JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, J. - This petition is directed against orders dated 11.5.1982, 2.11.1982 and 27.9.1984 (Annexures P.5, P.6 and P.9 respectively) passed by Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab (respondent No. 1) and Consolidation Officer, Jullundur (respondent No. 2) under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation & Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (for short, the Act). 2. Although, learned counsel for the parties have addressed somewhat lengthy arguments, I propose to dispose of the writ petition by a short order because, in my opinion, order Annexure P.5 is liable to be quashed on the ground that while accepting the petition filed by respondent No. 3 under Section 42 of the Act, respondent No. 1 did not at all consider the question of delay. 3. A perusal of the averments contained in the writ petition, the written statement and the documents filed by the parties shows that consolidation operation in Village Dinour, Tehsil Pathankot, District Gurdaspur was completed in 1959 and re-partition proceedings were finalised in 1960. The application filed by respondent No. 3 under Section 21(3) of the Act was dismissed by Settlement Officer (CH). Gurdaspur vide order dated 21.6.1960 (Annexure P.1). Appeal filed by her under Section 21(4) of the Act was dismissed by Assistant Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Jullundur vide his order dated 3.11.1960 (Annexure P.2). The petition filed by respondent No. 3 under Section 42 of the Act was also dismissed by respondent No. 1 vide order dated 7.7.1965 (Annexure P.3). 4. Undeterred by adverse orders passed by different authorities, respondent No. 3 filed another petition in 1981 under Section 42 of the Act in which she claimed path for use of residential building constructed on land comprised in Khasra No. 110/24. The same was allowed by respondent No. 3 vide order Annexure P.5 and remanded the case to respondent No. 2 with the direction to make out necessary correction in the record so as to enable respondent No. 3 to use the residential building. In the purported compliance of the direction given by respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 passed order dated 2.11.1982 (Annexure P.6) vide which he withdrew 10 kanals of land from Khasra No. 110/23 and transferred a part thereof to respondent No. 3. 5. In the purported compliance of the direction given by respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 passed order dated 2.11.1982 (Annexure P.6) vide which he withdrew 10 kanals of land from Khasra No. 110/23 and transferred a part thereof to respondent No. 3. 5. The petitioners challenged orders dated 11.5.1982 and 2.11.1982 by filing a petition under Section 42 of the Act, which was dismissed by respondent No. 1 vide order dated 27.9.1984 (Annexure P.9) on the ground that the short-fall suffered by respondent No. 3 had been made good by respondent No. 2 and the petitioners have not been put to any serious loss and no injustice has been caused to them. 6. One of the grounds on which the petitioners have assailed order Annexure P.5 is that respondent No. 1 could not have entertained the second petition filed by respondent No. 3 under Section 42 of the Act without examining the question of delay and without considering the fact that the petition and appeal filed by her under Sections 21(3) and 21(4) of the Act had been dismissed by the competent authorities; that the petition filed by her under Section 42 of the Act was dismissed by respondent No. 1 vide order dated 7.7.1965 and that the suit for permanent injunction filed by them against respondent No. 3 was decreed by Sub-Judge 1st Class, Pathankot vide judgment and decree dated 6.1.1975 (Annexure P.4). 7. Respondent No. 3 has filed written statement to contest the writ petition. She has averred that respondent No. 1 is competent to entertain any petition filed under Section 42 of the Act and the writ petition should be dismissed because no prejudice had been caused to the petitioners on account of transfer of a small portion of Khasra No. 110/23 to her. She has also pleaded that the petitioners are estopped from challenging order dated 11.5.1982 passed by respondent No. 1 and consequential order dated 2.11.1982 passed by respondent No. 2 because they had participated in the proceedings of the petition filed by her in 1981. 8. Shri R.P. Bali, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that delay of more than 16 years in filing the petition under Section 42 of the Act was fatal to the claim of respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 1 committed a jurisdictional error by entertaining the same. 8. Shri R.P. Bali, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that delay of more than 16 years in filing the petition under Section 42 of the Act was fatal to the claim of respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 1 committed a jurisdictional error by entertaining the same. On merits, he argued that respondent No. 1 committed a grave illegality by accepting the petition filed by respondent No. 3 in the year 1981 ignoring judgment and decree dated 6.1.1975 (Annexure P.4) passed by Sub-Judge 1st Class, Pathankot. 9. Shri Munishwar Puri controverted the arguments of Shri Bali and submitted that the Court should decline to entertain the petitioners prayer for invalidation of Annexure P.5 and the consequential orders passed by respondent No. 2 because they had volunteered to submit to the jurisdiction of respondent No. 1 Shri Puri further submitted that the Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because the impugned order has not resulted in manifest injustice to the petitioners. 10. I have considered the respective submissions. In my opinion, order Annexure P.5 is liable to be invalidated in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat, Kanoda v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 465 and Gram Panchayat, Kakran v. Additional Director of Consolidation and another, (1997) 8 SCC 484. In the second case, the Supreme Court referred to the previous decision and held as under : "This, however, cannot be understood as enabling the party which is aggrieved by the scheme or by repartition to make an application under Section 42 after an unreasonably long lapse of time. Even where no period of limitation is prescribed, the party aggrieved is required to move the appropriate authority for relief within a reasonable time. In fact, this Court in the case of Gram Panchayat, Kanoda v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, dealing with Rule 18 itself, said that when no limitation is prescribed for an application under Section 42 dealing with confirmation of the scheme, the application should be made within a reasonable time and this question will have to be decided on the facts of each case. In that case, the delay of about 3 years and 8 months in filing an application under Section 42 by the Panchayat was held to be not unreasonable. In that case, the delay of about 3 years and 8 months in filing an application under Section 42 by the Panchayat was held to be not unreasonable. In the present case, however, the delay is of 40 years. We have tried to ascertain from the 2nd respondent whether there is any explanation for this unreasonable and inordinate delay. But no satisfactory explanation appears to be there for this inordinate delay in making the application under Section 42. The only contention which has been urged before us by respondent 2 relates to the application of Rule 18 and the period of limitation prescribed therein not being applicable where the challenge is to the consolidation scheme and repartition. But even if Rule 18 is not directly attracted, an application which is made after such inordinate delay ought not to have been entertained. It is also contended by the 2nd respondent that the appellants have no locus standi to challenge the order of the Additional Director of Consolidation in a writ petition because the land in question continued to remain in the name of the proprietory body. He drew our attention to Rule 16(ii) of the said Rules. Rule 16(ii), however, quite clearly provides that the management of such land shall be done by the Panchayat of the estate or estates concerned on behalf of the village proprietory party and the Panchayat shall have to utilise the income and the benefits of the estate or estates concerned. Even before the Additional Director, the appellants were made a party-respondent. This contention, therefore, has no merit." In my opinion, the law laid down in the aforementioned judgment is squarely applicable to the present case. Therefore, I do not consider it necessary and proper to examine other points raised by the parties and feel that ends of justice would be met by remanding the case to respondent No. 1 for fresh adjudication of the petition filed by respondent No. 3 under Section 42 of the Act. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Order Annexure P.5 is declared illegal and quashed. Consequential order Annexure P.6 passed by respondent No. 2 is also declared illegal and quashed. Respondent No. 1 is directed to decide the application filed by respondent No. 3 under Section 42 of the Act afresh. The parties are directed to appear before respondent No. 1 on 24.5.2004. Order Annexure P.5 is declared illegal and quashed. Consequential order Annexure P.6 passed by respondent No. 2 is also declared illegal and quashed. Respondent No. 1 is directed to decide the application filed by respondent No. 3 under Section 42 of the Act afresh. The parties are directed to appear before respondent No. 1 on 24.5.2004. It is expected that the officer concerned will, after hearing the parties and considering the points raised by the petitioners against the maintainability of the petition filed by respondent No. 3 and counter points raised by the said respondent, pass speaking order within next 3 months. Copies of the order be given dasti on payment of the fee prescribed for urgent applications. Petition allowed.