JUDGMENT Virender Singh, J. - Phool Parkash son of Prabha Dayal, the petitioner-herein is convicted for the charge of Section 7 read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (in short the Act) by the judgment dated 12.12.1985 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment thereof to suffer further RI for four months. The appeal filed by the petitioner also stands dismissed vide impugned judgment of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh dated 25.1.1990. Hence this revision. 2. The petitioner was running a canteen in Sector 17, Chandigarh. On 4.2.1985, the Government Food Inspector H.K. Sharma visited his canteen and found that the petitioner had kept 10 Kilograms of prepared Chana in a Patila for sale. The Food Inspector purchased a sample of 1500 grams of Chana. After completing all the formalities according to the Act, the sample was sent to the Public Analysis. On analysis, it was found that the chana was having colouring matter, which was not permitted and as such, it was termed as adulterated. A complaint was consequently filed against the petitioner, in which he has earned conviction. 3. I have heard Mr. S.K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R.K. Handa, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent/Union Territory, Chandigarh. With their assistance I have gone through the entire record. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits at the Bar that he does not assail the impugned judgments of conviction on merits but confines his prayer for reduction in sentence only. 5. Although the impugned judgments have not been assailed on merits, yet I have scrutinized the entire record minutely. I do not find any irregularity or infirmity in the judgments of both the Courts below, which may call for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction. Consequently, the conviction of the petitioner as recorded by the learned trial Court and upheld by the first appellate Court is affirmed. 6. On the question of quantum of sentence, Mr. I do not find any irregularity or infirmity in the judgments of both the Courts below, which may call for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction. Consequently, the conviction of the petitioner as recorded by the learned trial Court and upheld by the first appellate Court is affirmed. 6. On the question of quantum of sentence, Mr. Garg submits that the petitioner was prosecuted in this case in the year 1985 and since then he has faced the agony of protracted trial for about 19 years; that he has remained in custody for about 14/15 days after conviction; that the petitioner is not a previous convict; that after institution of the present complaint in 1985, no other case of similar nature has been registered against him; that after registration of the present case, the petitioner left the said canteen within that very year and thereafter has not entered into the said business at all; and sending him to jail once again at this juncture would be a harsh step. 7. Refuting the arguments of Mr. Garg, the learned State counsel submits that the present case does not call for any lenient view with regard to quantum of sentence. 8. In Braham Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1789, their Lordships of the Apex Court while upholding the conviction of the appellant in a case under the Act, reduced the sentence to the period already undergone, considering that the occurrence had taken place about 8 years ago and no useful purpose would be served by sending him to jail for undergoing the remaining period of sentence. 9. Similarly in Haripada Dass v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1482, the Honble Apex Court considering the fact that the appellant was released on bail long back and because of protracted litigation, he has suffered a lot of mental agony and taking into account the financial hardship and also considering the fact that he had already undergone imprisonment for sometime (three weeks), the sentence of imprisonment was reduced to the period already undergone in the interest of justice. However, the fine imposed by the Court below was increased. 10. However, the fine imposed by the Court below was increased. 10. In a recent judgment rendered in Sher Singh v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, 2003(2) RCR(Cri.) 826, this Court in a case under the Act while considering the fact of speedy trial, reduced the sentence of the petitioner to the period already undergone observing that the incident was 18 years old and that the minimum sentence provided is six months. It was further observed that the process of Criminal Law Justice System is not only to bring peace, discipline and harmony in the society but also to give an opportunity to an erring individual to reform himself. 11. Similar view was taken in the following judgments : Harbans Lal v. State of Haryana, 2001(2) RCR(Cri.) 333; Hardwari Lal v. State of Haryana, 2003(1) RCR(Cri.) 10; Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2003(2) RCC 13; Ram Singh v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, 2003(2) RCC 164 and Jog Dhian v. State of Haryana, 2001(2) RCR(Cri.) 331. In Chandi Ram v. State of Haryana, Criminal Revision No. 63 of 1994, decided on 24.3.2004 and another decision rendered in Vijay Kumar v. State of Haryana, Criminal Revision No. 391 of 1989, decided on 24.3.2004, this Court in the cases of Food Adulteration Act while reducing the sentence to the period already undergone has increased the fine. 12. Taking into consideration the totality of facts and circumstances of the case and applying the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of Honble Apex Court and this Court, in my view the ends of justice would be adequately met if the substantive sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court and affirmed by the first appellate Court is reduced to the period already undergone. It is ordered accordingly. However, the fine of Rs. 1000/- is enhanced to Rs. 5,000/-. In case the petitioner has already deposited the amount of fine of Rs. 1,000/- awarded by the trial Court, the same shall be adjusted in the enhanced amount. The petitioner shall deposit the fine amount before the trial Court within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. In default of payment of the said amount, the petitioner would undergo RI for four months. With the modification in the quantum of sentence as indicated above, the present revision fails and is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.