Judgment :- Ext. P5 notice issued by the corporation of cochin dated 17-08-2004 has been subjected to challenge. The corporation had noticed that an advertisement board erected in Sy. No.34/1 of Ernakulam Village was unauthorized and since according to them it also posed a danger to the life and properties of general public, it was required to be remove. A deadline of three days had been given for such follow up action. In case of non-compliance, the Corporation was proposing too remove it at the risk and cost of the offenders. By virtue of the interlocutory orders passed, the operation of the order has been kept suspended. Reference had been made in Ext. P4 to an application submitted by the petitioner dated 05.03.2004, and it stood rejected thereby. 2. Ext. P5 is addressed to M/s. Siyad Komker and vimal Arakkal. Sri. Vimal Arakkal is the petitioner herein. According to him, he is running the business of putting up Hoardings as part of advertising and leasing it out to various parties on commercial basis. He referred to an agreement made by him with Mr. Siyad Koker, whereunder the latter had consented for putting up display board at the southern end of his property, described in more detail in Exts. P1 and P2 agreements. According to the petitioner, authorized as above, and with expert assistance, he had proceeded. Structurally, it was sound in every respect. Adequate measures of protection had also been secured for any loss that may occur because of the structure. It is claimed that after the erection, an application for putting up an advertisement was made to the corporation. Am advertisement also was placed on the board, which the petitioner submits is not an objectionable conduct. Because of unhealthy competition, the corporation had been misdirected, and arbitrarily the impugned notice had been issued. He describes the conduct as one without legal authority. 3. Sri. Govind K. Bharathan, counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the directions in the impugned order is illegal and without jurisdiction. The corporation was acting under external influence. The contentions raised could be codified as following:- (i) There is no authority for the proposition that sanction is necessary to put up a Board, since what is erected is not a building coming under section 2(2) of the Municipality Act, nor rule 2(1) of the Kerala Municipality Building Rules. The corporation was acting under external influence. The contentions raised could be codified as following:- (i) There is no authority for the proposition that sanction is necessary to put up a Board, since what is erected is not a building coming under section 2(2) of the Municipality Act, nor rule 2(1) of the Kerala Municipality Building Rules. (ii) The Corporation’s jurisdictional involvement is confined to the right for levying a tax, if at all tax is leviable, as envisaged by Sections 271 and 272 of the Act. (iii) Section 411 of the Municipality Act is invoked out of place and reference too the said section as an enabling provision for pulling down the structure was misconceived. (iv) Minimum requirement of adequate notice was not being given before threatening with coercive steps, which offended principles of fair play. (v) Mala fides. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed by the corporation and parties had made available further materials as well before me, when the matter was being gone into. Especially, the Corporation has placed before me Resolution No.53 dated 09.09.2004 passed by the council, and submits that at least as of now every installation of hoarding was to comply with the regulations so prescribed, whether they be existing ones or were to be installed in future. 5. In view of the development as above, brought as Ext.R1(a), which is a copy of the resolution adopted by the corporation, and since the same is not subjected to any challenge, I have to hold that every advertiser, who is already in business, and also those who propose to put to hoarding boards hereafter, will have to subject themselves too the stipulations so brought about, since the jurisdiction or authority of the Corporation for bringing such prescriptions has not been questioned. 6. But, nevertheless, since I had heard the stand of the Corporation vis-à-vis the legal contentions raised by the petitioner, I may examine them in seriatim, especially since I find that the petitioner had approached the issue with a basic misconception, factually and legally. 7. The first submission of the petitioner is that the Kerala Municipality Act or Rules did not postulate obtaining of a consent in the matter of installation of hoarding board. The argument is that the structure put up in the premises is not a ‘building’. 7. The first submission of the petitioner is that the Kerala Municipality Act or Rules did not postulate obtaining of a consent in the matter of installation of hoarding board. The argument is that the structure put up in the premises is not a ‘building’. The definition of building, s per the rules, the petitioner notices is generously wider than that had been given by the definition in the Act. But the contention was that it should have been restricted and made subservient to the definition in the Act. But, since there is no basis for the contention, and there is no challenge specifically made against the subordinate legislation as above, it may not be necessary to take serious note of the contention. On merits also I do not think that the argument as above is to be countenanced. 8. A building coming under section 2(2) of the Act is defined as following: “(2) ‘building’ includes a house, out-house, stable, latrine, shed, hut, bunk and any other structure whether of masonry, wood, brick, mud, metal or any other material whatsoever. The definition of ‘building by the rules [Rule 2(1) also could be extracted as herein below: “(1) ‘building’ means any structure for whatsoever purpose and of whatsoever material constructed and very part thereof whether used for human habitation or not and includes foundations, plinth, walls floors, roofs, chimneys plumbing and building services, verandah, balcony cornice or projections, part of a building or anything affixed thereof or any wall enclosing or intended to enclose any land or space and signs and outdoor display structures.” Under the Act, it is an inclusive definition and naturally has to be construed in a wide sense. The interpretation has to be also contextual. The submission that tit does not take notice of a hoarding cannot be accepted at all. When the statute defines the building as “any structure for whatsoever purpose and of whatsoever material constructed….” The intention of the legislature is clear. Over and above, the board “structure” has a very wide connotation, even at common parlance, and there is no justification for reading down any particular definition so as to make it otiose. Even if there is any possibility of doubts, the definition of the term by the rules, displaces any such argument. Over and above, the board “structure” has a very wide connotation, even at common parlance, and there is no justification for reading down any particular definition so as to make it otiose. Even if there is any possibility of doubts, the definition of the term by the rules, displaces any such argument. The display structures, to which the category of the structure put up by the petitioner could be described comes within the definition of building itself. Of course, the term “building” has acquired a special meaning, denoting a dwelling place or occupied premises, but it is well settled that for the purpose of special statutes, inclusion of men and matters which h ordinarily would not have been encompassed or came with the term, could have well been included. It has to be accepted that when we examine the Kerala Municipality Building Rules, predominantly the stipulation pertained to structures which are used for human habitation and for similar purposes. Although, in respect of walls, fences, wells, telecommunication towers etc., specific provisions have been made in the rules [See Rules 96, 103 and Chapter XIX], that by itself is insufficient for this court to hold that a hoarding does not come within the purview of a building. In matters of set back FAR, height etc., specific advertence to a hoarding structure had not been made or their relevance examined, but this also is not an enabling circumstance for the petitioner to successfully contend that what is put by him is not a building. Sri Bharathan of course had referred to the principles of ejusdem generis to suggest that the hoarding altogether formed a different class vis-à-vis residential structures. He also relied on the decision of this Court reported in 1974 K.L.T. 246 [M.Raman Pillai v. K.T. George and another]. The learned Judge in his discussions had adverted to the earlier decisions on the subject as also the observations in R. v. Neath Canal Navigation Co. [19871 (4) LJMC 193]. But, it has to be observed that the definition as contained in special statutes had not been a factor which was considered there. The question was whether an underground tank required for a petrol outlet amounted to a “building”. It is to be noticed that the “court had held that the above also could be a “building” coming under secti9on 106 of the Land Reforms Act. The question was whether an underground tank required for a petrol outlet amounted to a “building”. It is to be noticed that the “court had held that the above also could be a “building” coming under secti9on 106 of the Land Reforms Act. I have therefore to reject the contentions of the petitioner wholesale. 9. The next submission was with reference to sections 271 and 272 of the Kerala Municipality Act. the counsel had adverted to two decisions of this Court, one rendered by Mr. Justice Kurien Joseph I Joseph Thomas v. Changanacheerry Municipality [2002 (2) KLT 6.]. It had been held that permission from the Municipality is required for exhibiting or erecting an advertisement even in a private place, irrespective of liability to pay tax. The petitioner therein was the owner of a building complex. His tenant had put up an advertisement board of his shop, in front of the building. The building owner had represented to the Municipality that it was an unauthorized installation. But pointing out that it was a private dispute the Municipality refused to intervene, and the matter ultimately came to this Court. 10. From the recitals in the judgment, it is clear that the Municipality as well as the tenant argued for the position that an advertisement board as above does not require permission for being installed. However, relying on section271 of the Municipalities Act, the Court held that irrespective of whether tax is leviable or not, no advertisement board could have been erected, without the permission of the Municipality. Therefore, the Municipality was directed to re-examine the issue with a direction that if the installation was without permission the Board could be required to be removed. 11. However, the said decision was subjected to appeal and in Thomas Kurian v. Joseph Thomas [2002 (2) KLT 625] the judgment had been set aside and the Original Petition dismissed. The division Bench had held that since what was being advertised was with respect to a trade/business, that was carried on within the premises, or upon the building taken on rent by the tenant, and as it was installed in the premises where the room had been let out, there was no jurisdiction for the Municipality to levy tax on such advertisement. The Court held that it was a case where the advertisement stood exempted from the purview of section 271. The Court held that it was a case where the advertisement stood exempted from the purview of section 271. 12/ It could be seen that Explanation (2) to sub-clause (c) of section 271 provides for exemption from liability of tax in respect of “any advertisement relating to the name of the land or the building, upon or which h the advertisement is exhibited. This is equally so for exhibiting the name of the owner or occupier of such land or building”. This alone had been noticed by the Division Bench. The head notes of the Division Bench judgment, as appearing in respect of the decision in the journal, are slightly misleading. A reading of the full text would clarify the position. If fact, the decision as above are not relevant, as they deal with an altogether different issue. 13. Section 271 refers too tax on advertisements. The general provision is that advertisement on every hoarding and displays in any place within the Municipal area, whether put up in public or private place, are to pay on every such advertisement a tax calculated and levied, as authorized by a resolution of the council with the approval of the Government. Therefore, exemption can be there only in respect of hoardings, advertisements which stand specifically excluded. Under sectionm272, written permission of the Secretary, after the levy of tax is necessary, for displaying in any manner whatsoever any advertisement. There is no case for the petitioner that there has been remittances of tax as levied. The above proceedings were yet to be finalized. Therefore, the hoarding on which admittedly and advertisement appeared was not authorized. The case of the Corporation in fact is that very erection of the hoarding itself was without legal sanction. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however refers to the definition of “advertising sign” in an attempt to establish that it was only an advertising sign that was put up. However, the definition deals with a totally different situation and was the issue that had come up earlier before the Division Bench. When the petitioner admits that the hoarding is intended for putting up advertisement for general public, and for payment of a price, it is idle to contend that he is entitled to an exemption. However, the definition deals with a totally different situation and was the issue that had come up earlier before the Division Bench. When the petitioner admits that the hoarding is intended for putting up advertisement for general public, and for payment of a price, it is idle to contend that he is entitled to an exemption. The circumstance that the ‘building’ has been put up on a private land is immaterial, and argument arises only because of misconception of fact and law. In respect of a hoarding in private place as well, unless it is in the exempted category, tax is leviable, and permission is mandatory. 115. The next argument is centered round the directions issued for demolition under sectrion4121 of the Act. It is pointed out that powers under the section could be exercised only in very limited circumstances, and only when the structure is in a ruinous position. According to counsel, what is put up is a stable structure and brand new. Also the preconditions for procedures under section 411 was never there. Advertence was also made to the requirement of a reasonable opportunity for submission of explanation, with reference to the decision of this Court in Salim v. Corporation of cochin [1981 KLT 636]. Advertence was also made to the requirement of proper notice, citing law laid down in sunder Raj v. Corporation of Cochin [2001 (1) KLT 536]. 16. Sri Ramesh Babu, standing counsel for the corporation. Submits that reference to section 411 was made b y way of an abundant caution and the basic objectionable feature was that the installation of the board was unauthorized and the putting up of the advertisement without permission and levy of tax wan an objectionable conduct. He also points out that the board and the advertisement never conform to the parameters laid down by the resolution of the Corporation[Ext.R1 (a)]. According to him, the additional reason, and even invocation of a wrong section while enforcing a statute will not vitiate the orders, if it is possible for the authority to bring to the attention of the Court the relevant circumstances, which promoted action to be taken under the statute. The submission appears to be acceptable. Technical objections raised, as above by the petitioner, may not be sufficient enough too grant the reliefs prayed for. 17. The submission appears to be acceptable. Technical objections raised, as above by the petitioner, may not be sufficient enough too grant the reliefs prayed for. 17. The submission that minimum time for compliance had not been there also comes without grace. The conduct of the petitioner was one questioning the authority of the Corporation. If he had been in the industry, for over a decade, a claimed by him, he should not have conducted himself as a novice., and behaved as one lured by revenue alone. There is power vested in the Corporation to pull down structures, and at least in cases similar to this, the notice is only a courtesy. Petitioner hd achieved the desired objective because f the oversight of the Local authority, and extra time pleaded for was an unmerited request. Sri. Bharathan further referred to mala fide motives, but had not made available any materials for considering such aspects. Also when the petitioner’s hands are not clean, a plea of mala fides becomes allergic for comprehension. 18. The writ petition is therefore liable to be rejected. However, the parties were in a mood for compromise. The Corporation submits that notwithstanding the objectionable construction of the building demolition steps will not be pursued, of an application for regularization of such constructions appropriately made. 19. I direct that a formal application therefore should be made by the petitioner, and if they are in conformity with the Building rules, as might be relevant, the corporation is to regularize the construction. However, this will be only subject to the petitioner complying with the conditions as are there, as referred to in Ext. R1 (a), even though it is submitted that the length of the board has been reduced by separating the board too two and the height also has been brought down. But, nevertheless so long as the Corporation has proposal to strictly enforce Ext. R1 (a) in public interest, they will have the freedom and discretion to insist that the size of the board is sufficiently streamlined. 20. In the aforesaid circumstances, the contention of the petitioner that the revised norms will have no application to him may not be sustainable. I also note the submission made by the counsel for the Corporation that there will not be any discrimination as far as the petitioner is concerned, in such matters. 20. In the aforesaid circumstances, the contention of the petitioner that the revised norms will have no application to him may not be sustainable. I also note the submission made by the counsel for the Corporation that there will not be any discrimination as far as the petitioner is concerned, in such matters. It is stated that in respect of every other offending hoardings and advertisements within the city, after appropriate notice, whatever steps might be necessary have been decided to be taken so as to see that due obedience is made to Ext. R1 (a) proceedings. It is recorded. 21. If the petitioner does not comply with the course to be followed by him, as aforestated m, and does not make an application within a period of three weeks from today, Corporation may enforce Ext.P1. The Writ Petition is disposed of as above.