Judgment : The defendants in O.S.No.1172 of 1987 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Nalgonda, are the appellants in this second appeal. The suit filed against them by the plaintiffs was dismissed on 12-04-1994. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent-plaintiffs filed A.S.No.29 of 1994 in the Court of I Additional District Judge, Nalgonda. The appeal was allowed through judgment dated 06-09-2002. Hence, the second appeal by the defendants-appellants. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as arrayed in the suit. The facts leading to the filing of the second appeal may briefly be narrated as under: Plaintiffs filed the suit against the defendant for the relief of perpetual injunction in respect of Ac.13.22 gts. of land in Sy.No.388 and D.No.701 of Melladuppalapally Village, Nalgonda Mandal and District. The plaintiff did not plead in detail about their title, but have asserted their possession. They relied upon the entries in various revenue records in support of their plea of possession. The defendants did not seriously dispute the right of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property, except for an extent of Ac.1.25 gts. of land. They pleaded that they are in possession of Ac.1.25 gts of land having acquired the same from one Vallepu Mallaiah for a consideration of Rs.12,000/-. They also stated that they have constructed a cattle shed, house, and are in continuous possession over the same. Necessary issues were framed on the basis of the pleadings. Plaintiffs examined PW1 to 4, and marked documents Exs.A.1 to A-8, in support of their case. On behalf of the defendants DWs 1 to 3 were marked and Exs.B-1 to B-12 were marked. On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence before it, the trial Court decreed the suit, as prayed for, in respect of Ac.9.13 gts. of land, and dismissed the suit as regards the rest of the land, including an extent of Ac.1.25 gts. in respect of which the defendants pleaded their possession. Plaintiffs filed A.S.No.25 of 1992 before the Court of District Judge, Nalgonda, aggrieved by the denial of relief for rest of the land. When the appeal was pending, the defendants filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C., seeking permission to adduce additional evidence. The appellate Court allowed the application. in respect of which the defendants pleaded their possession. Plaintiffs filed A.S.No.25 of 1992 before the Court of District Judge, Nalgonda, aggrieved by the denial of relief for rest of the land. When the appeal was pending, the defendants filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C., seeking permission to adduce additional evidence. The appellate Court allowed the application. Since the matter needed recording of further evidence, the appellate Court had set aside the judgment and decree dated 17-12-1993 and remanded the matter for fresh disposal. After remand, DWs 4 and 5 were examined and Exs.B-13 to B-20 were marked on behalf of the defendants. The report of the Commissioner being Ex.C-1 was also marked. The trial Court re-heard the matter extensively. The controversy between the parties was confined only to the land to an extent of Ac.1.25 gts. out of Ac.13.22 gts. It took the view that the plaintiffs failed to establish their claim over this extent of land and thereby dismissed the suit through its judgment dated 12-4-1994. The plaintiffs preferred A.S.No.29 of 1994 before the I Additional District Judge, Nalgonda. During the pendency of this appeal, they filed I.A.No.692 of 1998, under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 C.P.C., to amend the plaint so as to include the prayer for recovery of possession. The appellate Court rejected the I.A. though its order dated 31-08-1998. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiffs filed C.R.P.No.4819 of 1998 before this Court. The C.R.P. and thereby the I.A., were allowed through orders dated 18-09-2001. It was observed that the defendants are at liberty to raise objections consequent on the amendment, and that appropriate issues including the question of limitation, be framed, if raised by the defendants. Neither any further pleadings were taken on file, nor any issues were framed; much less any further evidence was recorded. The appellate Court allowed the appeal by taking the view that though the plaintiffs did not hold the title in respect of Ac.1.25 gts of land as on the date of filing of the suit, they acquired title on the basis on Ex.A-1, which was executed subsequently, and in view of the recitals therein, their possession over that property can be said to have been established. Sri Y. Raji Reddy, learned counsel for the defendants submits that once the plaintiffs have prayed for the relief of recovery of possession, they have admitted that they are not in possession of the property and the appellate Court was in error in decreeing the suit. He submits that the appellate Court did not follow the directions of this Court in the matter of framing of issues, recording of evidence etc., consequent on the amendment. It is also his case that the plaint was amended only insofar as it related to the prayer, and no foundation as such was laid for the relief of recovery of possession, much less any evidence was adduced in that regard. Sri M. Raja Malla Reddy, learned counsel for the plaintiffs submits that the amendment to the plaint had the effect of incorporating alternative pleas, namely, a prayer of a decree for permanent injunction, or in the alternative, for a decree for recovery of possession. He submits that such a course of action is permissible in law. The learned counsel contends that, if the material on record is sufficient for the Court to grant the relief, specific prayer need not be insisted upon. According to him, though the plaint was amended by incorporating the prayer for recovery of possession, the appellate Court found that the plaintiffs have made out a case for permanent injunction, and that no exception can be taken to it. He relied upon the judgments of various Courts in support of each and every plea raised by him. The facts, which were referred to above, need not be repeated. Suffice it to say that the controversy between the parties to the suit is restricted to an extent of Ac.1.25 gts. of land, though the suit was filed in respect of land to an extent of Ac.13.22 gts. After the remand by the lower appellate Court, the trial Court in the second round before it, had dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal for the second time. It is during the pendency of this appeal, that they filed an application to amend the plaint to include the prayer of recovery of possession. The wording however, was not so clear about that. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal for the second time. It is during the pendency of this appeal, that they filed an application to amend the plaint to include the prayer of recovery of possession. The wording however, was not so clear about that. After the original prayer for permanent injunction, in the relief portion of the plaint, the following paragraph was sought to be inserted: "Alternative relief: if relief of injunction is not granted, the decree and judgment may be passed directing the defendants to put the plaintiff in possession of Ac.1.25 gts purchased under Ex.A-1, which is the part of the suit land." The only factual basis, which was sought to be provided in the body of the plaint, was by incorporation of the following paragraph in para 4: "If the Hon'ble Court comes to conclusion that the plaintiffs are not in possession of Ac.1.25 gts land purchased under Ex.A-1, the relief of recovery of possession may be granted." The learned counsel for the defendants strongly urges that the plaintiffs in a suit cannot be permitted to seek the relief of permanent injunction and recovery of possession simultaneously, or even in the alternative. He submits that the causes of action for these two kinds of relief, are different and the factual matrix for pleading one relief cannot inure for the benefit of the other relief. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs, on the other hand, submits that it is permissible to take alternative pleas and no exception can be taken for the type of relief claimed by the plaintiffs. Strictly speaking, the discussion on this aspect becomes superfluous, for the reason that though the plaintiffs sought to amend the plaint, as indicated above, this Court ultimately permitted the amendment as one for substitution and not for alternative prayers. In its order in C.R.P.No.4819 of 1998, this Court treated the application as under: "The plaintiff have filed the appeal and pending the appeal the present application is filed for amendment of the plaint, "converting the suit" the one from injunction to one for recovery of possession, as the said land was purchased by the plaintiffs under a registered sale deed." It was this amendment that was allowed. Consequently, the prayer for permanent injunction stands wiped off from the plaint. Consequently, the prayer for permanent injunction stands wiped off from the plaint. Since extensive arguments were made by the learned counsel for the parties, as regards the permissibility of alternative pleas, they need to be referred to. Law concedes the right to the parties in a suit, to take alternative or inconsistent pleas. The general examples, which are chosen to demonstrate this aspect, are plea of a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale. It is competent for a plaintiff to pray for a decree for execution of sale deed, or in the alternative, for refund of the advance paid in the transaction. In case of written statements, the contentions of a defendant in a money suit are apt illustrations. The defendant is entitled to deny the execution of a promissory note, or the signature thereon, or the absence of consideration there for. Though there appear certain logical inconsistencies in such variable pleadings, the effort behind in each of such plea is to prove the cause of action, if it is in a plaint, and absence thereof, in a written statement. It however, needs to be observed that an inconsistent plea by a plaintiff, which does not support the cause of action or does not arise out of it, would render the adjudication of the subject matter, almost impossible. For instance, the cause of action in a suit for permanent injunction presupposes the possession of the suit schedule property remaining with the plaintiff, whereas, the one, in a suit for possession flows from the factum of the plaintiff having been dispossessed. If both the pleas are taken in the same plaint, the trial Court would find it difficult even to locate or identify the starting point, for the trial of the suit. Further, such a state of affairs would demonstrate the absence of clarity and precision on the part of the plaintiff, which is an important requirement under Orders II, VII and VIII C.P.C. Various precedents relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs relate to the proceedings where such inconsistencies do not exist. In Firm Srinivas Ram v. Mahabir Prasad (AIR (38) 1951 Supreme Court 177), the Supreme Court was dealing with a suit for specific performance. In Firm Srinivas Ram v. Mahabir Prasad (AIR (38) 1951 Supreme Court 177), the Supreme Court was dealing with a suit for specific performance. Though the alternative relief of refund of the advance amount was not prayed for, the trial Court granted such a relief, on finding that there did not exist any agreement of sale. The Supreme Court observed as under: "A plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively, and there is nothing in the C.P.C. to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief there under in the alternative." In fact, sections 21 and 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and their corresponding provisions of 1908 Act, make this aspect amply clear. The fact however, remains that the inconsistency in the pleadings, particularly in a plaint, cannot be up to such a decree as to exclude one of them. As observed earlier, the trial Court recorded a specific finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove their possession over the suit property. The suit was not amended by the time it was disposed of by the trial Court. The amendment took place when the matter was pending in appeal. The nature of the suit changed substantially from the one for permanent injunction to that of recovery of possession. The record does not disclose whether the defendants were permitted to file any additional written statement. Even if their plea in the written statement that the plaintiffs were never in possession of the suit property can be taken as a defense, even to the amended plaint, the appellate Court was under obligation to frame an issue in this regard. The date and manner of dispossession, the entitlement of the plaintiffs to recover, from the point of view of establishment of title, and absence of any facts leading to adverse possession, etc., were required to be dealt with by framing necessary issues. The evidence, which was adduced by the parties in the context of the relief of permanent injunction, cannot be treated as adequate for the relief of recovery of possession. It is rather curious that without undertaking any of these exercises, the lower appellate Court proceeded to decree the suit for permanent injunction. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs submits that it is competent for a Court to grant a relief, which was not prayed for, if sufficient material exists before the Court. It is rather curious that without undertaking any of these exercises, the lower appellate Court proceeded to decree the suit for permanent injunction. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs submits that it is competent for a Court to grant a relief, which was not prayed for, if sufficient material exists before the Court. He relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Firm Srinivas Ram v. Mahabir Prasad (1 supra). In that case, the plaintiff did not make any specific prayer for refund of the amount paid by it, in the event of denial of decree for specific performance. During the trial of the matter, the defendant therein admitted the factum of receiving a sum of Rs.30,000/- from the plaintiff. It was in that context, the Supreme Court has observed as under: "The question, however arises whether, in the absence of any such alternative case in the plaint it is open to the Court to give him relief on that basis. The rule undoubtedly is that the Court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings. In such circumstances, when no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff to a separate suit." Such an admission did not exist in the present case. Therefore, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court is of no help to the plaintiffs. In such circumstances, when no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff to a separate suit." Such an admission did not exist in the present case. Therefore, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court is of no help to the plaintiffs. Though the learned counsel for the plaintiffs has relied on several other judgments touching on the scope of amendment of pleadings and other related issues, this Court does not find it necessary to refer them, in detail, for the reason that the amendment of the pleadings has already assumed finality in this matter. This Court finds that the decree passed by the appellate Court in A.S.No.29 of 1994 cannot be sustained either on facts or in law. Consequent on the amendment of the plaint, the defendants were entitled to be given an opportunity to file a written statement; necessary issues were to have been framed and the parties were entitled to be given an opportunity to lead evidence in support of their contentions. For all practical purposes, the suit has to be adjudicated afresh. Though the object of amending the plaint was to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, it worked exactly in the opposite direction the present case, at least, in effect. The suit, which is filed in the year 1987, has to be retried and heard after almost 15 years. Hence, the second appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree in A.S.No.29 of 1994 are set aside. The matter is remanded to the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Nalgonda, for fresh and adjudication on the following lines: a) The suit shall be treated as the one for recovery of possession of an extent of Ac.1.25 gts. covered by Ex.A-1 and not the one for permanent injunction. The defendants shall not have any right as regards the remaining land. b) After receipt of record, the trial Court shall give two weeks time from the date of service of notice on the defendants to file additional written statement, if any. c) Depending on the steps that may be taken by the parties, additional issues, if any, shall be framed. d) The parties shall be given an opportunity to lead evidence, if they so wish, and e) The suit itself shall be disposed of within a period of four months from the date of first hearing. No costs.