P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Sri Taddi Nageswara Rao, the counsel representing the revision petitioner. None represents the respondents though notices had been served on the respondents. ( 2 ) ON 3-1 -2003, this Court while admitting the Civil Revision Petition initially granted interim stay for a period of four weeks and subsequent thereto on 9-1-2003, interim stay already granted was extended till further orders. The 1st petitioner-1st judgment debtor in E. A. No. 539 of 2002 in E. P. No. 102 of 2000 in O. S. No. 168 of 1983 on the file of principal Junior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram is the present revision petitioner. ( 3 ) THE application in E. A. No. 539 of 2002 was moved by the revision petitioner herein and another Thripuragiri Kannayya who is shown as respondent No. 3 but specified as not a necessary party in the present Civil revision Petition. The respondents 1 and 2 herein obtained a decree for declaration and for perpetual injunction in O. S. No. 168 of 1983 on the file of Principal Junior Civil judge, Vizianagaram, in relation to the plaint schedule property. The judgment debtors as petitioners in E. A. No. 539 of 2002 raised objection that there is no neem tree at all in the plaint schedule property. It is also stated that neither the plaint plan nor the plaint schedule discloses the existence of neem tree, which is aged more than 25 years. But, however, the respondents 1 and 2-decree holders-plaintiffs are taking a stand that there is a neem tree falling within the plaint schedule property and hence, the decree can be executed. The learned Principal junior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram by order dated 1-10-2002 dismissed the said application with costs and aggrieved by the same, the 1st petitioner-1st judgment debtor alone had preferred the present Civil revision Petition. ( 4 ) SRI Taddi Nageswararao, the learned counsel representing the petitioner had taken this Court through the pleadings of the parties, plan and also the decree dated 30-9-1999 made in O. S. No. 168 of 1983 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge, vizianagaram. The learned Counsel also had taken this Court through the Order made in E. P. No. 102 of 2000 in O. S. No. 168 of 1983, dated 30-7-2002 as against which c. R. P. No. 3743 of 2002 was preferred which resulted in dismissal. The learned Counsel also had taken this Court through the Order made in E. P. No. 102 of 2000 in O. S. No. 168 of 1983, dated 30-7-2002 as against which c. R. P. No. 3743 of 2002 was preferred which resulted in dismissal. The learned Counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to certain observations made in the order while dismissing the prior Civil Revision Petition. The Counsel would contend that in view of the same inasmuch as the judgment debtors are entitled to move an application under section 47 of C. P. C. (hereinafter referred to as code for the purpose of convenience), this application was rightly moved. The counsel would also maintain that no proper opportunity was given and the parties were not permitted even to let in evidence. The learned Counsel would submit that the executing Court normally cannot go behind the decree, but here it is a case where the very identity of the property and the existence of the neem tree within the plaint schedule property is in controversy and that being so, instead of affording opportunity to the parties to let in evidence to establish their contentions, dismissing the application especially placing reliance on the prior order which was carried by way of revision and which had resulted in dismissal definitely cannot be sustained. The Counsel also had placed strong reliance on the citations reported in Potti Venkata Kasi Viswanadham v. Sri Vallabha Vyas (1982 (1) ALT 427); d. S. R. Prasad v. M. Ramarao and another (1994 (2) ALT 658); Immadi Laxmi v. Sreyabhilashi Chit Funds, Khammam and others ( 2002 (1) ALT 411 ); Mothika Mutyalu and another v. P. Venkata Krishna Divakar and others (2002 (2) An. W. R. 250); n. S. S. Narayana Sarma and others, v. M/s. Goldstone Exports (P) Ltd. , and others ( AIR 2002 SC 251 ). ( 5 ) HEARD the Counsel and perused the impugned order and also the material available on record. ( 6 ) THERE cannot be any controversy that when the very identity of the property is in dispute and a substantial stand had been taken that a particular tree i. e. , neem tree in question does not fall within the plaint schedule at all, it would have been desirable to permit the parties to let in evidence. ( 6 ) THERE cannot be any controversy that when the very identity of the property is in dispute and a substantial stand had been taken that a particular tree i. e. , neem tree in question does not fall within the plaint schedule at all, it would have been desirable to permit the parties to let in evidence. But the question in controversy in the present case is not of such a nature since while making order in E. P. No. 102 of 2000 in o. S. No. 168 of 1983 dated 30-7-2002, the learned Judge had recorded the evidence of p. Ws. 1 to 3 and R. Ws. 1 and 2 and Exs. A-1 and A-2 also had been marked. The operative portion of the said order reads as hereunder:"in the result, this E. P. is allowed directing the judgment debtor to show cause why he should not obey the decree and judgment in O. S. No. 168 of 1983 by filing an affidavit unconditionally and also giving undertaking that he will not object the decree holder while removing the tree. The Judgment debtor shall file undertaking within one week and after filing such undertaking the decree holder is permitted to remove the neem tree within 10 days. If the judgment debtor again raised any objection while removing the said neem tree by the decree holder then the judgment debtors shall be committed to civil prison for a period of 30 days. "the present revision petitioner had carried this matter by way of Civil Revision Petition no. 3743 of 2002 wherein while dismissing the revision, it was specifically observed by this Court as hereunder:"whether the decree holder is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property and whether the respondent- decree holder is preventing the petitioner from cutting the branches of the tree are the issues to be adjudicated in the suit and in view of the finalisation of the injunction orders passed against the petitioner-judgment debtor herein, now the petitioner cannot agitate such issues before a revisional court. The learned Judge has rightly held that the petitioner has no right to obstruct the respondent Decree holder from removing the neem tree. The learned Judge has rightly held that the petitioner has no right to obstruct the respondent Decree holder from removing the neem tree. Admittedly, when there is permanent injunction granted in favour of the respondent-Decree holder and against the petitioner-judgment debtor herein and when such decree has become final, the petitioner cannot obstruct the respondent-Decree holder from removing the said neem tree. "it is no doubt true that the revisional Court also had further stated that"at this stage, the learned counsel contended that on the guise of execution of the decree, the respondent is interfering with the properties of the petitioner. The said contention cannot be accepted for the reason that it is not the subject matter of the present application. If at all the petitioner is aggrieved by any such action of the respondent, it is always open for him to approach the competent civil court for appropriate relief. He cannot violate the injunction orders passed by the court below or obstruct for the execution of the decree, which has become final. " ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel no doubt made an attempt to take shelter that in view of the observation made giving liberty to approach competent Court for appropriate relief, this application under Section 47 of the Code had been thought of and hence, proper opportunity should have been given to both the parties to adduce evidence to substantiate their respective contentions. In the light of the fact that the evidence in fact had been recorded by the learned Principal junior Civil Judge while deciding the selfsame objection, the revision petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the same objection again by moving an application under Section 47 of the Code. The decree in o. S. No. 168 of 1983 dated 30th September 1999 reads as hereunder:" (1) that it is hereby declared the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the site shown in between the lane x. X1. Z. Z1 in the rough plan in the plaint; (2) that the defendants, their men and servants be and are hereby restrained by way of permanent injunction from trespassing into the points X X1, Z Z1 on interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same by the plaintiffs and their men (3) that each party do bear their own costs. ( 8 ) IN Potti Venkata Kasi Viswanadham v. Sri Vallabha Vyas it was held that,"when there is ambiguity in the decree, certainly it is competent for the executing Court to go behind the decree and look into the pleadings and the judgment so as to have the assistance from them in order to have the ambiguity dispelled. Therefore, sec. 47 C. P. C. would not be a bar and the Court can call in aid the contents of the pleadings as well as the judgment. But however, where the decree is clear, unequivocal and is not ambiguous, the executing Court cannot call for the assistance of any of the documents viz. , pleadings, judgments and so on. It has to be spelled out from the decree itself as to whether it is declaratory decree simpliciter or whether there are accompaniments to the decree with consequential directions in case the right conferred is not given effect to. "in D. S. R. Prasad v. M. Ramarao and another it was held"there cannot be any doubt about the proposition that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree. However, the issue involved is not that whether the executing Court can go behind the decree, but the issue is whether the decree can be executed against the person/personal properties of the second plaintiff, namely, the petitioner. Final decree is a decree against the 2nd plaintiff in his personal capacity. Since the preliminary decree did not provide for the realization of the decree debt from the second plaintiff in his personal capacity, to this extent, the respondents are not entitled to proceed against the petitioner in his personal capacity, but should proceed only against the estate of the deceased first plaintiff in the hands of the second plaintiff-petitioner. However, in the counter filed by the respondents, it is categorically stated that the petitioner got himself recognized as the sole legal heir of his father by way of Will on 3-9-1985 in the proceedings in i. A. No. 1079 of 1983 wherein it is pleaded by him that the E. P. schedule properties are the self-acquired properties of the first plaintiff and he alone succeeded to all the properties of his father. The court below has not examined this aspect. The court below has not examined this aspect. Therefore, the matter is to be remitted to the Lower court for the purpose of ascertaining whether the E. P. schedule properties to the extent of half share belonged to the deceased-1 st plaintiff, and whether the petitioner succeeded to the same. If so, the lower Court may pass a decree against the property of the deceased 1st plaintiff-Judgment debtor in the hands of the 2nd plaintiff-judgment debtor. "strong reliance was placed on Mothika mutyalu and another v. P. Venkata Krishna divakar and others wherein it was observed"no doubt, an attempt was made by the learned Senior Counsel to show that the remedy of the objectors is either under Order 21 Rule 97 or Order 21 rule 98 of the Code and not under section 47 of the Code and had made an attempt to explain that the general provision under Section 47 of the Code has to yield to such specific provisions. Apart from this aspect of the matter, as can be seen from the material available on record, for the reasons best known, no evidence was recorded though serious disputed questions relating to facts, including identity of the property had been agitated by the parties. If the final decree proceedings and the report of the Commissioner and also the judgments delivered in the prior proceedings, are taken into consideration, the Court has to necessarily come to an irresistible conclusion that the very identity of the property is in dispute and the same has to be located. The question whether these objectors are the representatives within the meaning of Section 47 of the code or not and whether the applications filed under Section 47 of the Code are maintainable in the fact and circumstances of the case, are all matters which are to be gone into. The question whether these objectors are the representatives within the meaning of Section 47 of the code or not and whether the applications filed under Section 47 of the Code are maintainable in the fact and circumstances of the case, are all matters which are to be gone into. Apart from this aspect of the matter, since the very identity of the property has to be located and the findings recorded in this regard are vague and also the observations made by the commissioner in his report also create serious doubt about the same, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, unless proper procedure is followed by the Commissioner to locate the property with the help and assistance of the persons concerned with the same and unless the parties are permitted to adduce necessary evidence to establish their respective claims, proper and just orders cannot be made in a dispute of this nature. Hence, for the reasons recorded above, Court is inclined to set aside the impugned orders made in the applications filed by the objectors- applicants in the Court below with a view to give opportunity to both the parties to let in evidence and also establish their respective claims relating to the disputed property. "reliance was also placed on Immadi Laxmi v. Sreyabhilashi Chit Funds, Khammam and others and N. S. S. Narayana Sarma and others v. M/s. Goldstone Exports (P) Ltd. , and others. The Apex Court in 5th cited while dealing with Order 21 Rules 99 and 101 and also Section 47 of C. P. C. had observed,"rules 97 to 101 of Order 21 contain the provisions enabling the executing court to deal with a situation when a decree holder entitled to possession of the property encounters obstruction from any person . From the provisions in these rules the scheme is clear that the Legislature has vested wide powers in the executing Court to deal with "all issues" relating to such matters. It is a general impression prevailing amongst the litigant public that difficulties of a litigant are by no means over on his getting a decree for immovable property in his favour. Indeed, his difficulties in real and practical sense, arise after getting the decree. It is a general impression prevailing amongst the litigant public that difficulties of a litigant are by no means over on his getting a decree for immovable property in his favour. Indeed, his difficulties in real and practical sense, arise after getting the decree. Presumably, to tackle such a situation and to allay the apprehension in the minds of litigant public that it takes years and years for the decree holder to enjoy fruits of the decree, the legislature made drastic amendments in provisions in the aforementioned rules, particularly, the provision in rule 101 in which it is categorically declared that all questions including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. On a fair reading of the rule it is manifest that the legislature has enacted the provision with a view to remove, as far as possible, technical objections to an application filed by the aggrieved party whether he is the decree holder or any other person in possession of the immovable property under execution and has vested the power in the executing Court to deal with all questions arising in the matter irrespective of whether the Court otherwise has jurisdiction to entertain a dispute of the nature". ( 9 ) THE present controversy is that in view of the fact that the Neem tree had not been specifically incorporated in the decree and as it was not shown in the plan, now the decree as such cannot be executed in relation to the Neem tree. It is no doubt that while deciding the present objection under section 47 of the Code, the parties are not permitted to let in evidence. But as already observed by me supra, in fact such objection had been taken at an earlier point of time and evidence was recorded and an order was made which was carried by way of revision to this Court and the said revision also resulted in dismissal. But as already observed by me supra, in fact such objection had been taken at an earlier point of time and evidence was recorded and an order was made which was carried by way of revision to this Court and the said revision also resulted in dismissal. In view of the same, I am of the considered opinion that there is no question of affording opportunity to let in evidence to substantiate these objections again by the parties. Hence in the light of the order passed by this Court in Civil revision Petition No. 3743 of 2002, this question cannot be permitted to be agitated again under the guise of moving an application under Section 47 of the Code. Hence, I am thoroughly satisfied that this revision petition is devoid of merits, ( 10 ) ACCORDINGLY, the Civil Revision petition shall stand dismissed. No costs.