JUDGMENT 1. - On March 26, 2004 when the arguments were concluded. I pronounced the order which reads as under:- "The writ petition being devoid of merit stands dismissed without any order as to costs. Reasons will follow." Here are the reasons : 2. The petitioner has sought intervention of this Court to declare the notice inviting tender (for short 'NIT') date March 17, 2004 and all consequential actions taken thereon by the respondents as legally inoperative and to direct the respondents State of Rajasthan and Excise Commissioner to grant to the petitioner licence on exclusive privilege amount basis for Jaipur-Dausa group for the year 2004-2005 w.e.f. April 1, 2004 till March 31, 2005 for a sum of Rs. 178.5 Crores. Contextual facts depict that for the year 2004-2005, the Excise Commissioner Rajasthan had evolved a policy and divided the entire state in 25 groups, Jaipur- Dausa group being one such group. A comprehensive NIT for all 25 groups was issued by the Excise Commissioner on January 28, 2004 and the last date of receiving the tenders for the various groups was fixed as February 24, 2004. The reserve price for Jaipur-Dausa group was Rs. 1,85,65,69,000/-. The earnest money of 5% of the reserve price was kept as Rs. 9,28,29,000/-. Since no tender was submitted till February 24, 2004 in response to NiT for Jaipur-Dausa group, another NIT was issued on February 25, 2004 and the last date for submitting tenders for the said group was fixed as March 1 ,2004. Again no tenders were received for Jaipur-Dausa group, therefore, another NIT for the said group was issued on March 1, 2004, wherein the last date for submitting the tenders was fixed as March 5, 2004. Yet another NIT was issued on March 5, 2004 for Jaipur-Dausa group, wherein the last date for submitting tenders was fixed as March 12, 2004. Finding no response pursuant to the NIT, the Excise Commissioner on March 17, 2004 issued another NIT wherein the last date for submitting tenders was fixed as March 20, 2004. In the said NIT, the reserve price for Jaipur-Dausa group for the year 2004-2005 was brought down from Rs. 185,65,69,000/- to Rs. 171,73,26,000/-. 3. Finding no response pursuant to the NIT, the Excise Commissioner on March 17, 2004 issued another NIT wherein the last date for submitting tenders was fixed as March 20, 2004. In the said NIT, the reserve price for Jaipur-Dausa group for the year 2004-2005 was brought down from Rs. 185,65,69,000/- to Rs. 171,73,26,000/-. 3. The respondents No. 1 & 2 filed reply to the writ petition with the averments that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief since he neither participated in the proceedings for NIT nor he raised any objection to the procedure before the last date of submission of the tender about the insufficiency of time. The NIT was published on March 17, 2004, tenders were opened on March 20, 2004 and the sanction was issued on March 20, 2004 and the sanction was issued on March 20, 2004, as such the process stood completed and attained finality. It is further pleaded that the matter pertains to plain and simple commercial contract having no statutory flavour attached there with, therefore, in the matters of ordinary commercial transaction the writ petition of present nature is not to be entertained. 4. Mr. Jagdeep Dhankar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, canvassed that the action of issuing notice dated March 17, 2004 and consequent actions taken thereon are legally impermissible and 35 lacking in jurisdiction. The actions are contrary to the provisions of the Rajasthan Excise Act 1950 and Rajasthan Excise Rules 1956. It is contended that the NIT March 17, 2004 does not conform to the procedure contained in sub-rule (3) of rule 67KK of the Rule of 1956. The NIT should have been provided for a period of 15 days and the action of respondents runs foul to the wholesome provisions of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. It is further contended that the impugned action is contrary to the principles of natural justice as also the public interest as the State of Rajasthan is being made to suffer loss of revenue to the extent of Rs. 3 crores in one year. It is further contended that the impugned action is contrary to the principles of natural justice as also the public interest as the State of Rajasthan is being made to suffer loss of revenue to the extent of Rs. 3 crores in one year. It is further contended that the NIT March 17, 2004 cannot be taken to be a virtual continuation of NIT January 28, 2004 as if geographical spread of the group or its fiscal parameters have substantial changes, the NIT has to be a different one and the same is required to confirm to the provisions of sub-rule (3) of rule 67KK and the proviso of sub-rule (3) of rule 67KK cannot be brought into play. It is further submitted that the procedure adopted is ex-so facie unfair, unreasonable, discriminatory and not only runs foul to the principles of natural justice but also militate against the fiscal interest of the State. The action of respondents runs contrary to the principles of fair play and natural justice. Once the Excise Commissioner, before issuance of the fifth NIT indicated to the media that there will be no reduction in the reserve price, fifth NIT which was issued with reduced reserve price, required a massive publicity. Reliance is placed on Ram and Shyam & Co. v. State of Haryana ( AIR 1985 SC 1147 ) , TVL Sundaram Granites v. Imperial Granites, ( AIR 1999 SC 3835 ) , Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., ( AIR 2000 SC 801 ) , Tata Cellular v. UOI, (1994) 6 SCC 651 , L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI, (1997) 3 SCC 261 and UOI v. G. Ganayuttam, ( AIR 1997 SC 3387 ) . 5. Per contra, Mr. B.P Agrawal, learned Advocate General supported the action of the State of Rajasthan and urged that in view of proviso to Rule 6 KK(3) the State is competent to introduce change. It is further contended that since the petitioner did not take part in the process of tender, the writ petition is not maintainable. 6. I have pondered over the submissions. 7. It appears from the material on record that the petitioner had is knowledge of the NIT published in the news paper on March 17, 2004 but he did not choose to take part in the process. 6. I have pondered over the submissions. 7. It appears from the material on record that the petitioner had is knowledge of the NIT published in the news paper on March 17, 2004 but he did not choose to take part in the process. The petitioner even did not raise any objection in regard to reduction of reserve price or insufficiency of time. It is after expiry of the last date of submission of tenders i.e. March 20, 2004, that the petitioner has instituted the instant writ petition. 8. It is trite that a party can not be permitted at the same time to affirm and disaffirm the same transaction affirm it as far as it is for his benefit and disaffirm it as far as it is to his prejudice. In Shah Mukhun Lal v. Baboo Sree Kishan Singh, (1867-69) 12 Moor Ind App. 157 , LORD CHELMSFORD indicated thus : "A men can not both affirm and disaffirm the same transaction, show its true nature for his own relief, and insist on its apparent character to prejudice his adversary. This principle, so just and reasonable in itself, and often expressed in the terms, that you cannot both approbate and reprobate the same transaction has been applied by their Lordships in this Committee to the consideration of Indian Appeals, as one applicable in the Courts of that Country, which are to administer justice according to equity and good conscience. The maxim is founded. not so much on any positive law, as on the broad and universally applicable principles of justice." 9. The maxim is founded. not so much on any positive law, as on the broad and universally applicable principles of justice." 9. The general principle of estoppel by conduct is thus sated by the Lord Chancellor in Cairncross v. Lorimer, 3 HLC 829 : "The doctrine will apply, which is to be found, I believe, in the laws of all civilised nations that if a man either by words or by conduct has intimated that he consents to an act which has been done, and that he will offer no opposition to it, although it could not have lawfully done without his consent, and he thereby induces others to do that from which they otherwise might have abstained, he cannot question the legality of the act he had so sanctioned, to the prejudice of those who have so given faith to his words or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct I am of opinion that, generally speaking, if a party having an interest to prevent an act being done has full notice of its being done, and acquiesces in it, so as to induce a reasonable belief that he consents to it, and the position of others is allowed by their giving credit to his sincerity, he has no more right to so challenge the act to their prejudice than he would have had if it had been done by his previous licence." (Underlining is mine) 10. In Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court propounded that the Court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. In the instant case it appears that when no group yielded despite publication of four NITs the State Government took decision to reduce the reserve price. I find myself unable to accept this contention of the petitioner that action of the State in reducing the reserve price, is against the public interest. The action of the State Government is evidently based on its economic policy and can not be termed as unfair. I find myself unable to accept this contention of the petitioner that action of the State in reducing the reserve price, is against the public interest. The action of the State Government is evidently based on its economic policy and can not be termed as unfair. The Excise Commissioner had to abide by the decision of the State Government and even if he initially was of the firm view not to reduce the reserve price, he was bound to introduce necessary changes in the NIT in view of proviso to sub rule (3) of Rule 67KK of the Rules of 1956, pursuant to the decision taken by the State Government. I am of the opinion that the petitioner is estopped by his conduct from challenging the NIT dated March 17, 2004 and consequential actions taken thereon. For these reasons the petitioner is not entitled to any reliefWrit petition dismissed. *******