Gurmeet Kaur (Widow) v. Lachhman Kaur (Deceased) Through L. Rs.
2004-04-28
HEMANT GUPTA
body2004
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment Hemant Gupta, J. 1. The present appeal is filed by the unsuccessful plaintiff arising out of suit for declaration to the effect that defendant No. 1 Lachhman Kaur had no right to dispose of half share of the house in dispute and also land measuring 98 kanals 17 marlas situated in village Hizara, Chander Sain and Kaniwal. 2. The brief facts out of which the present appeal arises is that one Punjab State was owner of land situated in villages Hazara, Chander Sain and Kaniwal and three houses, After his death, the property was inherited in equal shares by his sons Bhan Singh and Massa Singh. After the death of Massa Singh, his widow-Lachhman Kaur, defendant No.l, inherited half share of property falling to the share of Massa Singh. In the year 1953, Smt. Lachhman Kaur brought a suit for declaration that she was full owner of the property left by Massa Singh. The declaration was sought against Bhan Singh, brother of deceased-Massa Singh. The parties entered into a compromise in the said suit wherein Lachchman Kaur agreed to accept Rs. 400/- per year as maintenance and one house for her residence till her death. She relinquished her rights in two houses but was given right to retain the third house. The amount of maintenance was to be paid in two six monthly installments. There was also a condition in the compromise that Smt. Lachhman Kaur will not alienate house and other property. 3. The plaintiffs are claiming rights through Bhan Singh to seek declaration in respect of land situated in the three villages as well as the house in respect of which Lachhman Kaur was allowed to stay during her life time to the effect that Lachhman Kaur has no right to alienate half share of house and the land. Defendant No. 1-Lachhman Kaur contested the suit. She denied that she relinquished her rights in a compromise and asserted that she has become full owner of property after the commencement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 . 4. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit holding that Bhan Singh made a statement Ex.P7 in the previous suit wherein the parties have compromised. Smt. Lachhman Kaur had agreed to accept Rs. 400/- as maintenance and she would only have a right to reside in one house shown in the plan.
4. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit holding that Bhan Singh made a statement Ex.P7 in the previous suit wherein the parties have compromised. Smt. Lachhman Kaur had agreed to accept Rs. 400/- as maintenance and she would only have a right to reside in one house shown in the plan. But she would have no right to other property and would not have any power to alienate the house given to her and other property inherited by her. She was given right to seek partition of the property inherited by her from her husband in case maintenance was not paid to her. Lachhman Kaur accepted the above statement of Bhan Singh on 14.8.1954 vide Ex.P8. On the basis of such compromise, the suit was dismissed as withdrawn vide Ex.P4. The learned trial Court found that the defendant had agreed to accept Rs. 400/- as maintenance but continues to have right, title or interest in the property. She acquired right of residence and to seek partition of her half share in case maintenance was not paid to her according to compromise. The only rider was that Lachhman Kaur could not alienate the property in any manner by sale, mortgage or otherwise. Thus, the trial Court concluded that Lachhman Kaur continued to hold property for life term before the enforcement of Hindu Succession Act. It was held that defendant No. 1 on the enforcement of Hindu Succession Act being possessed of property become full owner in terms of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 . 5. In appeal, controversy rested on issue Nos. 6 and 16 as to what was the effect of the compromise in the previous suit on the right of Lachhman Kaur. The first appellate Court found that the language contained in Ex.P7 (statement of Bhan Singh) that "she has relinquished her right of two houses". However, there is no mention about the landed property for which the present suit is filed. She had surrendered possession over two houses but she had not agreed to give her right regarding landed property. The only restriction put on her was that she would not sell or mortgage the house during her life time. Thus, the first appellate Court held that Lachhman Kaur has pre-existing right in the estate of her father-in-law and she inherited the property to the extent of half share.
The only restriction put on her was that she would not sell or mortgage the house during her life time. Thus, the first appellate Court held that Lachhman Kaur has pre-existing right in the estate of her father-in-law and she inherited the property to the extent of half share. In respect of the house, the Court held that the only way to interpret the statement of Bhan Singh is that the amount of maintenance was given to her for relinquishing her right in respect of two houses. Thus, it was held that the trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that the case would be governed by Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. 6. In the present second appeal, the dispute has been raised to the effect whether under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 restricted estate enlarges into full ownership of Smt. Lachhman Kaur. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance have gone through the record of the case. 8. Punjab Singh was owner of the land and three houses, as mentioned above. He had two sons Bhan Singh and Massa Singh. Massa Singh left widow Lachhman Kaur, defendant No. 1. In a suit for declaration filed by her, Bhan Singh made a statement Ex.P7 which was accepted by Lachhman Kaur vide Ex.P8. The suit was dismissed as withdrawn vide Ex.P4. As per compromise, Lachhman Kaur had relinquished her claim in respect of two houses in lieu of maintenance of Rs. 400/- to be paid in two equal six monthly installments. Consequences were also provided if there is default in payment of installments. However, Lachhman Kaur was allowed to retain possession of the third house with further restriction to alienate the said house and the other property. This compromise was entered into prior to the commencement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 . Smt. Lachhman Kaur had pre-existing right in the property being widow of Massa Singh. After death of Massa Singh, such pre-existing right was acknowledged by Bhan Singh in a suit for declaration filed by Smt. Lachhman Kaur prior to enforcement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 when he agreed to pay maintenance and also recognized right of Lachhman Kaur to reside in a house.
After death of Massa Singh, such pre-existing right was acknowledged by Bhan Singh in a suit for declaration filed by Smt. Lachhman Kaur prior to enforcement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 when he agreed to pay maintenance and also recognized right of Lachhman Kaur to reside in a house. After the commencement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 when he agreed to pay maintenance and also recognised right of Lachhman Kaur to reside in a house. After the commencement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 such limited estate vesting in Smt. Lachhman Kaur enlarges into full ownership in terms of provisions of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The said principle is well settled that a limited ownership vesting with a Hindu female prior to commencement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 enlarges into full ownership. However, reference may be made to the judgments of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Smt. Beni Bai v. Raghubir Prasad, A.I.R. 1999 Supreme Court 1147 and Muninanjappa and Ors. v. R. Manual and Anr., A.I.R. 2001 Supreme Court 1754. In Beni Bais case (supra), it has been held that Section 14(1) applies to the cases where a conferment of right to a Hindu widow was in lieu of maintenance or in recognition of her pre-existing right as provided under the Shastric Law and Hindu Womens Right to Property Act. Para 7 of the judgment reads as under:- "From the aforesaid pronouncement of law by this Court, it is clear that sub-section (1) of Section 14 applies to the cases where the conferment of right to a Hindu widow was in lieu of maintenance or in recognition of her pre-existing right as provided under the Shastric Law and Hindu Womens Right to Property Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act would apply only to such cases where grant conferred a fresh right or title for the first time and while conferring the said right certain restrictions were placed by the grant or transfer." In Muninanjappas case (supra) it was held that when a widow claims her right under subsection (1) of Section 14, it is because of her pre-existing right of maintenance to the extent of her husbands share in a joint family property.
Para 13 of the judgment reads as under:- "Applying the said principle, it has to be seen whether Sevemma is possessed of the property of her deceased-husband based on her pre-existing right or is holding such property under any instrument prescribing restrictive estate in such property. By no stretch of interpretation it could be said, Sevemma was possessed of the suit property in lieu of her any pre-existing right. When a widow claims her right under sub-section (1) of Section 14 in the hand of either coparcener or male issue of her deceased-husband, it is because of her pre-existing right of maintenance to the extent of her husbands share in a joint family property. She cannot claim any such right out of share of other coparcener in which there is no trace of her husbands share. So when limited right as spoken with reference to the husbands right in joint Hindu family property, it only means limited to the extent of husbands share." 9. In view of the above well settled principle of law, the learned Courts below have recorded a finding of fact that Lachhman Kaur is owner of the property i.e. the house and the land falling to the share of Massa Singh and thus, competent to deal with it as owner thereof. 10. No ground for interference in second appeal is made out as no substantial question of law arises for consideration.