ARUN MISHRA, N. S. AZAD, JJ. ( 1 ) THESE appeals arise out of the same accident. Four appeals have been preferred by the owner and driver; M. A. Nos. 2457, 2459, 2458 and 2456 of 1999 aggrieved by the part of the award exonerating insurance company, National Insurance Co. Ltd. , whereas M. A. Nos. 2498, 2499 and 2500 of 1999 have been filed on behalf of the claimants for enhancement of compensation and also to saddle the liability on the insurer. Injured/deceased were travelling in the vehicle Tata 407 which is a goods carrier vehicle along with their goods, grain, etc. On 16. 3. 1997 at about 1. 30 p. m. at Bazar road at village Bharra Tola, Tata 407 MP 20-G 2018 turned turtle as it was driven by Kandhi alias Kanhaiyalal Sahu in a rash and negligent manner, resultantly persons travelling suffered injuries, some of them died. The vehicle was owned by Neeraj jain, insured with National Insurance Co. Ltd. Applications for compensation were preferred claiming compensation in each case. ( 2 ) THE driver, Kandhi alias Kanhaiyalal did not file any written statement. The owner in the written statement contended that the driver did not drive the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. Accident was not caused by him. Other facts were also denied. Excessive compensation has been claimed. Driver possessed valid and effective driving licence. Vehicle was insured as such there is liability of insurance company to make payment of compensation. ( 3 ) THE insurance company, National insurance Co. Ltd. in the written statement contended that there was no rash and negligent driving. Vehicle in question was a goods vehicle in which 20-25 persons were travelling. Driver of the vehicle did not possess the effective driving licence. As passengers were carried, there was violation of terms and conditions of the insurance policy, hence the insurer is not liable to make the payment of compensation. ( 4 ) LEARNED Claims Tribunal has passed the award in each of the cases. Insurer has been absolved of the liability to make payment, the owner and the driver have been held responsible to compensate. Finding has been recorded that the accident was the outcome of rash and negligent driving of the driver, Kandhi alias Kanhaiyalal. ( 4 ) LEARNED Claims Tribunal has passed the award in each of the cases. Insurer has been absolved of the liability to make payment, the owner and the driver have been held responsible to compensate. Finding has been recorded that the accident was the outcome of rash and negligent driving of the driver, Kandhi alias Kanhaiyalal. Insurer has been exonerated on the ground that there was violation of terms and conditions of the insurance policy inasmuch as injured/deceased were travelling in a goods vehicle and premium has not been realized for the labourers. ( 5 ) MR. Saurav Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the owner and driver has submitted that the insurer has been exonerated illegally. There is statutory liability of the insurer to make payment of compensation as all the injured/deceased persons were travelling in the vehicle along with their goods owned by them which they were carrying. Hence, the learned court below has gravely erred in law in exonerating the insurer from making the payment of the compensation. ( 6 ) MRS. Amrit Ruprah, learned counsel appearing on behalf of insurer, strenuously submitted that it is a case where 20-25 persons were carried in the goods vehicle. Thus, the vehicle was basically used for the purpose of carrying passengers which is a substantial violation of the insurance policy, as such insurer has been rightly exonerated. No interference is called for in this appeal. ( 7 ) M. A. No. 2499 of 1999 has been preferred by Sagni Bai for enhancement of compensation. She has been awarded compensation of Rs. 1,08,727 along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till realization. She has suffered disability to the extent of 64 per cent. Her right leg was amputated below knee. She has prayed for enhancement of compensation. ( 8 ) IN M. A. No. 2498 of 1999, Pancham paraste has died. Claim petition has been preferred by the widow, Sudhwaria Bai and daughter, Chandrawati Bai claiming compensation. Learned Claims Tribunal has awarded compensation of Rs. 1,12,068 along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of filing of claim petition till realization. Prayer has been made to enhance the compensation suitably. Claim petition has been preferred by the widow, Sudhwaria Bai and daughter, Chandrawati Bai claiming compensation. Learned Claims Tribunal has awarded compensation of Rs. 1,12,068 along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of filing of claim petition till realization. Prayer has been made to enhance the compensation suitably. ( 9 ) M. A. No. 2500 of 1999 has been preferred by the claimant Govind Singh, claiming compensation owing to death of his mother, namely, Shakuntala Bai. Compensation of Rs. 97,068 has been awarded along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition. Prayer made is to enhance compensation. ( 10 ) FIRST we take up the submission of the owner that the insurer is also liable to make the payment of compensation. There is evidence on record in all the cases and there is averment in the claim petition that the injured/deceased were travelling along with their goods. They were owner of the goods which they were carrying in the goods vehicle at the relevant time. There is evidence in each case of the claimants which has not been rebutted. No evidence has been adduced by respondent to show that the deceased/injured did not travel with their goods in the capacity of owner of goods. Thus, we are of the opinion that the deceased/injured were travelling in the vehicle at the time of accident along with their goods. Thus, there is statutory liability enjoined upon the insurer under section 147 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 covers liability of person who is travelling on goods vehicle as the owner of the goods. We are fortified in our view by the decision of the Apex Court in National Insurance co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur, 2004 ACJ 428 (SC), in which it has been laid down thus:" (17) By reason of the 1994 amendment what was added is, 'including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle'. The liability of the owner of the vehicle to insure it compulsorily, thus, by reason of the aforementioned amendment included only the owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle besides the third parties. The liability of the owner of the vehicle to insure it compulsorily, thus, by reason of the aforementioned amendment included only the owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle besides the third parties. The intention of Parliament, therefore, could not have been that the words 'any person' occurring in section 147 would cover all persons who were travelling in a goods carriage in any capacity whatsoever. If such was the intention there was no necessity for Parliament to carry out an amendment inasmuch as the expression 'any person' contained in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 147 would have included the owner of the goods or his authorised representative besides the passengers who are gratuitous or otherwise. (18) The observations made in this connection by the court in Asha Rani, 2003 acj 1 (SC), to which one of us, Sinha, j. , was a party, however, bear repetition: ' (26) In view of the changes in the relevant provisions in 1988 Act vis-a-vis the 1939 Act, we are of the opinion that the meaning of the words 'any person' must also be attributed having regard to the context in which they have been used, i. e. , a 'third party'. Keeping in view the provisions of 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that as the provisions thereof do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in a goods vehicle, the insurers would not be liable therefor. ' (19) In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorised representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorised representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise. (20) It is, therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorised representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorised representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people. "thus, we are of the opinion that the injured/deceased persons were travelling with their goods in the capacity of owner of the goods at the time of accident, insurer cannot escape from the liability. Question of examining insurance policy does not arise at all as the liability is statutory. Policy is subservient to the statutory provision. ( 11 ) THE Apex Court, even in the cases which involve violation of terms of policy of the number of persons permissible to be carried in a vehicle has held that even if number of passengers in a vehicle has exceeded that is not enough to exonerate the insurer from the liability to make payment of compensation. ( 12 ) THE Apex Court in B. V. Nagaraju v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. , 1996 ACJ 1178 (SC), has followed the decision of skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben chandravadan, 1987 ACJ 411 (SC), in view of the fact that there was "breach of carrying humans in a goods vehicle more than the number permitted in terms of the insurance policy, it was laid down that the same cannot be said to be such fundamental breach so as to afford ground to the insurer to deny indemnification" unless there were some factors which contributed to the causing of the accident. The Apex court has laid in B. V. Nagaraju (supra)that exclusion term of the insurance policy must be read down to serve the main purpose of it to indemnify the insured. The apex Court in B. V. Nagaraju (supra) has laid down thus:" (7) It is plain from the terms of the insurance policy that the insured vehicle was entitled to carry 6 workmen, excluding the driver. If those 6 workmen when travelling in the vehicle are assumed not to have increased any risk from the point of view of the insurance company on occurring of an accident, how could those added persons be said to have contributed to the causing of it is the poser, keeping apart the load it was carrying. Here, it is nobody's case that the driver of the insured vehicle was responsible for the accident. In fact, it was not disputed that the oncoming vehicle had collided head-on against the insured vehicle, which resulted in the damage. Merely by lifting a person or two, or even three, by the driver or the cleaner of the vehicle, without the knowledge of owner, cannot be said to be such a fundamental breach that the owner should, in all events, be denied indemnification. The misuse of the vehicle was somewhat irregular though, but not so fundamental in nature so as to put an end to the contract, unless some factors existed which, by themselves, had gone to contribute to the causing of the accident. In the instant case, however, we find no such contributory factor. In Skandia's case, 1987 acj 411 (SC), this court paved the way towards reading down the contractual clause by observing as follows: '. . . When the option is between opting for a view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of accidents or their dependants on the one hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by it, by way of business activity, there is hardly any choice. The court cannot but opt for the former view. The court cannot but opt for the former view. Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, the very same conclusion, would emerge in obeisance to the doctrine of 'reading down' the exclusion clause in the light of the 'main purpose' of the provision so that the 'exclusion clause' does not cross swords with the 'main purpose', highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose. The theory which needs no support is supported by Carter's Breach of Contract vide para 251. To quote:"notwithstanding the general ability of contracting parties to agree to exclusion clauses which operate to define obligations there exists a rule, usually referred to as the 'main purpose rule', which may limit the application of wide exclusion clauses defining a promisor's contractual obligations. For example, in Glynn v. Margetson and Co. , (1893) AC 351, Lord halsbury, L. C. stated: It seems to me that in construing this document, which is a contract of carriage between the parties, one must in the first instance look at the whole instrument and not at one part of it only. Looking at the whole instrument and seeing what one must regard. . . as its main purpose, one must reject words, indeed whole provisions, if they are inconsistent with what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contracl. "although this rule played a role in the development of the doctrine of fundamental breach, the continued validity of the rule was acknowledged when the doctrine was rejected by the House of lords in Suissee Atlantique Societe d'armement Maritime SA v. N. V. Rot-terdamsche Kolen Centrale, (1967) 1 ac 361. Accordingly, wide exclusion clauses will be read down to the extent to which they are inconsistent with the main purpose or object of the contract'. Accordingly, wide exclusion clauses will be read down to the extent to which they are inconsistent with the main purpose or object of the contract'. " ( 13 ) A Division Bench of this court in the case of Patharibai Karansingh v. Firm lalji Shankadal, 1985 ACJ 526 (MP), has held that:" (23) On a plain reading of the language of section 95 (1) (b) proviso (ii)it seems to us that the coverage of risk is extended to all those who are required of necessity to be on the insured vehicle by reason of or in pursuance of contract of employment and the employer having not been specified therein there is no reason to put a limitation that the benefit of coverage of risk is intended only for those who are in the employment of the insured owner of the vehicle. " ( 14 ) THUS, in our opinion, firstly as liability is statutorily covered under section 147 of Act, the larger number of persons travelling with their goods as owner is not relevant in the instant case. Even if number of passengers has exceeded than provided in insurance policy insurer cannot escape the liability in view of the above quoted decisions. In our opinion, the driver, owner and insurer are liable jointly and severally to make payment of compensation in each case. ( 15 ) COMING to claimants appeal: In m. A. No. 2498 of 1999 Pancham Paraste (aged 45 years) has died. Learned Claims tribunal has assessed the income of the deceased at Rs. 1,000 per month, has awarded total compensation of Rs. 1,12,068 along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. Multiplier of 13 has been applied. We find that as to income of the deceased there is evidence on record of Sudhwaria bai, CW 1. She has stated that her husband used to earn Rs. 1,500 per month, his age was 35 years. She has spent Rs. 15,000 in funeral and Rs. 1,000 for transporting the dead body from hospital. There is absolutely nothing to doubt the version of the claimant that the deceased was earning a sum of Rs. 1,500 per month which is most reasonable statement of income at the rate of Rs. 50 per day. Thus, in our opinion, the tribunal has erred in law in assessing the income at Rs. There is absolutely nothing to doubt the version of the claimant that the deceased was earning a sum of Rs. 1,500 per month which is most reasonable statement of income at the rate of Rs. 50 per day. Thus, in our opinion, the tribunal has erred in law in assessing the income at Rs. 1,000 and in discarding the income stated by the claimant. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the statement of widow is found reliable and worthy of credence. 1/3rd amount deceased would have spent on himself. Thus, the total monthly loss of dependency comes to rs. 1,000, annually Rs. 12,000. At the age of 45 years, which has been determined by the Tribunal, in the claim petition age of deceased has been mentioned 45 years, we take up it to be 45 years discarding the statement of widow that deceased was aged 35 years, appropriate multiplier at the age of 45 is 15. Thus, total loss of dependency comes to Rs. 12,000 x 15 = Rs. 1,80,000. In addition widow is entitled for Rs. 5,000 on account of loss of consortium. Claimants are entitled for Rs. 2,000 on account of funeral expenses, Rs. 2,500 on account of loss to estate and a sum of Rs. 5,000 on account of loss of expectancy of life. Thus, total compensation comes to Rs. 1,80,000 + Rs. 5,000 + Rs. 2,000 + Rs. 2,500 + rs. 5,000 = Rs. 1,94,500. ( 16 ) COMING to M. A. No. 2500 of 1999: in this case, Shakuntala aged 50 years died. She was earning Rs. 1,200 per month. The claims Tribunal has assessed the income at Rs. 1,000. In our opinion, the assessment of earnings made by the Tribunal is on the lower side. There is nothing to disbelieve the earning of the deceased at Rs. 1,200 per month. 1/3rd amount deceased would have spent on herself in her lifetime. Thus, loss of monthly dependency comes to Rs. 800, annually Rs. 9,600. Appropriate multiplier is 11. Thus, the total loss of dependency comes to Rs. 9,600 x 11 = Rs. 1,05,600. In addition, claimant is entitled for Rs. 2,000 on account of funeral expenses, Rs. 2,500 for loss to estate and Rs. 5,000 on account of loss of expectancy of life. Thus, the total compensation comes to Rs. 1,05,600 + Rs. 2,000 + Rs. 2,500 + Rs. 5,000 = rs. 9,600 x 11 = Rs. 1,05,600. In addition, claimant is entitled for Rs. 2,000 on account of funeral expenses, Rs. 2,500 for loss to estate and Rs. 5,000 on account of loss of expectancy of life. Thus, the total compensation comes to Rs. 1,05,600 + Rs. 2,000 + Rs. 2,500 + Rs. 5,000 = rs. 1,15,100. ( 17 ) COMING to M. A. No. 2499 of 1999: sagni Bai, claimant has suffered serious disablement in the instant case. Her right leg below knee was amputated. She has suffered permanent disablement to the extent of 64 per cent. The Claims Tribunal has awarded the total compensation of rs. 1,08,727 along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum which includes an amount of Rs. 78,727 awarded on account of 64 per cent disablement, medical expenditure of Rs. 20,000, for physical pain and mental suffering, a sum of Rs. 10,000 has been awarded along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. The Claims tribunal has assessed the income of the claimant at Rs. 1,000 per month. She was earning Rs. 40 per day as stated by her. There is absolutely nothing to doubt her statement. Thus, the monthly income comes to Rs. 1,200. She suffered loss of earning capacity to the extent of 64 per cent and was unable to perform any kind of work due to amputation of leg. She has suffered amputation of leg, in our opinion, it would be appropriate to grant compensation on account of disablement due to amputation of leg as she has suffered disability to the extent of 64 per cent taking income at the rate of Rs. 1,200 per month, total compensation by reduction of earning, applying appropriate multiplier at the age of claimant comes to Rs. 1,56,670. For physical pain and mental suffering we award a sum of Rs. 25,000, we enhance the medical expenditure from Rs. 20,000 to Rs. 25,000 on account of special diet, we award a sum of Rs. 5,000 and further sum of Rs. 5,000 for attendant, which amount must have been incurred by the claimant. Thus, the total compensation comes to Rs. 1,56,670 + Rs. 25,000 + Rs. 25,000 + Rs. 5,000 + rs. 5,000 = Rs. 2,16,670. ( 18 ) THE appeals preferred by owner and driver are allowed to extent that insurer is also liable. Liability is joint and several. 5,000 for attendant, which amount must have been incurred by the claimant. Thus, the total compensation comes to Rs. 1,56,670 + Rs. 25,000 + Rs. 25,000 + Rs. 5,000 + rs. 5,000 = Rs. 2,16,670. ( 18 ) THE appeals preferred by owner and driver are allowed to extent that insurer is also liable. Liability is joint and several. The appeals of claimants are allowed to extent indicated above. We affirm the rate of interest as awarded by the Claims Tribunal in all cases in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. No costs. Appeal allowed. .