A. N. RAY, ACJ. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal from an order dated 4th of March 2004 passed in execution proceedings whereby the decree holder appellant, who is also the award holder has his execution application dismissed. ( 2 ) ALTHOUGH numerous authorities have been cited before us, in our opinion, if a grip over the simple and basic facts of this case is taken, the matter resolves itself very easily without any intricacies of the law at all. In a Railway arbitration, an award was passed on the 25th of August, 1993 by the sole arbitrator, one H. K. Pudhee. On the 4th of February, 2000, the application for setting aside of the award succeeded; on the 4th of September, 2001, however, the appeal from that order succeeded and the Railways application for setting aside of the award was thus dismissed in appeal. Consequently, the award came to be upheld. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER, the judgment upon award being the decree was put into execution. On the 21st of August 2003, an execution order was actually passed in favour of the appellant award holder directing the Railway Authorities to pay a sum of Rs. 8. 94 lakh approximately within 30 days of the date of the order. ( 4 ) AFTER dismissal of the setting aside application the Railway Authorities have actually paid sizeable sums of money on the basis of the award itself. ( 5 ) AFTER the execution order the respondent applied before the Executing Court, raising a section 47 matter there, saying that there could be no reference at all as there had been a no claim certificate, signed by the appellant; as there was a no claim certificate, there was no difference or dispute existing and therefore, the arbitration itself was without jurisdiction. ( 6 ) THE point has succeeded in the Court below. Very simply put, the great surprise which we have felt is, that the first Court has in effect nullified the order of the Division Bench whereby the setting aside application was finally dismissed. ( 7 ) ANY point which could be taken by the Railways against the award leading to its setting aside or its being nullified should have been made a subject matter of a section 30 or a section 33 application; that not being done, those some points cannot be re-agitated once again in the execution proceedings. ( 7 ) ANY point which could be taken by the Railways against the award leading to its setting aside or its being nullified should have been made a subject matter of a section 30 or a section 33 application; that not being done, those some points cannot be re-agitated once again in the execution proceedings. If it is permitted to be done, the result will be odd, just like what has happened before us. ( 8 ) THERE might be a handful of cases where, even though the award itself is not liable to be set aside, the judgment upon the award, i. e. the decree suffers nonetheless from an inherent of jurisdiction or some such other fundamental defect, which can be pointed out in execution. These points can be taken in a section 47 matter but not others which should be taken properly, and if at all, in a setting aside application only. As an instance of that peculiar situation where the award is good but the judgment upon award is not, we refer to the case of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi reported at 1970 (1) SCC 670 . That judgment mentions in paragraph 7 a possible instance of decree being without jurisdiction; a decision of the Judicial Committee given in the case of Jananendra Mohan is referred to therein (60 Indian Appeals 71 ). There a decree had been passed on an award when the Indian Arbitration Act 1899 was in operation. We have examined that under section 15 of that Act, like under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 now, the award could be executed straight away and there was no provision for passing a judgment upon award. Thus, when a decree was passed on the award, the decree itself was without jurisdiction and such a point could be taken in execution. ( 9 ) THERE is no such point here. ( 10 ) FURTHERMORE, the no claim certificate, supposedly the trump card of the respondent, has not seen the light of the day yet; they have never produced it. On the other hand, the no claim certificate produced by the appellant in their reply show that they had made express reservations about making some of their claims go over to arbitration. ( 11 ) THE respondent's case is thus sustainable neither in law nor on facts. ( 12 ) THE appeal, is, therefore, allowed. On the other hand, the no claim certificate produced by the appellant in their reply show that they had made express reservations about making some of their claims go over to arbitration. ( 11 ) THE respondent's case is thus sustainable neither in law nor on facts. ( 12 ) THE appeal, is, therefore, allowed. The impugned order dated 4th March 2004 is set aside. The appellant will be entitled to the costs both before us and before the Court below. The execution application which was dismissed by the order which we have set aside revives and might be proceeded with and pressed further immediately. ( 13 ) STAY of operation of this order of ours is prayer for but where the award is already 11 years old and substantially already paid up, we have no hesitation in turning down that prayer. ( 14 ) ALL parties and all others concerned to act on and authenticated copy of this dictated order on the usual undertakings. Appeal allowed