Judgment :- M. Ramachandran, J. This batch of Original Petitions had been filed challenging a notification issued by the Government of Kerala dated 5.6.2000 revising the minimum wages in respect of private hospitals, dispensaries, pharmacies, scanning centres, X-ray units and ancillary establishments. A draft notification had been published by the Government proposing the revision on 10.5.1999. After considering the objections, the final notification had come to be passed. Taking notice of the interim orders passed by this Court, reservation had been recorded that the revision as above will be subject to final orders to be passed in O.P.No.30835 of 1999. The Kerala Private Hospitals Association (Modern Medicines), represented by its President is the petitioner in the Original Petition concerned. The Government as also the Minimum Wages Advisory Board had been made parties thereto. Additional respondents have got themselves impleaded. They represented employers, who support the contentions raised in the Original Petition. Trade Unions also have got themselves impleaded pointing out that there was no justification in the attack made. The final notification had come to be passed during the pendency of the above Original Petition and by amending the Original Petition, Ext.P4 the final notification also is challenged. Counter affidavit has been filed by the Government, justifying the action taken by them. 2. O.P. No. 30354 of 2000 has been filed by 21 establishments, and mostly hospitals situated in different parts of the State. O.P. No.23815 of 2000 has been filed by the Indian Dental Association and a Dental Surgeon, running a clinic. The extension of the notification to the establishments represented by them is thereby challenged. O.P.No.25420 of 2000 has been filed by two hospitals, who have their establishments in a moffusil area of Kodungalloor. O.P.No.4843 of 2001 has been filed by an establishment which runs aMulti Speciality Hospital at Changanacherry. An individual doctor, who has been proceeded against by the authorities under the Minimum Wages Act for non-maintenance of records, has filed O.P.No.9637 of 2001 and inter alia the notification is also challenged. A group of persons comprising of an Association known as "Qualified Private Medical Practitioners Association" is the first petitioner in O.P.No.20430 of 2001 and a doctor running a hospital at North Paravur is the second petitioner therein. Final notification is challenged at their instance as well 3. A group of persons comprising of an Association known as "Qualified Private Medical Practitioners Association" is the first petitioner in O.P.No.20430 of 2001 and a doctor running a hospital at North Paravur is the second petitioner therein. Final notification is challenged at their instance as well 3. The contentions are almost identical, but it has to be observed that the objections and vociferous challenge, especially by the Associations, are on a misconception of facts. By a notification dated 5.5.1999, the Government had added employment in Private Hospitals, Dispensaries, Pharmacies, Clinical Laboratories, Scanning Centres, X-ray Units and other allied institutions as a scheduled employment, but petitioners had omitted to note the above basic fact, and the principal contention raised was about the jurisdiction of the Government. However, I may deal with the arguments that have been raised generally, and examine the merits as have been highlighted. 4. As referred to earlier, the first submission was that the Hospitals, Dispensaries etc., were not a scheduled employment, as coming within Part I or Part II, envisaged under S.2(g) and S.27 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 5. The second point urged was that the Government had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter of fixation of minimum wages under S.5(1)(b) of the Act, and steps if at all should have been taken in exercise of powers under S.5(1)(a) of the Act alone. 6. The next contention was that the committee constituted was not as per the legal mandate and the basic error vitiated the notification and it was ab initio void. The further argument was that what was prescribed was not minimum wages, but in fact fair wages, and absence of the omission in the procedural formalities, the impact of the directions and the examination as to whether the industry was capable of taking note of the added burden went unnoticed. 7. The other summons were that the classification, as has been brought about, was artificial, if not unworkable, and the basic requirement for prescription of minimum wages depending upon the well demarcated localities of the State was not taken notice of. A contention was also raised that minimum wages did not take in its fold a power to prescribe a scale of pay, which was really the characteristic of a fair wage. 8. A contention was also raised that minimum wages did not take in its fold a power to prescribe a scale of pay, which was really the characteristic of a fair wage. 8. One other point raised was that in the matter of prescription of Dearness Allowance, the attempt was to provide for 100% utilisation, which could not have been appreciated or legally sustainable. On the whole, therefore, it was submitted that the impugned notification was liable to be set aside and petitioners prayed for a further direction that minimum wages should be fixed taking notice of all relevant aspects, as envisaged by law, and afresh in all its aspects. 9. Sri. M.P. Ashok Kumar led the arguments on behalf of the petitioners. Sri. M.K. Aboobacker represented the Government. Although the Trade Unions had got themselves impleaded in the proceedings, there was no representation from them, notwithstanding that the cases were listed for hearing on several days. 10. I may deal with the arguments in the sequence in which they have been narrated above. The objection was that the industry did not include in Part I or Part II of the Schedule. But, this is factually incorrect Under S.2(g) of the Act, the "scheduled employment" is defined. It means an employment specified in the Schedule, or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment. S.27 of the Act gives, power to the State Government to add to the existing Schedule of the Act. Under S.3, the appropriate Government has been given the jurisdiction and power to fix minimum rates of wages payable to employees employed in an employment specified in Part I or Part II of the Schedule and in an employment added to any of the said parts. It has also powers to review the minimum wages so fixed and revise the minimum wages, if necessary. The Government have the power to fix the minimum rate of wages for time work, for piece of work and the like. S.3 also provides that in fixing or revising the minimum rates of wages, different minimum rates of wages could be fixed for different scheduled employments, different classes of work as also different localities. By G.O.(MS) No.94/1980/LBR dated 8.9.1980, for the first time, minimum wages were fixed for employees employed in the private hospitals, dispensaries and pharmacies in the State, effective from 1979-1980. By G.O.(MS) No.94/1980/LBR dated 8.9.1980, for the first time, minimum wages were fixed for employees employed in the private hospitals, dispensaries and pharmacies in the State, effective from 1979-1980. This had been subjected to challenge in O.P.No.3430 of 1980 and connected cases. A Division Bench of this Court had, by judgment dated 28.6.1984 in Jayachandran v. State of Kerala, 1984 KLT 903, repelled the attack. At that time, principally the contention raised was that hospitals etc., were not "scheduled employment". However, accepting the contention of the State Government that such establishments came well within the purview of item No.21, namely employment in Shops and Establishments, the Court had held that such establishments came well within the purview of the power of the Government. The minimum wages fixed by the Government were so approved and they were being enforced from that time onwards. Thereafter by G.O.(Rt) No.1055/90/LBR dated 25.4.1990, effective from 1.5.1990, the minimum wages payable to the employees of the hospitals, dispensaries etc., were revised. The notification as above also had been the subject matter of challenge. 11. Accepting the case of the petitioners there, that it was irrational to group together all the establishments as one class, since the nature of duties of employees vary depending upon the size of the employment and observing that the Government had not taken notice of such aspects, the Original Petitions were allowed and the notifications were quashed. (See Arimala Clinic v. State of Kerala 1996 (2) KLT 133). It was thereafter, on 5.5.1999, that the Schedule was amended placing the class of employment as a specific item. 12. As a result thereof, the contention that the hospitals were never a scheduled employment was not more an issue which could be agitated. The Division Bench had held that they came within the purview of shops and establishments and the issue received a quietus thereby. Also if there was any doubt in the proposition, the amendment of the Schedule, by specifically including the employment in the group, dispelled any doubts, which would have been lingering in the minds of any persons. Therefore, the preliminary objection raised has no substance whatever. It can also be taken notice that what has been done was not an introduction of minimum wages to a new category of establishments. Therefore, the preliminary objection raised has no substance whatever. It can also be taken notice that what has been done was not an introduction of minimum wages to a new category of establishments. It was really a revision from the existing wages, and they were brought as a specific group, since the Government had statistics to show that more than a lakh of persons were employed in the sector. 13. The next submission of Sri. Ashok Kumar was that the procedure prescribed by S.5(a) alone should have been followed. According to him, as a matter of fact, circumstances indicated that a committee had been formed for the purpose, but the constitution of the committee was not as per the pattern that was to be mandatorily formulated. 14. Before going to the details, we may examine the two procedures which could be followed in the matter of fixation of minimum wages. Under S.S, when minimum rates of wages are prescribed for the first time or when a revision is brought about, two options are available for the Government. Under S.5(1)(a), it can appoint as many committees and sub-committees as it considers necessary to hold enquiries and be advised, in respect of such fixation or revision. This can be termed as the first method. There is also a second method, spoken to by the section. By S.5(1)(b), the Government has discretion and power to notify in the official Gazette a proposal for revision/ fixation of minimum wages, for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby. This method is employed when the Government has already with it the essential statistics. If that is the procedure followed, it is essential that the affected persons should be given opportunity to make representations in the matter. A minimum two months period has to be reserved for accepting such objections. After considering the advice of the sub-committees and committees, as the case may be, when proceedings under S.5(1)(a) are followed, or after considering the representations, as might have come, while following the procedure under S.5(1)(b), the Government can fix/revise the minimum rates of wages in respect of each scheduled employment. It comes into force on the expiry of three months from the date of issue. It comes into force on the expiry of three months from the date of issue. The proviso to sub-s.(2) of S.S, however, stipulates that when the proposal is to revise the minimum rates of wages under S.5(1)(b), ie., by the second method, the Government is to consult the Advisory Board, constituted under S.7 of the Act. 15. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that it was mandatory for the Government to follow procedure under S.5(1)(a). This was, according to him, in view of the directions that had been passed by a learned judge in the judgment, referred to earlier, viz., Arimala Clinic's case. Of course, the notification issued on 25.4.1990 had been quashed in the above said proceedings. On behalf of the State, it had been submitted, at that time, that the Advisory Committee was constituted as per G.O.(Rt.) No.2709/LBR dated 22.10.1993 consisting of representatives of the employees and employers and the Government had no objection to consider the whole issue afresh. Therefore, the direction was that the minimum wages should be fixed as required under the Act, in accordance with law, and after consulting the Advisory Committee constituted under the Government Order dated 22.10.1993, and this had to be done within a period of four months. Sri. Ashok Kumar submits that this was the duty precisely cast on the Government, by judgment dated 18.6.1996. Therefore, the recommendation from a Committee could not have been avoided by any short circuit and steps for fixation should have been taken only under S.5(1) (a) of the Act, 16. It is further submitted that Government were apparently in two minds for, according to the counsel, even though a Committee had been constituted, by Ext.P2 dated 1.9.1999, it did not contain adequate representation from the employers and this directly controverted the mandate prescribed under S.9 of the Act. Under S.9, the Committees, sub-committees and the Advisory Board were to consist of persons to be nominated by the Government representing employers and employees in the Scheduled employments, in equal number. Independent persons, not exceeding one-third of its total number of members, were also to be included. Therefore, the procedural flaw was fatal. 17. However, for two reasons, the argument appears to be misconceived. Independent persons, not exceeding one-third of its total number of members, were also to be included. Therefore, the procedural flaw was fatal. 17. However, for two reasons, the argument appears to be misconceived. First is that the Committee referred to in the judgment and constituted in 1993 was not there, when the matter was taken up for reckoning in the year 1999. There was nothing in the judgment also to indicate that the hands of the Government were tied and they were restrained from adopting procedure under S.5(1)(b) of the Act. In fact, such areas were not even touched when the earlier Writ Petition was disposed of. 18. The notification shows that the second method had been followed. The counter affidavit also shows that no committees had been formed by the Government before Ext.Pl or Ext.P4, as the Government had proposed to follow proceedings under S.5(1)(b) of the Act. 19. The petitioners later on under a misapprehension when they comprehend the real nature of Ext.P2. Reference made in Ext.P2 was not to a Committee which was to be constituted under S.5(1)(a) or S.9 of the Act. On the other hand, under S.7 of the Act, for the purpose of co-ordinating the work of sub-committees and advising the appropriate Government generally in the nature of fixing and revising minimum rates of wages., the Government is empowered to appoint an Advisory Board. Such a Board, statutorily constituted was there in existence. The counter affidavit indicated that after the draft notification was published under S.5(1)(b), the comments from the Advisory Board had been sought for. This was a mandatory requirement as contemplated by the proviso to S.5(2) of the Act. In its wisdom the Advisory Board had appointed a sub-committee in a meeting held on 28.8.1999. This sub-committee had held sittings in various centers of the State. Ext.P2 is a notice issued by the Advisory Board alone and not a Committee constituted by the Government, as mistakenly understood by the petitioners. The counter affidavit also indicates that there were equal number of representations from the employers and employees even in the sub-committee. 20. In fact, there is specific averments in the counter affidavit to the effect that after the draft notification was published, a number of representations had come, expressing opinions and views. The counter affidavit also indicates that there were equal number of representations from the employers and employees even in the sub-committee. 20. In fact, there is specific averments in the counter affidavit to the effect that after the draft notification was published, a number of representations had come, expressing opinions and views. As a matter of fact even after the dead line fixed, as authorized by the statute, representations received from the Indian Medical Association dated 24.11.1999 had also been taken up, though it would have been possible for the Government to enforce time limit as 27.1.1999 Therefore, I do not think the Government had committed any jurisdictional error in prescribing the minimum wages, as had been done. The procedural formalities have not been overlooked or ignored. The sustenance attempted to be drawn from the judgment reported in 1996 (2) KLT 133 (Arimala Clinic's case) is misconceived. 21. Now we will come to the merits of the contentions urged by the petitioners viz., that what was fixed were fair wages and not minimum wages. Even though specific grounds have not been raised in O.P.No.30835 of 1999, with reference to the contentions raised in O.P.No.9637 of 2001, Sri.Ashok Kumar submitted that the wages as prescribed could not have been considered as minimum wages. In support of his submissions, he had referred to a tabulated statement to show that in respect of wages prescribed, the hospitals were to pay the highest only next to the liquor trading/liquor vending industry. There also it is pointed out that because of the fixation of D.A., a position has come that the employer is bound to pay the maximum D.A. He also submits that the classification that had been brought about in the matter of wages payable, depending upon the number of beds, was extremely arbitrary when this Court had specifically pointed out that it would have been more appropriate if different wages were prescribed for different geographical regions of the State. 22. Reliance was also placed by the counsel on a decision of a single judge of this Court, namely Achuthan v. State of Kerala, 1992 (2) KLT 189, which related to Cinema Industry. However, when the petitioners have to concede the power of the Government for fixation of minimum wages, and when procedural formalities have been duly complied with, normally this Court may not interfere with the decision that has been arrived at. However, when the petitioners have to concede the power of the Government for fixation of minimum wages, and when procedural formalities have been duly complied with, normally this Court may not interfere with the decision that has been arrived at. Different localities could be segregated, if circumstances justify, but these are matters of policy. Further, the judgment in Arimala Clinic's case (cited supra) itself suggested that what might be a reasonable classification will be on the basis of bed strength. It had been observed that: "Evidently, there are small dispensaries without any modern facility with one or two rooms and situate in rural areas. There are small hospitals with 5 to 15 beds, there are hospitals with 1000 or more beds and hospitals with super speciality facilities in urban area. It will be irrational to group together all these establishments into one class since obviously nature of duties of employees vary very much depending on the size of the establishment. Apparently, the above aspects have not been considered by the Government while issuing 1990 notification." If, as suggested by the petitioners, pay is fixed region-wise, it may contribute to arbitrariness, as size of the establishmenfin certain scheduled employments, indeed is relevant. 23. The Supreme Court had occasion to hold that the power conferred on the Government under the Minimum Wages Act is not arbitrary. The statute entrust such powers with the highest authority, namely the Government itself. Sufficient safeguards normally conceivable to avoid criticism of arbitrariness, so as to take notice of the interest of the sector who are to pay, and the section of persons, who are to receive the wages, are mandatorily to be followed. The adherence to procedural formalities are to ensure that arbitrariness is minimized, while striking the balance. 24. When we compare the draft notification with the final notification, it could be well seen that large effort and thought in fact had been applied. Of course while dealing with the case of Cinema theatres, this Court, in Achuthan's case (cited supra), had opportunity to hold that theatres situated in different regions of the State may not have sufficient financial capacity to pay minimum wages on a uniform basis. This was after taking notice of a variety of circumstances. Of course while dealing with the case of Cinema theatres, this Court, in Achuthan's case (cited supra), had opportunity to hold that theatres situated in different regions of the State may not have sufficient financial capacity to pay minimum wages on a uniform basis. This was after taking notice of a variety of circumstances. B ut, that by itself is not the only yardstick, since the statutory provision itself gives sufficient elbow room for the Government to decide upon itself as to the method in which the minimum wages could be fixed. Under S.3(3), difference in the scheduled employment, difference in classes of work in the same scheduled employment as also difference between localities have been envisaged. The draft notification, in fact prescribed for five classes. One was in respect of salary payable in "city areas". There also different salary scales were prescribed for establishments, which were having up to 10 beds, between 11 beds and 50 beds, between 51 beds and 100 beds and those who had over 100 beds. Likewise, in respect of other areas also, these four classifications had been proposed and separate pay scales had been suggested. 25. But after consultation with the expert committee and wiser from the objections received, the matter was gone into in further details. The final notification, therefore, had brought in certain changes, and as at present hospitals were classified as A, B, C and D. Bed strength is a safe method to assess the size of a hospital. The A group consists of Pharmacies, Dispensaries etc., which had facilities upto 10 beds. B group consists of establishments which had more than 10 beds. Clinical Laboratories, X-ray Units, Dental Clinics are included within this category. Group C consists of Speciality Hospitals and Dental Clinics where the service of post graduate doctors were available.Group D consists of Super Speciality Hospitals and High-tech Hospitals. In respect of employees, Ext.P4 therefore, provided that difference should be there in the case of basic wages alone. For categories B, C and D respectively the basic pay for the time being payable was to stand enhanced by 10%, 20% and 30%, and this part of the emolument was to be reckoned as a special allowance. Service weightage had to be granted at the rate of one increment for five years of service. For categories B, C and D respectively the basic pay for the time being payable was to stand enhanced by 10%, 20% and 30%, and this part of the emolument was to be reckoned as a special allowance. Service weightage had to be granted at the rate of one increment for five years of service. The attempt was to prescribe wage levels for the different groups, in a most simple and straight forward manner. Prescription of rates of wages by the impugned notification or implementation could not have been treated as arbitrary for any of the grounds that were raised. 26. The nature of the institution has not been gone unnoticed. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in C.B.Boarding & Lodging v. State of Mysore, AIR 1970 SC 2042, had held, relying on M/s. Bhajkusa Yamasa Khatriya v. Sangamner Akola Taluka, Bidi Kamgar Union, AIR 1963 SC 806, that the fixation of minimum wages depends on the prevailing economic conditions, the cost of living in a place, the nature of the work to be performed and the conditions in which the work is performed. It is not as if the impugned notification has not borne in mind the above, since the justification given for prescribing an enhanced amount as basic pay, is that the employees in categories B, C & D have additional responsibility, work load and they are to possess higher qualifications. Higher standards in the matter of health care are expected of them. Further, apart from pointing out that the classification is arbitrary, the petitioners have not supplied any details about the investments, income, profitability, out-turn or any other supporting statistics whatsoever, to show that the burden or additional expenditure is unbearable. When the unskilled labour in the State get wages in the range of Rs. 150-200, the payment as now suggested cannot be treated as unreasonable. 27. This Court had occasion to consider similar arguments, almost in an identical situation, more than a quarter century back, when minimum wages were prescribed for plantation industry. There the argument was that the minimum wages fixed were even higher than the fair wages fixed a few years back. The Full Bench in Malayaldm Plantations Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1975 KLT 296-FB, had held as following: "In the wake of spiralling prices, which have been a feature for the last few years, fair wages cannot remain static. There the argument was that the minimum wages fixed were even higher than the fair wages fixed a few years back. The Full Bench in Malayaldm Plantations Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1975 KLT 296-FB, had held as following: "In the wake of spiralling prices, which have been a feature for the last few years, fair wages cannot remain static. Therefore, for the mere reason that a wage structure based upon the principle of determination of fair wages with particular reference to other matters too including "the needs of industry in the developing economy" had been settled will not automatically render any subsequent revisions of minimum wages, resulting in wages higher than that so fixed as fair wages earlier". The Court had further observed that the minimum wages have to take notice of amenities such as medical care and education. As standard of living increases, there must be a gradual change in the concept of minimum wages in any developing economy. The total take home salary even now is far below that of a last grade employee in Government/ public sector/co-operative sector. The rate of D.A. also is not exorbitant as suggested, for the salary and scales do not compare well with the current levels of wages of comparable groups, and full neutralisation might be essential. Reference of course had been made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Killick Nixon v. K & Co. Employees' Union, AIR 1975 SC 1778, to show that neutralisation as proposed is arbitrary. For two reasons, I think I will be justified in rejecting the contention as above. First is that even after the neutralisation, the total emoluments are low. Secondly, in the Killick Nixon's case, the Court was examining the validity of an award passed by a Tribunal and especially as to the claim of the management that a ceiling in D.A. had been called for. The decision is not therefore relevant while adjudging the prescription of minimum wages, including D.A. I do not find that any serious point has been raised so as to hold that the minimum wages as revised causes undue strain. 28. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Express Newspaper Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578, had approved the observation of the Bombay Textile Labour Inquiry Committee that the living wages basis affords an absolute external standard for the determination of the minimum. 28. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Express Newspaper Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578, had approved the observation of the Bombay Textile Labour Inquiry Committee that the living wages basis affords an absolute external standard for the determination of the minimum. The Court had also particularly taken notice of the Directive Principles, of the Constitution, and especially Art. 43, which spoke the duty of the State for ensuring a living wage, and a decent standard of life. The Court had, in paragraph 55 of the judgment, drawn the attention to the distinction between bare subsistence or minimum wage and a statutory minimum wage. The former is a wage, which would be sufficient to cover the bare physical needs of a worker and his family. The statutory minimum, the Court held, may be higher than the former, providing for some measure of education, medical requirements and amenities. Then alone it would have preserved the efficiency of the worker, and therefore ultimately could have contributed to the industry. The Court observed that the Minimum Wages Act was contemplated as measure for introducing statutory minimum wages. The objections of the petitioners could be taken notice of only in the above back drop. 29. One other submission raised by the counsel for the petitioners was that what could have been prescribed was minimum rates of wages alone and not a scale of pay. The prescription of course results in differentials, but by that reason alone, it does not convert itself to something other than a minimum wages. The special allowance, the weightage, and the increments will result in different pay packets, but that is not foreign to the concept of a minimum wage. Minimum wages are to be revised from-time to time and normally in a period of five years. As could be seen from the facts of the case, scale of wages fixed in 1980 was remaining till Ext.P4 came to replace it after about 20 years. A drastic change in economy leads to a situation where even the D.A. fails to adequately insulate the plight of a workman. A scale of pay and a marginal increase from year to year therefore tally with the principles of minimum wages. As a matter of fact, a similar contention has been raised by the managements when minimum wages were notified for plantation industry in respect of Supervisors. A scale of pay and a marginal increase from year to year therefore tally with the principles of minimum wages. As a matter of fact, a similar contention has been raised by the managements when minimum wages were notified for plantation industry in respect of Supervisors. The Full Bench in Malayalam Plantation's case (cited supra) had held that "It has not been shown to us by reference to any provision of the Act that prescribing a scale of wages for supervisors would in any way be beyond the purview of the Act". The Court was of the opinion that the attack did not deserve any serious consideration. That appears to be the case here as well. Further, the contention as above had already been examined by the Constitution Bench in Express Newspaper Ltd. case (cited supra). The argument was that fixation of rate of wages is different from fixation of scale of wages. The Court held that the two expressions did not have different connotations. I may extract paragraph 63 of the judgment herein below: "Rates of wages", therefore, mean the manner, mode or standard of the payments of remuneration for work done whether at the start or in the subsequent stages. Rates of wages would thus include the scales of wages and there is no antithesis between the two expressions, the expression being applicable both to the initial as well as subsequent amount of wages. It is true that in references made to Industrial Tribunals fixing of scales of pay has been specifically mentioned e.g., in the industrial dispute between certain banking companies and their workers. But that is not sufficient to exclude the "scales of wages" from being comprised within the larger connotation of the expression "rates of wages" which is capable of including the scales of wages also within its ambit. Even without the specific mention of the scales of wages it would be open to fix the same in an inquiry directed towards the fixation of the rate of wages"' 30. The notification is not to be interfered with, for this reason as well. Reference made by Mr. Ashok Kumar to the observations of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. K.P.Subbaiah, (2003) 11 SCC 646, which spoke about the subtle difference between Pay and Pay Scale, can have no application as the said decision was rendered in a totally different context. 31. Reference made by Mr. Ashok Kumar to the observations of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. K.P.Subbaiah, (2003) 11 SCC 646, which spoke about the subtle difference between Pay and Pay Scale, can have no application as the said decision was rendered in a totally different context. 31. I am not adverting to the special contentions attempted to be raised in respect of the Dentist's dispensaries. They do have all the characteristic of other dispensaries, and as suggested by the Government Pleader, perhaps will have a better financial capacity, as the number of staff employed always will be far lesser. 32. The Original Petitions are dismissed. But taking note of the pendency of the Petitions and interim orders,1 direct that the prosecution steps, if any, taken against the petitioners herein are not to be pursued any more, and only fresh violations alone be taken cognizance of by the enforcement authorities. The concerned authorities should take appropriate follow up action in respect of such proceedings, as might be required.