SOUMITRA SEN, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ application the petitioner has, inter alia, challenged the order of dismissal dated 21st of May, 2002, issued by the Respondent authority. ( 2 ) THE subject-matter of controversy in issue between the parties is briefly stated as hereunder. ( 3 ) THE petitioner was working as an Assistant Manager (Quality control) under the Food Corporation of India and was posted in the District office of Food Corporation of India, Kolkata (West ). ( 4 ) WHILE discharging his duties as an Assistant Manager (Quality control) he was given the additional charge of District Manager of Food corporation of India, Kolkata (West), between 1st August, 1997 to 24th july, 1998. ( 5 ) ON or about 14th/16th of May, 2001, the petitioner while working as Assistant Manager (Quality Control) at Food Storage Depot of Kalyani, was served with a Memorandum of charge-sheet dated 14th/16th of May, 2001, containing two Article of Charges. The charges which were framed against the petitioner are as follows :- "article-l : Shri P. K. Das Adhikari, Assistant Manager (Quality control) while functioning as the District Manager of the Food corporation of India, Kolkata (West) has sanctioned advance/ad-hoc payment upto 80% to the transport contractor in contravention of. the provisions of the Tender Agreement, which was beyond his power without obtaining the financial concurrence and thereby shown undue favour to the transport contractor. He has also not taken action to adjust the previous advance/ad-hoc payment while sanctioning further ad-hoc payment/advance and did not take take into account the demurrage charges paid to the railways on account of the failure of the transport contractor to supply adequate number of trucks. Such payment of unauthorized and un-adjusted ad-hoc payments/advances have resulted in an excess payment to the tune of Rs. 12,62,690/- to the handling transport contractor. By his act as aforesaid, Shri P. K. Das Adhikari, Assistant manager (Quality Control) has failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to his duties and acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation contravening Regulations 31 (a) (b), 32, 32 (A) (5) and 32 (A) (10) of the Food Corporation of India (Staff) regulations, 1971 (as amended ). Article-ll : Shri P. K. Das Adhikari, Assistant Manager (Q. C) while functioning as District Manager, Food Corporation of India, kolkata (West), has failed to prevent the misappropriation of three trucks load containing 488 bags of wheat weighing Q. 429. 39 which was also entrusted to the transport contractor for transportation to the various godowns between 4th February, 1998 and 14. 6. 1998 and to take any follow up action including recovery of the cost to the transport contractor as per the tender agreement and thereby failed to maintain the absolute integrity and devotion to his duties and acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation contravening regulations 31 (a) (b), 32, 32 (A) (5) and 32 (A) (10) of the Food corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971 (As amended ). " ( 6 ) THE petitioner received the said charge-sheet on 21 st of May, 2001, shown thereafter by letter dated 28th May, 2001, requested the concerned authority to allow inspection of relevant documents and to extend the time to file written statement of defence. The respondent by letter dated 7th of august, 2001, rejected such request contending that such request was made with an object of delaying the proceedings, and proceeded to appoint an enquiry Officer. ( 7 ) THE Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry and came to a conclusion that both the charges against the petitioner was proved except the extent of quantum of overpayment to the tune of Rs. 12. 68 lacs. The report of the Enquiry Officer sent to the petitioner by letter dated 23rd April, 2002. The writ petitioner duly submitted his written representation on 30. 4. 2002 against the finding of the Enquiry Officer. ( 8 ) THE petitioner in usual course was due to superannuate from the service with effect from 31. 5. 2002. In accordance with established practice the petitioner applied for Leave Travel Concession in advance. Such Leave travel Concession was sanctioned on 9. 3. 2002 for a period commencing of 13th May, 2002 to 24th May of 2002. ( 9 ) PRIOR to going on leave from 13th May, 2002 to 24th May, 2002, the Petitioner also applied for Casual Leave for three days from 28th May, 2002 to 30th May, 2002. The application for Casual Leave was given on 10. 5. 2002. 3. 2002 for a period commencing of 13th May, 2002 to 24th May of 2002. ( 9 ) PRIOR to going on leave from 13th May, 2002 to 24th May, 2002, the Petitioner also applied for Casual Leave for three days from 28th May, 2002 to 30th May, 2002. The application for Casual Leave was given on 10. 5. 2002. ( 10 ) AFTER availing the period of Leave Travel Concession sanctioned in favour of the petitioner, he joined his office on 27. 5. 2002 and worked in office for the day. in fact, the petitioner was asked to joint the office and a telegram to that effect was sent by the District Manager, Food Corporation of India. ( 11 ) THE petitioner allegedly fell ill during the period when he was on casual Leave i. e. 28th to 30th May, 2002 and accordingly during the said period a letter was sent for extension of Casual Leave another date I. e. upto 31st of May, 2002. The said letter was received by the concerned respondent on 30th of May, 2002. ( 12 ) THE aforesaid facts have become necessary to be mentioned in order to deal with one of the principal contentions of the petitioner that the letter of dismissal was served upon the petitioner after his retirement. On 3rd June, 2002, by the time the petitioner had already retired from the service, he received the impugned order of dismissal dated 21 st of May, 2002. The said letter mentions that the dismissal order was to take effect immediately. ( 13 ) IT is significant to mention here that the petitioner joined the office on 27th of May, 2002 and worked for the day. Prior thereto the District manager by a telegram dated 23rd of May, 2002, asked the petitioner to attend office on 27th of May, 2002 positively. ( 14 ) THE petitioner on 3rd June, 2002 that is the period after he, had retired, received another letter dated 27th of May, 2002 sent under registered Post on 31st of May, 2002, intimating that is Casual Leave application from 28th of May, 2002 to 30th of May, 2002 was not sanctioned. ( 15 ) IN view of the aforesaid facts, the petitioner had sought to contend that the order of dismissal was served upon the petitioner when he had already retired. ( 15 ) IN view of the aforesaid facts, the petitioner had sought to contend that the order of dismissal was served upon the petitioner when he had already retired. Further the impugned order of dismissal which was dated 21st of May, 2002, it would appear that the same could not have been made immediately effective as the petitioner had, in fact, joined on 27th of may 2002 and worked for day pursuant to the instruction given to him by the concerned authority. It was further contended that the letter dated 27th of May, 2002, which was posted on 31st May, 2002, intimating that his leave Application from 28th to 30th May, 2002, was not sanctioned, was sent only to cure the defect, inasmuch as that the respondents were fully aware as to the fact that the petitioner had already retired by the time the order of dismissal could be served upon him. ( 16 ) THE petitioner has further contended that the contention of the respondents in the affidavit-in-opposition that the petitoner refused to accept the dismissal order on 27th of May, 2002, was incorrect as it would appear from the copy of impugned order of dismissal that it was attested by Chief labour Inspector on 31. 5. 2002 prior to which the impugned order could not have been served. ( 17 ) WITH regard to Article of Charge I it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the said charge seeks to hold the petitioner guilty of sanctioning of ad-hoc/advance payments beyond his authority thereby showing undue favour to the transport contractor and that the petitioner has not taken action to adjust the previous advances and ad-hoc payments while sanctioning further ad-hoc payments and moreover did not take into account the demurrage charges paid to the railways on account of the transport Contractor who did not supply adequate number of trucks resulting in excess payment to the tune of Rs. 12,62,690/ -. The petitioner has contended that there was a long standing practice of the respondent to sanction advance/ad-hoc payments to the transport contractor. Since the bills submitted by the Transport Contractor was invariably not processed and completed by the concerned Department it became necessary to sanction ad-hoc payment otherwise the work of transportation itself would have come to a standstill. The petitioner has contended that there was a long standing practice of the respondent to sanction advance/ad-hoc payments to the transport contractor. Since the bills submitted by the Transport Contractor was invariably not processed and completed by the concerned Department it became necessary to sanction ad-hoc payment otherwise the work of transportation itself would have come to a standstill. ( 18 ) IT was pointed out that the practice of granting ad-hoc payment to transport Contractor in District Office, Kolkata (West), actually started in the year 1975 and continued even after the petitioner had retired from service. During these, long period of 27 years ad-hoc payments have been sanctioned and no objection from any quarters particularly the internal audit nor CAG audit have been raised as to the competency of District Manager to sanction advance and ad-hoc payments. It was further contended on behalf of the petitioner that the total bill submitted by the Transport contractor, at every stage when ad-hoc payments were made, was of a much larger sum. Accordingly, the respondent authorities were always at a liberty to withhold any sum accruing towards demurrage from the outsanding bills. ( 19 ) IT was also pointed out on behalf of the petitioner from the various documents on record that the charges itself were framed long after the petitioner stopped working as the District Manager. The concerned transport company had worked as a transporter for the respondent even after the period for which the petitioner worked as the District Manager. The said transport contractor had worked in various other zones other than the zone with which the charges are concerned. Accordingly, without any apportionment as to what would be the exact extent of demurrage attributable to the zone and the period for which the petitioner was concerned, the charges could not have been proved against the petitioner in any manner whatsoever. ( 20 ) IT was further submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the transport contractor had also worked under separate tender agreement in Hooghly district which was beyond the jurisdiction of the petitioner. ( 21 ) FROM the records it appears that when ad-hoc payments were sanctioned the bills submitted by the transport contractor, was of a much larger sum. As an example it was shown that against a total bill of 24 lacs ad-hoc payment was made to the extent of Rs. ( 21 ) FROM the records it appears that when ad-hoc payments were sanctioned the bills submitted by the transport contractor, was of a much larger sum. As an example it was shown that against a total bill of 24 lacs ad-hoc payment was made to the extent of Rs. 12,93,695/- clearly indicating that demurrage charges, if any, accruing during the period could have recovered from the remaing outstanding bills, but unfortunately, as it appears that the concerned department of Food Corporation of India was totally negligent in processing the bill in time which necessitated, sanctioning of ad-hoc payment. ( 22 ) MY attention has been drawn to various documents wherefrom it will appear that while sanctioning ad-hoc payments the petitioner had made categorical remarks that the pending bills should be immediately processed. Further the concerned department had made series of recommendations for making ad-hoc payments in accordance with the established practice of the department. ( 23 ) THE respondents have basically contended that the petitioner has avoided service of the dismissal order and that there being an alternative remedy of appeal the writ petition was not maintainable. It was sought to be contended that there was some nexus between the petitioner and the transport Contractor and that the petitioner was obliged to know the extent of his authority. It was submitted that in terms of the agreement only 50% ad-hoc payment could have been allowed but not in excess thereof. ( 24 ) IT is an admitted position that the petitioner worked as a District manager-in-Charge which was an additional duty entrusted upon him along with his duty as an Assistant Manager (Quality Control) from August 1, 1997 to July 24, 1998. Prior to issuance of the charge-sheet being the subject-matter of the writ petition another disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner alleging that the petitioner has caused financial loss of Rs. 52. 81 lacs towards demurrage charges for period between august, 1997 to December, 1998. The respondents disposed of the said charge-sheet by imposing a penalty of withholding promotion for a period three years but no financial liability for demurrage charges of Rs. 52. 81 lacs was imposed. It is apparent that for the period loss due to demurrage charges in the charge-sheet being the subject-matter of Article 1 of the charges, there are period, which is overlapping, the period for which the earlier charges were framed. 52. 81 lacs was imposed. It is apparent that for the period loss due to demurrage charges in the charge-sheet being the subject-matter of Article 1 of the charges, there are period, which is overlapping, the period for which the earlier charges were framed. The petitioner could not be held guilty twice for the same offence. ( 25 ) I have carefully perused the report of the Enquiry Officer. From the said report it appears that with regard to Article 1 of the Charges the enquiry Officer has proceeded on the basis that the petitioner has exceeded his authority in allowing ad-hoc payments. Consequently, the Enquiry Officer has come to a conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of not adjusting previous advance or ad-hoc payments and did not take into account the amount of demurrage charges paid by the respondents to the Railways, which resulted in over-payment to the transport contractor. ( 26 ) IT is apparent from the enquiry report that great deal of evidence has been led on behalf of both the parties with regard to payment of ad-hoc and advance payment to the Transport Contractor. ( 27 ) IT is, therefore, necessary to consider whether the petitioner had in fact the power to sanction ad-hoc payment. ( 28 ) THE power to grant ad-hoc payment in actually contained in the model tender form Clause 16. From the said clause it appears that advance payment can be made at the discretion of the Regional Manager to the extent of 50% of the value of work done in cases where the contractors are not in a position to submit their final bill due to operational or other difficulties. ( 29 ) BY a letter dated 12th, February, 1999, disclosed in these proceedings the Deputy Manager had initimated the District Manager that district Manager was the competent authority to fix responsibility of any irregularity of the Transport Contractor and settlement of his payment. ( 30 ) FROM the nature of submissions made before the Enquiry Officer it appears that it was nobody's case that the petitioner was not authorised to sanction ad-hoc payment but the allegations was that he has exceeded his authority by allowing ad-hoc payment in excess of 50%. ( 31 ) THE provision contained in the tender document does not assume the character of a statutory provision. Therefore, the same can be waived. ( 31 ) THE provision contained in the tender document does not assume the character of a statutory provision. Therefore, the same can be waived. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that there has been a long standing practice in the department concerned to allow ad-hoc payment because the bills submitted by the Transport Contractor could not be finalized in time. It is, therefore, apparent that the strict construction of the clause regarding the ceiling limit of payment of ad-hoc payment to the transport Contractor was never adhered to. ( 32 ) THE Enquiry Officer has on the basis of various exhibits have come to a conclusion that since the Transport Contract has not submitted bills in some cases, ad-hoc payment could not have been released. But from Clause 16 of the model tender form it appears that ad-hoc payment to the extent of 50% value of work done can be sanctioned in cases where the Contractors are not in a position to submit their final bills. It is, therefore, clear that in cases where the Transport Contractor is unable to submit its final bill, ad-hoc payment could be sanctioned on the basis of the work. done. ( 33 ) THERE is a procedure laid down for internal audit in respect of the accounts of the respondents. Such internal audit is to be held every quarter i. e. on 30th June, 30th September and 31st December, Curing one year and the accounts are required to be closed as on 31st March of every year. It is, therefore, apparent that during the tenure for which the petitioner has worked as District Manager at least two quarters of audit were required to be done. It is significant to point out here that no objection from the audit department has ever come regarding sanctioning of ad-hoc payment. In fact the petitioner has never been intimated by anyone that he ought not to have sanctioned such ad-hoc payment. On the contrary, there were clear notings from the concerned department that ad-hoc payment can be made. ( 34 ) THE Enquiry Officer himself has recorded in the enquiry report that it was astonishing that in none of the district offices starting from dealing assistant to the District Manager, were aware of the particular cause in the tender document and went on making ad-hoc payment as per practice. ( 34 ) THE Enquiry Officer himself has recorded in the enquiry report that it was astonishing that in none of the district offices starting from dealing assistant to the District Manager, were aware of the particular cause in the tender document and went on making ad-hoc payment as per practice. ( 35 ) IT is also on record that prior to sanction the concerned files were sent for scrutiny to the concerned department only after the same has been fully scrutinized by the respective Assistant Manager, it was put up to the concerned officer for sanction. Therefore, prior to sanction of ad-hoc payment, the claim of the Transport Contractor had, in fact, gone through a process of checking. ( 36 ) WITH regard to the other portion of Article 1 of the Charges, in my opinion, is consequential to proving of the first part of the charge that the petitioner was not competent to allow and/or sanction ad-hoc payments. In any event, it is on record that a committee appointed by the District Manager, calcutta (West), with regard to the period commencing from August, 1997 to February, 1998 have enquired as to the responsibility of the Transport contractor with regard to demurrage and wharfage charges. The said committee after detailed investigation has come to a conclusion that only rs. 2,85,380/- could be made attributable to the Transport Contractor whereas for the said period the claim for demurrage and wharfage charges was Rs. 49,12,354/ -. ( 37 ) THE period from August 1, 1997 to February 9, 1998 is a period during which the petitioner had actually worked. The balance period of tenure the petitioner is only remaining four months because admittedly the petitioner's tenure as District Manager of the concerned area ended on 24th of July, 1998. ( 38 ) FROM the report of the committee it also appears that on various heads for which the responsibility has been fixed upon the Transport contractor, no liability can be fixed upon the petitioner. There were numerous instances of operational hazard faced by the respondent Authority at its shalimar Railway Siding. ( 38 ) FROM the report of the committee it also appears that on various heads for which the responsibility has been fixed upon the Transport contractor, no liability can be fixed upon the petitioner. There were numerous instances of operational hazard faced by the respondent Authority at its shalimar Railway Siding. ( 39 ) THE Enquiry Officer have also dealt with the allegation of ad-hoc payment and consequent non-adjustment of demurrage and wharfage charges during the regular period for which the Transport Contractor has worked which was admittedly two years commencing from 10th February, 1998 going a period much beyond the tenure of the petitioner. ( 40 ) FOR the said regular period it was alleged that an amount of rs. 67,50,998/- has accrued towards demurrage and wharffage charges. Out of which a sum of Rs. 19,02,999/- was fixed as the liability of the transport Contractor. It is apparent that during the four months tenure of the petitioner /'. e. from February, 1998 to July, 1998, the amount of rs. 67,50,9987- towards demurrage and wharfage charges could not have accrued. This amount has accumulated for the entire two years period. Unfortunately, it does not appear from any records nor from the order of the Enquiry Officer as to the break-up of the amount, which could be made attributable to the petitioner. ( 41 ) THE allegations that the amount of demurrage and wherffage charges for which the Transport Contractor was liable, could not be recovered due to over-payment of ad-hoc amount could not be proved against the petitioner. I have already stated earlier that since only part of the bills were sanctioned for payment of ad-hoc amount the actual amount accruing towards demurrage could have been recovered from the Transport Contractor upon finalisation of the bills. In fact, it appears from the record that part of which has been recovered subsequently. ( 42 ) IN the circumstances, I am of the opinion that Article-l of the charges has not been proved against the petitioner. ( 43 ) WITH regard to the Article of Charge It whereby the petitioner was sought to be held guilty of preventing misappropriation of three trucks which allegedly took place on three days, namely 4. 2. 1998, 9. 3. 1998 and 14. 6. 1998. ( 43 ) WITH regard to the Article of Charge It whereby the petitioner was sought to be held guilty of preventing misappropriation of three trucks which allegedly took place on three days, namely 4. 2. 1998, 9. 3. 1998 and 14. 6. 1998. It was alleged that in spite of the fact of misappropriation being brought to the notice of the petitioner he has failed to take any action. ( 44 ) IT is an admitted position that the petitioner was on leave from 4th of February to 6th of February, 1998. Accordingly, he could not have been proved guilty of alleged misappropriation, which took place on 4th of february, 1998. ( 45 ) ON 9th of March, 1998, a squad team consisting of 5 members was present at the Shalimar Railway Siding. No explanation was forthcoming from the respondent as to how the trucks could have been found to be missing in present of such a squad team. It also appears that in spite of such alleged misappropriation, which took place between 4th of February and 14th of June, 1998, the transport contractor continued to work for a much longer period even thereafter. ( 46 ) THE respondents have not been able to satisfy as to how the petitioner was allegedly intimated about such misappropriation of trucks. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner was ever intimated. Even on account of the payment of making of ad-hoc payments which is the basic subject-matter of Article of Charge 1, the respondents have not been able to satisfy me that the petitioner was ever informed or that it was brought to his notice during his tenure as District Manager that he ought not to have allowed such ad-hoc payments. It is also on record that the quantum attributable to the transport contractor due to the alleged misappropriation of trucks was assessed by the subsequent District Manager who took charge after expiry of the tenure of the petitioner and who thereafter assessed the amount recoverable against the transporter after permitting the transporter to work for subsequent period, accordingly the petitioner cannot be held liable for the alleged missing trucks. ( 47 ) FURTHER with regard to Article II of the Charges, from the finding of the Enquiry Officer it is clear that the Enquiry Officer himself was vacillating while coming to a conclusion against the petitioner. ( 47 ) FURTHER with regard to Article II of the Charges, from the finding of the Enquiry Officer it is clear that the Enquiry Officer himself was vacillating while coming to a conclusion against the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer in the enquiry report had clearly recorded that District Manager, Comiplation section, is the first organ to take note of non-receipt of truckloads of stock and not the District Manager directly. It has also been recorded in the enquiry report that there is nothing on record to show that the District Manager was ever informed from any corner regarding the purported non-receipt of the truckloads. In spite of such recording, the Enquiry Officer sought to hold the petitioner guilty of vicarious liability for not detecting such missing trucks. ( 48 ) THE Enquiry Officer has come to his own opinion while proving the charges that it was naturally expected of the petitioner to see there was no mischief on the part of the Transport Contractor while making payments. The duty of the Enquiry Officer is to find out whether the charges are proved not he is not to form his own subjective opinion on the basis of the facts recorded and/or disclosed in the enquiry proceedings. ( 49 ) THE enquiry Officer has completely failed to appreciate that while sanctioning payments the concerned files were routed through various stages in the department before the same reached the petitioner for the purpose of sanctioning ad-hoc payment. Under these circumstances, to hold the petitioner guilty of vicarious liability purely on the basis of surmises and conjectures and personal, opinion of the Enquiry Officer was highly unjustified if not mala fide. ( 50 ) WITH regard to. the other part of the Article II of the Charges regarding not taking any action for recovery of the cost of the missing stock, the Enquiry Officer himself has held that the charges itself is very "fragile and self-determining". However, at the same time, the Enquiry Officer had expressed his opinion that it is a high expectation on the petitioner to record such misappropriate stock and this allegation against the petitioner, namely, not taking any action for recovery of the missing stock does not supplant the first action, but merely supplements the first action. However, at the same time, the Enquiry Officer had expressed his opinion that it is a high expectation on the petitioner to record such misappropriate stock and this allegation against the petitioner, namely, not taking any action for recovery of the missing stock does not supplant the first action, but merely supplements the first action. ( 51 ) FROM the aforesaid, it is, therefore, apparent that the Article If of the Charges could not have been proved against the petitioner under any circumstances. One significant factor, which the Enquiry Officer had totally failed to take into account either deliberately or due to over sight that the same Transport Contractor against whom there was an allegation of misappropriation of trucks have been made to work for a much longer period even after the allegation of misappropriation was made. No explanation was given on the part of the respondents as to why such a Transport contractor against whom allegation of misappropriation of stock has been made and on which the charges petitioner has also been held guilty, was allowed to work for subsequent periods. ( 52 ) NO explanation was given as to why the value of the missing stock was not appropriated against the subsequent bills or if such realization has been made then in that case the respondents appear to have condoned the action of the Transport Contractor regarding misappropriation of stock by allowing the contractor to work for subsequent period. In either of the circumstances the petitioner could not have been held guilty. ( 53 ) THE fact that the respondents were proceeding in a biased manner against the petitioner is apparent from the fact that immediately after receipt of the Memorandum of Charges the petitioner by his letter dated. . . May, 2001, sought for inspection of relevant documents and also made a prayer for suitable extension of time for submission of written statement of defence. It is needless to point out that the charge-sheet itself was served upon him nearly after three years he had stopped working as the District Manager of the concerned area. ( 54 ) IT was, therefore, imperative that the petitioner was given every opportunity to inspect all the documents on the basis of which charges were framed against him in respect of numerous transactions. ( 54 ) IT was, therefore, imperative that the petitioner was given every opportunity to inspect all the documents on the basis of which charges were framed against him in respect of numerous transactions. ( 55 ) CURIOUSELY enough nearly three months after the petitioner had written the said letter requesting inspection of documents, the respondent aurhority replied by a letter dated 7th of August, 2001 rejecting such prayer observing that the said request was an example of "delaying tendency" of the petitioner. I have not been able to appreciate the said action on the part of the respondents. The letter itself was replied to after nearly three months. Prior thereto there have been no occasion for the petitioner to seek any extension of time. Therefore, the conclusion of the respondents that it was "delaying tendency" on the part of the petitioner was totally uncalled for. Even while rejecting such prayer for inspection of document, the respondents sought to appoint the Enquiry Officer by the same letter. ( 56 ) THEREFORE, in my opinion, the petitioner was denied a reasonable opportunity of inspecting documents before giving answer to the charges. This action on the part of the reapondent authority is in clear violation of the principle of natural justice. ( 57 ) NOW coming back to the issue whether the order of dismissal was served during his employment or after he had retired. From the facts it appears that the order of dismissal was not served upon the petitioner during his tenure of employment. The petitioner, indeed, worked in the office on 27th of May, 2002 and thereafter went on Casual Leave till his retirement. Therefore, the order of dismissal dated 21st May, 2002, could not have been made effective as on that date since the petitioner was allowed to work on a subsequent date i. e. 27th of May, 2002. It is an admitted position that the dismissal order was not received by the petitioner before 31st of may, 2002 and it was received only on 3rd June, 2002. Therefore, the service was made effective on the date when it was received. In support of the said contention the decision reported in AIR 1966 SC 1313 , was relied upon on behalf of the petitioner. Therefore, the service was made effective on the date when it was received. In support of the said contention the decision reported in AIR 1966 SC 1313 , was relied upon on behalf of the petitioner. It was submitted on the basis of the said decision that the dismissal order is effective only after it is communicated to the officer concerned. ( 58 ) SINCE the respondents have taken a point that there is an alternative remedy by way of appeal, therefore, the writ petition was not maintainable, the petitioner has relied upon the decision in the case of whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Mark, Mumbai and Ors. reported in 1998 (8) SCC 1 , in support of the proposition that when there is a question of violation of the fundamental right and violation of the principle of natural justice, alternative remedy is not a bar. ( 59 ) REITERATING the settled law on the issue that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision of Whirlpool corporation have held that the power to issue prerogative writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and not limited by other provisions of the Constitution, therefore, there is no restriction on the part of the High court to issue writs not only in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, prohibition, quo-waranto, certiorari, but also for any other purpose, but it has imposed upon itself a restriction, which is nothing, but a self imposed restriction in the matter of exercising its discretion dealing with the matters under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the instant case, I find that there has been, indeed, a violation of natural justice. Therefore, the writ petition is maintainable. The decision of Pato Hembram v. Union of India, reported in 2000 (2) Calcutta High Court Notes, was relied upon in support of the same proposition that alternative remedy is not a bar for entertaining a writ application when there is a violation of natural justice. The case of The state of Uttar Pradesh v. S. Lall, reported in 1998 (6) SCC 661, was relied upon on behalf of the petitioner in support of the proposition that non-supply of documents amount to depriving of opportunity of effective hearing. The case of The state of Uttar Pradesh v. S. Lall, reported in 1998 (6) SCC 661, was relied upon on behalf of the petitioner in support of the proposition that non-supply of documents amount to depriving of opportunity of effective hearing. In the instant case also, the inspection to the documents relied upon by the respondents and which formed the basis of the charge-sheet was denied to the petitioner. Therefore, the ratio decided in the case of The State of uttar Pradesh (supra) clearly applies in the instant case. ( 60 ) IT is, therefore, my considered opinion that there was no material before the respondent authority on the basis of which both the charges, namely, the Articles I and II could be proved against the petitioner. Furthermore, the respondents have proceeded in a biased manner against the petitioner from the very inception and there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice as against the petitioner. From the order of dismissal issued by the concerned respondents it appears that the report of the Enquiry Officer has been accepted in full without really applying any independent mind with regard thereto. Large number of conclusion of the enquiry Officer is based on subjective appreciation of fact and is a product of his own personal opinion. Therefore, the order of dismissal cannot stand and the same is hereby set aside and the writ petition is allowed. The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits as a result of the dismissal order being set aside and such benefits should be paid to the petitioner within a period of 4 (four) weeks from the date of the communication of the operative portion of this order. No order as to costs. Later-All parties are to act on a signed copy of the operative part of this judgment on the usual undertaking.