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2004 DIGILAW 414 (MAD)

R. Natesan v. State of Tamilnadu & Another

2004-03-11

N.V.BALASUBRAMANIAN, V.KANAGARAJ

body2004
Judgment :- N.V.Balasubramanian, J. The petitioner is the brother of the detenu, Sankar @ Umari Sankar and the detenu has been detained under custody under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers,Drug Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982), branding him as a 'Goonda'. The order of detention has been passed by the second respondent herein and was made in H.S.(M) Confdl. No.39 of 2003 dated 15.10.2003. 2. According to the grounds of detention on which the detention has been made, one Gunaseelan residing at South Maranthalai is a cousin brother of Muthuvel of Umarikadu. The said Muthuvel of Umarikadu was murdered and according to the prosecution, the detenu and his associates were responsible for the murder of the said Muthuvel on 4.8.2003 at Authoor. A case under sections 147, 148 and 302 I.P.C. has been registered against the detenu in Crime No.125 of 2003 of Authoor Police Station. Gunaseelan, cousin brother of the deceased was examined and according to the grounds of detention, on 7.10.2003 the said Gunaseelan along with two others went to a place called, Madathuvilai near Arumuganeri to see his friend, Antony Samy @ Arockiasamy and at about 8.30 a.m. when they alighted from the bus at Madathuvilai, the detenu came towards them and threatened Gunaseelan using obscene language and also stabbed him. It is stated that Gunaseelan escaped from his clutches and ran towards west and when the persons accompanied him intervened, the detenu intimidated and attempted to murder them and out of fear they ran away. It is stated that the detenu chased Gunaseelan and Gunaseelan entered into a hut and bolted from inside. It is also stated that the detenu then got wild and kicked the door and finally set the hut to fire. It is stated that nearby residents rushed there and put out the fire and Gunaseelan went to the Police Station and gave a complaint and the Inspector of Police took up the investigation and prepared the observation mahazar and seized the material objects. He also recorded statements from the witnesses. It is stated that the detenu was arrested on 10.10.2003 and his confession statement was recorded and he was produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruchendur and remanded to judicial custody till 22.10.2003 and he was lodged in the Central Prison, Palayamkottai. 3. He also recorded statements from the witnesses. It is stated that the detenu was arrested on 10.10.2003 and his confession statement was recorded and he was produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruchendur and remanded to judicial custody till 22.10.2003 and he was lodged in the Central Prison, Palayamkottai. 3. The detaining authority came to the conclusion that the detenu is habitually committing crime and he is also acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and as such he is a goonda under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. He therefore came to the conclusion that by committing the grave crime in the public, in a busy locality, the detenu has created alarm and feeling of insecurity in the minds of the people of the area and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is, on the above grounds, the order of detention was passed which is the subject matter of challenge in the petition. 4. Mr.B.Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the detaining authority has not applied his mind to the question whether the detenu was a remand prisoner not only with reference to the ground case, but also with reference to the last of the adverse cases relied upon by the detaining authority. Learned senior counsel produced before us a copy of the remand order passed by the learned Principal District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Tiruchendur in P.R.C.No.19 of 2003 and submitted that the detenu was remanded by the learned Judicial Magistrate not only in the ground case, but also in the last of the adverse cases noticed by the detaining authority, but, according to him, the detaining authority has not noticed that the detenu was remanded to the custody by the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruchendur with reference to the last of the adverse cases referred to by the detaining authority. Learned senior counsel therefore submitted that the order does not reflect that the detaining authority has applied his mind to the question whether the detenu was a remand prisoner not only with reference to the ground case, but also with reference to the last of the adverse cases relied upon by him. Learned senior counsel therefore submitted that the order does not reflect that the detaining authority has applied his mind to the question whether the detenu was a remand prisoner not only with reference to the ground case, but also with reference to the last of the adverse cases relied upon by him. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned senior counsel for the reason that in paragraph-4 of the grounds of detention, the detaining authority has stated that the detenu was remanded by the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruchendur on 10.10.2003. There is no dispute that the detenu was remanded to judicial custody by the same Judicial Magistrate with reference to both the cases on 10.10.2003 and the statement made by the detaining authority that the detenu was remanded to judicial custody by the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruchendur is neutral and it would cover the orders of judicial remand in both the cases. It is not as if that the detenu was remanded in the other case by a different Judicial Officer, but he was remanded to the judicial custody by the same Judicial Magistrate on the same day. Moreover, we are of the view, what is relevant is whether the detaining authority has applied his mind to the question whether the detenu was a remand prisoner on the date of passing the order of detention. 5. It is seen from the booklet filed before us that in so far as crime No.125/2003 which is the last adverse case referred to in the grounds of detention is concerned, the order of remand is found at page 351 by the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruchendur. In so far as the ground case which is registered in Crime No.219 of 2003 is concerned, the order of remand by the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruchendur is found at page 429 of the same booklet. A reading of the grounds of detention clearly shows that the detaining authority has applied his mind to the orders of remand in both the cases. In the grounds of detention the detaining authority has stated that the detenu was remanded to judicial custody which statement does not confine to the order of remand made in the ground case, but it would encompass the order of remand made in the last of the adverse cases as well. In the grounds of detention the detaining authority has stated that the detenu was remanded to judicial custody which statement does not confine to the order of remand made in the ground case, but it would encompass the order of remand made in the last of the adverse cases as well. It is seen from the confession statement of the detenu found at page 341 of the booklet that the detaining authority was aware of both the cases registered against the detenu. It is not a case where the detaining authority was completely oblivious of one of the adverse cases in which the detenu was remanded. The detaining authority has noticed that the ground case emanated from the last adverse case referred to in the confession statement and when two orders of remand by the same Judicial Magistrate were before him it must be taken that the detaining authority has applied his mind to both the orders of remand passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate. 6. Mr.B.Kumar, learned senior counsel referred to the decision of this Court in THENNAVAN v. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (2000) MLJ (Crl.) 380) where a Division Bench of this Court held as under:- " There is no document on record to suggest as to how the detenu was dealt with after his arrest, as to whether he was produced before the concerned Judicial Magistrate and as to whether his remand was extended further. The documents are totally silent about it. Though at the most it can be said that the Detaining Authority was aware that the detenu was arrested on 17.5.1999 for the offences covered under Crime No.149 of 1999 which also involved a major offence as compared to the earlier offences. However, since there is nothing on record to suggest as to what has actually happened thereafter it must be said that there is nothing on record to suggest that the Detaining Authority was aware regarding the arrest of the detenu and continuation of the same by way of judicial remand or otherwise. It is surprising that the Detaining Authority should have made reference only to the minor offences and should have completely left out of consideration the major offence under Sec.307, I.P.C. covered by Crime No.149 of 1999 and in fact, there is no reference whatsoever to that crime in the grounds. It is surprising that the Detaining Authority should have made reference only to the minor offences and should have completely left out of consideration the major offence under Sec.307, I.P.C. covered by Crime No.149 of 1999 and in fact, there is no reference whatsoever to that crime in the grounds. Under such circumstances, it has to be said that the Detaining Authority was not even aware of at least did not bother to consider whether the detenu was in a judicial remand for a major offence under Sec.307. Had the Detaining Authority law aware of the such fact, it had to be reflected in the grounds there by the Detaining Authority should have shown that he had considered the fact of the concerned detenu being in judicial remand for a major offences under Sec.307, I.P.C. and that fact would have certainly affected his decision to order or not to order the preventive detention." 7. Mr.B.Kumar, learned senior counsel also referred to the decision of this Court in JAYAKRISHNAN, ETC. v. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, LAW AND ORDER, ETC. AND 3 OTHERS (2000-1-L.W.(Cri) 455) wherein the above view has been reiterated. We are of the view, the principles laid down in the above decisions have no application to the facts of the case as we have already referred to the copies of two orders of remand which are found in the booklet and also the confession statement of the detenu. Therefore, the records suggest that the detaining authority was aware of the arrest of the detenu in both the cases and the continuation of judicial remand of the detenu in both the cases. It is also not a case where the said fact is not reflected in the grounds of detention as the detaining authority, after referring to the narration of facts in respect of both the cases, has stated that the detenu was remanded to judicial custody by the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruchendur. We are of the view that since the detenu was in remand in both the cases by the same Judicial Magistrate on the same day, the statement would, in our opinion, reflect that the detaining authority was aware of both the orders of remand and it is reflected in the grounds of detention also. 8. Mr.B.Kumar, learned senior counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in KANNAN ALIAS KANNAPPAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR. 8. Mr.B.Kumar, learned senior counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in KANNAN ALIAS KANNAPPAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR. ( 1992 (1) CRIMES 1160 ) wherein this Court after referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate ( AIR 1986 SC 315 ), Meera Rani v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu ( AIR 1989 SC 2027 ) and Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate ( AIR 1964 SC 334 ), held as under:- " What we notice is that the petitioner has been taken into custody in connection with the ground case which is stated to be for offences punishable under sections 392 read with 394, 397, 336, 426 and 506(ii) I.P.C. The antecedent cases also show the offences punishable under sections 457, 380 and 511 I.P.C. to say the least. Besides the ground case, the petitioner has been remanded in several other cases. How could then the detaining authority think that the petitioner was likely to be released on bail. He seems to be oblivious of the fact that howsoever liberal a Court of law may be in granting bail, it is always required to take notice of the seriousness of the offence and the antecedent of the culprit. No order of bail is issued without giving an opportunity to the State of being heard unless the detaining authority and the respondents were sure of the case that they had registered against the petitioner that they had no reason to think that the Court of law would not take notice of the seriousness of the offence committed by the petitioner and his antecedent and release him without any consideration given to this aspect of the case. There is no reason to think that the detaining authority was unaware of the fact that the petitioner was a remand prisoner not only in the ground case, but in several other cases. There is no reason to think that the detaining authority was unaware of the fact that the petitioner was a remand prisoner not only in the ground case, but in several other cases. The only consideration given by him in the grounds related to likely release of the petitioner on bail in the ground case and not in the other cases in which also he is a remand prisoner." The decision of this Court in Kannan's case has no application as it cannot be stated that the detaining authority was unaware of the fact that the detenu was a remand prisoner not only in the ground case, but also in the last of the adverse cases. It is only after considering the same, he came to the conclusion that there was a possibility for the detenu to come out on bail which shows that the detaining authority has noticed the seriousness of the offences committed by the detenu and his antecedent acts and then came to the conclusion that the detenu was liable to be detained as a Goonda under the Tamil Nadu act 14 of 1982. 9. Learned senior counsel submitted that the detaining authority has failed to notice that the detenu was a remand prisoner in the last adverse case in which he was charged for the offences under sections 147, 148 and 302 I.P.C. He further submitted that there is non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority as to the impossibility of the detenu to come out on bail when he was charged for the offence under section 302 I.P.C. Learned senior counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in KANNAN ALIAS KANNAPPAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR. ( 1992 (1) CRIMES 1160 ) and also the decision of this Court in DHARMAR v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ANOTHER (1995-1-L.W. (Crl.) 333) in support of his submission that besides the ground case, the detenu was charged for the offence under section 302 I.P.C. and considering the seriousness of the offences involved in the ground case as well as in the last adverse case no order of detention could be made against the detenu as the detaining authority has not applied his mind to the question whether there was an imminent possibility for the detenu to come out on bail taking into account the serious nature of offences in both the cases referred to in the grounds of detention. 10. We are of the view that the decision relied upon by the learned senior counsel in Dharmar's case (1995-1-L.W.(Crl.) 333) has no application as we have already noticed that the detaining authority has taken note of the ground case as well as the last of the adverse cases before clamping the order of detention which shows that he was aware of the seriousness of the offences and the possibility of the detenu to come out on bail. It is not a case where the detaining authority was completely oblivious of the seriousness of the offences charges in the last adverse case, but he took into consideration both the cases and then came to the conclusion that the detenu was required to be detained. Hence, the decision in Dharmar's case relied upon by the learned senior counsel has no application to the facts of the case. 11. Mr. B.Kumar, learned senior counsel submitted that the detaining authority has not taken into consideration the major offence covered in the last ground case which is one registered under sections 147, 148 and 302 I.P.C. and compared to the major offence involved in the last adverse case, the offence covered in the ground case is not so grave but minor in nature and since the detaining authority has left out of consideration the major offence for which the detenu was charged, the order of detention suffers from non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. Learned senior counsel referred to the decisions of this Court in THENNAVAN v. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (2000) I MLJ (Crl.) 380), KANNIAPPAN v. THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, ETC. Learned senior counsel referred to the decisions of this Court in THENNAVAN v. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (2000) I MLJ (Crl.) 380), KANNIAPPAN v. THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, ETC. 7 ANOTHER (2001-1-L.W. (Crl.) 196) and DHARMAR v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ANOTHER (1995-1-L.W. (Crl.) 333). The consistent view taken by this Court is that the detaining authority should have applied his mind to the serious offences registered in the adverse cases against the detenu and when there is non-application of mind as to the seriousness of the offences registered in the adverse cases that would vitiate the order of detention. However, we are of the view that the decisions relied upon by the learned senior counsel have no application to the facts of the case as we have already noticed that the detaining authority has applied his mind to the ground case as well as one of the adverse cases in which the detenu was charged for the offences under sections 147, 148 and 302 I.P.C. 12. Moreover, learned Additional Public Prosecutor was perfectly justified in brining to the attention of this Court the confession made by the detenu which is found at page 341 of the booklet, and the confession statement shows the extent of his involvement in the murder case, however, it is not necessary to go into the question as the said question has to be decided at the time of criminal trial. We are of the view that the ground case in which the detenu was charged for the offences under sections 341, 307, 436 and 506 (II) I.P.C. is more serious in nature than the last adverse case referred to as the detenu attempted to eliminate the witnesses in the criminal case involving murder and thereby acted against the entire judicial system which would have greater and serious repercussion when compared to the murder case. We are of the view that the ground case is directed against the judicial system as a whole and it is not merely a law and order problem, but would disturb public order and shake the faith of the people in the criminal justice system. We are of the view that the ground case is directed against the judicial system as a whole and it is not merely a law and order problem, but would disturb public order and shake the faith of the people in the criminal justice system. We are of the view that in considering the gravity of the offences, it would not be proper to focus one's attention only to the quantum of punishment that may be imposed, but it is also necessary to consider the nature of the offence affecting the judicial system as a whole. Viewed in the manner, we are of the view that the ground case is of more serious in nature than the last of the adverse cases. 13. In HARPREET KAUR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (1992 SCC (Cri.) 370) the Supreme Court has held as under:- " The fear psychosis created by the detenu in the witnesses was aimed at letting the crime go unpunished which has the potential of the society, and not merely some individual, to suffer. The activities of the detenu, therefore, squarely fall within the deeming provision enacted in the Explanation of section 2(a) of the Act, and it therefore, follows as a logical consequence that the activities of the detenu were not merely prejudicial to the maintenance of 'law and order'; but were prejudicial to the maintenance of 'public order'." We are of the view that the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Harpreet Kaur's case would apply as the ground case is more serious in nature than the last adverse case and hence, the decisions relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the case. 14. Mr.B.Kumar, learned senior counsel submitted that there is uncertainty in the language used and nothing is mentioned in the grounds of detention that the detenu was a remand prisoner with reference to the case registered for the offence under section 302 I.P.C. Learned senior counsel submitted that since the language used is uncertain the detenu was not in a position to meet the case which he has to meet since there is uncertainty as to whether he was remanded in the ground case or in the last of the adverse case. Learned senior counsel referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of YUMNAM MANGIBABU SINGH v. STATE OF MANIPUR ( AIR 1983 S.C. 300 ), particularly the following passage in support of his submission:- " It is not possible to accept the view of the High Court for the simple reason that the appellant was entitled to put forth his case about it which could include either a denial or an explanation of the alleged admission and he was deprived of an opportunity to do so." There can be no doubt about the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court, but the decision has no application as the detaining authority in the grounds of detention has not only referred to the ground case, but also the last of the adverse cases which led to the ground case. Moreover, we have already pointed out the relevant copies of the orders of remand in both the cases furnished to the detenu, and by the statement made in the grounds of detention it cannot be construed to mean that he was in remand only with reference to the ground case and not with reference to the last adverse case. We are of the view that the alleged confusion of the detenu is a creation of his own and the statement made in the grounds of detention is clear enough to refer to the orders of remand passed in both the cases. Hence, the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is rejected. 15. Learned senior counsel also submitted that there is absolutely no material to show that the detenu was likely to come out on bail and in the absence of any such material, a mere statement in this regard would not be sufficient. Learned senior counsel relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in N.MEERA RANI v. GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU (1989 SCC (Cri) 732), DHARMENDRA SUGANCHAND CHELAWAT v. UNION OF INDIA ( AIR 1990 S.C. 1196 ) and RIVADENEYTA RICORDO AGUSTIN v. GOVT. OF DELHI (1994 SCC (Cri) 354). Learned senior counsel relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in N.MEERA RANI v. GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU (1989 SCC (Cri) 732), DHARMENDRA SUGANCHAND CHELAWAT v. UNION OF INDIA ( AIR 1990 S.C. 1196 ) and RIVADENEYTA RICORDO AGUSTIN v. GOVT. OF DELHI (1994 SCC (Cri) 354). In Meera Rani's case the Supreme Court has considered the earlier case-laws on the subject and laid down the law as under:- " Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention and the decision must depend on the facts of the particular case; preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order etc. ordinarily it is not needed when the detenu is already in custody; the detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order; but, even so, if the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied on cogent material that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made even in anticipation to operate on his release. This appears to us, to be the correct legal position." 16. In Dharmendra Suganchand Cehlawat's case ( AIR 1990 SC 1196 ) the Supreme Court reiterated the law and held as under:- " The decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii)there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression 'compelling reasons' in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities." 17. In Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin's case (1994 SCC (Cri) 354) the Supreme Court held as under:- " The above statement merely speaks of a 'possibility' of the detenu's release in case he moves a bail petition. It neither says that such release was likely or that it was imminent. Evidently, the statement falls short of the requirement enunciated by this Court in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 88. Even in the return filed in this petition, the authority has not stated (in response to Ground 'B' of the writ petition) that there was material before him upon which he was satisfied that the petitioner was likely to be released or that such release was imminent. In Ground 'B' of the writ petition, the petitioner has alleged: "(T)hat the respondent knew perfectly well that a complaint has already been filed in Court against the petitioner. He also knew that his two applications for bail were rejected by the Court. Between June and August, the petitioner has made no attempt whatsoever to secure any bail either from the trial Court or from any superior court. Without any application of mind to this aspect of the matter, the respondent acted perversely incoming to the conclusion that the petitioner was ever likely to indulge in any offence of smuggling, to prevent which the respondent found it necessary to pass the order Annexure 'A' hereto." 9. In response thereto, the following statement is made in para 9-B of the return: " As regards contents of ground B, I say that the petitioner moved applications for bail which were rejected by the concerned courts and the release of the petitioner on bail on subsequent application could not be ruled out. In response thereto, the following statement is made in para 9-B of the return: " As regards contents of ground B, I say that the petitioner moved applications for bail which were rejected by the concerned courts and the release of the petitioner on bail on subsequent application could not be ruled out. The fact that the petitioner was in judicial custody was within the knowledge of the detaining authority and having full knowledge of the facts, the detaining authority considered it necessary to detain the petitioner. The subjective satisfaction was arrived at having full knowledge of the facts." (Emphasis supplied)." However, on the facts of the case, we find that the detaining authority in the grounds of detention has applied his mind and recorded his statement that the detenu has not filed any bail application and there is likelihood of filing bail application and being enlarged on bail in the criminal case. We have already noticed that the confession statement of the detenu was also taken into consideration and in the confession statement the role of the detenu in the commission of the offence is also indicated. There are materials to show that the detenu is likely to file bail application and get enlarged on bail. In other words, the detaining authority has applied his mind to the materials and the grounds show that he applied his mind to the question that the detenu has not filed any bail application and there is likelihood of filing bail application and being enlarged on bail. Therefore we are of the view that the statement made by the detaining authority cannot be stated to fall short of the requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 88). 18. The last submission of the learned senior counsel is that the statement of the detaining authority in the grounds of detention falls short of the requirement of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin v. Govt. of Delhi (1994 SCC (Cri) 354) and Amritlal v. Union Govt. (2001 SCC (Cri) 147). 18. The last submission of the learned senior counsel is that the statement of the detaining authority in the grounds of detention falls short of the requirement of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin v. Govt. of Delhi (1994 SCC (Cri) 354) and Amritlal v. Union Govt. (2001 SCC (Cri) 147). The Supreme Court in Amritlal's case, after referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin's case (1994 SCC (Cri) 354) and Kamarunnissa v. Union of India (1991) 1 SCC 128 ), laid down the law as under:- " The requirement as noticed above in Binod Singh case (1986) 4 SCC 416 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 490) that there is 'likelihood of the petitioners being released on bail' however is not available in the reasoning as provided by the officer concerned. The reasoning available is the 'likelihood of his moving an application for bail' which is different from 'likelihood to be released on bail'. This reasoning, in our view, is not sufficient compliance with the requirements as laid down. 7. The emphasis however, in Binod Singh case (1986) 4 SCC 416 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 490) that before passing the detention order the authority concerned must satisfy himself of the likelihood of the petitioner being released on bail and that satisfaction ought to be reached on cogent material. Available cogent material is the likelihood of having a bail application moved in the matter but not obtaining a bail order." Learned senior counsel therefore submitted that on the facts of the case the detaining authority has not stated that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail and hence, the statement made by the detaining authority does not meet the requirement of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above case. 19. To appreciate the submission of the learned senior counsel, it is better to quote the statement of the detaining authority as found in the grounds of detention, and the detaining authority has stated as under:- " He is a remanded prisoner in the Central Prison, Palayamkottai. I am also aware that he has not filed any bail application so far, but there is likelihood of his filing such application and being enlarged on bail in the criminal Court". I am also aware that he has not filed any bail application so far, but there is likelihood of his filing such application and being enlarged on bail in the criminal Court". In our view, the detaining authority has applied his mind to the question that the detenu was a remand prisoner and he has not filed any application and there was likelihood of filing bail application and being enlarged on bail. We are of the view that the word, 'likelihood' employed by the detaining authority should be read along with the expression, 'enlarged on bail in the criminal court'. It is not possible to dissect the sentence into two as the detaining authority has stated that there is likelihood of filing bail application by the detenu and he being enlarged on bail by the criminal court. In our view, the detaining authority has combined both the requirements of likelihood of filing the bail application and the likelihood of release on bail by the employment of the expression, 'likelihood' used earlier and if the statement is read in that manner, we hold that the detaining authority has applied his mind to the question whether there is likelihood of the detenu being enlarged on bail. Further, we are of the view, what is relevant is whether the detaining authority has applied his mind to the said question and when the statement made by the detaining authority shows that he has applied his mind to the question of possibility of the detenu being enlarged on bail and the statement made by the detaining authority conveys the meaning that would be sufficient to meet the requirement of law laid down by the Supreme Court. We are of the view that the statement of the detaining authority cannot be read as if it is a piece of a statute, but has to be read in a proper perspective. Since the view of the detaining authority that there is likelihood of the detenu coming out on bail is reflected in the statement and the conclusion has been arrived at on the basis of materials on record, we are of the view that the order of detention is not liable to be quashed. 20. We find that there are materials for the detaining authority to arrive at the subjective satisfaction that the order of detention should be made against the detenu. 20. We find that there are materials for the detaining authority to arrive at the subjective satisfaction that the order of detention should be made against the detenu. He has taken into account the grave nature of the offences said to have been committed by the detenu and he has also noticed that the detenu was a remand prisoner and he was also aware of the fact that the detenu has not filed any bail application and there is likelihood of filing bail application and there is likelihood of coming out on bail. We find that other statutory requirements as found in the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 are complied with and the detenu has been provided with all constitutional safeguards that are required to be given. We do not find any ground to interfere in the order of detention clamped against the detenu. Accordingly, the petition stands dismissed.