JUDGMENT P.G. Agarwal, J. 1. Heard Mr. J.M. Choudhury, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners and Mr. R.P. Sarmah, the learned Counsel for the Respondent. 2. By this common order, we dispose of Criminal Revision Nos. 674/2002, 675/2002 and 676/2002 analogously as they involve common question of law and facts and for the purpose of convenience, we like to quote the relevant facts from Criminal Revision No. 676/2002 which has been directed against the order dated 23.7.2002 passed in C.R. Case No. 1959 c/2002 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Kamrup, Guwahati. 3. The accused-Petitioners Saumitra Sankar Dutta and his wife Smti. Papiya Dutta, both Directors of M/s. Arati Plantation and Agro Products Pvt. Ltd., issued a cheque for Rs. 4,47,077/- in favour of the Respondent-complainant Sri Biswajit Paul. The said cheque was presented by the complainant for payment on 6.4.2002 and it was returned as the cheque was dishonoured on the ground of fund 'not arranged for'. The complainant thereafter issued a legal notice as required under Section 138Bof the Negotiable Instrument Act, for short, the Act and sent the said notice by registered post. The notice was returned back with the remark that "office always closed out of station." Thereafter, the complainant redeposited the said cheque on 4.6.2002 for clearance. But the cheque was again retuned back dishonoured on the ground of "account closed". The complainant thereafter issued a second notice on 6.6.2002 by registered post. The said notice was also returned back with the remark “Office totally abandoned”. The complainant thereafter made enquiries and gave another notice against the accused through local daily Newspaper on 19.6.2002 but as no payment was received, complaint was filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 4. The quashing of the complaint has been sought mainly on the ground that cause of action for filing the complaint arose on 19.4.2002 when first notice was issued and as the complainant did not file the complaint within the statutory period, the complaint is barred by limitation and second notice does not give a fresh lease of life as claimed by the accused Petitioners. 5. The learned Counsel for the Respondent-complainant submits that issuance of second notice is not barred by law and under the circumstances, second notice maybe issued. 5. The learned Counsel for the Respondent-complainant submits that issuance of second notice is not barred by law and under the circumstances, second notice maybe issued. In support of his submission, reliance has been placed on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Galaxy Traders and Agencies Ltd. and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 676 . The facts under which second notice was accepted by the Apex Court in M/s. Dalmia (supra) were altogether different. In that case, when the first notice was received by the addressee, it was found to be an empty envelope without any contents. Thereafter, the drawer of the cheque sent a letter to the complainant requesting them to send the contents thereof and as desired, the cheque was presented again and when it was dishonoured, fresh notice was served. Considering the peculiar facts of that case, the Apex Court held that the complainant tried to blow hot and cold in the same breath and in view of the letter of the drawer, the proceeding can not be quashed for want of proper notice. 6. The law regarding presentation of cheque upteem times was laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 514 wherein the Apex Court held that under the provisions of Section 138and 142 of the NI Act, cause of action can arise once only. As regards the right to present cheque received by the payee, the Apex Court held as follows: Now, the question is how the apparently conflicting provisions of the Act, one enabling the payee to repeatedly present the cheque and the other giving him only one opportunity to file a complaint for its dishonour, and that too, within one month from the date the cause of action arises, can be reconciled. Having given our anxious consideration to this question, we are of the opinion that the above two provisions can be harmonized, with the interpretation that on each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour, a fresh right and not cause of action accrues in his favour. He may, therefore, without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of his such right under Clause (b) of Section 138, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. He may, therefore, without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of his such right under Clause (b) of Section 138, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. But once he gives a notice under Clause (b) of Section 138, he forfeits such right for in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the stipulated time, he would be liable for offence and the cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. Needless to say, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer expires. 7. The learned Counsel for the Respondent complainant submits that as the notice was not received by the Petitioner-accused persons, the complainant was not precluded from presenting the cheque again for the second time and thereafter issuing of second notice by the complainant was in accordance with law. In this connection reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel in the case of Dalmia (supra) wherein the Apex Court observed as follows: To constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Act the complainant is obliged to prove its ingredients which include the receipt of notice by the accused under Clause (b). It is to be kept in mind that it is not the 'giving' of the notice which makes the offence but it is the 'receipt' of the notice by the drawer which gives the cause of action to the complainant to file the complaint within the statutory period. This Court in K. Bhaskarans v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (1999) 7 SCC 510 : 1999 AIR SCW 3809 : AIR 1999 SC 3762 : 1999 Cril L.J 4606 considered the difference between 'giving; of a notice and 'receipt' of the notice. 8. In view of the provisions of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, it is seen that notices were issued by the payee at the proper address; but the notices were returned with the remarks that house locked, not available at the address etc. In the present case, on both the occasions, notices were returned with the remarks as stated above. In the case of State of M.P. v. Hiralal and Ors. In the present case, on both the occasions, notices were returned with the remarks as stated above. In the case of State of M.P. v. Hiralal and Ors. (1996) 7 SCC 523 the Apex Court observed that where notices were returned with postal remark "not available in the house", "house locked" and "shop closed" respectively, it must be deemed to have been served on the Respondents. In the C2 and of Sridhar M.A. v. Metalloy N. Steel Corporation, (2000) 1 SCC 397 it was held that although in appropriate case deemed service is to be accepted by Court, but such presumption of deemed service is not a matter of course in all cases. Deemed service is to be accepted in the facts of each case. In the present case, the complainant contends that the accused was avoiding service of notice and as such the notice returned unserved. Unlike Dalmia (supra) the Petitioner has not taken contradictory pleas regarding non receipt of notice etc. We, therefore, hold that the notices were deemed to have been served at the first instance and as such there is no scope for issuing a second notice as because cause of action arose in the month of April itself and the proceeding was not launched within the statutory period as required under the law. 9. In view of the above, all the three revision petitions stand allowed and the proceeding in the complaint case stands quashed. Petition allowed