JUDGMENT : D. Murugesan, J.—The writ-petitioner is the management of Konganapuram Primary Agricultural Co-operative Bank. The second respondent herein was appointed to the post of clerk by order, dated July 24, 1992, and she joined the duty on the same day. She was fixed in the basic pay of Rs. 650 per month. In G.O. (2D) No. 68 Co-operation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, dated November 12, 1993, the pay- scale, D.A., H.R.A, etc., of the employees of the Primary Agricultural Banks in Tamil Nadu were refixed. The said benefit was extended with effect from July 1, 1992. The said benefits were restricted only to such of those employees who joined the service on or before July 1, 1992. 2. In terms of the said Government Order, a settlement, dated January 22, 1996, u/s 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act was entered into between the petitioner and the employees. In terms of the settlement, pay of the clerks were refixed at Rs. 865-2105. Though the petitioner was appointed on July 24, 1992 after the cut-off date, by mistake she was also extended the benefits of the settlement and her pay was fixed at Rs. 865-2105. The minimum benefit is Rs. 150 and the maximum is Rs. 550. By order, dated March 3, 1994, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies clarified that the minimum qualifying service of three years is necessary for the entitlement of the minimum benefit of Rs. 150. Hence, revision of pay-scale granted to the second respondent was directed to be withdrawn by order of the Deputy Registrar, dated October 9, 1996 with a further direction to recover the excess amount of Rs. 14,178 paid to the second respondent. Based upon the said order, the petitioner-Society in the Board's Resolution, dated November 30, 1996, directed the recovery. 3. Aggrieved by the recovery, the second respondent herein filed Claim Petition No. 51 of 1997 which was allowed by order, dated July 7, 1997. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner-Society has filed the present writ petition. 4. I have heard Sri Kamatchisundaram, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri N.G.R. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent. 5. There is no dispute that the second respondent was appointed on July 24, 1992. As per the order of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, dated March 3, 1994, even for entitlement to the minimum benefit of Rs. I have heard Sri Kamatchisundaram, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri N.G.R. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent. 5. There is no dispute that the second respondent was appointed on July 24, 1992. As per the order of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, dated March 3, 1994, even for entitlement to the minimum benefit of Rs. 150 the employee must have put in three years of service as on July 1, 1992, viz., the cut-off date fixed in G.O. (2D) 68 Co-operation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, dated November 12, 1993. 6. The benefit is extended only on the basis of the settlement, dated January 22, 1996, entered into between the petitioner and the employees u/s 12(3) of Industrial Disputes Act. Clause 10 of the said settlement enables the petitioner to recover the excess amount found to have been paid erroneously. As the second respondent was appointed only on July 24, 1992, much after the cut-off date, viz., July 1, 1992 and in view of the fact that the second respondent has not put in three years of service even to get the minimum benefit, the petitioner is entitled to reconsider the fixation and revise the pay-scale considering the entitlement of the second respondent to such revision. The facts of this case reveal that the pay of the second respondent was refixed erroneously though she was not entitled to the revision of pay. 7. As far as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner as to the maintainability of the claim petition, as the quantum of pay-scale is in dispute, I am unable to agree with the said submission as there is no dispute as to the pay-scale of the second respondent fixed by the petitioner. The only reason for withdrawal of the excess amount paid was that the pay-scale was refixed erroneously. There is no dispute as to the quantum. In this context, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in R.D. Rajendran v. K.T.M. Abdul Khader 2003 (2) L.L.N. 93, to contend that unless the pre-existing right established as to the quantum, the petition u/s 33-C(2) is not maintainable. There is no dispute as to the quantum. In this context, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in R.D. Rajendran v. K.T.M. Abdul Khader 2003 (2) L.L.N. 93, to contend that unless the pre-existing right established as to the quantum, the petition u/s 33-C(2) is not maintainable. Whether the Labour Court was justified in invoking Section 9-A of Industrial Disputes Act to sustain the finding as to unfair labour practice as the conditions of service was changed without following the said provision is a matter to be considered. From the reading of the claim statement it is seen that nowhere it is stated by the second respondent as to violation of Section 9-A of the Act. There is no such pleading and in the absence of such pleading, the petitioner had no opportunity to defend the case. Secondly, Exhibit A12 is a letter addressed by the second respondent herself agreeing to return the excess amount paid but requesting only time. Though this letter cannot be treated as estoppel, nevertheless it can be a material that could be relied upon to hold that the second respondent was aware of the terms and conditions of settlement and also her disentitlement to the revision of pay as she joined the service only on July 24, 1992 and the settlement was made applicable only to those employees who are appointed on or before July 1, 1992. Therefore, the finding of the Labour Court that change has been effected in conditions of service without notice u/s 9-A is unsustainable. On the facts of this case, I am of the view that there is no change effected in the conditions of service as recovery order was made only pursuant to the conditions of settlement. In this context, Section 9-A itself is not made applicable whenever a change is effected pursuant to the settlement. 8. The above finding leads to the next question as to whether the direction for recovery could be sustained on the facts of this case. As already held that the petitioner is empowered to pass orders of recovery placing reliance on the settlement, nevertheless whether the petitioner would be justified in recovering the amount which has been paid in excess which was not due to the fault of the second respondent. 9. As already held that the petitioner is empowered to pass orders of recovery placing reliance on the settlement, nevertheless whether the petitioner would be justified in recovering the amount which has been paid in excess which was not due to the fault of the second respondent. 9. Similar question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the judgment reported in Shyam Babu Verma and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1994) 2 SCC 521 . In that case the Apex Court has held since revision of pay-scale was made for no fault of the employees, it shall only be just and proper not to recover any excess amount already paid to the employees. The said view is reiterated by the Apex Court in the subsequent judgment reported in The State of Karnataka and Another Vs. Mangalore University Non-Teaching Employees Association and Others, AIR 2002 SC 1223 , Sri Kamatchisundaram, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, however submitted that these judgments arose under service and cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case which arise on challenge to the order in the claim-petition. I am unable to agree with the said submission as admittedly excess amount paid was not due to either misrepresentation or the fault of the second respondent. But, admittedly it is due to the mistake of the petitioner-Society. Hence, following the judgment of the Apex Court cited supra. I am of the view that the finding of the Labour Court that there is merit in the grievance of the second respondent in questioning the recovery is correct. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of making the second respondent's entitlement for the revised pay only upto the period where the order of refixation was cancelled and further only to the extent of recovery alone. The second respondent is entitled to the pay-scale as fixed by the petitioner-Society while resolved to recover the amount on November 30, 1996. No costs.