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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2004 DIGILAW 437 (MP)

Prem Narayan v. Munnalal

2004-05-06

A.K.SHRIVASTAVA

body2004
JUDGMENT Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by first appellate Court affirming the judgment and decree passed by trial Court dismissing the suit of plaintiffs for eviction based on the ground of relationship of landlord and tenant, the appellants-plaintiffs have knocked the door of this Court by preferring second Appeal under section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The plaintiffs filed suit for eviction against defendant-respondent on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant on the grounds as envisaged under section 12 (1) (a), (e), (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). According to the plaintiffs, the defendant-respondent Munnalal is the tenant at the rate of Rs. 25/- per month and the rent is due w.e.f. 1.1.1992 which has not been paid by the defendant-respondent despite repeated demand. The accommodation-in-question is required bona fide by the landlord for residence as well as for running the business. The plaintiffs sent a notice by registered AID post on 31.3.1992 which was received by defendant respondent on 3.4.1992, but neither he vacated the suit accommodation nor paid any rent. The reply which has been sent, is based on incorrect facts. On the basis of these premised pleadings, a decree of eviction has been sought by the plaintiff-landlord against the defendant-respondent. The averments made in the plaint were denied by the defendant in his written statement. On going through the written statement, it is revealed that defendant specifically denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. According to him, he is not the tenant of plaintiffs, but is the tenant of Amarchand and Babulal. The grounds for eviction envisaged under the Act were categorically denied in the written statement and it was prayed that since defendant is not the tenant of the plaintiffs, the suit which has been filed on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant, be dismissed. The learned trial Court framed several Issues. 1, 2, 3 and 9 pertain to the relationship between plaintiffs and defendant. The learned trial Judge, after appreciating and marshalling the evidence, came to hold that the defendant is not the ·tenant of plaintiffs and, therefore, the suit was dismissed. An appeal, which was preferred by appellants before the .appellate Court, was also dismissed and the finding was affirmed by the impugned judgment and decree. Hence, this second appeal. The learned trial Judge, after appreciating and marshalling the evidence, came to hold that the defendant is not the ·tenant of plaintiffs and, therefore, the suit was dismissed. An appeal, which was preferred by appellants before the .appellate Court, was also dismissed and the finding was affirmed by the impugned judgment and decree. Hence, this second appeal. This second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: A. "Whether in an ejectment suit, Courts below can decide the question of title of third person, namely, Amarchand who is not a party to the suit?" B. "Whether in the absence of original unregistered document Ex.D:-4 on record, the Courts below were right in holding that the plaintiff is not owner of the suit property?" It has been contended by Shri K.S. Tomar, learned senior counsel assisted by Shri. Ajit. Saraswat, that :in a suit filed on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant, the question of determining third person's title is altogether 'foreign' and it was not incumbent upon the learned Courts below to decide the title of third person. It has also been propounded by learned senior counsel that the original document Ex. D-4 is not on record and a photocopy thereof which has been marked as Ex. D-4-C cannot be relied upon, and same is also an unregistered document. Refuting the aforesaid submissions of learned counsel for the appellants, Shri D.D. Bansal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, argued in support of impugned judgment. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the. view that this appeal deserves to be dismissed. I shall now deal with the first substantial question of law. It has bee; vehemently contended by learned senior counsel for the appellants that the learned Courts below exceeded their jurisdiction by giving a finding in respect to title of the accommodation-in-question in favour of a third person, namely, Amarchand. It has been put forth by learned counsel that indeed learned Courts below should have confined to the pleadings and the grounds envisaged under the Act, for eviction. True, in a suit filed on the grounds envisaged under section 12 of the Act on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant, the Court is not obliged to decide the title, that too in respect of third person, but in the present case this is not the position. True, in a suit filed on the grounds envisaged under section 12 of the Act on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant, the Court is not obliged to decide the title, that too in respect of third person, but in the present case this is not the position. The learned trial Court, while deciding the issues No.1, 2, 3 and 9 in paras 6 to 14, after X-raying the entire material placed on record, came to hold that the plaintiffs are not the landlord of the defendant. While deciding those issues, the learned trial Judge was well aware in respect to the scope of the enquiry of the present suit. It has been categorically held by learned trial Judge that in the present suit, which is based on relationship of landlord and tenant, the question of deciding the title is altogether foreign. In the present case the finding of learned trial Judge is that since the landlord-plaintiffs did not file any document in order to show and prove that defendant-respondent is their tenant, the relationship of landlord and tenant is not established and proved. The evidence led by the defendant was scanned and while appreciating and marshalling the· evidence of the parties, it was herd that the defendant is the tenant of Amarchand. Nowhere in its judgment, the learned trial Judge has held that Amarchand is the title holder of the suit property. . The judgment of trial Court was affirmed by the appellate Court by adopting the same criteria. There is no finding of either Court below holding that Amarchand is the title holder of the suit property. The substantial question of law 'A' is thus answered accordingly. I shall now consider the second substantial question of law. True, the original document Ex. D-4 was tendered in the evidence but, later on, a photocopy of the Ex. D-4-C has been placed on record. There is nothing on record in order to show with whose permission Ex. D-4 was taken back and by whom. This Court on 20.3.1997 has directed District Judge, Vidisha, to hold an enquiry in that regard and send the original document Ex. D-4. Looking to the entire gamut of the present factual scenario, it is hereby directed that an enquiry be held in that regard and a report be placed in the Registry. D-4 was taken back and by whom. This Court on 20.3.1997 has directed District Judge, Vidisha, to hold an enquiry in that regard and send the original document Ex. D-4. Looking to the entire gamut of the present factual scenario, it is hereby directed that an enquiry be held in that regard and a report be placed in the Registry. The District Judge, Vidisha, is hereby directed to instruct all the Courts that without adopting the proper procedure as prescribed under the law, no original document should be returned to any party. The second substantial question of law has nothing to do with the merit of this case because even if it is held that EX.D-4 is not a valid conveyance deed, it cannot be held that plaintiffs would become the landlord of the defendant. Before parting with the case, it would be condign to mention that whatever has been said either by the Courts below or by this Court while deciding this appeal in respect to the right of Amarchand in the suit property, would not come in way, if any suit is filed on the basis of title by the plaintiffs against Amarchand. Ex consequentie, the appeal is found to be devoid of any substance and the same is hereby dismissed. However, the parties are directed to bear their costs throughout.