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2004 DIGILAW 428 (GAU)

Subhra Dey v. Joy Prakash Gulgulia

2004-06-24

AMITAVA ROY, P.P.NAOLEKAR

body2004
JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. This bunch of appeals put to test the decision of the learned Single Judge rendered in a string of writ petitions questioning the levy of composite fee by the State of Mizoram on vehicles authorized to ply in the said State under the Tourist Permit granted under Sub-section (9) of Section 88 of the Motor Vehicle Act 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act.) The writ Petitioners most of whom are in appeal assailed the levy to be one without jurisdiction lacking constitutional as well as statutory sanction. The plea has been negative in the original proceedings. While admitting the appeal the Appellants were permitted to pay 50% of the composite fee levied subject to the result thereof. 2. We have heard Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. A.K. Goswami and Mr. P. Bora, Advocate for the Appellants and Mr. A. Dasgupta, Government Advocate, Mizoram. None appeared for the Union of India or the State of Assam. 3. The controversy centers around the notification dated 21.3.95 issued by the Transport Department, Govt. of Mizoram levying composite fee at the rates mentioned therein payable with effect from 1.4.95. While the Appellants brand the levy as compulsory exaction by way of tax without any legislation backing it, the State of Mizoram pleads that it is a fee realizable for meeting the expenses towards development of tourism in the State. 4. Sans the unnecessary details the relevant facts to be noticed are that the Appellants are the registered owners of tourist omnibuses holding. All India Tourist Permits issued by the State Transport Authority, Assam for States of Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram (and in some cases also Tripura). The permits held by them bear different dates of expiry but were valid when the writ petitions were filed. According to the Appellants, most of the tourist Omnibuses operating in the North Eastern States and carrying Inter State tourists are being issued permits by the various State Transport Authorities of the said States. 5. The All India Permit for Tourist Transport Operator Rules 1993 (hereinafter referred to as Transport Rules) framed under Section 88(14) of the Act provide for issuance of Authorization Certificate to the Tourist Transport Operators of the country. 5. The All India Permit for Tourist Transport Operator Rules 1993 (hereinafter referred to as Transport Rules) framed under Section 88(14) of the Act provide for issuance of Authorization Certificate to the Tourist Transport Operators of the country. There under such certificate is to be obtained by applying to the State Transport Authority concerned and the Appellants had obtained such Authorization Certificates from the State Transport Authority in Assam failed in the State of Assam, Meghalaya and Mizoram. For some Appellants the Authorization Certificate for the State of Tripura has also been issued. For this the Appellants had to pay amongst others Rs. 1000/- as composite fee for the State of Mizoram. By the impugned notification dated 21.3.95 the State of Mizoram imposed a composite fee of Rs. 12,000/- per quarter per State for the Minibuses with effect from 1.4.95, whereby the Appellants being the permit holders of said category of vehicles have been adversely affected. The Appellants have impugned the levy to be without any authority of law being in the form of tax without any legislation. They have maintained that the composite fee sought to be charged was much in excess of Rs. 1000/- prescribed as the maximum annual fee under Section88(14) of the Act and therefore, is in contravention thereof. The notification has also been assailed on the ground that it has thereby imposed a, burden on the existing tourist vehicles which by the enormity of the demand is grossly arbitrary and has resulted in an unreasonable restriction in the matter of freedom of trade and commerce in violation of Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution of India. 6. The State of Mizoram has responded by contending that the Transport Rules were framed on the recommendation of the Transport Development Council of the Government of India recorded in its meeting held in January, 1992 and pursuant to a decision of the Government of India, Ministry of Surface Transport (Transport Wing), New Delhi as contained in its letter dated 30.8.1993, the impugned notification had been issued. It is admitted that prior to the said notification, the State used to charge Rs. 1000/- as composite fee per annum per vehicle. It is admitted that prior to the said notification, the State used to charge Rs. 1000/- as composite fee per annum per vehicle. While maintaining that the notification had been issued in exercise of the power of the Government under Section 88 of the Act and the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), the answering Respondents have asserted that the annual fee realized for the purpose of issuing an Authorization Certificate is different from the composite fee levied by the neighbouring states on the tourist vehicles on account of various facilities provided by them to such vehicles and the tourist commuted thereby. The stand taken is that the annual authorization fee realized by the issuing state enables a Motor Vehicle covered by the permit to ply in other states subject to payment of taxes or fee levied by them meaning thereby that the permit holders of the tourist vehicles were bound in law to pay the composite fee as levied by the impugned notification in return of the various facilities provided to them while using the roads and visiting the tourist spots in Mizoram. The levy is sought to be justified by citing economic and geographical conditions of the State, the high cost of living and rising prices of commodities and the increasing necessity to secure better amenities for the tourists. This stand is reinforced by filing additional affidavits stating that the purpose of levying the composite fee which is in lieu of all taxes payable is to improve the facilities extendable to the tourists and to promote tourism amongst others by developing roads, tourist spots etc. 7. In course of the arguments in the appeals, noticing the above stand, the state Respondents were permitted to furnish additional particulars pertaining to the expenditure incurred under the above heads. By two affidavits this has "been done to which we would revert later. 8. The gist of the argument advanced by Mr. Sahewalla is that the composite fee referred to in the impugned notification is in the nature of tax which in absence of any legislation authorizing the imposition is wholly without any authority of law. There being no clement of quid pro quo, the levy could not be passed as a fee as claimed by the state he argued. Sahewalla is that the composite fee referred to in the impugned notification is in the nature of tax which in absence of any legislation authorizing the imposition is wholly without any authority of law. There being no clement of quid pro quo, the levy could not be passed as a fee as claimed by the state he argued. According to him as no special benefit is extended to the vehicles from which the composite fee would be realized, the levy imposed in exercise of the executive fiat without any guidelines provided either by the Transport Rules or the Act is grossly arbitrary and unconstitutional. He maintained, referring to the impugned notification that it was clear therefrom that the composite fee was in the nature of tax as it was payable in lieu of all taxes in the state. Mr. Sahewalla sought to reinforce his arguments by referring to the following authorities. AIR 1973 SC 724 . The Secretary, Govt. of Madras Home Department and Anr. Appellants v. Zenith Lamps and Electrical Ltd. Respondents, (1995) 1 SCC 655 Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti and Ors. Appellants v. Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. Respondents, (2000) 8 SCC 167 A.P. Paper Mills Ltd. Appellant v. Govt. of A.P. and Anr. Respondents (2004) 1 SCC 225 State of U.P. and Ors. Appellant v. Vam Organic Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. Respondents. 9. The learned Govt. Advocate while supporting the notification impugned has argued that the decision contained therein is pursuant to a consensus struck by all the states to levy composite fee on the tourist vehicles at uniform rates. He also invited our attention to the extract of the letter dated 30.8.93 referred to in the impugned notification as available in the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Sharma Transport etc. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 188 . According to the learned State Counsel the fee chargeable in lieu of all taxes was regulatory in nature and was intended for promoting tourism in the State. Referring to the statements made in the additional affidavit Mr. Dasgupta sought to impress upon us that the amounts realized by way of composite fee have been expended for development of tourism, namely, construction and maintenance of tourist lodges, inns etc. Improvement of tourist spots, roads and projects of like nature. Referring to the statements made in the additional affidavit Mr. Dasgupta sought to impress upon us that the amounts realized by way of composite fee have been expended for development of tourism, namely, construction and maintenance of tourist lodges, inns etc. Improvement of tourist spots, roads and projects of like nature. He asserted that the levy was clearly relatable to the services rendered in the return satisfying the test of quid proquo. The learned State Counsel urged that the levy of composite fee, therefore did not have the potential of restricting the Appellants business and to the contrary, would promote the same. He contended that for the levy to be valid, it is not necessary that the corresponding services need be confined to the vehicles subjected thereto. As the underlying purpose of the realization is to promote tourism in the state and thereby advance public interest, the impugned notification cannot be faulted with in any manner Mr. Dasgupta endeavoured to sustain his arguments by relying on the following decisions: AIR 1999 P&H 130 M/s Indo Canadian Transport Company Petitioners v. Union of India and Ors. Respondents, AIR 1991 SC 2096 Sri Krishna Das Appeallant v. Town Area Committee Chirgaon Respondent, (2001) 3 SCC 482 B.S.E. Brokers Forum, Bombay and Ors. Appellants v. Securities and Exchange Board of India Respondent and (2002) 2 SCC 188 Sharma Transport represented by D.P. Sharma v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors. Respondents. 10. As the genesis of the following dissertation has to be Section 88(9) of the Act, we propose to begin with it. Appellants v. Securities and Exchange Board of India Respondent and (2002) 2 SCC 188 Sharma Transport represented by D.P. Sharma v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors. Respondents. 10. As the genesis of the following dissertation has to be Section 88(9) of the Act, we propose to begin with it. The above legal provision for ready reference is extracted herein below: (9) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) but subject to any rules that may be made by the Central Government under Sub-section (14) any State Transport Authority may, for the purpose of promoting tourism, grant permits in respect of tourist vehicles valid for the whole of India, or in such State Transport Authority may, for the purpose of promoting tourism, grant permits in respect of tourist vehicles valid for the whole of India, or in such contiguous States not being less than three in number including the State in which the permit is issued as maybe specified in such permit in accordance with the choice indicated in the application and the provisions of Sections 73,74, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86 clause (d) of Sub-sections (1) of Section 87 and Section 89 shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such permits 11. Under Section 88(14) of the Act the Central Government has been conferred the power to make Rules for carrying out the purposes of that section. The rules to be framed inter alia are to provide for the authorisation fee payable for the issue of permits referred to in Sub-Section 88(9). In the explanation appearing in Section 88(14) "authorization fee" has been defined as hereunder: authorization fee' means the annual fee, not exceeding one thousand rupees, which maybe charged by the appropriate authority of a state to enable a motor vehicle, covered by the permit referred to in Sub-section (9) and (12) to be used in other states subject to the payment of taxes or fees, if any, levied by the States concerned. 12. In exercise of powers inter alia under Section 88(14) of the Act, the Central Motor Vehicle Rules 1989 (for short the Rules) had been framed. Rule 82 to 85(A) thereof deals with grant of tourist permits and authorization by a State Transport Authority. The forms in which the applications for such permit and authorisation have to be made and the authorization certificate is to be granted are contained therein. 13. Rule 82 to 85(A) thereof deals with grant of tourist permits and authorization by a State Transport Authority. The forms in which the applications for such permit and authorisation have to be made and the authorization certificate is to be granted are contained therein. 13. The Central Government in exercise of powers under Sub-Section 14 read with Sub-Section 9 of Section 88 of the Act has framed the All India Permit for Tourist Transport Operators Rules 93 (for short the Transport Rules). Rule 1(4) excludes the operation of Rule 82 to 85(A) of the Rules in respect of permits granted under the Transport Rules. Under Rule 4 of the Transport Rules, application for issuing an authorization certificate has to be made to the concerned State Transport authority in the form as set out in the first schedule thereto and the authorization certificate has to be in the form as appears in the second schedule. Rule 9 thereof prescribe Rs. 500/- per annum to be the authorization fee for issuance of an authorisation certificate. 14. A conjoint reading of the above provisions of the Act, the Rules and the Transport Rules makes it abundantly clear that any State Transport Authority, subject to the Rules and Transport Rules may for the purpose of promoting tourism issue permit in respect of a tourist vehicle valid for the whole of India or such contiguous states not less than three in number including the state in which the permit is issued as may be specified in such permit in accordance with the choice indicated in the application therefore. The authorization fee payable for the issue of permit would be the annual fee not exceeding Rs. 1000/- as may be charged by the appropriate authority of the issuing state to enable a motor vehicle covered by the permit to be used in the other states subject to the payment of taxes or fee if any levied by those states. The authorization fee payable for such permit, therefore, is independent of the taxes or fees levied by and payable to the states other than the issuing state. The composite fee referred to in the impugned notification is therefore distinctly different from the authorization fee and if levied by the concerned states is payable by a tourist operators to which the permit under Section 88(9) has been issued. The composite fee referred to in the impugned notification is therefore distinctly different from the authorization fee and if levied by the concerned states is payable by a tourist operators to which the permit under Section 88(9) has been issued. To this extent in our considered opinion the plea of the state Respondents that the authorization certificate issued on payment of the annual authorization fee is subject to payment of tax or fee by the states other than the issuing state stands vindicated. 15. The issuance of the impugned notification as the same reveals, is in terms of a letter No. RT-11053/1/92-MVL(Vol ii) dated 30.8.93 issued by the Government of India Ministry of Surface Transport (Transport Wing) New Delhi. The back ground of this letter can be gathered from the decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s. Indo Canadian Transport Co. (supra). 16. In the year 1992, the Transport Development Council of India in its meeting recommended that an appropriate scheme may be worked out for operation of tourist Cabs/Coaches on the basis of an All India Permit. A committee of the State Transport Secretaries was thereafter formed and on the basis of its recommendations, the Transport Rules were framed and finally noticed on 10.8.93. It was recorded that the State Governments had agreed that apart from the Home State Tax, a composite fee would be charged from the permit holders at fixed rates. For Omni Coach of 14-35 seats, a composite fee of Rs. 12,000/- per quarter per State (other than the Home State) was fixed. By the communication dated 30.8.93 addressed to all the Transport Secretaries of the State Governments, and Union Territory administrations a request was made to take necessary action to incorporate this provision relating to composite fee in the state Motor Vehicle Taxation Rules and also to issue necessary instructions guidelines to the State Transport Authorities for grant of permits. It was underlined therein that the composite fee was to be in lieu of all taxes. 17. The contention of the Petitioner in M/s Indo Canadian Co. (supra) that the authorities having granted the authorization certificate to it as a transport operator and that it having paid the composite fee of Rs. 12,000/- per quarter, it was not liable to pay any tax beyond the composite fee except in the Home State was upheld. 18. 17. The contention of the Petitioner in M/s Indo Canadian Co. (supra) that the authorities having granted the authorization certificate to it as a transport operator and that it having paid the composite fee of Rs. 12,000/- per quarter, it was not liable to pay any tax beyond the composite fee except in the Home State was upheld. 18. That the letter dated 30.8.93 does not in any way restrict the power of the State Legislature or its delegatee to levy or exempt tax from time to time was declared by the Apex Court in Sharma Transport (supra). The above background therefore proclaims that the impugned notification is the product of the exercise that was undertaken by the Transport Development Council of India and the Committee aforementioned which had framed the Transport Rules and letter dated 30.8.93. 19. No argument has been advanced before us challenging the power of the Respondent State to levy the composite fee in terms of the said letter. The competence to levy tax or fee by the concerned state (other than Home State) can be easily deciphered in the definition of "authorization fee" noticed hereinabove. As marked hereinabove, an uniform rate of composite fee was agreed to be levied by all the States following the deliberations in the meeting of the Transport Secretaries of all States. The Petitioners/Appellants have not been able to draw the attention of this Court to any material to suggest otherwise. 20. This takes us to the core issue, namely, whether the impost in the impugned notification is a tax or a fee. Indeed in course of the arguments the only emphasis by the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants was on this feature of the controversy. Admittedly the vires of the Rules or the Transport Rules has not been questioned. The thrust of the attack on behalf of the Petitioners/Appellants is that in the attending facts and circumstances of the case, the element of quid pro quo in the levy is conspicuously absent and it therefore is a tax. 21. The question whether an imposition is a tax or a fee has engaged the attention of the Courts for long and the parties understandably have cited a host of decisions in support of their respective stands. 22. While dwelling on the issue whether fees taken in courts was a tax, the Apex Court in the Secretary, Govt. 21. The question whether an imposition is a tax or a fee has engaged the attention of the Courts for long and the parties understandably have cited a host of decisions in support of their respective stands. 22. While dwelling on the issue whether fees taken in courts was a tax, the Apex Court in the Secretary, Govt. of Madras, Home Department (supra) while answering in the negative recalled its observations in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt 1954 SCR 1005 : ( AIR 1954 SC 282 ) where it was held that tax is a compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not a payment for services rendered. But a fee may generally be defined as a charge for a special services rendered to individuals by some governmental agency. The distinction between a tax and a fee, it recorded, lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as part of a common burden while a fee is a payment for special benefit or privilege. The fact that one item of revenue is credited to the consolidated fund is not conclusive to show that the item is a tax, it observed. 23. Following an exhaustive review of its earlier decisions on the topic the Apex Court in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti and Ors. (supra) summarised the law holding that tax is a compulsory exaction of money for public purposes enforceable by law and is not a payment for the services rendered. It is a part of common burden and the quantum of imposition upon the tax payer, depends generally on his capacity to pay. 24. In contrast, fee is a charge for the special services rendered to a class by some Governmental agency. The amount of fee levied is supposed to be on the expenses incurred by the Government in rendering the services. Ordinarily the fees are uniform and no account is taken of the varying activities of the different recipients to pay, though an element of convulsion is present in all kinds of imposition including the fees. It held that public interest was the basis of all imposition but the reasons for levying a fee is some special benefit which is conferred. Ordinarily the fees are uniform and no account is taken of the varying activities of the different recipients to pay, though an element of convulsion is present in all kinds of imposition including the fees. It held that public interest was the basis of all imposition but the reasons for levying a fee is some special benefit which is conferred. A fee is a sort of return or consideration for the services rendered and hence it is primarily necessary that the levy of fee should on the face of legislative provision be correlated to the expenses incurred by the Govt. in rendering the services. In determining whether the levy is a fee, the true test must be whether its primary and essential purpose is to render specific services to specific area or classes. It is inconsequential that the state may directly or indirectly be benefited by it. The amount of levy must depend upon the extent of services sought to be rendered and if they are proportionate it would be unreasonable to say that since the impost is high it must be a tax. The Apex Court however clarified that it is not a postulate of a fee that it must have relation to the actual service rendered. The test of quid pro quo is not to be satisfied with close or proximate relationship in all kinds of fees. It is not necessary to convert the whole of the benefit on the payers of the fee but some special benefit must be conferred on them which has a direct and a reasonable relation to the fee. It held that while conferring some special benefits on the payers of the fee it is permissible to render service in the general interest of all concerned. Quid pro quo is not possible or even necessary to be established with arithmetical exactitude. It is enough if there is a broad, reasonable and general correlationship between the levy and the resultant benefit to the class of people on which the fee is levied though no single payer of the fee receives direct or personal benefit from these services. It is immaterial that general public may also be benefited from some of the services if the primary service intended is for the payers of the fee, it ruled. It is immaterial that general public may also be benefited from some of the services if the primary service intended is for the payers of the fee, it ruled. It was further of the view that it is not necessary that the amount of fees collected should be kept separately. It held that merely because the collections for the services rendered or for grant of privilege are taken to the consolidated fund of the State and not separately appropriated towards the expenditure for rendering the services is not by itself decisive of the nature of the levy whether it is a fee or a tax. 25. The Apex Court in State of U.P. and Ors. v. Vam Organic Chemicals Ltd. (supra) held that the word "service" in the context of a fee could include a levy for a compulsory measure undertaken vis a vis the payer in the interest of the public, but there has to be a correlation between the levy imposed and the quid pro quo. The nexus however has to be of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. All that is necessary is that there should be a reasonable relationship between the levy of the fee and the services rendered. 26. The decision in A.P. Paper Mills Ltd v. Govt. of A.P. (supra) mainly deals with the distinction between regulatory fees and compensatory fees with which we are not concerned in the instant case. 27. In Sri Krishna Das v. Town Area Committee (Supra) the Apex Court was of the view that where the service is indistinguishable from the public services and forms part of the latter, it is necessary to enquire what is the primary object of the levy and the essential purpose which it is intended to achieve. While there is no quid pro quo between a tax payer and the authority in case of a tax, there is a necessary correlation between the fee collected and service intended to be rendered. It reiterated that quid pro quo however should not be understood in mathematical equivalence but only in a fair correspondence between the two. 28. The plea that the amount collected by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and credited to its common fund was suggestive of the fact that there is no element of quid pro quo was negatived by the Apex Court in Secundrabad Hyderabad Hotel Owners Association and Ors. 28. The plea that the amount collected by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and credited to its common fund was suggestive of the fact that there is no element of quid pro quo was negatived by the Apex Court in Secundrabad Hyderabad Hotel Owners Association and Ors. (supra) holding in the contextual facts that the amounts though credited in the common fund were earmarked for the purposes for which they were collected and therefore the levy was a fee. 29. In B.S.E. Brokers Forum Bombay and Ors. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (supra), the Apex Court recounted its observations in City Corporation of Calicut v. Thachambalath Sadasivan (1985) 2 SCC 112 that the traditional concept of quid pro quo in a fee has undergone a transformation and though the fee must have a relation with the services rendered or the advantages conferred, it is not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct or special benefit or advantage of the services rendered for which the fee is paid. If one who is liable to pay receives general benefits from the authority levying the fee, the element of service required for collecting fee is satisfied. The Apex Court therefore in the facts of that case concluded that since the amount collected under the impugned levy was spent on various activities with which the Petitioners were directly connected, the fact that the entire benefit of the levy did not accrue to them did not make the levy invalid. 30. In Secretary to the Govt. of Madras v. P.R. Sriramulu (1996) 1 SCC 345 , it was held that there could not be any scientific method by which levy of fee may be made exactly corresponding to the expenditure in a particular year relating to administration of civil justice and it is not the requirement of law that the collection raised by the levy should exactly tally or correspond to the expenditure on that count. The test of correlation with the services rendered is to be reckoned at the aggregate level and not at the individual level. 31. The test of correlation with the services rendered is to be reckoned at the aggregate level and not at the individual level. 31. The pronounced judicial dicta as contained in the aforementioned authorities lay down unequivocally that though the element of service or quid pro quo is an essential trait of a levy to designate it as a fee in contradistinction to tax, the correlation between the impost and the service rendered may be broad and general and no formulaic precision should be insisted upon. If the collection is set apart and appropriated for the associated services for the benefit of the payers be also for the general public, it can be counted as a fee and not a tax. The imposition to bear the characteristics of a fee need not be wholly utilized to extend any direct or special benefit or service to the payers. If one who is liable to pay receives the benefit of service along with others the requirement of quid pro quo is satisfied. It is also immaterial whether the amount collected is diverted to the general fund of the state so long as it is earmarked for providing the services for which the levy has been imposed. The amount of impost however has to bear a reasonable affinity with the services rendered. 32. Details of the benefits so granted need not be worked out with mathematical precision and identified. No specified percentage of the collection is necessary to be shown reserved or utilized for the services of the payers to the exclusion of the others. So long as an existing interrelation between the levy and the services is traceable vis a vis the payers, the same can safely be construed to be a fee. A general relationship between the impost and the services is sufficient and an exclusive bond between the imposition, the services and the payers is not a sine qua non to identify the levy as a fee. It is in this background that the true identification of the composite fee levied by the impugned notification has to be made. 33. It has been the consistent stand of the Respondents that the levy is directed to promote tourism prospects in the state. According to them increase in the composite fee had become imperative to provide better facilities and amenities to the visiting tourists. 33. It has been the consistent stand of the Respondents that the levy is directed to promote tourism prospects in the state. According to them increase in the composite fee had become imperative to provide better facilities and amenities to the visiting tourists. As the Appellants being the tourist operators would also be benefited by the improvements sought to be effected in this regard, the levy utilized for such developmental purposes would logically enure to their benefit as well. In the additional affidavits filed by the Respondents in the appeal it has been categorically pleaded that the State of Mizoram has spent Rs. 2231.23 lakhs for promoting tourism in the State during 1995-96 and 2002-03 against Rs. 181.41 lacs collected as composite fee for the said period. A chart furnishing the necessary particulars of the expenditure under different heads has also been annexed to the affidavit containing the endorsement of the Under Secretary, Transport Department, Govt. of Mizoram. It appears there from that the Govt. has spent Rs. 1338.87 lakhs during the aforementioned period towards maintenance cost of tourist lodges, restaurants etc. An amount of Rs. 892.36 lakhs has also been spent during that time towards construction of tourist lodges, restaurants etc at various places. It has also been specifically stated in the additional affidavit that out of the composite fee so collected, amounts have been spent for development of roads as well. 34. No affidavit has been filed by the Petitioners/Appellants controverting the correctness of these statements. No material on record has been pointed out rendering the particulars furnished in the affidavit unacceptable. 35. From the uncontroverted statements made in the affidavit and the additional affidavit filed by the State it can be reasonably concluded that the composite fee levied had been expended for construction, development and maintenance of tourist spots and other infrastructure facilities to boost tourism in the State of Mizoram. The expenditures made proclaim that those are directed towards promoting the tourism industry of the State. The Petitioners/Appellants being tourist operators consequently would also be benefited in the process as they are in extricably associated with the business of tourism, Better roads and facilities would promote their business as well. From the business point of view, the Petitioners/Appellants therefore are specially served by the tourism promotional ventures, undertaken by the state with the impugned impost. The Petitioners/Appellants being tourist operators consequently would also be benefited in the process as they are in extricably associated with the business of tourism, Better roads and facilities would promote their business as well. From the business point of view, the Petitioners/Appellants therefore are specially served by the tourism promotional ventures, undertaken by the state with the impugned impost. It cannot therefore be held that the utilization of the composite fee as disclosed of the State affidavit does not amount to any service to the tourist operators like the Appellants liable to pay the composite fee. A perceptible nexus between the levy and the services rendered qua the Petitioners/Appellants exist. The element of quid pro quo is evidently decipherable in the present setting of facts. 36. Having regard to the clear and unequivocal stand of the Respondents which stand uncontroverted, it is uncalled for to embark upon an exercise for ascertaining in golden scales the exact percentage of service rendered to the Petitioners and for that matter to the tourist operators subject to such levy. In our view, from the available materials on record, the element of service vis a vis the composite fee in question has been unequivocally established. The levy therefore has to be construed to be a fee in the touchstone of the judicially evolved principles marked hereinabove. The Petitioners/Appellants having failed to establish that the imposition has no service element or quid pro quo, we find no good and sufficient reason to interfere with the impugned notification. We have closely examined the judgment in appeal. On an analysis of the above discussion and the findings recorded, we are of the view that the same does not warrant any interference. 37. In view of the above, we find no merit in the appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed. The interim orders passed earlier stand vacated. No costs. Appeal dismissed