JUDGMENT Surya Kant, J. - This judgement will dispose of Civil Writ Petitions No. 2077 of 2002 and 1853 and 3324 of 2003 as the common questions of law and facts are involved in these cases. For the sake of brevity, the facts are being taken from C.W.P. No. 2077 of 2002. 2. The two societies - one registered with the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Haryana (Petitioner No. 1) and the other under the Societies Registration Act, 1890 (Petitioner No. 2), have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing notifications dated August 1, 2001 (Annexure P-9) issued by the State of Haryana under Section 4 read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and dated August 2, 2001 (Annexure P-10) issued under Section 6 of the Act as, according to the Petitioners, having not been published in accordance with the law, the same are illegal and are an outcome of misuse and abuse of the process of law as no circumstances warranting the invoking of urgency clause ever existed. The petitioners have also sought a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to release the acquired land from acquisition in view of an agreement dated October 19, 1985 (Annexure P-3) purported to have been singed on behalf of the Government of Haryana. 3. The petitioners have also sought a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to release the acquired land from acquisition in view of an agreement dated October 19, 1985 (Annexure P-3) purported to have been singed on behalf of the Government of Haryana. 3. Petitioner No. 1 - Society (for short the Petitioner-Society) is the owner in possession of land measuring 60 kanals 2-2/3 marlas situated in the revenue estate of village Nangal Kheri, Tehsil and District Panipat; in addition to the afore-mentioned land, the petitioner society is also owner of the land measuring 6 kanals 13 marlas situated in the same revenue estate; Petitioner No. 2 - Sabha is a registered society for conducting religious Satsangs, and has been allotted a part of the land owned by the petitioner-society which was later on transferred in its favour by way of a registered sale deed; the State of Haryana issued notification under Section 4 of the Act dated December 15, 1982 (Annexure P-1) allegedly for a public purpose, namely, development and utilization of the land owned by the petitioners, as residential, commercial and industrial areas in Sectors 11, 12 and 25 Part II, Panipat, which were to be developed by the Haryana Urban Development Authority (in short the HUDA); this notification was followed by another notification dated June 20, 1984 (Annexure P-2) issued under Section 6 of the Act; however, against the afore- mentioned notification; the petitioner-society represented to the State Government and an agreement dated October 19, 1985 (Annexure P-3) was entered into between the petitioner-society on the one hand and the Governor of Haryana, through Director, Urban Development, Haryana on the other hand, in terms of which it was decided that land measuring 53 kanals 8 marlas be released on fulfilment of certain conditions; pursuant to the afore-mentioned agreement, the Director, Urban Development, Haryana sent a communication dated December 4, 1985/January 10, 1986 (annexure P-4) to this effect endorsing the order whereby the land of the petitioner-society was released; after the re- alignment of the Sectors of Panipat, the land of the petitioner-society now falls in Sector 29 and is described as "site for teachers colony"; that the land measuring 6 kanals 13 marlas owned by the petitioner-society, however, still remained acquired as the same fell in the green belt developed along- side G.T. Road going from Ambala to Panipat as is evident from the notification issued under Section 9 (Annexure P-5); that the petitioner society has got the area demarcated and after carving out the plots, has also reserved plots for temples, overhead tanks, green belt, etc.; the lay out plan of the society along with necessary charges was sent for the approval of the Director, Town and Country Planning vide letters dated June 28, 1989 and October 16, 1989 (Annexure P-6 and P-7 respectively); the HUDA Panipat issued a public notice on November 10, 2000 acknowledging that the land owned by the petitioner-society comprising Rect. No. 32 in village Nangal Kheri had been released from acquisition; in the meantime, the petitioner-society raised certain constructions including the boundary wall around the colony and a few members of the society also raised their individual boundary walls apart from certain other constructions; similarly, an electricity meter and a water connection were got installed in the name of the petitioner No. 2 and a hall had also been constructed; however, notwithstanding the fact that the land owned by the petitioner was released from the acquisition, the State of Haryana initiated fresh proceedings for acquiring the land and issued a notification dated August 1, 2001 (Annexure P-9) under Section 4 of the Act read with clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act; the entire land owned by the petitioner-society forms part of the afore-mentioned notification and was sought to be acquired for the alleged public purpose, namely, construction of a road connecting the Sanauli road with G.T. Road for Sector 25 Part II-B in Urban Estate, Panipat; that contents of the notification dated August 1, 2001 (Annexure P-9) were required to be published in two newspapers having circulation in the locality in terms of section 4(1) of the Act and one of the two newspapers was required to be of a regional language having circulation in the locality; the Collector was further required to cause public notice of the substance of the notification in the locality by way of proclamation; however, no such steps were taken by the respondents in the present case. The petitioners did not come to know about the publication of the notification in the Government Gazette or in any of the newspapers or about the proclamation and they also checked up the records of the Patwari and found no rapat roznamcha entry with regard to issuance of any public notice; the petitioners, on account of non-publication of the notification dated August 1, 2001 (Annexure P-9) and due to invoking of urgency provisions, have been denied valuable opportunity and remedy of submitting objections under section 5-A of the Act; the State of Haryana issued another notification dated August 2, 2001 (Annexure P-10) purported to be under section 6 of the Act read with clause (c) of Section 17(2) of the Act declaring its intention to acquire the land in village Nangal Kheri including the one owned and possessed by the petitioners; that the substance of the notification issued under section 6 of the Act has also not been published in two newspapers having circulation in the locality in accordance with the law as one of the two newspapers was required to be of regional language having circulation in the locality and that the authorities have also failed to cause public notice of the publication to be made in the locality by proclamation; the notification dated August 1, 2001 (Annexure P-9) issued under section 4 of the Act is illegal and is liable to quashed having not been published in accordance with the law inasmuch as declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act should have been issued within one year from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act; in the present case, the respondents have failed to publish the notification under section 6 of the Act in the two newspapers as well as the public notice by proclamation in the locality; even the Department of Urban Estate, Government of Haryana was not aware of the issuance of notifications dated August 1, 2001 and August 2, 2001 (Annexure P-9 and P-10 respectively) and issued another notification dated 12.9.2001 (Annexure P-11) under section 4 of the Act seeking to acquire the same land owned by the petitioners for another so-called public purpose, namely, development and utilization of the acquired land or the shifting of dying units in Sector 29 Part II, Panipat; that the petitioner-society raised objections on 9.10.2001 (Annexure P-12) against the afore-mentioned notification dated 12.9.2001 and pursuant thereto the State of Haryana issued a notification dated 1.10.2001 (Annexure P-13) thereby withdrawing the notification dated 12.9.2001; according to the petitioners, the acquisition in question is bad in law and is liable to be quashed for the reason that the land in question had been acquired earlier also in the year 1982 and 1984 but was released on the representation of the petitioner-society, therefore, it could not have been re-acquired; the respondents are bound by the agreement entered into on behalf of the Governor of Haryana and the principle of promissory estoppel fully applies; the land of the petitioner-society cannot be acquired in contravention of the agreement dated 19.10.1985; no circumstances existed to invoke the emergency clause and the petitioners ought to have been afforded an opportunity to file objections under Section 5-A of the Act; the period of six months has expired after the issuance of notification under Section 6 of the Act and since 80% of the compensation amount has not been tendered by the Collector, therefore, the acquisition is in violation of the provisions of the Act and that the impugned acquisition is also violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. 4. While issuing notice of motion, the Bench directed to maintain status quo with regard to possession of the land. The respondents have contested the writ petition through a written statement filed by the Land Acquisition Collector, Urban Estate, Haryana. It has, inter alias, averred that the notification under Section 4 read with Section 17 dated 1.8.2001 (Annexure P-9) was duly published in the Government Gazette on 1.8.2001 and in two daily newspapers, namely, the Pioneer (English) on 10.8.2001 and Sangharsh (Hindi) on 12.8.2001. The proclamation of the afore-mentioned notification was made in the locality on 6.8.2001 vide Rapat No. 563. Similarly, the declaration under section 6 read with section 17 of the Act was published in the Government Gazette on 2.8.2001 and in two daily newspapers namely, the Pioneer (English) on 10.8.2001 and Sangharsh (Hindi) on 12.8.2001. The proclamation of the notification was made in the locality on 6.8.2001 vide rapat No. 564. The award in respect of the land in question was announced on July 5, 2002. However, possession of the acquired land was not taken and handed over to the beneficiary department, namely, HUDA in view of the ad interim order dated February 1, 2002 passed by this Court; the land in question was acquired for public purpose, namely, for development and utilization of the land for the construction of a road connecting Sanauli road with G.T. Road for Sector 25, Part II-B, Panipat; it is correct that the land of the petitioner-society was released from previous acquisition, however, even after a period of 15 years of its release, no development has been carried out by the society at the site as per the report of the District Town Planner, Panipat; the inclusion of the land in question in the subsequent notification dated 12.9.2001 issued under Section 4 of the Act was due to an inadvertent error and the same was subsequently rectified vide notification dated 1.1.2002; the notices under section 9 were issued to the land owners/interested persons but due to non- availability of the addresses of the petitioners, the same were pasted at the convenient places; the award in respect of the land was made and announced on 5.7.2002. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. The primary contention of Shri M.S. Jain, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the follow up declaration under section 6(1) of the Act cannot be issued before the last date of publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act as per sub-section (1) thereof. According to Shri Jain, it is the case of the respondents themselves that the last date of publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act is August 12, 2001 when it was published in one of the daily newspapers Sangharsh (Hindi). However, the declaration under section 6(1) was admittedly made in the Govt. Gazette on August 2, 2001 (Annexure P-10), therefore, the afore- mentioned notification having been issued contrary to the mandatory scheme of the statute, is liable to be quashed. Reliance has been placed upon judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Radhey Shyam Nigam, AIR 1989 SC 682. 7. On the other hand, Shri Sanjay Vashishth, learned Senior Deputy Advocate General, Haryana has contended that once the urgency provision under Sections 17(1) & (4) is invoked, though issuance of notification under section 4 in the manner prescribed in sub-section (1) thereof is required but it is not mandatory that all the three steps should be completed before making the declaration under section 6(1) of the Act and have to be published before directing the Collector to take decision under Section 17(1) or 17(2) of the Act, therefore, the procedure followed by the authorities in the present case is valid as held by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Singh and others v. International Airport Authority of India, JT (1996) 1 SC 31. 8. Before adverting to the rival submissions, we find that Sections 4(1), 6(1) and 17(4) of the Act have a direct bearing on the issue involved and the same are reproduced below :- "4. 8. Before adverting to the rival submissions, we find that Sections 4(1), 6(1) and 17(4) of the Act have a direct bearing on the issue involved and the same are reproduced below :- "4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon - (1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, or for a company, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last date of such publication and the giving of such notice being hereinafter referred to as the date of publication of the notification). (2) xxx xxx xxx xxx 6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose - (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, made under section 5A, sub- section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders, and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under section 5A, sub-section (2) :- Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section (1), - xxx xxxx xxx (ii) published after the commencemnt of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification : Provided further no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled by a local authority." 9. Coming to the submission made by Shri Jain, as noticed above, there can hardly be any dispute that on an interpretation of the provisions of the Act, as amended by the Amendment Act No. 66 of 1984, their Lordships in Radhey Shyam Nigams case (supra) held that even while invoking the urgency clause under section 17(4) of the Act, declaration under section 6 can be made only after the publication of the notification under section 4(1) and such declaration, therefore, would be subsequent to the date of the publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act. However, out of the three steps required to be taken under section 4(1) which one shall constitute "the last date of publication" for the purpose to find out as to whether the notification under section 6(1) is "subsequent to the date of publication of notification under section 4(1)", did not arise for consideration before their Lordships as is spelt out from para 14 of the report, which reads as under :- "It is the true the expression "after the date of the publication of the notification" introduced in Section 4 can be explained away as making no change from the provisions of law by reading it along with amendment made in Section 4 whereby in different situation in Section 4, the last date of publication of the notice has been determined as the date of the publication of the notification and similarly in Section 6 a date of the publication of the notice has been provided for. But the words "after the date of the publication of the notification" in sub-section (4) of Section 27 read simplicitor clearly indicate that declaration under Section 6 had to be made after the publication of the notification meaning thereby subsequent to the date of the publication of the notification. It appears to us that there is nothing in the scheme of the Act which militates against such construction. The fact that at times where emergency provisions are invoked emergent action may be taken but in such a situation in view of the state of law that was before it, the legislature has made a conscious change which cannot be explained away merely because this is a consequence of the changes in Sections 4 and 6 of the Act." 10. The afore-mentioned issue, however, is no longer res integra. The afore-mentioned issue, however, is no longer res integra. In Mohan Singhs case (supra), the notification under section 4(1) was published on December 23, 1986. The same was published in two newspapers on January 3, 1987. The notice of substance of such notification was given at convenient places in the locality. Declaration under section 6(1) was published on December 24, 1986 and notice of substances thereof was given in the locality thereafter. An argument, somewhat similar to the one raised in the present case, was also canvassed before the Supreme Court which as noticed in para 4 of the report reads as under:- "Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior counsel for the appellants, contended that the exercise of the power under Section 17(4) invoking urgency clause under Section 17(1) is conditioned upon the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). Thereafter, the Government has the power to invoke Section 17(4). Section 4(1) contemplates three mandatory conditions to be complied with, i.e., (1) publication of the notification under section 4(1) in the official Gazette; (2) publication of the notification in two daily newspapers having circulation in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language; and (3) the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. The last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice has reference to the date of the publication of the notification. Unless all the three steps are complied with and after compliance of last of it or any one of them which will be the last of it, the Act gives power to the appropriate Government to exercise the power under Section 17(1) and empowers thereafter to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5A and declaration under Section 6(1) may be made in respect of that land at any time "after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1)". In support thereof, he placed strong reliance on State of U.P. v. Radhey Shyam Nigam & Ors. etc. JT 1989(1) SC 58 : [(1989) 1 SCR 92. He also contended that the publication of the three steps required to be taken under Section 4(1) is mandatory......." 11. In support thereof, he placed strong reliance on State of U.P. v. Radhey Shyam Nigam & Ors. etc. JT 1989(1) SC 58 : [(1989) 1 SCR 92. He also contended that the publication of the three steps required to be taken under Section 4(1) is mandatory......." 11. Their Lordships considered the afore-mentioned issue in the light of "mandatory" and "directory" nature of certain provisions of the Act and after elaborate discussions in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the report, answered the same in para 27, as under :- "In the light of the above law, we have no hesitation to hold that though compliance of publication of the three steps required under Section 4(1) is mandatory while exercising the power of eminent domain under Section 4(1), when the appropriate Government exercises the power under sub-section (4) of Section 17 dispensing with the enquiry under section 5-A and directing the Collector to take possession of the land before making the award when the lands are needed urgently either under sub-section (1) or (2) thereof, it is not mandatory to publish the notification under Section 4(1) in the newspapers and giving of notice of the substance thereof in the locality; the last of the dates of publication should not be the date for the purpose exercising the power under Section 17(4). This interpretation of ours would subserve the public purpose and suppresses mischief of non-compliance and seeks to elongate the public purpose, namely, taking immediate possession of the land needed for the public purpose, envisaged in the notification." This view has been subsequently reiterated by Honble Supreme Court in the case of A.P. Sarin v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 SC 1284. We, thus, find no substance in the first submission made on behalf of the petitioners. 12. Shri Jain, then contended that facts and circumstances of the present case do not warrant invoking of urgency clause by the State under Section 17 of the Act. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon a communication dated September 5, 1991 (Annexure P-17) sent by the Director, Town and Country Planning, Haryana to M/s Emco Fab Pvt. Ltd. and para 3(1) of which recites as under :- "that according to the Layout Plan of Sector-II, Panipat, large chunk of the proposed sites comes in the Sector Road;" 13. In the lay out plan of Sector II, Panipat, according to Shri Jain, the land in question was proposed to be utilized for construction of he sector road about ten years back as mentioned in the afore-said communication but the road was not constructed for such a long period and thus, there existed no element of urgency justifying dispensation with the requirement of Section 5-A of the Act at the time of present acquisition. Shri Jain has further supplemented his submission by placing reliance upon the lay out plan of Industrial Sectors 25-II and 29-II (Part) of Panipat (Annexure R-1) to demonstrate that the land owned by the petitioner-society, in fact, is not required for laying the proposed sector road and the same would remain unutilized even after the road is laid. 14. We are, however, not impressed with this submission of Shri Jain. When the Government forms an opinion that it is necessary to acquire a piece of land for a specified public purpose and it also forms a bona fide opinion that the possession of such land is required to be taken immediately, it is entitled to direct dispensing with the inquiry envisaged under section 5-A of the Act. It is not disputed that the land in question is sought to be acquired by the State Government for "construction of road connecting Sanauli road with G.T. Road for Sector 25, Part II in Urban Estate, Panipat" and the notification dated August 1, 2001 (Annexure P-9) issued under Section 4 of the Act expressly recites that "the Government of Haryana is satisfied that the land is urgently required for the above said purpose and ........... is of the opinion that the provision of sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Act thus, applicable, it is hereby directed under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the said Act that the provision of Section 5-A of the said Act shall not apply in regard to this acquisition". In the written statement filed on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 also, it has been reiterated that the urgency clause was invoked as the land in question is acquired for the construction of road connecting Sanauli road with G.T. Road. It is the pleaded case of the petitioners that the constructions of the proposed road will connect Industrial Sectors 25-II and 29-II (Part) of Panipat with G.T. Road. It is the pleaded case of the petitioners that the constructions of the proposed road will connect Industrial Sectors 25-II and 29-II (Part) of Panipat with G.T. Road. In its endeavour to encourage industralisation, every State is bound to provide infrastructual facilities and the road transport has its own significance amongst such facilities. Connectivity of industrial sectors with the main national Highway so as to facilitate the supply of raw material or smooth transportation of the manufactured goods, plays major role in the industrial and financial growth of State. In a world of competition, no one can afford to lag behind. Panipat is located in the National Capital Region (NCR) and National Highway No. 1, namely G.T. Road connects it with the national capital. The anxiety of the State Government, therefore, in developing a modern industrial sector in Panipat township and to connect it with the national capital through G.T. Road, can very well be appreciated. With a view to attract entrepreneurs and prospective industries towards its newly developed industrial sectors, the State Government is bound to provide basic amenities at the spot and not merely on its lay out plans. In our view, the invoking of urgency clause by the State has to be tested on the touchstone of such like relevant factors. We are satisfied that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there existed circumstances justifying the invoking of urgency clause by the State Government and necessitating the dispensation of the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. We cannot overlook the fact that unless the action invoking urgency clause by the State Government is vitiated either by mala fides or colourable exercise of power, the opinion as formed by the State Government cannot be substituted even if a contrary opinion could be formed by us. In this regard, reference may be made to Chameli Singh and others v. State of U.P. AIR 1986 SC 1051 as well as A.P. Sarins case (supra). So far as the plea that the land owned by the petitioner-society would remain unutilized even after the proposed road is laid, suffice to say that the land in question is yet to be utilized for the public purpose for which it has been acquired. So far as the plea that the land owned by the petitioner-society would remain unutilized even after the proposed road is laid, suffice to say that the land in question is yet to be utilized for the public purpose for which it has been acquired. We are also not persuaded by the submission that in view of the fact that the land of the petitioner- society was previously released from acquisition in terms of the agreement dated October 19, 985 (Annexure P-3), the same could not have been acquired vide the impugned notifications. The principles akin to res judicata are not attracted to the land acquisition proceedings. 15. Shri P.K. Mutneja, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in CWP No. 1853 of 2003 has taken an additional plea that the land was purchased by the petitioner-industry for the purpose of expansion of their existing industrial unit; the land was purchased by registered sale deeds dated 18.6.90 and 2.2.91; that the petitioner built boundary wall and also started building three big sheds for the purpose of setting up a factory for manufacturing items for export; however, the State Government vide their communication dated September 5, 1991 (Annexure P-5) declined permission for the "change of land use" on the pretext that as per the lay out plan, the land was required for the sector road and that "there was a proposal to acquire the said area." However, it took 10 years, contends Shri Mutneja, for the State Government to acquire the land in question and that too by invoking the urgency clause. Shri Mutneja has further contended that neither any notice under Section 9 of the Act (in accordance with Section 45 of the Act) was served upon the petitioners to claim compensation in respect of the land in dispute nor the Collector tendered payment or paid 80% of the compensation as estimated by him though he was mandatorily required to do so in terms of sub-section (3A) of Section 17 of the Act. 16. We have already held that invoking of the urgency clause for acquiring the land in question, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is justified in law. 16. We have already held that invoking of the urgency clause for acquiring the land in question, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is justified in law. We may, however, add that mere mentioning in the communication dated September 5, 1991 (Annexure P-5) that there was a proposal to acquire the area, does not necessarily mean that the proposal, if any, in the year 1991 was to acquire the land for the same public purposes for which it has been acquired now. 17. Coming to the plea that no notice under section 9 was served upon the petitioners in accordance with section 45 of the Act, we may mention that the respondents in their written statement have taken the plea that due to non- availability of addresses of the petitioners, notices under section 9 were pasted at the convenient places in the locality. However, the petitioners in their rejoinder reiterated that no notice was ever served upon them or pasted at their premises. The respondents have thereafter filed their rejoinder and in para 4 thereof, the following plea has been taken :- "....It is wrong to say that no notice under section 9 was issued to the land owners/interested persons, but as per revenue record maintained by this officer the petitioners company was not entered as owner of the land in question at the time of issuance of notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. However notices under section 9 were issued to Smt. Saraswati Devi w/o Hari Krishan Lal and Narinder s/o Des Raj. But due to non-availability of the address of the petitioners, same was pasted at the convenient places in the locality. The land falls in the middle of the Road as per the plan submitted by the District Town Planner, Panipat........" From the afore-mentioned factual averment, we are, prima facie, satisfied that notice under section 9 was issued to petitioner No. 2 and other interested persons as per the prescribed procedure inasmuch as notice by fixing the copy thereof on the outer door of the house in which the affected person ordinarily dwells or carries on business or even by fixing a copy of the notice on some conspicuous place in the office of the Collector and on some conspicuous part of the acquired land, is one of the prescribed mode of effecting service under section 45(3) of the Act. However, this argument of Shri Mutneja need not detain us further as failure to serve notice under section 9 of the Act, does not per se render the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 5 (Annexures P-9) and P-10) illegal which are under challenge in these writ petitions. We, thus, find no merit in the afore-mentioned submission as well. 18. So far as the plea of Shri Mutneja regarding non-compliance of sub-section (3A) of Section 17 is concerned, there can be no doubt that the Collector is duty bound to tender payment of 80% of the compensation as estimated by him for the acquired land to the person interested/entitled thereto and pay it to them before taking possession of any land under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 17. However, it is the positive case of the respondents that the award was announced by the Collector on 5.7.2002 and the entire amount of compensation has been deposited and it is open to the petitioners or for that matter any other interested person to collect the amount of compensation which is lying with the Collector. According to the respondents, possession of the land in question was taken under section 16 only after the Collector had announced the award under section 11 of the Act. The question of violation of sub-section (3A) of Section 17, therefore, odes not arise. The petitioners in their rejoinder to the written statement have not disputed the fact regarding passing of the award by the Collector on 5.7.2002. That being so, we find no substance in the submission made by Shri Mutneja regarding non-compliance of sub-section (3A) of Section 17 of the Act. The State Government, after passing of the award under Section 11 by the Collector, was fully entitled in law to take possession of the land under section 16 without resorting to the procedure prescribed in sub-section (3A) of Section 17 of the Act. 19. Shri Mutneja has lastly contended that the land in question was never intended to be utilized for an urgent public purpose as the petitioners still continue to be in possession thereof. This fact, however, has been seriously disputed by Shri Sanjay Vashishth, learned Senior Deputy Advocate General for the State of Haryana, as, according to him, the award was pronounced by the Collector on July 5, 2002 and the possession was taken immediately. This fact, however, has been seriously disputed by Shri Sanjay Vashishth, learned Senior Deputy Advocate General for the State of Haryana, as, according to him, the award was pronounced by the Collector on July 5, 2002 and the possession was taken immediately. We find from the record that the present Writ Petition was filed by the petitioners on February 3, 2003 and status quo with regard to possession was directed to be maintained by the motion Bench on February 4, 2003. In the light of the admitted fact that the Collector had already announced award on July 5, 2002, we are of the view that possession of the land stood vested absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances in terms of section 16 of the Act. 20. Shri Pritam Saini, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner in Civil Writ Petition No. 3324 of 2003 vehemently argued that the petitioner, namely, M/s Lord Shiva Exports, is a running industrial unit dealing in export of woollen and cotton clothes; that it was owned by M/s Janta Woollen & Finishing Works and was mortgaged with the Haryana Financial Corporation along with its building; that M/s Janta Woollen & Finishing Works failed to repay the loan amount, therefore, the land and machinery were put to open public auction; that the petitioner was the highest bidder who purchased the afore- mentioned running industrial unit from the Haryana Financial Corporation on October 21, 1997 and thereafter raised further construction of shed etc. to make it a viable industrial unit; that the premises of the factory and its open space is located far away from the proposed road connecting Sanauli road to G.T. Road and thus, neither the open space nor the land underneath the factory are required for construction of the proposed road; that the entire area has already been developed as an industrial sector yet the petitioner, who is a running industrial unit, is sought to be acquired and, thus, the action of the respondents is self-contradictory. Shri Saini has further stated at the bar that the land underneath the structure of the factory, ought to have been released even if the remaining vacant land was required for the proposed public purpose. Shri Saini has further stated at the bar that the land underneath the structure of the factory, ought to have been released even if the remaining vacant land was required for the proposed public purpose. From the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents, we find that though the fact that there existed any factory, has been disputed, however, construction of a boundary wall and a shed over the land in question are admitted. The land of the petitioner is facing Sector 29 Part-II which has been developed as an industrial sector. Though there is nothing on record like registration with the Sales Tax authorities, Industries Department, etc., to hold that the petitioner is/was a running industrial unit before initiation of the acquisition proceedings. However, we are of the view that in case the petitioner-industry is a running industrial unit, it must have been registered with the Sales Tax Department and other authorities of the Central and State Government. On being satisfied about its status as a running industrial unit, if the authorities are further satisfied that the land underneath the factory/structure can be exempted without disturbing the lay out plan or the construction of the proposed road, they should reconsider the acquisition of the petitioner-industry, particularly, when the same is located in an area which is sought to be developed as an industrial sector. We are, therefore, of the view that before demolishing the existing structure of the petitioner-unit, the respondent authorities shall call upon the petitioner to produce relevant material and/or inspect the site to find out as to whether or not there existed a running industrial unit at the time of initiation of acquisition proceedings, and in case it is found that the petitioner-unit was functional at the relevant time, they shall release the petitioners land or part thereof from acquisition provided that such release does not cause much disturbance to the lay out plan or the proposed construction of the connecting road. For the reasons stated above, C.W.Ps. No. 2077 of 200 and 1853 of 2003 are dismissed whereas C.W.P. No. 3324 of 2003 is disposed of in terms of the directions afore-mentioned. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.