu'. P.W. 5 has also deposed that the accused went out saying that he was going to pass urine and a little while thereafter, Babai, too, went out to pass urine. P.W. 5 has further deposed that thereafter, Nripen (P.W. 3) went out and returned a short while later only to relate that Babai was lying outside and that he was bleeding. It is in the evidence of P.W. 5 that on coming out, they saw Babai lying at the courtyard and when she (P.W. 5) called Babai, Babai did not respond and she could, then, learn that Babai was already dead. It is also in the evidence of P.W. 5 that there was bleeding from a place in Babai's chest. 19. What needs to be noted, while considering the evidence of P.W. 5, is that this witness was declared hostile by prosecution. Notwithstanding the fact that this witness denied the investigating Officer (P.W. 8) has confirmed that this witness had stated in her statement made under Section 161Code of Criminal Procedure, "Baba Gogoi goes out. Right then, hearing a cry outside, "I am dying I am dying, Laghu has assaulted him. Catch him Catch him," my son, husband, Nripen Konwar, Anil Mech and I came out and we witnessed the incident with our own eyes that Laghu runs away after stabbing Baba Gogoi to dealt with a dagger." 20. From a bare reading of the previous statement of P.W. 5 made before the police, it is crystal clear that the evidence given by P.W. 5 is inconsistent with, and contrary to, what she had stated before the police. In her statement before the police, she projected herself as an eye witness to the occurrence, but she has resiled from her previous statement. In her statement before the police, she projected herself as an eye witness to the occurrence, but she has resiled from her previous statement. Though what she had stated before the police might not have been true, yet the fact remains that her glaringly inconsistent versions of the occurrence make her an unreliable witness. A hostile witness's evidence cannot be thrown away lock, stock and barrel; rather, the same can be relied upon to the extent that it supports the evidence on record, whether the evidence goes in favour of the prosecution or the defence. A reference may be made to the State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra and Anr. reported in (1996) 10 SCC 360 , wherein the Apex Court, while dealing with the probative value of a hostile witness, has observed as follows: It is equally settled law that the evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused, but it can be subjected to close scrutiny and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence may be accepted. 21. In fact, in Koli Lakhmanbhai Chanabhai v. State of Gujrat reported in (1999) 8 SCC 624 , the Apex Court has observed as follows: It is settled law that evidence of a hostile witness also can be relied upon to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version. Evidence of such witness cannot be treated as washed off the record. It remains admissible in the trial and there is no legal bar to base his conviction upon his testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence (Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana and Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn.) 22. Keeping in view the law laid down in RP Mishra and Koli Lakhamanbhai Chanabhai (supra), when we revert to the evidence of P.W. 5, we notice that even her evidence discloses that on the occasion of Bihu, the accused came to their house and was offered food and shortly, thereafter, Babai joined them and he was also served with homemade liquor It also transpires from the evidence of P.W. 5 that a little thereafter. Anil Mech (P.W. 2) and Nipen Konwar (P.W. 3) also arrived there and they too were served with liquor and, thereafter, the accused went out telling that he was going to make water and shortly thereafter, the accused was followed by Babai, who also went out to make water. 23. Thus, even in the light of the evidence of P.W. 5, it is abundantly clear that to the extent that at one point of time, on the day of occurrence, in the evening, P.W. 1, P.W. 2, P.W. 3, the accused-Appellant and the said deceased were present at the house of P.W. 5 is not in dispute. However, while it is the evidence of P.W. 3 that it was Babai, who went out for making water and was followed by the accused-Appellant P.W. 5 claims that it was the accused Appellant, who went out, first, to make water and was followed by the said deceased. So far as P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 are concerned, they too support P.W. 5's evidence that Babai followed the accused. Thus, there is, indeed, a discrepancy between P.W. 3, on the one hand, and P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 5, on a the other, as to who had gone outside the house first, whether the accused or the said deceased. 24. What is, now, of immense importance to note is that while the evidence of P.W. 3 and also P.W. 2 is that they had heard Babai's cries to catch Raghu (i.e. the accused-Appellant), for Raghu had killed him, P.W. 1 states to the effect that while he (P.W. 1), P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 were busy in talking to each other, P.W. 3 told him (P.W. 1) that something wrong was, perhaps, happening outside and they were being unmindful and, then, all of them came out of the house. In effect, the evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 is that when they were expecting the accused-Appellant and the said deceased to return back, they all came out together on, obviously, hearing Babai's cries and saw that while Babai was lying at the courtyard, the accused-Appellant was running away. In effect, the evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 is that when they were expecting the accused-Appellant and the said deceased to return back, they all came out together on, obviously, hearing Babai's cries and saw that while Babai was lying at the courtyard, the accused-Appellant was running away. Contrary to this consistent version of the occurrence given by P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3, P.W. 5 claims that P.W. 3 went out, came back and told that Babai was lying outside and bleeding and it was, then, that all of them came out of the house and found Babai lying at the courtyard. 25. While considering the above aspect of the matter, one has to bear in mind that every witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and/or be equally capable of recalling the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. The power of observation differs from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas the same might go unnoticed by another person. 26. The possibility of even a complete and truthful witness is likely to fall in error, while describing an occurrence, has been succinctly described by the Apex Court in the case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai Appellant v. State of Gujrat ( AIR 1983 SC 753 ), as follows: Overmuch importance cannot be attached to minor discrepancies. The reasons are obvious: (1) By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as it video tape is replayed on the mental screen. (2) Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. (3) The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. (4) By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. (4) By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. (5) In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guess word on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals which varies from person to person. (6) Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on. (7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the Court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination made by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, of fill up detail from imagination on the spur of the moment. The sub-conscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of liking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnesses by him perhaps it is a sort of a psychological defence mechanism activated on the spurt of the moment. 6. Discrepancies, which do not go to the root of the matter and shake the basis version of the witnesses, therefore cannot be annexed with undue importance. More so, when the all important "probabilities-factor" echoes in favour of the version narrated by the witnesses. 27. Referring to the State of Rajasthan v. Kalki ( AIR 1981 SC 1390 ), the Apex Court in Gangadhar Behera and Ors. More so, when the all important "probabilities-factor" echoes in favour of the version narrated by the witnesses. 27. Referring to the State of Rajasthan v. Kalki ( AIR 1981 SC 1390 ), the Apex Court in Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v. State of Orissa reported in (2002) 8 SCC 381 , further laid down as follows: As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki normal discrepancies in evidence are those, which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition, such as, shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there, however honest a witness may be. Material discrepancies are those, which are not normal and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode and credibility of a part's case, material discrepancies do so. 28. Thus, normal discrepancies in evidence are those, which arise out of normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory caused by lapse of time, due to mental disposition of the witness, such as, shock, tension and horror at the time of occurrence. Such normal dicrepancies may always occur however, honest a witness maybe. Material discrepancies are those discrepancies, which are not normal and not expected of a normal person. It is the duty of the Court to label the category to which a discrepancy may fall. If the discrepancy is normal, such discrepancy will not erode the credibility of the witness. It is only material discrepancy, which can adversely affect the credibility or veracity of the evidence of the witness concerned. 29. The possibility, therefore, that P.W. 3 might have, genuinely, fallen into error in describing accurately as to who was the one, who had first, gone outside the house to make water - whether the accused Appellant or the said deceased cannot be boldly ruled out. 29. The possibility, therefore, that P.W. 3 might have, genuinely, fallen into error in describing accurately as to who was the one, who had first, gone outside the house to make water - whether the accused Appellant or the said deceased cannot be boldly ruled out. What is, however, imperative to note is that while the evidence of P.W. 3 has remained unshaken in the cross examination, the evidence of P.W. 5 has been seriously impeached and on account of the incosistency between the version of the occurrence, which P.W. 5 has delineated before the Court, and the one that she had revealed before the police restrain this Court from treating her evidence as the evidence of a reliable witness. What is also imperative to note is that the value of a credible and trustworthy witness, such as, P.W. 3, cannot be reduced by the discredited evidence of a hostile witness, such as, P.W. 5, when the evidence of P.W. 3 has, otherwise, remained unshaken and, hence, his evidence cannot be ignored and/or brushed aside by placing reliance on the evidence of P.W. 5, whose credibility is seriously in doubt. 30. While considering the above aspect of the case, it is of paramount importance to note that apart from the fact that we consider, for reasons that we have already assigned hereinabove, P.W. 5 as an unreliable witness, we also notice that the evidence given by P.W. 5 that after the accused-Appellant and the said deceased went out of the house, P.W. 3 went out and came back and told that Babai was lying outside and that he was bleeding is not supported by anyone and cannot, therefore, be believed, particularly, when the unshaken evidence of not only P.W. 1, who is the husband of the P.W. 5, but also of P.W. 2 more than amply show that all of them, i.e., P.W. 1, 2 and 3 came out of the house hurriedly and almost altogether on hearing Babai's cries. 31. Moreover, the above inconsistency, which has occurred in the evidence of the two witnesses, namely, P.W. 3 and P.W. 5, is to our mind, not very vital, for, it is not very material as to who was the one, who had gone out first, whether the accused-Appellant or the deceased. 31. Moreover, the above inconsistency, which has occurred in the evidence of the two witnesses, namely, P.W. 3 and P.W. 5, is to our mind, not very vital, for, it is not very material as to who was the one, who had gone out first, whether the accused-Appellant or the deceased. The fact of the matter remains that both the accused-Appellant as well as the said deceased went out of the house of P.W. 1 indicating that they would be back soon after making water and while P.W. 1, P.W. 2, P.W. 3, and P.W. 5, admittedly, remained inside the house expecting both the accused Appellant as well as Babai (since deceased) to return back soon, but none of the two returned and attracted by Babai's cries, when P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 came out, what they saw was that the accused-Appellant was running away and Babai was lying at the courtyard and, on going near Babai, they found him dead. 32. Mr. PJ Saikia, learned Counsel appearing for the accused-Appellant, has drawn our attention to the evidence given by P.W. 3, in his cross examination, wherein he stated, "I can't say perfectly whether the man on the run was Raghu." 33. While considering the above aspect of the matter, it is necessary to note that the evidence given by P.W. 3, in his examination-in-chief, as already indicated above, is that he had seen the accused-Appellant fleeing away. Had P.W. 3 been a liar, an unreliable and untrustworthy witness and had his intention or object been to, somehow or other, implicate the accused-Appellant, nothing could have stopped him from insisting even in his cross-examination that it was the accused-Appellant, Raghu, whom he had seen running away from scene of occurrence. This witness's unhestitant answer that it was possible for him to have fallen into error in inferring that the man on the run was Raghu is a proof of the fact that this witness is a truthful one, but as the possibility of his having fallen into error existed, he candidly admitted the same. This makes his evidence given to the effect that he had seen the accused-Appellant running unsafe to rely upon, but this does not mean, we must hasten to add and clarify, that he can be dubbed as a liar. This makes his evidence given to the effect that he had seen the accused-Appellant running unsafe to rely upon, but this does not mean, we must hasten to add and clarify, that he can be dubbed as a liar. When such a witness says that he had heard Babai's cries saying, "I am dying, I am dying: Raghu has killed me. Catch him, catch him", we have no reason to disbelieve his evidence. 34. Coupled with the above, even the evidence of P.W. 2 shows that shortly after the accused-Appellant as well as the said deceased had gone out for urinating, he had heard Babai's cries saying, "Laghu has killed him, catch him, catch him". The evidence of P.W. 2 is, as already indicated hereinabove, remained unshaken in all its material particulars. Though P.W. 1 has not deposed that he had heard Babai's cries, the possibility that P.W. 1 had not paid attention to Babai's cries and/or was unmindful of the cries raised outside cannot be ruled out, for the clear evidence of P.W. 1 is that a little after the accused-Appellant and the said deceased had gone out, P.W. 3 told that they were being unmindful and that something was, perhaps, happening outside. 35. What crystallizes from the above discussion of the evidence on record is that four persons, namely, the said deceased, accused - Appellant, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 came to the house of P.W. 1 and were offered rice beer, etc. in celebration of Bihu. When they were so consuming beer and other snacks the accused - Appellant and the said deceased went out, one following the other, for making water and after a short while, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 heard Babai's cries that Raghu had killed him asking them to catch Raghu. When hearing the cries, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3, accompanied by P.W. 1 came out, they found the accused-Appellant running away and Babai lying dead at the courtyard with injuries on his chest. The utterances of the said deceased heard by P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 constitute, really, an oral dying declaration of Babai that it was Raghu (i.e. the accused-Appellant), who had injured him. In the face of the attending circumstances of the present case we have no reason to discard this piece of version emerging from the evidence on record. 36. The utterances of the said deceased heard by P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 constitute, really, an oral dying declaration of Babai that it was Raghu (i.e. the accused-Appellant), who had injured him. In the face of the attending circumstances of the present case we have no reason to discard this piece of version emerging from the evidence on record. 36. Coupled with the above, it is pertinent to note that apart from the fact that the accused-Appellant was seen running away, he was the only one, who had gone out of the house and was present with the said deceased. Neither any explanation has been offered by the accused Appellant for his fleeing away from the scene of occurrence nor is there any explanation discernible, in this regard, from the evidence on record. The omission to explain as to why he did not come back to the house and/or why he was seen fleeing away from the place of occurrence when Babai lying almost dead with injuries on his chest is a strong incriminating circumstance against the accused Appellant. (See: Sahadevan @ Sagadevan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, Chennai reported in (2003) 1 SCC 534 ). 37. We may also pause here to point out that according to the evidence of P.W. 6, at about 7 or 7.30 p.m., in the evening, on the day of/Magh Bihu', he was taking 'Bihu' food at the house of Nripen Basumatary of their village, Gamlo Mawra and Jammo Majhi were also with him and at that time, accused Raghu Majhi came there carrying with him a small knife, the accused kept the said knife on the table on which 'jalpan' (light refreshment) were served. It is in the evidence of P.W. 6 that on seeing the accused, his elder brother, Jammo Majhi, took the accused out side and while going out, the accused took with him the knife and on the following day, he learnt that someone had killed Baba Gogoi. 38. What is of immense importance to note, now, is that the defence declined to cross-examine P.W. 6. Apart from the fact that the whole evidence of P.W. 6 went unchallenged by the defence, we notice nothing in his evidence to show that what he deposed was untrue or false. 38. What is of immense importance to note, now, is that the defence declined to cross-examine P.W. 6. Apart from the fact that the whole evidence of P.W. 6 went unchallenged by the defence, we notice nothing in his evidence to show that what he deposed was untrue or false. This witness's evidence discloses that shortly after the alleged occurrence, the accused-Appellant came with a knife to the house of Niren Basumatary and on seeing him, Jammo Majhi, elder brother of the accused-Appellant, took away the accused-Appellant. The undisputed evidence of the accused-Appellant having a knife with him moments after Babai died is a strong piece of incriminating evidence against the accused Appellant, more so, when the findings of the doctor (P.W. 7) show that the injuries, which Babai had sustained on his chest, could have been caused by a sharp cutting weapon, such as, knife. 39. Apart from the oral dying declaration, which we have already referred to hereinabove, the evidence on record, as already pointed out unfolds strong incriminating circumstances against the accused-Appellant. The law with regard to the circumstantial evidence is more than amply established. The circumstances relied upon shall not only be consistent with the guilt of fee accused, but shall also be inconsistent with every hypothesis of this innocence. In Bodhraj @ Bodha and Ors. v. State of Jamu and Kashmir reported in (2002) 8 SCC 45 , the Apex Court has observed that while conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence, it should be tested by the touchstone of law, which has been laid down, in this regard, by the Apex Court, way back in 1995, in Govina Nargundkar v. State of MP ( AIR 1952 SC 343 ) where the Apex Court has observed as follows: It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 40. In Bodhraj @ Bodha (supra), the Apex Court further observed as follows: A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, wherein, the Apex Court, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that the onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in the prosecution cannot be cured by a false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are: (SCC p. 185, para 153) (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and not may be established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 41. In Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa reported in AIR 1991 SC 1388 , the Apex Court has clearly laid down that the Court must ensure following three conditions before the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence. 41. In Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa reported in AIR 1991 SC 1388 , the Apex Court has clearly laid down that the Court must ensure following three conditions before the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence. It is well settled that the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain the conviction must satisfy three conditions; (i) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; (ii) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; (iii) the circumstance taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else, and it should also be incapable of explanation on any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. 42. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, it clearly emerges that the accused-Appellant and the said deceased were present out side the house of P.W. 1, until before P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 came out of the house on hearing the cries of the said deceased and saw the accused-Appellant fleeing away and the said deceased lying at the courtyard. The accused-Appellant was also seen with a knife in his hand by P.W. 6 shortly thereafter. Closely connected with these facts is the evidence of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 that they had heard the cries of the said deceased naming the accused-Appellant as his assailant. When all these facts are in the light of the law discussed above, considered together, one is left with no conclusion other than the conclusion that it was the accused-Appellant, who had caused the injuries on the person of the said deceased resulting into the death of the deceased. 43. The number of the injuries caused to the said deceased, the nature of the weapon, which the accused Appellant used, and the part of the body, which the accused-Appellant chose to inflict the blows eloquently speak that the intention of the accused Appellant was to bring a complete end to the life of his victim and as the evidence on record unfolds, the accused-Appellant did succeed in attaining his intention. There can, thus, be no escape from the conclusion that the accused-Appellant intentionally caused the death of the said deceased and committed thereby offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC. 44. In view of the above, we see absolutely no merit in this appeal and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 45. Send back the LCRs immediately. Appeal dismissed.