Asia Vision Entertainment Limited v. Suresh Productions
2004-04-13
L.NARASIMHA REDDY
body2004
DigiLaw.ai
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals are filed against the order dated 10-2-2004 passed by the learned Chief judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in l. A. No. 4069 of 2003 in O. S. No. 392 of 2003. C. M. A. No. 1239 of 2004 is filed by defendant No. l and C. M. A. No. l 133 of 2004 is filed by Defendant No. 3 in the suit. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as arrayed in the suit. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFFS 1 to 4 are engaged in the business and activity of production, distribution and exhibition of cinematography films in various languages in the country. They filed O. S. No. 392 of 2003 for the relief of declaration that Defendants 1 to 4, have no manner of right, title or interest in the copy rights in respect of as many as 16 films, mentioned in the schedule (hereinafter referred to as "the Films"), and for a consequential decree of perpetual injunction against Defendants 1 to 4, from telecasting the said films, or dealing with, in any manner, and from interfering with the enjoyment of the copy rights by the plaintiffs. ( 3 ) BROADLY stated the case of the plaintiffs is, that after producing the films, they negotiated with Defendant No. 4 for assignment of copyrights for telecasting the films on cable network for a consideration of Rs. 35 lakhs in the year 1994. The 4th defendant is said to have nominated defendants 5 to 8 for assignment of the same rights for a period of nine years with effect from 23-12-1994, duly adjusting the consideration paid by it. Plaintiffs alleged that they did not assign the copyrights in favour of the Respondents 1 to 3, and despite the same, they have been telecasting the said films. On the same contentions, plaintiffs filed two interlocutory applications under order 39, Rule 1 C. P. C. One application is filed for restraining the defendants from issuing notices or advertisements to any medium, claiming copyrights, and the other is filed for restraining the defendants from exercising copyrights or telecasting the films. ( 4 ) THE plea of Defendants 1 to 3 was common. According to them, the plaintiffs assigned the copyrights of the films in favour of Defendant No. 4, through an agreement dated 10-10-1994 for a consideration of rs.
( 4 ) THE plea of Defendants 1 to 3 was common. According to them, the plaintiffs assigned the copyrights of the films in favour of Defendant No. 4, through an agreement dated 10-10-1994 for a consideration of rs. 35 lakhs, and Defendant No. 4 in turn, assigned the rights in favour of Defendant no. 3, within one week thereafter i. e. , 17-10- 1994, for a consideration of Rs. 60 lakhs. They claim that through an agreement dated 16-3-1997, Defendant No. 3 assigned rights in respect of the said films, together with several other films, in favour of Defendant no. 2, and thereafter, through an agreement dated 21-3-1997 and 20-4-1999 the 1st defendant acquired rights for the films. They repeated their contentions in their counter affidavits filed, opposing the interlocutory applications, and supplemented through some documents. ( 5 ) INITIALLY, the Trial Court granted ex parte ad interim injunctions. After service of notice and on hearing the parties, the trial Court made the ad interim injunction, restraining the Defendants 1 to 4 from telecasting the films or exercising the copyrights, absolute, through the order under appeal. ( 6 ) SRI C. Kodandaram and Sri J. Prabhakar, learned Counsel for Defendants 1 and 2, respectively, submit that the Trial court did not follow the procedure prescribed by law in passing the order under appeal, be it, as regards referring to the contentions, documentary evidence placed before it, or furnishing the index of evidence. They contend that not a single provision of the copyright Act, which has an important bearing on the issue, was referred to. The learned Counsel also urged that though it has emerged on record that the Defendants 1 and 2 have been exercising their rights of exhibiting the films for the past 8 years, by continuously telecasting the films, the trial court did not take the same into account either in the context of prima facie case or balance of convenience. They complain that the principles governing for grant of temporary injunction were not at all taken into account by the Trial Court. ( 7 ) SRI Milind G. Gokhale, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, on the other hand, submits that the Trial Court took into account the submissions made by the parties as well as the documents relied upon by them.
( 7 ) SRI Milind G. Gokhale, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, on the other hand, submits that the Trial Court took into account the submissions made by the parties as well as the documents relied upon by them. He contends that there is no dispute that the plaintiffs are the producers, and that the defendants 1 to 3 failed to establish even prima facie, that there existed a valid assignment in favour of Defendant No. 4 from the plaintiffs, when the 3rd Defendant is said to have acquired such rights from defendant No. 4. ( 8 ) THE grievance of the Defendants 1 and 2, against the order under appeal is, both as regards the procedure and the substance. Important rights of the plaintiffs as well as defendants are involved in the matter. The contest between them was serious and both of them relied upon series of documents. Even to arrive at a prima facie conclusion, it was necessary to discuss the matter with reference to the respective contentions, documents on record, and relevant provisions of law. The Trial Court referred to as many as 10 documents, relied upon by the plaintiffs, in the body of the order. Reference was made to one document, relied upon by the 1 st Defendant. The order discloses that several documents were filed on behalf of the 1st Defendant. However, at the end of the order in the appendix of evidence, it was indicated "nil". ( 9 ) WHEN there is no reference to the documents in the appendix of evidence, it would be difficult to identify them or to know as to how many documents were filed by the respective parties, and which of the documents weighed to the Trial Court. ( 10 ) THE C. P. C. does not stipulate any special procedure to be followed in respect of interlocutory or miscellaneous proceedings. Section 141 thereof, mandates that the procedure provided for in the Code, in regard to suit, shall be followed in all the proceedings in any Civil Court to the extent possible. Till the year 1977, there used to be uncertainty as to whether the expression "proceedings"referred to under Section 141 would take in its fold the interlocutory applications.
Section 141 thereof, mandates that the procedure provided for in the Code, in regard to suit, shall be followed in all the proceedings in any Civil Court to the extent possible. Till the year 1977, there used to be uncertainty as to whether the expression "proceedings"referred to under Section 141 would take in its fold the interlocutory applications. Through an Act 4 of 1976, the Parliament added an explanation to section 141, which is to the effect that the expression "proceeding" shall include those under Order IX C. P. C. The proceedings under article 226 were excluded, because they are governed by the writ rules, framed by the respective High Courts. The proceedings under Order DC, are referred to, almost as an illustration. Reference to it is not exclusive, but inclusive. Therefore, applications under order 39 C. P. C. , fall within the scope of section 141. Even before Section 141 was amended, the Nagpur High Court held way back in the year 1933, that Section 141 CPC covers the proceedings under Order 39, rule 2. (See AIR 1933 Nagpur page 62) ( 11 ) THE purport of Section 141 cannot be said to be to the extent that every interlocutory application shall be decided as though it is a suit. The indication is that the procedure in regard to suit shall be followed "as far as it can be made applicable". Instances are not lacking, where oral evidence is recorded, while deciding interlocutory applications, such as those under Order 22, or under Order 39 etc. Confining the evidence, to the form of affidavits at the interlocutory stages is mostly as a measure of convenience. With the recent amendment to C. P. C. , the evidence through affidavits almost stands equated to that of oral evidence. The broad principles such as reference to pleadings, evidence, appreciation of the contentions, application of the provisions of law, need to be followed even while disposing of interlocutory applications. ( 12 ) FOR example, the nature of the assignment of copyright, the duration of assignment, governed by provisions of sections 18 and 19 of the Copyright Act, had an important bearing on the matter. Adjudication of the I. A. , on a consideration of such provisions, would go a very long way, in deciding the rights of the parties more effectively.
Adjudication of the I. A. , on a consideration of such provisions, would go a very long way, in deciding the rights of the parties more effectively. The purpose underlying such a course of action is to ensure that the matter receives proper appreciation, be it, on facts or in law, and the parties concerned, or the appellate Court would be in a position to appreciate as to how the matter was analyzed by the Trial Court. ( 13 ) THOUGH the relevancy and admissibility of documents is to be considered at the trial of the suit, the importance and relevance of documents at the interlocutory stages cannot be ignored. Discussion with reference to the documents relied upon by the parties would enable the Courts to arrive at an objective and effective conclusion. Omission to refer to any of the documents relied upon by the parties would have its own impact. Unless all the documents are referred to in the index, it would be too difficult to discern as to whether the parties have filed such documents, and whether such documents were relied upon at all. Therefore, the grievance of the Defendants 1 and 2, that omission to refer to the documents in the appendix of evidence and absence of discussion of the matter with reference to relevant provisions has resulted in failure of justice to them, cannot be brushed aside. ( 14 ) THERE existed some confusion as to the number of the I. A. , in which the order under appeal is passed. Plaintiffs assert that mentioning of the LA. No. 4069 of 2003 in the order under appeal is a mistake. According to them, the order is referable to the one in LA. No. 4082 of 2003. Since both the parties agreed that there is some mistake as to reference of the number of the LA. , in the order, it needs proper attention. ( 15 ) COMING to the contention of the defendants 1 and 2, that no reference was made to several proceedings and documents referred to them, and contentions touching on merits; it needs to be observed that the principles governing grant of relief of permanent injunction, by and large, apply to those of the temporary injunctions also.
( 15 ) COMING to the contention of the defendants 1 and 2, that no reference was made to several proceedings and documents referred to them, and contentions touching on merits; it needs to be observed that the principles governing grant of relief of permanent injunction, by and large, apply to those of the temporary injunctions also. The question as to whether there exists any prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs, and as to whether they would suffer irreparable loss, if the injunction is not granted, are to be taken into account. Where the rights involved are in relation to movable properties, or intangible rights, such as copyrights, the possibility of any loss being compensated in terms of money; needs to be addressed by the Courts, while considering applications for temporary injunctions. The broad principles underlying the Act, in which the rights are claimed by the parties, need to be taken into account. The reason is that the grant or denial of injunction should not result in defeating the rights that have accrued to the parties under the relevant provision of law. ( 16 ) ANOTHER important aspect of the matter is that temporary injunctions are to be issued to enable the existing state of affairs to continue, and not to bring about a new state of affairs. From the order under appeal it is not evident that these aspects were taken into account. This Court is of the view that the matter needs a fresh consideration on the lines indicated above. Any further discussion on the matter is likely to have its impact on the merits of the matter. ( 17 ) HENCE, the order dated 10-2-2004 in I. A. No. 4069 of 2003 in O. S. No. 392 of 2003, is set aside. The learned Chief Judge, city Civil Court, Hyderabad, is directed to dispose of the I. A. , afresh, on merits, and in accordance with law, after giving opportunity to both the parties, before 30th June 2004. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed. No costs.