JUDGMENT Rajesh Tandon, J. : By the present criminal appeal the appellant has challenged the sentence awarded by the Sessions Judge, Udham Singh Nagar, Rudrapur dated 9th August, 2001 under section 302 IPC as well as under section 307 IPC. The appellant was sentenced life imprisonment under section 302 IPC and ten years rigorous imprisonment under section 307 IPC. The Sessions Judge has also imposed a fine of Rs. 10,000/- failing which the appellants has to undergo another three years rigorous imprisonment. Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are: 2. The complainant Shri Ajeet Singh on 27th April, 2000 has lodged a First Information Report at about 6.40 P.M. at P.S. Rudrapur stating therein that his grandfather Shri Har Dayal Singh had five sons and his grandfather gave the shares to Gopal Singh, Jogender Singh and Mahinder Singh in the property. In the AR it has further been stated that his father and uncle Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma had not been given their shares. It was stated that complainant's uncle Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma sold the plot of Kalyani New, Rudrapur by fraud. It was further stated that on 27th April, 2000 the complainant's grandfather namely Shri Har Dayal Singh had executed the Power of Attorney regarding Matkay Wali Gali residential home in favour of his father namely, Shri Inderjeet Singh. On the said execution Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma abused words and threatened his father. In the FIR it has further been mentioned that on 27th April, 2000 at about 5.45 P.M. the complainants Ajeet Singh his father Inderjeet Singh, his brother Surender Singh, Sharanjeet Singh, Baljeet Singh, Satwant Singh and Gurmeet Singh went to leave his grandfather at his residential house i.e. Matkay Wali Gali. It was stated that when they were coming down from the car, Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma and his 2-3 companions were standing therein. Paramjeet Singh had started firing with an intention to kill them due to which complainant's father and brothers Surender Singh, Sharanjeet Singh, Baljeet Singh and grandfather Har Dayal Singh got injuries. .As a result of the aforesaid firing complainant's father namely Shri Inderjeet Singh his brothers Surender Singh and Sharanjeet Singh died. Baljeet Singh got injury on his face and his grandfather Har Dayal Singh also got injuries by - gunshot. .As a result of the aforesaid firing complainant's father namely Shri Inderjeet Singh his brothers Surender Singh and Sharanjeet Singh died. Baljeet Singh got injury on his face and his grandfather Har Dayal Singh also got injuries by - gunshot. FIR further revealed that after - hearing the noise of gunshot Harpal Singh, Rajender Kumar came there and saw the - incident. Some people went to the hospital alongwith complainant's father and brothers. 3. As per written report Ex. Ka-1, the - FIR was lodged at P.S. Rudrapur as Ex.Ka-6. The entry of the case lodging was mentioned in G.D. the carbon copy of which is Ex. Ka-30. 4. Investigating Officer has prepared the report of blood stained mud and simple - mud, report of recovery of empty cartridges and turban and goggles which are marked Ex. Ka-2, Ka-3 and Ka-4 respectively. The Panchayatnama were also prepared with regard to dead bodies of corpses of Inderjeet Singh, Surender Singh and Sharanjeet Singh marked as Ex. Ka15; Ka-18 and Ka-23. 5. On 28th April, 2000' post-mortem of Sharanjeet Singh, Surender Singh and Inderjeet Singh were made in Base Hospital, Haldwani. Post-mortem reports are marked as Ex. Ka-27, Ka-28 and Ka-29 respectively. The post-mortem report of Sharanjeet (Ex. Ka-27) reads as under: 1. Lacerated wound 1 cm. x 1 cm, circular, margins inverted over forehead in between eye-brows. 2. Lacerated wound 1 cm. x'1 cm. right side chest, 6 cm. above right nipple. 3. Lacerated wound 1 cm. x 1 cm. right side of lower abdomen 6 cm. lateral to unblicus, circular, margins inverted. 4. Lacerated wound 1 cm. x 1 cm. over right shoulder, margins inverted, circular. 5. Multiple firearm injuries measuring 1 cm. x 1 cm. in an area of 12 cm. x 16 cm. over middle of back, margins inverted cavity deep, pellets and plastic cork recovered from cavity (wound of entering). The post-mortem report of Surender Singh. (Ex. Ka-28) reads as under: 1. Lacerated wound 12 cm. x 14 cm. right side abdomen 6 cm. above and lateral to unblicus and 10 cm. below right, nipple, margins crushed and multiple firearm injuries measuring 1 cm. x 1 cm. around the lacerated wound, margins inverted, muscle deep. 2. Multiple lacerated wounds measuring 1 cm. x 1 cm. over left chest around nipple some are cavity deep and Some skin deep. 3. Lacerated wound 10 cm. x 6 cm. below right, nipple, margins crushed and multiple firearm injuries measuring 1 cm. x 1 cm. around the lacerated wound, margins inverted, muscle deep. 2. Multiple lacerated wounds measuring 1 cm. x 1 cm. over left chest around nipple some are cavity deep and Some skin deep. 3. Lacerated wound 10 cm. x 6 cm. left abdomen lateral side. I The post-mortem report of Inderjeet Singh (Ex. Ka-29) reads as under: 1. Lacerated wound 1 cm. x 1.5 cm. left side chest oval in shape, margins inverted 6 cm, above left nipple, cavity deep. 2. Two circular lacerated wound right side chest 6 cm. below right nipple, skin deep, margins inverted. 3. Three lacerated wound in an area of 8 cm. x 6 cm. over right shoulder joint, skin deep, margins inverted. 4. Lacerated wound 1 cm, x 1 cm. circular in shape over right lower abdomen 6 cm. lateral to unblicus. 5. Lacerated wound 3 cm. x 3.5 cm. oval in shape margins averted and irregular over back of chest, left side, track corresponding to injury No.1, injury No.5 is wound of exit. R.M., present both upper and lower limbs. 6. Similarly, Har Dayal Singh, Ajeet Singh and Baljeet Singh were also got medically examined reports of which are Ex. Ka-36, Ka-37 and Ka-38 respectively. The medical examination report of Shri Har Dayal Singh (Ex. Ka-36) is as under: (i) Punctured wound 4 mm. x 4 round in the left side of temporal area 3 cm. above the left extended ear. Bleeding. X-ray advised. (ii) Punctured wound 112 cm x 1/2 cm. round with level of 1st therocic vertibra. Bleeding. X-ray advised. (iii) Punctured wound 1/2 cm. x 1/2 cm. on left scapulo. Bleeding. X-ray advised. The medical examination report of Shri, Ajeet Singh (Ex. Ka-37) is as under: (i) Lacerated wound of 3 cm. x .3 cm, on the back side of right hand, skin deep. Oozing of blood present. (ii) Multiple firearm wound of entry size 3 x 3 cm. in the area of 18 cm. x 9 cm. on middle part of the left thigh snaut and outer side. Black colored. Jean pant is also turned on the same places. Margins are charred and indication is present around them. Advised X-ray of left thigh. Oozing of blood present. (ii) Multiple firearm wound of entry size 3 x 3 cm. in the area of 18 cm. x 9 cm. on middle part of the left thigh snaut and outer side. Black colored. Jean pant is also turned on the same places. Margins are charred and indication is present around them. Advised X-ray of left thigh. (iii) Multiple firearm wound of entry on the medial and anterior aspect of right thigh, some part is also torn on the same places over the injures. Margins are charred and indication is present around them. Oozing of blood also present size 13 cm. x .3 cm. Advised X-ray of the right thigh. (iv) No other external injuries seen. The medical examination report of Shri Baljeet Singh (Ex. Ka-38) is as under: (i) Lacerated wound over the right side of face and neck involving the lower jaw and right angle of lip and tongue. (ii) Excessive bleeding through the wound. (iii) Irregular margin defect in the skin ent. (iv) Boney pieces of mandible. (v) Right lower palpable throughout the wound. 7. On 4th May, 2000, Investigating Officer has submitted the enquiry report of accused Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma that his finger prints were found on his gun No. 17466-96. The gun was recovered from an Arms Dealer of Rampur and has been marked as Ex. Ka-39. 8. Recovered gun and bullets were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory, Agra for investigation and the report has been submitted as Ex. Ka-46. 9. The report of Forensic Science Laboratory, Agra submitted as Ex. Ka-46 is as under : 10. Samples of blood and soil which were collected from the spot i.e. at the place of incident and the report received from the Forensic Science Laboratory, Agra was marked as Ex. Ka-47: 11. Map of the recovery site has also been prepared and has been marked as Ex. Ka-45. 12. During the investigation, Investigating Officer had taken the statements of witnesses under section 161. IPC and also made the map of place of incident (the same was marked as Ex. Ka-26) after the completion of the investigation the charge sheet was framed against the accused Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma under section 302/307 IPC. To prove the charges against the accused persons eight witnesses were examined the names are as under: 1. Ajeet Singh PW-1 (Injured) 2. Baljeet Singh PW-2 (injured) 3. 3. Ka-26) after the completion of the investigation the charge sheet was framed against the accused Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma under section 302/307 IPC. To prove the charges against the accused persons eight witnesses were examined the names are as under: 1. Ajeet Singh PW-1 (Injured) 2. Baljeet Singh PW-2 (injured) 3. 3. Gurmeet Singh PW-3 4. Satwant Singh PW-4 5. Rajender Kumar PW-5 6. Harpal Singh PW-6 7. Hira Lal PW-7 8: Rajan Tyagi 10 (Inspector) PW-8. 13. The statement of the accused was recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. who has denied his participation and has stated that his finger prints was found from the gun which was deposited at Rampur's dealers. It was alleged that the Police has made a fraud case and the report of the Investigation and the witnesses of Police speaks lie and no evidence was produced from the accused. 14. The learned Sessions Judge has given the following circumstances while sentencing the accused. The first circumstances was about the motive that the accused had motive and reason for committing the offence and murder. The second circumstance was the recovery of 12 bore licensee gun (Ex. 6) of the accused on the information and statement made by the accused and the three empty cartridges of 12 bore gun which were found at the place of incident clearly indicating that the bullets were fired by the 12 bore licensee gun of the accused at the time of incident and that the gun was in the possession of the accused himself and not in possession of anybody else on the day of incident. The third circumstance was with regard to the compromise that after this incident, a compromise was made between accused and others in which it was decided that the accused should be apologize for that. The fourth circumstances was with regard to absconding of he accused. 15. The Counsel for the appellant Mr. P.M.N. Singh vehemently argued that the conviction is likely to be vitiated, as there was no direct evidence available on the record. 16. He has further stated that the FIR was ante dated. He has stated that the learned Sessions Judge has relied upon the motive between the parties but since the said question was not asked during the proceedings under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore, the entire prosecution story was liable to be vitiated. 17. 16. He has further stated that the FIR was ante dated. He has stated that the learned Sessions Judge has relied upon the motive between the parties but since the said question was not asked during the proceedings under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore, the entire prosecution story was liable to be vitiated. 17. The Counsel for the appellant has also filed the application for additional evidences under section 391 of the Cr.P.C. The contents of the additional evidences referred to in the application is and under : (1) A certified copy of the complaint filed by Hardayal Singh S/o Tara Singh, the father of the appellant, against Inderjeet Singh S/o Hardayal Singh, Surendra Singh SI o Hardayal Singh, Sharanjeet Singh S/o Hardayal Singh and 4 others in the Court of Munsif Magistrate, Rudrapur, Distt. Nainital and registered as Criminal Case No. 1060/91 under sections 147, 148,452,323, 504, 506 IPC. (2) A certified copy of the complaint filed by Indergeet Singh S/o Hardayal Singh against Hardayal Singh S/o Tara Singh and 6 others in the Court of Munsif Magistrate, Rudrapur, Nainital under sections 147,323,504,506,392 IPC and registered as Criminal Case No.392/95. (3) A photostat copy of the affidavit of Hardayal Singh S/o Tara Singh dated 15.52000. 18. The Counsel for the appellant had argued on the following points with regard to additional evidences : (i) that the certified copies of complaint of the Criminal Case No. 1060/91, and Criminal Case No. 392/95 shows that there was dispute of property between the three deceased persons and Hardayal Singh; the injured witness, and they were litigating and there were frequent criminal incidents disputes among them. The appellant was not at all concerned with the dispute of the property or any other criminal incident due to legacy of Hardayal Singh. (ii) that the Photostat copy of the affidavit of Hardayal Singh dated 15.5.2000. shows that Hardayal Singh S/o Tara Singh had deposed before the Sessions judge, Udham Singh Nagar that the appellant was not the assailant. 19. A reply has been filed by the prosecution against this application which reads as under : 1. That the application moved by the appellant is at a belated stage and is not maintainable as during the trial the appellant has ample opportunity to file the present application before learned-Sessions judge. 2. 19. A reply has been filed by the prosecution against this application which reads as under : 1. That the application moved by the appellant is at a belated stage and is not maintainable as during the trial the appellant has ample opportunity to file the present application before learned-Sessions judge. 2. That the contents of certified copy for - the Criminal Complaint No. 1060 of 1991 and certified copy of the Criminal Case No. 392 of 1995 are not relevant at this stage, which amounts to taking a new plea for his defence. The photocopy. annexed with the affidavit is a got-up evidence, which is not likely to assist this Hon'ble Court in the disposal of the present appeal, and the same is against the provisions of Indian Evidence Act. 3. That the incident/facts shown in the complaint case mentioned in the certified copies filed by the petitioner has no relevance on facts of the incident, which took place on 27.4.2000 and Hardayal Singh had received injuries in the said incident. The veracity of the statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. during the trial has been judged in the proper perspective by the learned Sessions judge, therefore, the prayed by the appellant is misconceived. 4. It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this application may please be dismissed being not maintainable under the circumstances of the appeal. 20. We find none of the contents of the above application which can be admitted as additional evidences as the documents are not concerning any subsequent events but are only narration of the' entire story and as such we find no substance in admitting them as additional evidences. 21. So far as Panchayatnama is concerned the Counsel for appellant has stated that the same cannot be relied upon in absence of the person in 'whose favour the decision was taken. The Counsel for the appellant has also challenged the report of the Ballistic Expert on account of some discrepancy in the report. 22. Coming to the FIR the same has been lodged on 27th April, 2000. Time has been mentioned as 18:40 (6:40). The FIR was lodged by Sri Ajeet Singh, S/o Inderjeet Singh. The F.I.R shows as under: (i) As will appear from the FIR that Shri Ajeet Singh. has very clearly stated that his father Inderjeet Singh, Surender Singh and Sharanjeet Singh died on the spot. Time has been mentioned as 18:40 (6:40). The FIR was lodged by Sri Ajeet Singh, S/o Inderjeet Singh. The F.I.R shows as under: (i) As will appear from the FIR that Shri Ajeet Singh. has very clearly stated that his father Inderjeet Singh, Surender Singh and Sharanjeet Singh died on the spot. (ii) His brother Baljeet Singh and grandfather were injured as a result of the aforesaid firing. (iii) The FIR further shows that the uncle of Ajeet Singh came from Maruti Van and had fired from his gun in order to kill the family members. (iv) On the top of the FIR there is a mention that the grandfather of Ajeet Singh has given the share to his three uncles, namely Gopal Singh, Jogender Singh and Mahender Singh from his property. But no share was given to Inderjeet Singh and Paramjeet Singh, father and uncle of Ajeet Singh. (v) Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma; uncle of Ajeet Sil1gh has sold the plot of Rudrapur without conveying to the grandfather of Ajeet Singh., (vi) The grandfather of Ajeet Singh went to the Registry office for executing the will alongwith Ajeet Singh and his father Inderjeet Singh and ultimately the grandfather has executed 'Mukhtarnama' in favour of the father of Ajeet Singh, namely Inderjeet Singh, (vii) Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma came on the spot and abused the grandfather of Ajeet Singh. (viii) The quarrel started from the moment as will appear from the motive that Paramjeet Singh abused the father of Ajeet Singh and his grandfather and therefore while entering in the house by the Maruti car his uncle Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma fired on the family of Ajeet Singh. The narration in the FIR aforesaid clearly indicates that there was a family dispute amongst the heirs of the grandfather of Ajeet Singh and that Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma had seen the power of Attorney being executed, abused the grandfather of Ajeet Singh and ultimately fired from his licensee gun with an intention to kill all of them. 23. Coming to the statement of Ajeet Singh, PW-l. PW-l has stated in his statement that the FIR (Ex. Ka-l) was lodged by him. The cross-examination of Ajeet Singh shows as under: Further so far as the compromise is concerned the same was admitted by Ajeet Singh. The same is quoted below. 23. Coming to the statement of Ajeet Singh, PW-l. PW-l has stated in his statement that the FIR (Ex. Ka-l) was lodged by him. The cross-examination of Ajeet Singh shows as under: Further so far as the compromise is concerned the same was admitted by Ajeet Singh. The same is quoted below. The PW 2 Baljeet Singh who is an injured witness has stated as under : The PW-3 Gurmeet Singh has stated as under : . The PW-4 Satwant Singh has stated as under : 24. There is a clear admission that the double barrel gun No. 17466-96 was recovered from Rampur and the recovery memo was prepared which is a part of the recorded as Ex. Ka-39 the accused has admitted that the gun was deposited by him. In the end the question asked was, what you have to say in your defence and it has been frankly stated by the Accused that he has nothing to say. No more evidence was laid with regard to the motive. or any other part in spite of the direct question which were asked from the accused. 25. The recovery memo of the gun of Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma bearing NO. 17466-96 was recovered from Rampur as will appear from Ex. Ka-39 on 4th May, 2000. The accused persons were also examined under section 161, Cr. P.C. and thereafter a charge-sheet was submitted under section 302/307, IPC. 26. The statement under section 313, Cr. P.C. of the accused was recorded. The details of the statements made under section 313, IPC is quoted below; 27. The first circumstance was about the motive as will appear from the RR that there was a dispute with regard to the land and the accused had purpose and reason for committing the offence and murder. 28. So far as the first circumstance is concerned the learned Sessions Judge has recorded the findings to the following effect : . 29. The second circumstance was the recovery of 12 bore licensee gun (Ex. 6) of the accused on the information and statement made by the accused and the three empty cartridges of 12 bore gun which were found at the place' of incident clearly indicates that the bullets were fired by the 12 bore licensee gun of the. 29. The second circumstance was the recovery of 12 bore licensee gun (Ex. 6) of the accused on the information and statement made by the accused and the three empty cartridges of 12 bore gun which were found at the place' of incident clearly indicates that the bullets were fired by the 12 bore licensee gun of the. accused at the time of incident and that the gun was in possession of the accused himself and not in possession of anybody else on the day of incident as is evident from the statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. made by the accused in which he had admitted that the gun bearing No. 17466-96 belongs to him which he had deposited with Arms Dealer namely. M/s G.B. Sales Arms and Ammunition at Rampur. 30. So far as the second circumstance is concerned the learned Sessions Judge had recorded the findings to the following effect : 31. The third circurristance was with regard to the compromise. After this incident, a compromise was made between accused and others regarding the settlement of property dispute in which it was decided that the accused should be excused. 32. So far as the third circumstance is concerned the learned Sessions Judge has recorded the findings to the following effect : 33. The fourth circumstance was the behaviour of the accused to abscond on the day of the incident besides the fact that the accused did not plead alibi and he had simply chosen to stay away from the place of incident and not even attended the funeral of his near and dear. It is pertinent to mention here that one of deceased was his real brothers and the other two deceased were his real nephews, two of the injured are also his real nephews and the other injured namely Har Dayal Singh is the father of the accused. 34. So far as the fourth circumstance is concerned the learned Sessions Judge has recorded the findings to the following effect : 35. The Counsel for the appellant has argued that the proceedings under sections 82 and 83 Cr.P.C. are wholly irrelevant so far as the chain of the evidence against the appellant is concerned. 34. So far as the fourth circumstance is concerned the learned Sessions Judge has recorded the findings to the following effect : 35. The Counsel for the appellant has argued that the proceedings under sections 82 and 83 Cr.P.C. are wholly irrelevant so far as the chain of the evidence against the appellant is concerned. Similar controversy came up before the Divisional Bench in 2003 (47) ACC 534 where their Lordships has held as under : It is also a factor to be taken note of that after the incident the accused appellants absconded and proceedings under sections 82 and 83 Cr.P.C. had to be drawn against them. The Investigating Officer Ram Chandra Dubey PW-5 deposed that articles of the accused appellants were attached. Though the accused appellants admitted the factum of attachment of their property but denied that they had absconded. There could hardly be any necessity of attaching their property, if they had not absconded. All the facts, circumstances and the injuries caused to the victim indicate as if the accused-appellants were not satisfied by simply putting her to eternal sleep. Rather they committed this murder in most cruel and diabolical manner demonstrating sadistic proclivity. 36. The Counsel for the appellant has referred the following judgments in order to show that the statement under section 313, Cr.P.C. is material and the conviction cannot be based on any material which was not put under section 313, Cr.P.C. 37. The Counsel for the appellant has also referred section 8 of the Evidence Act. The same reads as under : "8. Motive, Preparation and previous or subsequent conduct :-Any fact is relevant, which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact)n issue or relevant fact. The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit or proceedings, in reference to such suit or proceedings, or in reference to a fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any proceedings, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevar.t fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto." 38. As will appear from the FIR that motive as well as preparation both 'are available in the FIR itself as well as other chain of circumstance as referred' in the judgment of Smt. Nandani Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025 in which it has been stated that : . "On the other hand, we must never forget that crimes, in India and internationally, are growing and criminals are outwitting the detectives, What holds good in the cities of the United States is infecting other countries, including our own. An American author in a recent book has stated : "What do you think the city of tomorrow will be ? In 1969 the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence made alarming pre~ dictions. You will live in a city where everyone has guns. Houses will be protected by grills and spy equipment. Armed citizen patrols will be necessary. The political extremes will be small armies. Buses will have to carry armed guards. There will be hatred and war between the races, and between the rich and the poor. In other words, your city will be a place of terror. "From 1969 to 1974 the number of crimes for each hundred thousand people is up 38%. Violent crimes rose 47%. Robbery increased 48%. Burglary went up a whopping 53%. Theft rose 35%. The chances are becoming better and better that you or someone dear to you will be a victim. The chances are also better that the close relative will be involved in crime as criminal:. "........ In only 12% of the serious crimes is there a suspect arrested. Half of those are convicted. (Serious crime includes homicide, burglary, aggravated assault, larceny over $ 50. forcible rape, robbery, and auto theft). "The situation is so discouraging that only half the people bother to report serious crime. Even then, in 1974, 82% of the known burglaries went unsolved. That means only 18% of the half known to the police were solved. ".... President Johnson's message to congress March 8, 1965 is' a true today as it was then: "Crime has become a malignant enemy in America's midst......... We must arrest and reverse the trend towards lawlessness ......... We cannot tolerate an endless, self-defeating cycle of imprisonment, release, and imprisonment which fails to alter undesirable attitudes and behaviour. ".... President Johnson's message to congress March 8, 1965 is' a true today as it was then: "Crime has become a malignant enemy in America's midst......... We must arrest and reverse the trend towards lawlessness ......... We cannot tolerate an endless, self-defeating cycle of imprisonment, release, and imprisonment which fails to alter undesirable attitudes and behaviour. We must find ways to help the first offender avoid a continuing career to crime. The first obligation of the criminal justice system is to secure justice by seeking and substantiating truth through proof. of course, the means must be as good as the end and the dignity of the individual and the freedom of the human person cannot be sacrificed by report to improper means, however worthy the ends. Therefore, 'Third degree' has to be outlawed and indeed has been. We have to draw up clear lines between the whirl pool and .the rock where the safety of society and the worth of the human person mayea-exist in peace. 39. In Khujji v. State of Madhya Pradesh following principles has been laid down: Mr. Lalit, learned Counsel for the appellant, however, argued that since the report of the serologist does not determine the blood group of the stains on the weapon and the pant of the appellant, the mere find of human blood on these two articles is of no consequence, whatsoever. In support of this contention he placed strong reliance on the decisions of this Court in Kansa Behera v. State of Orrisa, 1987 (3) SCC 480 and Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 21. in the first mentioned' case the conviction was sought to be sustained on three circumstances, namely, (i) the appellant and the deceased were last seen together, (ij) a dhoti and a shirt r~covered from the possession of the appellant were found to be stained with human blood, and (iii) the appellant had made an extra-judicial confession to two witnesses when arrested. There was no dispute in regard to the first circumstance and the third circumstance was held not satisfactorily proved. In this backdrop the question for consideration was whether the first and the second circumstances were sufficient to convict the appellant. There was no dispute in regard to the first circumstance and the third circumstance was held not satisfactorily proved. In this backdrop the question for consideration was whether the first and the second circumstances were sufficient to convict the appellant. This Court, therefore observed that a few small blood stains could be of the appellant himself and in the absence of evidence regarding blood group it cannot conclusively connect the blood stains with the blood of the deceased. In these circumstances this Court refused to draw any inference of guilt on the basis of the. said circumstance since it was not 'conclusive' evidence. This Court, however, did not go so far as to say that such a circumstance does not even provide a link in the chain of circumstances on which the prosecution can place reliance. In the second case also this Court did not consider the evidence regarding the finding of human blood on the knife sufficient to convict the appellant in the absence of determination of blood group since the evidence 'of PW-2 was found to be uninspiring and there was no other circumstance to connect him with the crime. In this case we have the direct .testimony of PW-1 Komal Chand, besides the testimony of PWs-3 and 4 which we have considered earlier. The find of human blood on the weapon and the pant of the appellant lends corroborator to the testimony of PW-1-Komal Chand when he states that he had seen the appellant inflicting a knife blow' on the deceased. The appellant has not explained the presence of human blood on these two articles. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the aforesaid two decisions turned on the peculiar facts of each case and they do not lay down a general proposition that in the absence of determination of blood group the find of human blood on the weapon or garment of the accused is of no consequence. We, therefore, see no substance in this contention urged by' Mr. Lalit. 40. The evidence on the record has fully proved the recovery of blood stains, recovery of gun and in such circumstances the judgment of the Khujji v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1991 (3) SCC 627 is fully applicable to the facts of the case. 41. We, therefore, see no substance in this contention urged by' Mr. Lalit. 40. The evidence on the record has fully proved the recovery of blood stains, recovery of gun and in such circumstances the judgment of the Khujji v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1991 (3) SCC 627 is fully applicable to the facts of the case. 41. The Counsel for the prosecution has referred the judgment of Mani Kumar Thapa v. State of Sikkim, 2002 (45) ACC 948 (SC) regarding circumstantial evidence as well as the failure of the accused to explain any inculpatii1g circumstance under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. as under: If the prosecution case were to be confined only to the facts referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellant is his presentation of the hypothesis then there may be some force in the said argument. But then while considering a hypothesis of this nature, we will have to take into consideration the entire prosecution case and the circumstances proved by the prosecution as also any legitimate inference that could be drawn from such proved circumstances. If that is done then we notice the main plank of the appellant's hypothesis that the appellant did not know the intention of A-1 in taking away the deceased with him in his jeep, falls to the ground. In this regard we notice that it is an admitted fact as could be seen hereafter that the appellant was found in. the company of A-1on 12.2.1988 sometime in the afternoon while travelling in the jeep driven by A-1 and searching for the deceased. To the extent that he as with A-Ion that afternoon is admitted by the appellant himself in his statement under section 313, Cr.P.C. From the evidence of PWs-3, 5 to 9, 11 and 12., the prosecution has established that A-1 and the appellant ultimately met the deceased and took him away in the jeep driven by A1. During that time PW-5 also accompanied these accused persons and the deceased to some distance in the jeep. It is a fact that then the appellant did not in any manner indicate that he shared the common intention of A-1 in taking the deceased away. During that time PW-5 also accompanied these accused persons and the deceased to some distance in the jeep. It is a fact that then the appellant did not in any manner indicate that he shared the common intention of A-1 in taking the deceased away. But then if we examine the conduct of the appellant we find that if really the appellant did not know the object for which the deceased was being taken in the jeep, one would have expected as a natural conduct at least after PW-5 alighted from the vehicle, the appellant would have asked A1 the purpose of taking the deceased with them. The appellant had done no such thing nor has the appellant given any explanation in his statement under section 313, Cr.PC. in this regard. The explanation in this regard is only found in the argument of the learned Counsel in this Court which is that the appellant being an obedient subordinate of A-1, might not have questioned the authority of his superior. We do not think such an explanation is acceptable to anybody. If really the appellant was innocent, having known that a crime is committed, any prudent person if he was innocent, would certainly haw~ tried to dissuade A-1 from committing a' crime and if he failed in his attempt, he would have certainly taken steps to see that his non-involvement is safeguarded by seeking help from others. Failure to do so makes us infer that the appellant already knew the intention of A-1 and acquiesced with the same. Here we would also note that in the normal course if the deceased was being taken for interrogation or for the purpose of keeping him away from any mischief that A-1 suspected him of planning to commit in the meeting of the Chief Minister then the normal destination would have been the police station but that was not the direction in which the vehicle was moving, therefore, it is legitimate for us to conclude that the appellant knew that the deceased was being taken towards the check post with certain other oblique motive. This conduct of the appellant in not trying to find out the reason for taking the deceased and the destination further strengthens our inference that the appellant knew well in advance what was the reason and the-destination to which the deceased was being taken. This conduct of the appellant in not trying to find out the reason for taking the deceased and the destination further strengthens our inference that the appellant knew well in advance what was the reason and the-destination to which the deceased was being taken. Assuming for argument's sake that he was obedient or innocent or ignorant enough to keep quite right through the journey then one would have expected him on his return at least to have informed of the incident to some person in authority or at least to a friend with a view to exculpate himself from the incident in which the deceased lost his life except what he told PW5 on 13th and 16th of February, which, of course, is only one of the versions of his story which the appellant had adopted to mislead the investigation. This statement to PW-5 apart we see there is nothing which the appellant did which is in consonance with his innocence. Per contra, it is seen that the appellant accompanied A1 in the evening of 12.2.1988 to a farewell function organized to bid farewell to one of their colleagues, this also indicates the appellant's conduct in sharing A-1 's intention. It is further seen that on 13.2.1988 the appellant accompanied A1 and went to Ramam Check post without there being any official reason for the same except to deliver two torch lights. We find it difficult to believe that the appellant who witnessed a crime to which he is not a party, would venture to go again with A-1on 13.2.1988 to the scene of the occurrence if he was actually innocent. It is also to be noticed that even though on 13.2.1988 he told PW-5 about the incident of 12.2.1988 without inculpating himself, he again goes to Ramam Check post on 14.2.1988. This constant visit to the place of the incident alongwith A-1 makes the hypothesis presented on behalf of the appellant highly improbable and gives sufficient room to infer that the appellant did know and share the intention harbored by A-1 in the crime. If we analyse the prosecution evidence further it is seen that in regard to travelling in the jeep from where they picked up the deceased then on to Ramam Check post and back, we see the appellant has given 3 different version on 3 different occasions. If we analyse the prosecution evidence further it is seen that in regard to travelling in the jeep from where they picked up the deceased then on to Ramam Check post and back, we see the appellant has given 3 different version on 3 different occasions. To PW- 5 he stated that while taking the deceased towards Singla from the Check post, he allowed him to run away from the jeep after they crossed Ramam Check post when A-I had got down from the jeep to ease himself. To PW 36 he told that when they were bringing a smuggler from Darjeeling side to Ramam Check post i.e. from the opposite direction the smuggler escaped from the jeep and in the process of running he fell down and suffered fatal injuries. In his statement under section 313, Cr. PC. before the Court, he stated that or, 12.2.1988 he had gone to Soreng on the orders of his SP as the Chief Minister was visiting Soreng and on the evening of that day as he did not have any vehicle, he took a "lift" in the vehicle of A-I up to Jorethang from where he went to his quarters and Accused 1 went' to Naya Bazar Dak Bungalow as he was camping there on duty. These 3 different versions which are self-contradictory further show that the appellant has not been consistent in his stand as to what happened on 12.2.1988. This Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, 2000 (8) SCC 45 has held that a false answer offered by the accused when his attention was drawn to any inculpating circumstance would render such circumstance as capable of inculpating him. The Court also held that in such a situation a false answer can also be counted as providing "a missing link in completing the chain. If the said principle in law is to be accepted, the statement of the appellant made under section 313, Cr.PC. being palpably false and there being cogent evidence adduced by the prosecution to show that the appellant had given two other versions as to the incident of 12.2.1988, we will have to proceed on the basis that the appellant has not explained the inculpating circumstances established by the prosecution against him which would form an additional link in the chain of circumstances. Then again there is another factor to be taken note of in regard to the sharing of the common object of A-1 by the appellant. It has come in the evidence of PW-5 that the appellant had told him that after the body of the deceased was taken from the place where it had fallen in the first instance, the appellant had taken away certain possible identification materials like panchayat seal and some personal papers with view to create false evidence as to the whereabouts of the deceased. This also indicates the involvement of the appellant in the crime. These circumstances and inferences drawn from such proved circumstances establish beyond all reasonable doubt that the appellant did share the common intention of A-1 in taking. the deceased away in the jeep driven by A-1 and causing the murder, therefore, the hypothesis of innocence pleaded on behalf of the appellant in our opinion is not in consonance with the innocence of the appellant. On the contrary, from the chain of circumstantial evidence the prosecution has been able to establish beyond all reasonable doubt that the appellant did share the common intention of A-1 in abducting the deceased, causing his death as also causing disappearance of evidence of offence under section 201, IPC. 42. The Counsel for the prosecution has also referred the judgment of Bodhraj alias Bodha and others u. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 2002 (8) SCC 45 on circumstantial evidence. An extract of the same is quoted below : "It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. See Hukan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, Eradu v. State of Hyderabad, Earabhadrappa v. State of Karanataka, State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi, Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab and Ashik Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M. P. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab, 2000 (8) SCC 45 it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable doubt. We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy v. State of AP, wherein it has been observed this: (See pp. 206-07, para 21) "21.In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence." 43. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests. "10.(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established, (2) those circumstances should be of a, definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused, (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of guilt of the accused and such evidence should not -only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence." In State or U. P v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must the consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must the consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book "Wills' Circumstantial Evidence" (Chapter VI) lays down the following Rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial evidence: (1) the facts altered as the basis of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of guilt, the exculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt; and (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accus~d, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted. 44. After relying upon the aforesaid facts the Apex Court has come to the conclusion that conviction can be based solely on the circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touch-stone of law relating to circumstantial evidence and it should be a complete chain in the following manner: A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra. Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are. (1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are. (1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and not may be established, (2) The fact so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accrued is guilty; (3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 45. Further, in Hanumant Govind Nar gundkar v. State of M. P., "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from' which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability' the act must have been done by the accused. " 46. The Counsel for the prosecution has also referred the' judgment of Alia China Apparao and others v. State of A. P., 2000 (8) SCC 440 on circumstantial evidence. " 46. The Counsel for the prosecution has also referred the' judgment of Alia China Apparao and others v. State of A. P., 2000 (8) SCC 440 on circumstantial evidence. An extract of the same is quoted below : "A question that now arises is that where first information report is shown' to have actually been recorded without delay and investigation started on its basis, if any delay is caused in sending, the same to the Magistrate which the prosecutions fails to explain by furnishing reasonable explanation, what would be its effect upon the prosecution case. In our view, ipso facto the same cannot be taken to be a ground for throwing out the prosecution case if the same is otherwise trustworthy upon appreciation of evidence which is found to be credible. However, if it is otherwise, an adverse inference may be drawn against the prosecution and the same may affect the veracity of the prosecution case, more so when there are circumstances from which an inference can be drawn that there were chances of manipulation in the first information report by falsely roping in the accused persons after due deliberations. Reference in this connection may be made to decisions of this Court in the cases of Pala Singh v. State of Punjab, Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, State of Karnataka v. Main Patel, Harpa! Singh v. Devinder Singh, Shiv Ram v. State of U.P., Anil Rai v. State of Bihar and Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihar. Lastly it was submitted that no blood was found on the weapons of assault recovered by the Investigation Officer. It may be stated that the Trial-Court in its judgment has taken note of this fact and did not draw any inference there from against the prosecution in' view of the fact that the weapons were• recovered from a pipe in which water was flowing, as such non-existence of blood thereon was quite natural. We do not find any infirmity in the reasoning of the Trial Court on this score. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the High Court has not committed any error in upholding convictions and sentences awarded against the appellants." 47. The object of section 313, Cr.P.C. has been explained in Basavaraj R. Patil v. State of Karnataka in paragraph 18. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the High Court has not committed any error in upholding convictions and sentences awarded against the appellants." 47. The object of section 313, Cr.P.C. has been explained in Basavaraj R. Patil v. State of Karnataka in paragraph 18. The same is quoted below: "What is the object of examination of an accused under section 313 of the Code? The section itself declares the object in explicit language that it is. "for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him". In Jai Dev v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 612 Gajendragadkar. J. (as he then was) speaking for a three Judge Bench has focused on the ultimate test in determining whether the provisions has been fairly complied with. He observed thus (Pars 21 of AIR and CrLL.J.) "The ultimate test in determining whether or not the accused has been fairly examined under section 342 would be to enquire whether, having regard to all the questions put to him, he did get an opportunity to say what he wanted to say in respect of prosecution case against him. If it appears that the examination of the accused person was defective and thereby a prejudice has been caused to him that would no doubt be a serious infirmity." 48. The learned Counsel for the prosecution has referred the judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 257 of 2002 in the case of Chandra Mohan Singh D. State of Uttaranchal, delivered by Hon'ble P.C. Verma, A.C.J. and lrshad Hussain, J. which is quoted below: "Before proceeding to scrutinize the in criminating circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, it is desirable to state that the legal proposition as to when conviction can be recorded on circumstantial evidence has been settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court and the different High Courts. The legal position has also recently been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Mohibur, Rahman and another v. State of Assam, 2002 (2) UC 659. The legal position has also recently been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Mohibur, Rahman and another v. State of Assam, 2002 (2) UC 659. The Hon'ble Judges observed that: "It is well settled by a catena of decision of this Court that in order to find conviction on circumstantial evidence each of the incriminating pieces of circumstantial evidence should be proved by cogent and reliable evidence and the Court should be satisfied that the proved pieces of circumstantial evidence taken together forge such a chain where from no inference other than of guilt can be drawn against the accused persons or, in other words the proved pieces of circumstantial evidence should not be capable of being explained on any hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused." 49. The Counsel for the appellant has referred the following judgments viz. Jagir Singhv. State (Delhi), 1975 (3) SCC 562; Satpaul Singh v. Delhi Administration'1976 (1) SCC 729 para 39, 42, 44, 52, 54 and 55; Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana, 1976 SCC (Cr) 7; Rauinder Kumar Day v. State of Orissa, AIR 1997 SC 170; Sayid Akbar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848;Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2001 (2) SCC 205; K. Angara v. State of Kerala. 50. None of the judgments tallies with the facts of the present case in as much as the circumstantial chain fully establishes the guilt of the accused appellant. 51. The State has also referred the judgments of Subimal Sarkar v. Sachindra Nath Mundal and others, JT 2003 (1) SC 72 Para 8 : 2003 (1) UC 580 and State of U.P. V. Arun Kumar Gupta, JT 2003 (1) SC 49 Para 17 : 2003 (2) UC 737 : 2003 (2) J.Cr.C. 899 in order to show that the motive alone is sufficient for conviction. In State of U. P. v. Arun Kumar Gupta, JT 2003 (1) SC 49 Para 17 : 2003 (2) UC 737: 2003 (2) J.Cr.C. 899 the following observations were made by the Honble Judge: "From the above decision of this Court it is clear that in such circumstances when the prosecution fails to send the blood stained material to the chemical examiner a reasonable doubt arises as to the genuineness of the prosecution case in regard to the recovery of such• material. It is also relevant to notice at this stage the factum of recovery of the blood stained earth was not put to the respondent when his statement was recorded under section 313, Cr.P.C. From the above discrepancies noticed by us in the evidence of PW-s 7 and 9 and also from the omission on the part of the prosecution in sending blood stained material to the serologist we are constrained to doubt the prosecution case in regard to the recovery. Coming to the evidence of PW-2, who says that he had seen the respondent taking the deceased from his shop on 27th May, 1988, it should be noticed that this person is of the same biradari as of the deceased and was a close friend of the father of the deceased for over 20 years. The defence has suggested that he is actually the brother-in-law of PW-1, but the same is denied. The facts remains that this witness is an interested witness. From the material produced by the prosecution, it shows that this witness was taking extraordinary interest in the investigation and was present at practically every important place and time in the course of the investigation. The High Court has very elaborately discussed the evidence of this witness and has rejected the same for good reasons with which we agree. In our opinion, the evidence of this witness does not inspire much confidence. From the above discussion, in our opinion that the prosecution has been able to establish only a motive as against the respondent for committing the murder, while most of the circumstances which are otherwise important to be proved in this case have not been established. We are of the opinion, the High Court was justified in interfering with the judgment of the Sessions Judge and allowing the appeal. 52. Therefore, the chain of circumstances highlighted by the prosecution presents a complete picture which absolutely rules out the role of any other person than the person described in the FIR by the complainant immediately after the occurrence had taken place. 53. For the foregoing reasons we find 'no substance and merit in the appeal and the same is hereby dismissed. The conviction and sentence to life imprisonment awarded against him is confirmed. The appellant is in jail and he shall serve out the sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge. 54. 53. For the foregoing reasons we find 'no substance and merit in the appeal and the same is hereby dismissed. The conviction and sentence to life imprisonment awarded against him is confirmed. The appellant is in jail and he shall serve out the sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge. 54. Let the record of the trial be sent back to the Court concerned for' compliance of the order. Appeal Dismissed.