A. K. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE hearing stems from an application filed by the petitioner M/s. Jagadhatri Rice Mills, hereinafter referred to as the said Mills, praying for revision of the order dated 16. 08. 2002 passed by the learned District Judge, Hooghly in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 47/2001 arising out of order No. 68 dated 17. 03. 2001 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 1st Court, Hooghly in Miscellaneous J. Case No. 10 of 1992. ( 2 ) THE circumstances leading to the above revision are that there was an agreement dated 17. 12. 1971 between the petitioner and Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971-respondent No. 1, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, for milling of paddy by the former and delivery of the milled rice to the latter. One of the terms of the said agreement was that all disputes and differences concerning the agreement shall be referred to the sole arbitration of any person appointed by the Managing Director of the respondent. The respondent vide its letter dated 22/24. 08. 1982 demanded payment of Rs. 1,76,497. 21 towards the price of short-fall of resultant rice followed by filing a money suit being No. 19 of 1995 for recovery of the amount in the Court of learned Assistant District Judge, Hooghly. In the said suit, the present petitioner's application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 was allowed vide order No. 43, dated 26. 09. 1988 and further proceeding of the suit was stayed. In view of the said order, Sri S. Gooptu, learned senior Central Government advocate was appointed as Arbitrator vide memo dated 05. 06. 1991 and and as he expressed his inability to take up the arbitration proceeding, the present respondent No. 2 Sri R. C. Mukherjee was appointed as sole Arbitrator. The petitioner instituted T. S. 10 of 1992 in the Court of learned Assistant District Judge, 1st Court, Hooghly for declaration and injunction challenging the said appointment of Arbitrator as it is barred by limitation which was dismissed on contest vide order dated 17. 03. 2001 and it was affirmed by the learned District Judge, Hooghly by the impugned order dated 16. 08. 2002. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, the petitioner has preferred the present revision. 03. 2001 and it was affirmed by the learned District Judge, Hooghly by the impugned order dated 16. 08. 2002. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, the petitioner has preferred the present revision. ( 4 ) ALL that now requires to be considered is whether the learned Court below was justified in passing the above order. ( 5 ) MR. Swapan Kumar De, learned counsel for the petitioner, on referring to Clause 33 of the agreement, petitioner's letter dated 05. 07. 1983 demanding appointment of Arbitrator, respondent's memo dated 04. 02. 1992 appointing respondent No. 2 as sole Arbitrator and the decision reported in AIR 1996 SC 542 advanced argument contending that when despite the said arbitration clause the respondent resorted to the aforesaid money suit for realization of the amount and the appointment of 1st Arbitrator was made on 05. 06. 1991 as disclosed in the memo dated 04. 02. 1992 which was absolutely barred by limitation in view of sub-section (3) of section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 read with section 137 of the Limitation Act prescribing the limitation of three years from the date of dispute which brings the last date for appointment to 04. 07. 1986, the learned Court below having acted without jurisdiction in rejecting the prayer of his client, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. Mr. Prabir Chandra Roy, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, on referring to the affidavit-in-opposition and proviso to Clause 33 of the agreement contended that when the petitioner admitted the claim of the Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971 by its three letters expressing its willingness to repay the amount by installments, that on their prayer Mr. Gooptu was appointed as the first Arbitrator when no objection was raised on the alleged ground of limitation and the subsequent appointment of Mr. Mukherjee is the continuation of the same proceeding, that the petitioner duly participated in the said arbitration proceeding, filed counter-claim and still they are participating, that the proviso to Clause 33 of the agreement is applicable to the agent only on fulfillment of the conditions embodied therein, none of which is involved here, the question of the appointment of Arbitrator being barred by limitation does not arise and there being no material the revision should be dismissed. ( 6 ) INDUBITABLY, Clause 33 of the agreement provides for referring all disputes and differences arising out of or in any way touching or concerning the agreement to the sole Arbitrator to be appointed by the respondent. As per proviso to the said Clause 33 ?any demand for arbitration in respect of any claim (s) from the agent (s) under the agreement shall be in writing and made within one year of the date of termination or completion (expiry of the period) of the agreement and where such demand is not made within that period the claim (s) of the agent (s) shall be deemed to have been waived and absolutely barred and the corporation shall be discharged and released of all liabilities under the agreement in respect of these claims. In other words, the said proviso is applicable to the agent alone and one year's limitation is computable from the date of termination or completion of the agreement, none of which is involved here. Accordingly, there is no scope for invoking the said proviso in the present case. Under sub-section (3) of section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 an arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced under sub-section (3) when one party to the arbitration agreement serves on the other parties thereto a notice requiring the appointment of an Arbitrator, or where the arbitration agreement provides that the reference shall be to a person named or designed in the agreement requiring that the difference be submitted to the person so named or designated. For the purpose of section 37 (1), ?action? and ?cause of action? should be construed as arbitration and cause of arbitration. Cause of arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced when one party serves a notice on the other party requiring the appointment of an Arbitrator. An application under section 37 is governed by Article 137 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 and must be made within three years from the date when the right to apply first accrues. There is no right to apply until there is a clear and unequivocal denial of that right by the respondent. It must, therefore, be clear that the claim for arbitration must be raised as soon as the cause for arbitration arises as in the case of cause of action arises in a civil action. There is no right to apply until there is a clear and unequivocal denial of that right by the respondent. It must, therefore, be clear that the claim for arbitration must be raised as soon as the cause for arbitration arises as in the case of cause of action arises in a civil action. In the present case, despite the said request vide letter dated 05. 07. 1983 for appointment of Arbitrator, the petitioner admitted the claim of the respondent vide its letter dated 18. 04. 1983 and subsequent reminders dated 02. 01. 1984, 21. 11. 1984 and 01. 03. 85 and lastly vide letter dated 15. 10. 1985 expressing its willingness to replenish the quantity of short-fall of resultant rice by installments with request to settle up the matter. That being so, the said letter of request for arbitration became unmeaningful, as the very subject matter of arbitration being admitted there remained no more dispute and the petitioner by its conduct waived the right of arbitration. When the respondent instituted the said money suit for recovery of the amount, it was on the prayer or the petitioner the suit was stayed under section 34 of the Arbitration Act vide order dated 26. 09. 88. s regards contention of Mr. De regarding absence of any specific direction for appointment of Arbitrator in the said order, section 34 of the old law (now section 81) provides for authority to make an order staying the legal proceeding thereby intending to prevent breach of the arbitration agreement. It is virtually an indirect means to enforce the arbitration agreement. In this connection, the decision reported in AIR 1970 SC 189 may be referred to. So, in pursuance of the said order, when Mr. Gooptu was appointed as Arbitrator vide memo dated 05. 06. 1991, a copy of which appears to have been served upon all concerned including the petitioner and no objection was raised by the petitioner for such appointment on the ground of limitation (nor, of course, there was any scope in this regard) and subsequent appointment of respondent No. 2 as sole Arbitrator due to inability of the previous Arbitrator to take up the arbitration proceedings is continuation of the arbitration proceedings in view of the specific provision of the agreement, the question of the said arbitration proceedings being barred by limitation is out of the way. Accordingly, the above contention of Mr. De appears to be more capacious than substantial. ( 7 ) IN the premises, in the light of the above discussion, there being no material to interfere with the decision of the learned Court below, the present revisional application be dismissed on contest but without any cost in the circumstances. The impugned order dated 16. 08. 2002 passed by the learned District Judge, Hooghly in Miscellaneous Appeal 47/2001 is hereby affirmed. Let a copy of this order be sent down at once to the learned Court below. Application allowed