BHANWAR SINGH, J. Both these writ petitions arise out of the same judgment dated November 28, 1992 passed by Sri Rajendra Goswami, Deputy Director (Consolidation), Bulandshahr. 2. By filing Writ Petition No. 45710 of 1992, Mangal Singh and his two brothers have prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the two orders dated 16th July, 1991 and 28th November, 1992 passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Bulandshahr and the Deputy Director (Consolidation), Bulandshahr respectively. Further a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to disturb the peaceful possession over their respective share in land in dispute has also been prayed for. 3. The petitioner of other Writ Petition No. 45711 of 1992, namely, Sri Mahipal Singh, has also sought for a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing both the above referred orders dated 16th July, 1991 and 28th November, 1992 passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Bulandshahr and the Deputy Director (Consolidation), Bulandshahr respectively and he has also pleaded for another writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to disturb his peaceful possession over the land of his share. 4. The facts of both the writ petitions being common main brief is recapitulated as below : 5. Mangal Singh and others pleaded in their petition that Hukum, Mangal Surat and Jagdish had no right or interest in the land of Khata Nos. 122 and 251 as Hukum Singhs father Naval Singh had been adopted by his uncle Jauhari. The names of Pyare Lal, Mahendra, Dashraj, Shyadan, Kushal Singh, Dharam Pal Singh, Badri, Hukam Singh, Khajan, Mangal, Suraj, Jagdish, Kale and Ram Singh were recorded as Bhumidars of Plot No. 122 in the Khatauni of the base year while the names of Hukam Singh, Khajan Singh, Mangal, Jagdish and Suraj were recorded as Sankramaniya Bhumidhar. The Consolidation Officer rejected the plea that the names of Hukam Singh and others were wrongly recorded as tenure holders and held that the names of Hukam Singh, Mangal, Suraj and Jagdish being rightly recorded as Bhumidars, they were entitled to have their shares in the disputed land. The Consolidation Officer rejected the plea that the names of Hukam Singh and others were wrongly recorded as tenure holders and held that the names of Hukam Singh, Mangal, Suraj and Jagdish being rightly recorded as Bhumidars, they were entitled to have their shares in the disputed land. It was submitted before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) that Hukam Singhs father Naval Singh had been adopted by his uncle Jauhari, as a consequence, none of his legal heirs in his branch would be entitled to have any share in the land in dispute, which was the property of the branch of Natuva. As a matter of fact, after the adoption of Naval Singh, Natuva became the sole owner of the disputed land. 6. These arguments advanced on behalf of the Lekhraj and others were accepted by the Settlement Officer and therefore, it was decided that the ancestor of Mangal, Jagdish, Suraj, Hukam Singh was wrongly recorded as Bhumidar in Khatauni of 1322 Fasli. On the basis of his findings, the Settlement Officer modified the order of the Consolidation Officer and directed for deletion of the names of Mangal Singh and others from the Khatauni of Khata Nos. 122 and 251 and it was held further that the names of the legal heirs of Naval Singh would be recorded as Bhumidars of the land in dispute. In this way, both the appeals were disposed of. 7. Mahipal Singh and Mangal Singh - both filed Revisions No. 1442 and 1443 in the Court of Deputy Director (Consolidation ). The Deputy Director (Consolidation), on having heard learned counsel appearing for both the parties, decided a preliminary issue pertaining to the limitation and arrived at a conclusion that both the revisions were time-barred. 8. The Revisional Court recorded a categorical finding that the Revisionists failed to establish a cogent reason for filing the revisions with delay. The appeals were decided on 16th July, 1991 while the revisions were filed on May 13, 1992. Accordingly, on the basis of the conclusions drawn by the Deputy Director (Consolidation), the revisions were dismissed as time-barred. 9. Feeling aggrieved of the dismissal orders, the petitioners - Mahipal Singh and Mangal Singh and others filed the Writ Petitions No. 45711 of 1992 and 45710 of 1992 respectively. Accordingly, on the basis of the conclusions drawn by the Deputy Director (Consolidation), the revisions were dismissed as time-barred. 9. Feeling aggrieved of the dismissal orders, the petitioners - Mahipal Singh and Mangal Singh and others filed the Writ Petitions No. 45711 of 1992 and 45710 of 1992 respectively. At the time of final arguments, both the parties, namely, Mahipal Singh on one side and Mangal Singh and others on the other entered into a compromise. The original compromise was filed in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Bulandshahr, where some offshoot of the litigation pertaining to the same land in dispute is pending. According to the compromise, Lekhraj and Ranveer have to be recorded tenure holders. However, half of the land of Khata No. 251 now assigned as new No. 388 is to be recorded as that of Ajay Pal and Preet Singh as it was sold by Lekhraj and the remaining half is to be entered in the name of Mahipal Singh. The name of Pooran Singh has also to be recorded in some portion thereof. The accurate and specific details have been given in the compromise, a copy whereof is enclosed with the affidavits of Lekhraj filed in both the petitions. 10. Now a short question is involved for determination and it is - as to whether a writ petition can be determined on the basis of a compromise? 11. There is no doubt that if two parties, in a writ petition filed before this Court, bona fide enter into a compromise, with a view to come to finality to their litigation, the compromise should be accepted for being acted upon. As such, the compromise will not only decide the dispute forever leaving there no room for another round of litigation but it will also give the families and their members a peace of mind. The only safeguard the Court has to vouchsafe is that possibility of their being any mischief or fraud should be ruled out so that a party may not subsequently complain of resulting injustice. In order to protect that interest of a party, it seems to be necessary that all the parties concerned should agree to the compromise and the Court of competent jurisdiction should be fully convinced about the genuineness of the compromise and settlement of the dispute. 12. In order to protect that interest of a party, it seems to be necessary that all the parties concerned should agree to the compromise and the Court of competent jurisdiction should be fully convinced about the genuineness of the compromise and settlement of the dispute. 12. In the case in hand, before this Court, original compromise has not been filed. As recited by Lekhraj, one of the respondents in both the petitions - the original compromise has been filed in a Civil Suit pending in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Bulandshahr. The copies of the said compromise filed in the two petitions are not legible so as to decipher the contents and the signatories thereof. In these circumstances, the Deputy Director (Consolidation) is authorized to verify the veracity of the compromise, legal and factual implications thereof and to decide the dispute finally. 13. This Court has already held in surendra Nath Rai v. Prahlad Singh and others, [2002 (93) RD 468], that unless there is something contrary to public interest or there are specific reasons, a petition can and should be decided on the basis of compromise, although under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court is not bound to accept a compromise and decide the petition. 14. However, as decided by this Court in laljee v. Deputy Director (Consolidation), 2001 (2) JCLR 958 (All) : [2002 (93) R&d 430], if an application for compromise is filed, it should be decided expeditiously by the appropriate authority, namely, the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 15. It is also well within the competence of this Court, as ruled in dhaneshwar v. Deputy Director (Consolidation), Deoria and others, 2003 (2) JCLR 589 (All) : 2003 JIR 744 (All) : [2003 (95) RD 372], to refer the compromise to the appellate authority and then pass orders on the basis of the clarification and report of the Deputy Director (Consolidation ). No doubt, possibility of mischief and fraud may be ruled out by taking recourse to that procedure but in my opinion it would amount to a lengthy procedure and the parties would be put to lot of inconvenience by going to the appellate Court and then coming back again to this Court. It will also entail huge expenditures to be incurred by them. 16. It will also entail huge expenditures to be incurred by them. 16. Moreover, in this case, the descendants of two branches of the same forefather have, by virtue of their mutual settlement, decided to recognize their rights and this will certainly confer a finality to the two decades old litigation subsisting between them. 17. Having regard to the interest of the parties and keeping in view that there is no likelihood of any malpractice, mischief or fraud being played by anyone of the parties, this writ petition is finally disposed of with a direction to the Deputy Director (Consolidation) to examine the contents of the compromise and unless there is something contrary to the public policy, as envisaged in the Consolidation Act, decide the dispute by according an opportunity of hearing to all the parties and then pass final orders. Accordingly, the judgment dated 28th November, 1992 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (Annexure-4 in both the writ petitions) are hereby quashed. Petition disposed of. .