JANARDAN SAHAI, J. Govind Bhawan Karyalaya, the applicant in this revision filed a suit against the respondent Chhedi Lal Dinesh Kumar for eviction and for the recovery of arrears of rent and damages after determining their tenancy by a notice dated 7/11-10-1999. The plaintiff is a society registered under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961. Its case is that Gita Press is its unit and the defendant/respondent was a tenant of two shops in Gita Press Bhawan. The plaintiff claimed exemption from the U. P. Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 under Section 2 (1) (bb) thereof on the ground that it is a public charitable institution. The Judge Small Causes, Gorakhpur dismissed the suit on 30-5-2003 giving rise to this revision. 2. The Judge Small Causes held that in order to claim exemption under Clause (bb) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 it was necessary for the plaintiff to get an exemption from the State Government under Rule 3 of the Rules framed under the Act, which the plaintiff did not obtain. The Court then proceeded to consider whether the plaintiff could get exemption under Section 2 (1) (f) of Act No. 13 of 1972. On facts it was found that the plaintiff is not entitled to any exemption under that provision either. It was held that the plaintiff is a private charitable institution. There is also a finding that the rent was being paid to Gita Press and that Gita Press was, therefore, rather the landlord and not the plaintiff. 3. Section 2 (1) (bb) exempts from the operation of the Act "any building belonging to or vested in a public charitable or public religious institution". This provision was introduced by Act No. 5 of 1995. Before its introduction exemption to a building owned by a public charitable or public religious institution was available if a notification was made by the State Government under Section 2 (3) of the Act. Section 2 (3) was deleted from the Statute Book. This provision was introduced by Act No. 5 of 1995. Before its introduction exemption to a building owned by a public charitable or public religious institution was available if a notification was made by the State Government under Section 2 (3) of the Act. Section 2 (3) was deleted from the Statute Book. Before its omission it read as under : " (3) The State Government, if it is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of general public, may by notification in the Gazette, exempt from all or any of the provisions of this Act any building which is owned by a public charitable or public religious institution and the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for the purposes of that institution and may in the like manner cancel or amend such notification. " Rule 3 lays down the manner in which exemption of a building under Section 2 (3) is to be granted. The institution seeking exemption has to make an application to the State Government stating the ground on which the exemption is sought and in particular the interest of the general public that is likely to be served by the exemption. This statement was required so that the State Government could form the satisfaction required under Section 2 (3) of the Act as it then stood that it would be "in the interest of the general public". In contrast Section 2 (1) (bb) no longer requires any notification by the State Government granting exemption nor does it impose a pre-condition of a satisfaction that the interest of the general public must be served by the exemption. Rule 3 was meant to provide the manner in which the exemption under Section 2 (3) was to be granted by the State Government. Under the provisions as they now stand it is no longer necessary that the exemption must be granted in the interest of the general public or for the institution to establish that the whole of its income is utilised for the purposes of the institution. The effect of omitting sub-section 3, is that no such notification of the State Government is required. It would, therefore, be for the Court to determine in the suit itself whether the institution is entitled to the exemption under Section 2 (1) (bb ). The effect of omitting sub-section 3, is that no such notification of the State Government is required. It would, therefore, be for the Court to determine in the suit itself whether the institution is entitled to the exemption under Section 2 (1) (bb ). In this scheme of things Rule 3 has become redundant. I am supported in the view that I take by the decision reported in 1999 (2) Allahabad Rent Cases 483, Nand Kishore Goswami and another v. State of U. P. and others. 4. Sri Ramendra Asthahna, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that Rule 3 (1) has been amended by the U. P. Urban Building Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction 4th Amendment Rules, 2002 and, therefore, it cannot be treated as redundant. The amendment referred to is an amendment in the Hindi version of Rule 3 (1) by which the words "meeje&peefveke efnle" were substituted by the words "meeoeejce pevelee kee efnle". This amendment is only in the Hindi version of Rule 3 (1) and it appears to have been made to bring it in accord with the English version, which contains the expression "interest of the general public". However, as I have already said Section 2 (3) has been omitted from the Statute Book and there is no longer any requirement to establish for the grant of exemption that it is in the interest of the general public. A rule is subordinate to the Act and it is clear from the reasons already given above that Rule 3 serves no purpose now. The amendment to Rule 3 (1) by the State Government, therefore, does not change the position and is otiose. 5. Sri Murlidhar who appeared for the applicant submitted that he was not claiming exemption under Section 2 (1) (f) of the Act but was claiming it only under Section 2 (1) (bb ). I shall, therefore, consider this case in the light of this provision alone. Before examining this question on merits I shall consider the contention of Sri Ramendra Asthana, learned counsel for the respondents that no exemption under Section 2 (1) (bb) can be granted by the Judge Small Causes in a suit for eviction of the tenant like the present one but can only be granted by the regular Civil Court. Before examining this question on merits I shall consider the contention of Sri Ramendra Asthana, learned counsel for the respondents that no exemption under Section 2 (1) (bb) can be granted by the Judge Small Causes in a suit for eviction of the tenant like the present one but can only be granted by the regular Civil Court. Section 20 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 permits a suit for eviction being filed on grounds specified therein only. Unless the landlord brings his suit under one of the grounds provided under that Section the suit would not be maintainable. However, if a building is exempt from the applicability of the Act itself under Section 2 (1) (bb) or under any of the other clauses of exemption it would not be necessary for the landlord to establish any of the grounds mentioned in Section 20. He can then institute a suit after determining the tenancy by a simpliciter notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. By virtue of Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act read with Article 4 of the II Schedule of that Act a suit for eviction of a tenant from a building after determination of the lease is maintainable in the Small Causes Court. All questions arising between the parties in such a suit would, therefore, have to be determined by the Judge Small Causes. Where an exemption is claimed by the plaintiff the Court would have to decide that question because upon it would depend whether the plaintiff would have to prove the existence of the grounds under Section 20 or not. When the Legislature has created a forum for deciding a particular class of suits it would be presumed to have conferred it with the jurisdiction to decide all questions that arise therein and there is no plausible reason why the question of exemption under Clause (bb) of Section 2 (i) in the same way as an exemption, under any other clause of that sub-section cannot be decided by the Judge Small Causes Court. 6. We now come to the question whether the plaintiff is a public charitable institution. Charitable institution has been defined in Section 3 (r) as follows : " (r) "charitable institution" means any establishment undertaking organisation or association formed for a charitable purpose and includes a specific endowment; Explanation. 6. We now come to the question whether the plaintiff is a public charitable institution. Charitable institution has been defined in Section 3 (r) as follows : " (r) "charitable institution" means any establishment undertaking organisation or association formed for a charitable purpose and includes a specific endowment; Explanation. For the purposes of this clause, the words "charitable purposes" includes relief of poverty, education, medical relief and advancement of any other object of utility or welfare to the general public or any section thereof, not being an object of an exclusively religious nature. (s) "religions institution" means a temple, math; mosque, church, gurudwara or any other place of public worship and includes a waqf not being a waqf-alal-aulad. " 7. The plaintiff is a society registered under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961. The preamble of the Act indicates the nature of the societies that can be registered thereunder. These are such societies as literary, cultural, scientific, political charitable, and religious -all of them being noble purposes. The question in this case is whether the plaintiff is a public charitable institution. I have already referred to the definition of that term under the Act. The requirement of Section 3 (r) is that the institution must be formed for a charitable purpose. It is necessary, therefore, to refer to the memorandum of association of the society to determine whether the objects for which the society was formed are purposes covered in the explanation to Section 3 (r ). It appears that the society was originally registered under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860. Some of the objects of the society disclosed in its Memorandum of Association dated 26-3-1928 are : "2 (b) to help the distressed and the poor; (c) to promote and spread the principles of Hindu religion among the general public, (d) to impart Hindu religious education, (e) to spread the use of pure articles for the protection of Hindu religion, (f) to provide raiments, shelter and education to the needy, if necessary. (g) to publish newspaper, pamphlets, books, articles, leaflets, booklets etc. and to organise public lectures, debates etc. to further and carry into effect the objects of the Society and to educate public opinion in favour of the same. " 8. (g) to publish newspaper, pamphlets, books, articles, leaflets, booklets etc. and to organise public lectures, debates etc. to further and carry into effect the objects of the Society and to educate public opinion in favour of the same. " 8. The object of helping the distressed and the poor and of providing raiments, shelter and education to the needy are clearly charitable purposes within the meaning of the explanation. The publication of newspapers books etc. to organise lectures and debates to educate public opinion is the activity by which the objects are to be achieved. This is clear from the expression "to further and carry into effect the objects of the society and to educate public opinion" used in this clause. Education which is one of the objects of the society is not to be confined to class room lectures. Education can be provided by books lectures, debates etc. An educational institution may be classed as charitable if the purpose of imparting education is the predominant purpose and not the purpose of profit making. In R. C. Raja Ratnam Institution v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others, A. I. R. 1990 SC 816, while interpreting the provisions of Section 115 (4) (a) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 it was held by the Apex Court that the test of charitable purpose is satisfied by the proof of the three conditions, namely, relief of the poor, education, or medical relief. The fact that some fees is charged from the students is also not decisive. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Children Book Trust, A. I. R. 1992 SC 1456, the Court considered the question whether education per se is a charitable purpose. Paragraph 64 of the judgment of the Supreme Court is quoted below : " (64) In this background, we will consider whether education per se is a charitable purpose and its application to the appellant-society. The case relied on strongly is Pemsel, 1891 (3) Tax Case 53 (supra ). The dictum of Lord Macnaghten at page 96 is as follows : " "charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty, trusts for the advancement of education, trusts for the advancement of religion and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding heads. The dictum of Lord Macnaghten at page 96 is as follows : " "charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty, trusts for the advancement of education, trusts for the advancement of religion and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding heads. The trusts last referred to are not the less charitable in the eye of the law because incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed every charity that deserves the name must do, either directly or indirectly. " 9. It was held that an element of public benefit or philanthropy has however to be present. Many of the objects of the society referred to above are for the public benefit and are philanthropic. About some of the objects there can be some doubt about their is being charitable such as to impart Hindu Religious education and to promote and spread the principles of Hindu Religion amongst the general public. The definition of charitable purpose includes education within its scope. Religious education is also education and therefore, if the activity is not carried on for a profit motive it can be said to be regarded as charitable. Indeed in Hindu law there is not much distinction between religious and charitable objects. The following passage from page 14 of B. K. Mukerjees The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust 1952 Ed. is being quoted : "in the Hindu systems there is no line of demarcation between religion and charity. On the other hand charity is regarded as part of religion. The Hindu religion recognises the existence of a life after death, and it believes in the law of Karma according to which the good or bad deeds of a man produce corresponding results in the lift to come. All the Hindu sages concur in holding that charitable gifts are pious acts par excellence, which bring appropriate rewards to the donor, and the seer in the Regveda says in clear accents that "he who gives alms goes to the highest place in heaven" (x ). According to the Smriti writers charity is the supreme virtue in this (Kali) age. All the Hindu sages concur in holding that charitable gifts are pious acts par excellence, which bring appropriate rewards to the donor, and the seer in the Regveda says in clear accents that "he who gives alms goes to the highest place in heaven" (x ). According to the Smriti writers charity is the supreme virtue in this (Kali) age. Thus Manu says "in the Creta the prevailing virtue is declared to be in devotion, in Treta divine knowledge, in the Dwapara holy sages call sacrifice the duty chiefly performed; in the Kali liberality alone" (v ). The same verse occurs in Parasra (z ). It may be mentioned here that charity is not only regarded by Brahminical writers as a means of securing happiness in after life, it is also one of the forms of explation prescribed for those who have committed sinful acts. "by forgiveness of injuries" says Manu "the learned are purified; by liberality those who have neglected their duties " (a ). As we have already seen, the expression Purtta is not confined to secular charities alone, but includes various acts (e. g. erecting a temple), which are regarded as meritorious only from the religious point of view. The sole distinction between Istha and Purtta lies in the fact that the former relates to Vedic sacrifices while the latter do not. As the Vedic sacrifices fell into disuse and became confined to comparatively few persons, the Purtta works became more popular, particularly as they were open to the Sudras as well. This is why inter Smriti writers extol the merits of Purtta works and regard them as the means of securing salvation (b ). Even as regards Vedic sacrifices it may be pointed out, as has been observed in the Chandogya Upanishad, that "the offerings to the God are really offerings for the benefit of all human beings" (c ). The position, therefore, is that in the Hindu system, religion and charity overlap each other and do not admit of any differentiation. They are both integral parts of `dharma or the rule of righteousness which the Hindu sages regard as the upholder of the entire fabric of the universe, both in its physical and moral aspects. " The conditions of Indian life and Indian beliefs about the concept of charity cannot be ignored. In a deeply religious society expenditure for promoting religion is regarded as charitable. " The conditions of Indian life and Indian beliefs about the concept of charity cannot be ignored. In a deeply religious society expenditure for promoting religion is regarded as charitable. A gift to a temple or a math is regarded by a common Hindu as charitable. It was held by the Privy Council in A. I. R. 1944 PC 88, Spinners Association v. C. I. T. , as follows : "lord Macnaghtens definitions of charity and English decisions on the law of charities have no binding authority on its construction and though they sometimes afford help or guidance, cannot relieve the Indian Courts from their responsibility of applying the language of the Act to the particular circumstances that emerge under conditions of Indian life ". 10. An activity the object of which is religious may also be charitable and I am of the view that imparting religious education even for promoting principles of Hindu Religion is a charitable object. The exclusion in the explanation to Section 3 (r) of a purely religious object from the definition of charitable purpose refers to other objects of welfare and utility not specified and is not meant to exclude the institution, which has such religious education object to promote, from exemption. The Act is not opposed to religion and indeed public religious institutions are also exempt. 11. But it would not be correct to say that if the activity permits any kind of profit making it would cease to be charitable. If profit making is not the main object and the profits are not diverted to benefit private persons but are ploughed back to promote the objects of the institution it would still be regarded as a charitable purpose if the predominant objects are charitable. 12. In the Trustees of the Tribune v. Commissioner of Income Tax, A. I. R. 1939 PC 208, it was observed "in the High Court stress was laid by the learned Chief Justice and by Addison, J. , on the fact that the tribune newspaper charges its readers and advertisers at ordinary commercial rates for the advantages which it affords. As against this the evidence or findings do not disclose that any profit was made by the newspaper or press before 1918 and it is at least certain that neither was founded for private profit whether to the testator nor any other person. As against this the evidence or findings do not disclose that any profit was made by the newspaper or press before 1918 and it is at least certain that neither was founded for private profit whether to the testator nor any other person. By the terms of the trust it is not to be carried on for profit to any individual. It cannot in their Lordships opinion be regarded as an element necessarily present in any purpose of general public utility, that it would provide something for nothing or for less than it costs or for less than the ordinary price. An eleemosynary element is not essential even in the strict English view of charitable uses Commissioners v. University College of North Wales, 1909 (5) Tax Case 408. 13. In Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay City, AIR 1955 Bombay 250, a decision of which the following passage was cited by the Apex Court in the Children Book Trust case it was observed : "a settlor or a donor may make a charity by setting up an institution and also providing funds by which those who take advantage of the institution can do so without paying any charge, or we may have a case where the charity may not go to those limits and one may confine his charity to merely setting up the institution and provided that those who wish to take advantage of the institution must pay reasonable charges for the same. In both cases the setting up of the institution would be a charitable object if the institution serves a purpose of general public utility. The only essential factor to determine whether it is a charity or not would be whether there is any private gain by the setting up of the institution. If the gain derived by running the institution continues to be impressed with the trust which is a charitable trust, then it is immaterial whether the institution is run as a commercial institution or not, but if in the running of the institution profits are made and the profit goes to any private individual or if the institution is intended for any private gain, then undoubtedly the running of the institution could not be considered as being run for a charitable object. " 14. " 14. No doubt there are certain objects in the memorandum, which cannot be regarded as charitable such as: to borrow moneys that may be required, with or without interest; to purchase, take on lease, or in exchange or hire or otherwise acquire any moveable or immovable property or any rights or privileges in such property, to construct, alter or keep in repair from time to time buildings or other immovable property belonging to the society, to invest moneys of the society not immediately required for its purposes in such securities as may be from time to time determined upon; to sell, improve manage, develop, lease, mortgage, dispose or otherwise deal with all or any part of the property of the society. These objects are not charitable. 15. We are, therefore, faced with a situation where some of the objects of the society are charitable and others not. In such a case it is the predominant object that has to be seen. It was held in the Children Book Trust case that where the predominant object is to subserve charitable purpose and not to earn profit it would be a charitable purpose. It has, therefore, to be determined as to whether the predominant object of the society is to promote the charitable objects or to earn profit. Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Association dated 26-3-1928 provides that the income and property of the society whencesoever derived shall be applied solely towards the promotion of this society as set forth in the memorandum of Association and no portion thereof shall be paid or transferred directly or indirectly by way of dividend or bonus or otherwise howsoever by way of profit to the persons who at anytime are or have been members of the society. It is clear from this paragraph that even if any profit is made it will be ploughed back to promote the object of the society and will not be appropriated by the members. It is clear from this paragraph that even if any profit is made it will be ploughed back to promote the object of the society and will not be appropriated by the members. Even in the event of a dissolution of the society contemplated in paragraph 13 of the Rules and Regulations of Govind Bhawan Karyalaya, Board of Trustees dated 28th March, 1928 if after the satisfaction of all its liabilities, any property, whatsoever remains the same shall not be paid to or disbursed amongst the members of the society aforesaid or any of them but shall be applied to such objects as are mentioned in the Memorandum of Association of the Society as may be determined by the Board of Trustees. Paragraph 39 of the revised Rules and Regulations of Govind Bhawan Karyalaya Board of Trustees dated 21-9-1951 contains a similar provision. It appears from these provisions that the predominant object of the society is charitable. Such of its objects as are not charitable are not the predominant objects of the society. The objects such as investment of money not immediately needed by the society and the right to lease out or sell property do not appear to be the predominant objects. 16. It may now be examined as to whether in fact the society has been carrying on its activities for profit making. In the balance sheet for the year ending 31st March, 1997 the amount spent on various charitable activities has been shown as 13,02,841. 85 and the total income over expenditure is shown as 2,05,494. 42. In the balance sheet for the year ending 31st March, 1998 the amount spent on charitable activities is disclosed as 13,41,027. 14 and the income over expenditure is shown as 1,75,768. 01. The balance sheet for the year ending 31st March, 1999 indicates that a sum of Rs. 24, 81,366. 09 was spent on charitable activities and expenditure was in excess over income by Rs. 2,56,039. 18 In the balance sheet for the ending year 31st March, 2000, the amount shown to have been spent towards charitable activities is 26,14,086. 42 and there is again an excess of expenditure over income by Rs. 1,61,102. 96. 24, 81,366. 09 was spent on charitable activities and expenditure was in excess over income by Rs. 2,56,039. 18 In the balance sheet for the ending year 31st March, 2000, the amount shown to have been spent towards charitable activities is 26,14,086. 42 and there is again an excess of expenditure over income by Rs. 1,61,102. 96. The balance sheet of Gita Press for the year ending 31st March, 1997 also indicates expenditure for charitable activities like Ganga Ji Ki Puja, free distribution of books, advance of Gita-Ramayan Satsang expenses, Pustak Mela expenses and advance of donation. The expenditure for this year is in excess over the income by Rs. 12,01,5,904. 56. For the year ending 31st March, 1998 the balance sheet of Gita Press shows expenditure on charitable activities like Gita, free distribution of book, advancement of Gita- Ramayan Satsanj expenditure, Pustak Mela expenses, advancement of donation and there is again an excess of expenditure over income by Rs. 1,32,79,262. 5. In the balance sheet of Gita Press for the ending year 31st March, 1999 the amount towards charitable expenses is disclosed as 2,69,517. 90 and there is again an excess of expenditure over income by Rs. 1,78,88,738. 57 transferred to Govind Bhawan Karyalaya Trust. The balance sheet for the ending year 31st March, 2000 Paper No. 24-ga also indicates that Rs. 6,40,963. 70 was spent as charitable expenses and this year again there is an excess of expenditure over income by 1,72,92,392. 03. The balance sheet indicates that the losses of Gita Press have been transferred to Govind Bhawan. The balance sheet of the other unit of the society i. e. Rishi Kul Brahmacharya Ashram for the year ending 31st March, 1997 has been filed. It also shows that the expenses exceed the income and the loss was transferred to Govind Bhawan Karyalaya Trust. Similar is the position in the balance sheet of Rishi Kul Brahmacharya Ashram for the year ending 31st March, 1998 and 31st March, 1999, which also shows that the expenses in this year exceeded the income. The balance sheets indicate that for certain years there was a profit and in certain others a loss. Similar is the position in the balance sheet of Rishi Kul Brahmacharya Ashram for the year ending 31st March, 1998 and 31st March, 1999, which also shows that the expenses in this year exceeded the income. The balance sheets indicate that for certain years there was a profit and in certain others a loss. It can be said on the basis of these figures that the society at least has not been making such a profits from which an inference may be drawn that it is really meant to be a profit making institution and the charitable purpose is merely its facade. 17. By way of oral evidence P. W. 1 Anil Kumar Srivastava who is Karmik Prabandhak, Gita Press was examined. He stated that Baij Nath Agarwal is a trustee and Manager of Gita Press Gorakhpur and there is a power of attorney executed in favour of Baij Nath Agarwal. He stated that Gita Press, Gorakhpur and Rishi Kul Brahmcharya Ashram are branches of the plaintiff society, which is a public charitable institution. He deposed that the institution publishes religious books made available to the general public at less than cost price and that it provides aid for victims of earthquake, floods, fire and other helpless and poor people and also supplies free medicines and life saving drugs to the common man. He deposed that the defendant had paid rent upto March 1998. He has proved the balance sheet. 18. The society has also been notified as being a religious and charitable institution under Section 10 (23) (v) of the Income Tax Act. The notification dated 21-7-1998 issued by the Ministry of Finance has been filed. In Lachman Deo v. District Judge, Nainital and others, 2000 U. P. R. C. C. 469, it was held that papers of exemption from octroi terminal, house tax, bonus, income and sales tax although are not conclusive and binding are relevant and admissible under Section 13 of the Evidence Act. 19. It was submitted by Sri Ramendra Asthana, learned counsel for the respondents that the memorandum of the society does not contemplate any procedure for raising any grievance by the public regarding the fact that the plaintiff is not distributing charity. It is also submitted that in the dissolution clause in the rules the public has no say. 19. It was submitted by Sri Ramendra Asthana, learned counsel for the respondents that the memorandum of the society does not contemplate any procedure for raising any grievance by the public regarding the fact that the plaintiff is not distributing charity. It is also submitted that in the dissolution clause in the rules the public has no say. The fact that the public has not been given any right of raising any grievance about non-distribution of charity is not decisive or sufficient to take out the institution 0 from the category of a charitable institution. If the objects of the society are for a charitable purpose and the element of profit making is not predominant the institution would be a charitable institution. Even the trial Court has held that the institution is a private charitable institution. The distinction between a public charity and a private one is to be drawn from the fact as to whether the benefit is being received by a few individuals or the benefit is available to the public or a section thereof. In Lachman Deo v. District Judge, Nainital and others (supra) a passage from Tudor on Charities was cited, which is being quoted below : "if the intention of the donor is merely to benefit specific individuals, the gift is not charitable, even though the motive of the gift may be to relieve their poverty or accomplish some other purpose with reference to those particular individuals which would be charitable if not so confined on the other hand, if the donors object is to accomplish the abstract purpose of relieving poverty, advancing education or religion or other purpose charitable within the meaning of the Statute of Elizabeth without giving to any particular individuals the right to claim the funds, the gift is charitable. " 20. I have already referred to that clause in the Memorandum which provides that the profit is not to be distributed amongst the members but is to be ploughed back for supporting the objects of the society. In view of what has been said above I am of the opinion that the society is a public charitable institution. 21. Sri Ramendra Asthana submitted that no exemption under Section 177 of the U. P. Mahapalika Adhiniyam has been obtained by the plaintiff, which shows that it is not a public charitable institution. In view of what has been said above I am of the opinion that the society is a public charitable institution. 21. Sri Ramendra Asthana submitted that no exemption under Section 177 of the U. P. Mahapalika Adhiniyam has been obtained by the plaintiff, which shows that it is not a public charitable institution. Section 177 of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam imposes a general tax on buildings and land in the city. One of the exceptions made under clause (b) thereof is in respect of buildings and lands solely occupied and used for public worship or for a charitable purpose. The exception is limited to buildings solely occupied for the purpose of public worship or for charitable purpose. The requirement of "sole occupation" qualifies both religious and charitable purposes. If a building is not solely occupied for charitable purpose the exemption would not be available. Then again the exemption applies to particular buildings and not to institutions whereas in this case we are concerned with exemption to an institution. The fact, therefore, that no exemption has been obtained under Section 177 is, therefore, not of much importance. 22. The evidence appears to be all one way in favour of the plaintiff. In the affidavit of Vimal Kumar which was treated as his examination-in-chief it has been stated that the plaintiff is carrying on commercial activity but that is not sufficient. In such circumstances it is not necessary to remand the case for assessing the evidence on the point whether the activity is being carried on for profit as the evidence appears to be one way vide Laxmi Kishore and another v. Har Prasad Shukla, 1981 Allahabad Rent Cases 545. In Chandra Mohan v. Sen Gotaiyan, (2000) 1 SCC 451 , it was held that where the findings recorded by the appellate Court are illegal, erroneous or perverse the High Court may reverse the finding in its revisional jurisdiction and record its own finding. In Chandra Mohan v. Sen Gotaiyan, (2000) 1 SCC 451 , it was held that where the findings recorded by the appellate Court are illegal, erroneous or perverse the High Court may reverse the finding in its revisional jurisdiction and record its own finding. Sri Remendra Asthana relied upon Shiv Charan Dass v. Ujagar Singh, 1999 (1) JCLR 138 (All) : 1998 (2) A. R. C. 14, in which it was held that the scope of a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act is quite limited and that the provision confers a superior and not an appellate power and the revisional Court has to satisfy itself that the trial Court decree or order is according to law and that a wrong decision on facts is also a decree according to law. This case has no application here. The judgment of the Judge Small Causes is not in accordance with law because it has taken the view that the procedure under Rule 3 of which reference has been made above not having been followed the plaintiff was not entitled to exemption under Section 2 (1) (bb ). In my opinion, therefore, the trial Court had gone on a completely wrong track. The evidence on the record referred to above establishes that the plaintiff is a public charitable institution. The rent from April 1998 was not paid. The building being exempt the deposit under Section 30 cannot be taken into account. 23. The trial Court has held that the plaintiff is not the landlord. It has been found that landlord means under Clause (j) of Section 3 the person to whom the rent is paid or payable and also the agent. The trial Court has held that Gita Press as an agent could also be the landlord and that the rent was being paid to Gita Press and, therefore, Gita Press is the landlord. Reliance was also placed upon the extract of Municipal Assessment. Rent receipts are on the record. Paper No. 80-Ga is the receipt dated 12-2-1988. It bears the heading Govind Bhawan Karyalaya dwara Gita Press. Similar is the heading in the rent receipts Paper No. 80-Ga-2 dated 29-6-1996, rent receipt Paper No. 80-Ga-3 dated 5-4-1976 rent receipts Paper No. 80-Ga-4 dated 13-1-1980 and rent receipt paper 80-Ga-5. In the rent receipt 80-Ga-6 dated 30-3-1972 the heading is Govind Bhawan Karyalaya. It bears the heading Govind Bhawan Karyalaya dwara Gita Press. Similar is the heading in the rent receipts Paper No. 80-Ga-2 dated 29-6-1996, rent receipt Paper No. 80-Ga-3 dated 5-4-1976 rent receipts Paper No. 80-Ga-4 dated 13-1-1980 and rent receipt paper 80-Ga-5. In the rent receipt 80-Ga-6 dated 30-3-1972 the heading is Govind Bhawan Karyalaya. The letter dated 10-4-1999 is a letter of the defendants addressed to Gita Press Jeemles (for) Govind Bhawan Karyalaya. The receipt and this letter indicates that Govind Bhawan Karyalaya was treated as the landlord. The finding recorded by the trial Court that it was the Gita Press, which is the landlord is not in accordance with law. The Judge Small Causes has relied upon the statement of P. W. 1 that there was a separate account for Gita Press and Govind Bhawan Karyalaya and that the rents were being paid by the tenants to Gita Press. P. W. 1 had stated that Gita Press is a branch of Govind Bhawan Karyalaya. The balance sheets filed show that the losses of Gita Press have been transferred to the account of Govind Bhawan Karyalaya. The rent receipts show distinctly that they are in the name of Govind Bhawan Karyalaya through Gita Press. The mere fact that in the assessment list the name of Gita Press is shown in the owner column and of the defendant as tenant would in the circumstances that Gita Press is a unit of Govind Bhawan Karyalaya not at all be sufficient in the face of the rent receipts and the letter of the defendant for a finding that Govind Bhawan is not the landlord. The finding of the Judge Small Causes on this point, therefore, is also reversed. 24. It was submitted by Sri Ramendra Asthana that Baijnath Agarwal was not competent to represent the plaintiff in the revision as he did not hold any power of attorney. A similar contention was raised in the suit. The Judge Small Causes relied upon the power of attorney filed in favour of Baijnath Agarwal and has given a finding that Baijnath Agarwal was authorised to verify the plaint. P. W. 1 has also deposed that there was a power of attorney in favour of Baijnath Agarwal. There is ample material on the record to prove that Baijnath Agarwal was competent to verify the plaint. P. W. 1 has also deposed that there was a power of attorney in favour of Baijnath Agarwal. There is ample material on the record to prove that Baijnath Agarwal was competent to verify the plaint. I agree with the finding recorded by the Judge Small Causes on this point. It is also submitted by Sri Ramendra Asthana that the power of attorney in favour of Baijnath Agarwal was executed by P. D. Goenka as Secretary of the plaintiff and P. D. Goenka has resigned on 15-12-2000 and V. P. Chandgothiya on 16-12-2000 executed a new power of attorney in favour of Anil Kumar Srivastava and therefore, Baijnath Agarwal was not authorised to file the revision. This submission too has no force. P. D. Goenka had executed the power of attorney on behalf of the society. The subsequent resignation of P. D. Goenka from the post of Secretaryship would not terminate the power of attorney, which was executed by him on behalf of the society. The execution of any new power of attorney in favour of Anil Kumar Srivastava by V. P. Chandgothiya would also not make invalid the power of attorney executed in favour of Baijnath Agarwal. 25. The question of damages may now be considered. The plaintiff had claimed damages at Rs. 20 per square foot. The matter would require assessment of evidence and calls for a remand of the case as a higher rate than the rate of rent is being claimed as damages. Ordinarily in the absence of any evidence about the rate of rent of similar property in the locality, damages ought to be awarded at the rate of rent. However, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the event of the other findings in his favour the case be not remanded to the trial Court merely for assessment of damages, but this Court may itself decide the question to avoid delay. I am, therefore, not remanding it. Applying the ordinary rule it is held that the damages in the present case shall be payable at the rate of rent. As the defendant was paying to the landlord Rs. 960/- per month inclusive of taxes this will be the amount payable as damages. This will however not be a precedent for any other case which may be decided on its own evidence. The revision is allowed. As the defendant was paying to the landlord Rs. 960/- per month inclusive of taxes this will be the amount payable as damages. This will however not be a precedent for any other case which may be decided on its own evidence. The revision is allowed. The suit for recovery of rent, eviction and damages is decreed. The defendant shall pay damages pendente lite and future at the rate of Rs. 960 per month inclusive of taxes until they hand over possession to the plaintiff. .