A.H. SAIKIA, J.— Heard Mr. A.R. Benerjee, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Miss B. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellants and also heard Mr. P.C. Deka, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. R.L. Yadav and Mrs. K. Yadav, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This Second Appeal has been brought from the Judgment and decree dated 18.12.97 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Cachar at Silchar in T.A. No. 5/93 reversing the judgment and order dated 20.3.93 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge No.2, Cachar at SilcharinT.S. No. 17/1977. 3. Though the Court by order dated 27.7.98 at the time of admission of the Second Appeal accepted the grounds Nos. A, D and E incorporated in the Memo of Appeal as substantial questions of law, this Court upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, when the matter is taken up for final hearing proposes to formulate precisely the following substantial question of law:- "Whether the First Appellate Court committed the jurisdictional error in admitting and entertaining a time barred appeal ex-parte as a result of which the subsequent impugned judgment and decree has been vitiated." 4. In order to appreciate and answer the substantial question of law formulated above, it would be necessary to notice the facts of the case in a short compass. 5. The defendants/respondents (for short the 'respondents') filed T.A. No. 5/93 before the learned Addl. District Judge, Cachar at Silchar on 24.6.93 against the judgment and order dated 20.3.93 passed by the learned Asstt. District Judge-2, Cachar at Silchar in T.S. No. 17/97 and final decree signed on 17.5.93. 6. Alongwith the Memo of appeal the respondents also filed an application being petition No. 521/93, being supported by an affidavit, stating, inter alia that though the judgment appealed against was passed on 20.3.93, the decree thereof was written and signed only on 17.5.93 and accordingly excluding the time required for getting the certified copy as narrated in the said petition itself, the appeal filed on 24.6.93 against the judgment and decree as mentioned above, maybe accepted to be filed in time and since there was no delay, the appeal was not barred by limitation. It would be convenient if the said petition is extracted herein and the same runs as follows:- "521/1993. IN THE COURT OFTHEDISTRICT JUDGE: CACHAR:SILCHAR T.A.NO.5OF1993 Md. Makbul All and Others ... Appellants -Versus- Sukhamay Paul and Others ... It would be convenient if the said petition is extracted herein and the same runs as follows:- "521/1993. IN THE COURT OFTHEDISTRICT JUDGE: CACHAR:SILCHAR T.A.NO.5OF1993 Md. Makbul All and Others ... Appellants -Versus- Sukhamay Paul and Others ... Respondents That the humble petition of the appellants abovenamed; Most respectfully sheweth :- 1. That this appeal has been filed against the judgment of the final decree in T.S. No. 17 of 1977 passed on 20.3.93. 2. That the decree of the said suit was written and signed on 17.5.93 by the court on which date the same was shown to the lawyer to the defendant-appellants as per endorsement made in the decree. 3. That the application for the certified copy of the Judgment and Decree was filed on 26.3.93 and the Judgment was ready for delivery on 2.4.93. The appellants received the same on the following day i.e. on 3.4.93. The estimate for the decree was not given as decree was not drawn. 4. That the decree of the suit was not prepared by that time and as such no application for the copy of the decree was filed till 3.5.93 on which date the defendant-appellants got the information that the decree was being prepared. 5. That in the said circumstances, the defendant-appellant filed petition on 3.5.93 for obtaining certified copy of the decree. 6. That on 18.5.93 there was notification for submission of requisite court fees and Folios and on the following day i.e. on the 19.5.93 stamp and Folios were submitted. 7. That the certified copy of the decree was prepared on 5.6.93 and the applicants received the same on7.6.93. 8. That the decree aforesaid being not prepared for a long time i.e. from 20.3.93 till 17.5.93 the copy of the decree could not be obtained for filing the appeal. In the matter of computation of limitation for the appeal, the said dates need to be excluded under law and under all fairness of justice. 9. That the appeal after been prepared is filed on this day. It is, therefore, humbly prayed that the court would be pleased to find that the appeal is filed in time and there has not been any delay and the same is not barred by limitation. AFFIDAVIT I, Makbul Ali son of late Jaban Ali, resident of Lochan Bairagi Road, Bilpar, Silchar Town, Ph. Barakpar, Dist. It is, therefore, humbly prayed that the court would be pleased to find that the appeal is filed in time and there has not been any delay and the same is not barred by limitation. AFFIDAVIT I, Makbul Ali son of late Jaban Ali, resident of Lochan Bairagi Road, Bilpar, Silchar Town, Ph. Barakpar, Dist. Cachar, aged about 45 years, do hereby solemnly affirm and state that I am Defendant-appellant No.l of the above appeal and the facts mentioned in para 1 to 9 are true to my knowledge and those in the last para are our submission and prayer which I believe to be true. In proof whereof I sign this Affidavit on this day the 24th day of June, 1993 before the Sheristadar of this Court. Identified by :-. SdASriTamalSingh A/C Sd/- Makbul Ali Card No. 316 Deponent." 7. Referring to the date of filing of the Memo of Appeal as well as the contents of the petition being No. 521/03 as noticed above, Mr. Benerjee, learned Sr. Counsel for the appellants has forcefully contended that the learned appellate court entertained a time barred memo of appeal without condoning the delay and as such, committed an error of jurisdiction in admitting the appeal and on this count alone the impugned Judgment and decree cannot be sustained. According to him, since the judgment was passed on 20.3.93 and decree was signed on 27.5.03, the respondents ought to have filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of delay in preferring the appeal and also the appellants ought to have been given an opportunity of hearing on the point of limitation as raised. Drawing attention of this Court to the observations made by the learned Addl. District Judge in paragraph 8 of the impugned Judgment, Mr. Benerjee has urged that a grave mistake was committed by the learned Judge by brushing aside the contentions made on behalf of the appellants to reopen the question of limitation on the ground that the question of limitation was not kept open by the learned appellate Court when the order dated 25.6.93 was passed by which the appeal was admitted for hearing. His argument is that whether the question of limitation was kept open or not, once the question as regard the limitation has been raised, the learned Addl. His argument is that whether the question of limitation was kept open or not, once the question as regard the limitation has been raised, the learned Addl. District Judge was duty bound to address the said issue, failure of which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Mr. Benerjee has in order to substantiate his contentions, relied on the following judicial decisions: 1) Udayan Chinubhai Vs. R.C. Ball, reported in AIR 1977SC 2319. 2) State of Assam Vs. Gobinda Ch. Paul, reported in AIR 1991 Gau-104 3) Pradip Kumar Kalita Vs. Hiran Prabha Kalita (Smt.), reported in 2002 (1) GLT135(F.B.) 8. On the other hand relying on the petition being No. 521/93 as already referred to above, Mr. Deka, learned Sr. Counsel for the respondents, has asserted that the Memo of appeal was filed within the period of limitation and there was no delay in preferring the same. Assuming but not admitting that there was any delay in filing the appeal, the Petition No. 521/93 was filed by the respondents explaining the entire fact situation and entertaining the same, the learned Addl. District Judge admitted the appeal for hearing and as such, there was no illegality and/or mistake occurred in entertaining and deciding the appeal. He has also contended that if the Court is not satisfied with the said explanation made in the Petition being No. 521/ 93, the respondents maybe allowed to file an application for condonation of delay before the appropriate authority by remanding the matter back for securing the ends of justice. 9. Mr. Deka, learned Sr. counsel has relied upon the following authorities:- 1. Udai Bhan Gupta Vs. Hari Shankar Bansal and Others, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1469 . 2. Punsi Devi Arajbhar Vs. Pista Devi Agarwal, reported in 1987 (1) GLR 216 . 3. State of Rajasthan Vs. Raj Singh and Another, reported in AIR 1996SC2812. 10. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and also after close scrutiny of the materials available on record alongwith the impugned Judgment, it appears that admittedly the appeal was preferred on 24.6.93 against the Judgment dated 20.3.93 and decree dated 17.5.93. Under Order 20, Rule 7 C.P.C. it is provided that the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced; meaning thereby, the date of judgment and decree must be the same. Under Order 20, Rule 7 C.P.C. it is provided that the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced; meaning thereby, the date of judgment and decree must be the same. In other words, the decree though signed later on, the date thereon shall carry the date of passing the judgment. This provision may be read with the provision of Order 20, Rule 6A C.P.C. as stood prior to amendment of the same by Amendment Act 46/99 dated 30.12.99 which reads as under: - "6A. Last paragraph of judgment to indicate in precise terms the reliefs granted :- (1) The last paragraph of the judgment shall state in precise terms the relief which has been granted by such judgment. (2) Every endeavour shall be made to ensure that the decree is drawn up as expeditiously as possible, and, in any case, within fifteen days from the date on which the judgment is pronounced; but where the decree is not drawn up within the time aforesaid, the Court shall, if requested so to do by a party desirous of appealing against the decree, certify that the decree has not been drawn up and indicate in the certificate the reasons for the delay, and thereupon - (a) an appeal may be preferred against the decree without filing a copy of the decree and in such a case the last paragraph of the judgment shall, for the purpose of Rule 1 of Order XLI, be treated as the decree; and (b) so long as the decree is not drawn up, the last paragraph of the Judgment shall be deemed to be the decree for the purpose of execution and the party interested shall be entitled to apply for . a copy of that paragraph only without being required to apply for a copy of the whole of the judgment; but as soon as the decree is drawn up, the last paragraph of the judgment shall cease to have effect of decree for the purpose of execution or for any other purpose: Provided that, where an application is made for obtaining a copy of only the last paragraph of the judgment, such copy shall indicate the name and address of all the parties to that suit." 11. A bare perusal of the above provisions goes to show that if the decree is not prepared within time frame as mentioned therein, the party intending to prefer an appeal against the decree shall make a request to the Court to certify that since the decree has not been drawn within the reasonable time, the last paragraph of the judgment shall be deemed to be the decree for the fulfillment of the requirement of Order 41, Rule 1 C.P.C. which provides, as stood prior to the amendment mentioned above, that the memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from. In the instant case, there is no record to show that the respondents made any endeavour to make a request to the Court in terms of Rule 6A of order 20 C.P.C. Nor was there any application requesting for issuing any certificate from the Court to the effect that the last paragraph of the Judgment should be deemed to be the decree in order to enable them to file the Memo of Appeal without copy of the decree. Since the date of decree has to be treated as a date of judgment, in the case in hand, it can be safely stated that the limitation for filing the appeal run from the date of judgment i.e. 20.3.93 and as such the appeal preferred against the said judgment, was, no doubt, barred by limitation. Since there was no application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, at this stage, this Court cannot approve the submissions of Mr. Deka, learned Sr. counsel for remanding the case to the appellate Court for reconsideration on the point of limitation inasmuch as by such remand, the respondent shall, in my opinion, not been able to improve their case on the point of limitation. 12. In so far as the finding arrived at in paragraph 8 of the impugned judgment, this Court is of the view that the learned Addl. District Judge committed an error of jurisdiction in not entertaining the question of limitation so raised before him. 12. In so far as the finding arrived at in paragraph 8 of the impugned judgment, this Court is of the view that the learned Addl. District Judge committed an error of jurisdiction in not entertaining the question of limitation so raised before him. It is settled law that question of limitation is also a question of jurisdiction and the same has to be decided by the concerned Court, once it is raised and the same cannot be ignored on the plea that the issue of limitation was not kept open when the appeal was admitted 13. In view of what has been discussed, observed and indicated above, this Court is of the view that the first appeal filed before the learned Addl. Judge, appeared to be barred by limitation and consequently the impugned judgment rendered on a time barred appeal, has no leg to stand and the same stands set aside and quashed. 14. In the result, appeal succeeds and stands allowed. No costs.