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2004 DIGILAW 413 (PNJ)

Jarnail Singh v. Karamjit Singh

2004-04-02

VINEY MITTAL

body2004
Judgment Viney Mittal, J. 1. The tenant is the petitioner before this Court. He is aggrieved against the order of eviction dated December 4, 2003 passed by the learned Appellate Authority, Kapurthala. 2. Landlord, Karamjit Singh, filed an ejectment petition against tenant, Jarnail Singh. The ejectment of the tenant was sought on the grounds of arrears of rent as well as the demised premises having been sub-let by the tenant to respondent No. 2 Charanjit Singh. Additionally, the landlord also sought eviction on the ground of personal necessity. 3. The learned Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment petition filed by the landlord. All the grounds of ejectment were negated. 4. The landlord took up the matter in appeal. The learned Appellate Authority reappraised the entire evidence. Whereas the learned Appellate found that the ground of arrears of rent taken by the landlord was not correct but the learned Appellate Authority held that the landlord had been able to prove that he required the prentises for his personal necessity as well as the tenant had sub-let the premises to Charanjit Singh without the written consent of the landlord. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the learned appellate authority, ordered the ejectment of the tenant. The learned Appellate Authority held that the landlord required the premises bona fide for his personal use since he had proved that he wanted the premises in question for starting his own business. 5. With regard to the question of sub-letting, the learned Appellate Authority also held that it was proved from the evidence on the record that the premises in dispute were in the possession of Charanjit Singh. Although the tenant had taken up the plea that the aforesaid Charanjit Singh was his employee but no evidence had been led in this regard by the tenant to prove the aforesaid fact. On that basis, a presumption was drawn against the tenant and it was held that the tenant had sub-let the premises to Charanjit Singh. On the basis of the aforesaid finding, the learned Appellate Authority accepted the appeal filed by the landlord and ordered the ejectment of the tenant. 6. The tenant has felt aggrieved and has approached this Court through the present revision petition. 7. I have heard Shri K.K. Singla, the learned counsel appearing for the tenant-petitioner at some length and with the assistance have also gone through the record of the case. 6. The tenant has felt aggrieved and has approached this Court through the present revision petition. 7. I have heard Shri K.K. Singla, the learned counsel appearing for the tenant-petitioner at some length and with the assistance have also gone through the record of the case. 8. Shri K.K. Singla, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the landlord had completely failed to prove the factum of sub-letting in as much as the bald statement of the landlord could not have been used by the appellate authority to hold that the premises in dispute had been sub-let by the tenant Jarnail Singh in favour of Charanjit Singh, respondent No. 2. 9. However, I find myself unable to agree with the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel. 10. The learned appellate authority has duly taken Note of the fact that the plea of the landlord was that Charanjit Singh, respondent No. 2 was in exclusive possession of the property in dispute. While appearing as AW-1, the landlord Karamjit Singh has stated that Charanjit Singh used to open the shop in the morning and close the same in the evening. He has also stated that Charanjit Singh was in exclusive possession of the shop in dispute. A further reliance was placed upon the statement of Ramesh Chand, RW-1, a witness produced by the tenant himself. The aforesaid Ramesh Chand has categorically stated that Jarnail Singh had become the Director of the Mandi Board and as such was a very high officer of the District. Ramesh Chand has further stated that Jar-nail Singh used to come to Kapurthala at the shop after about 10 days. Ramesh Chand has further stated that in the absence of Jarnail Singh, Charanjit Singh used to open and close the shop. Jarnail Singh, tenant, himself appeared as RW-2 and stated that Charanjit Singh was his employee, who was working as an electrician with him. However, he had left the job. According to the tenant-Jarnail Singh, Charanjit Singh had remained in the employment with him since the year 1987. However, the learned appellate authority has rightly observed that if Charanjit Singh had remained with Jarnail Singh as an employee for about a period of 13 years, then some document proving the aforesaid fact could have been produced by the tenant. However, no such document was produced. However, the learned appellate authority has rightly observed that if Charanjit Singh had remained with Jarnail Singh as an employee for about a period of 13 years, then some document proving the aforesaid fact could have been produced by the tenant. However, no such document was produced. It has also been noticed by the learned Appellate Authority that Jarnail Singh had admitted that he was filing returns regarding his Finance Company. The learned Appellate Authority has also drawn an inference against the tenant Jarnail Singh for not producing any document with regard to the number of employees employed by the aforesaid Finance Company or the fact the aforesaid Charanjit Singh was ever an employee of Jarnail Singh. 11. From the discussion of the aforesaid evidence, the learned Appellate Authority has found it as a fact that the possession of Charanjit Sigh with regard to the property in dispute stood proved and, therefore, the onus shifted on the tenant to prove as to in which capacity Charanjit Singh was occupying the premises in dispute. Since the tenant failed to prove by leading any cogent and convincing evidence that Charanjit Singh was merely an employee, therefore, a presumption has rightly been drawn by the Appellate Authority that Charanjit Singh was in exclusive possession of the property in dispute in his capacity as sub-tenant. 12. Faced with the aforesaid difficulty, the learned counsel appearing for the tenant-petitioner has also argued that since the landlord had been disbelieved on the ground of arrears of rent, therefore, no reliance should have been placed by the learned Appellate Authority on the statement of the landlord. 13. I am afraid, the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel is also without any merit. The learned Appellate Authority has discussed all the three grounds pressed into service by the landlord, seeking the ejectment of the tenant, separately and in detail. Whereas the ground of arrears of rent has been rejected because the said ground did not stand the judicial scrutiny but the other two grounds taken by the landlord have been found to be duly proved. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the landlord did not require the premises in dispute for personal necessity in as much as he had retired as a teacher in the year 1997 and after retirement he could not be expected to carry on the business. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the landlord did not require the premises in dispute for personal necessity in as much as he had retired as a teacher in the year 1997 and after retirement he could not be expected to carry on the business. This contention of the tenant has also been dealt with in detail by the learned Appellate Authority. The learned Appellate Authority has held that the evidence on the record duly proved that the landlord did require the premises in dispute for his personal requirement. Merely because the landlord had retired from service in the year 1997 could not be taken to mean that after retirement the landlord was not capable of running his own business in the premises. 15. No other point has been urged. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in the present revision petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. 17. However, the tenant is granted one month time to vacate the premises.