JUDGMENT 1. The appellant was appointed as Beldar on 1st May, 1986. In the year 1987 his services were terminated by the respondents. The appellant challenged the order of termination by way of a writ petition. On 19th January, 1989, the writ petition was allowed by this Court. As a result thereof the appellant was reinstated in service. But at the same time the respondents filed a Special Leave Petition against the order of the High Court. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court on the ground that the appellant was appointed against the post of a Beldar under the special scheme for providing employment to at least one member of every landless family for 100 days in a year and the scheme conceived of an arrangement to whereby on expiry of 100 days of employment, someone else, similarly situated, would be provided employment so that the scheme would be available for providing employment to as many unemployed persons as possible. It appears that despite the order of the Supreme Court. The appellant continued in service. According to the learned counsel for the appellant his client was given fresh appointment w.e.f. 1st January, 1992. 2. On 19th March, 1997, the services of the appellant were terminated. The appellant, thereupon filed a fresh writ petition challenging the order of termination. The learned Single Judge, however, dismissed the writ petition in view of the aforesaid order passed by the Supreme Court. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the appellant has filed the instant appeal. 3. We do not find any error or illegality in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The appellant was given employment under the aforesaid scheme whereby work has to be provided by the State Government to the member of every landless family for 100 days in a year and the scheme conceived of an arrangement whereby on expiry of 100 days of employment someone else similarly situated would be provided employment so that maximum unemployed persons of the State would get benefit. In spite of the fact that the appointment was to last only for 100 days, it appears that it continued for a number of years. In spite of the fact that the appointment was to last only for 100 days, it appears that it continued for a number of years. This was contrary to the scheme of the State Government.The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant was given fresh appointed w.e.f. 1st January, 1992 and that appointment was not s under the scheme. The claim of the appellant appears to be hollow as no appointment order has been produced by the appellant on record. Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was given fresh appointment on 1st January, 1992 dehors the scheme, but this would mean that the appellant was given back-door entry in service, Such a position can not be la countenanced in law. 4. The learned counsel also submits with reference to Schedule-1 to the writ petition that the department recommended the case of the appellant for granting him semi-permanent status.From a reading of Schedule-1 it is clear that the appellant and other 1 s similarly situated persons were kept in service in ignorance of the order of the Supreme Court. 5. The appointment under the scheme cannot be permitted to last beyond 100 days. Any appointment beyond 100 days has the effect of short circuiting the scheme as the benefit of the scheme will not reach to maximum number of persons as is conceived by the scheme. The purpose of the scheme will be frustrated in case persons employed under the scheme are continued indefinitelyIn the circumstances therefore, the appeal fails and is, hereby, dismissed.Writ Appeal Dismissed. *******