D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) FACTS : Points for determination : Submission of the respective counsel : ( 2 ) A small but interesting question has been raised before us by Mr. Khaitan and Mr. Chowdhury appearing in support of the application and opposing the application, respectively. This question has two limbs, which we are called upon to answer. ( 3 ) THE first limb is with regard to Rule 1d of the Wealth-tax Rules, 1957. Under the said rule, the unquoted shares are valued in the manner provided therein which in the case of Bharat Hari Singhania v. CWT, was held to be mandatory and is to be followed in every case where unquoted equity shares of a company are to be valued. Rule 1d provides for an exception in a phrase " (other than investment company or a managing agency company)". The said exception appears to be quoted in the decision in Bharat Hari Singhania as is quoted in the order dated September 4, 2001, passed in AWT No. 3730 of 1993 (Lalit Mohan Thapar v. CWT, ), of which rectification has been asked for. In the operative part of the said order dated September 4, 2001, the exception phrase has not been mentioned or indicated. ( 4 ) THIS, according to Mr. Khaitan, creates the confusion in respect of the valuation of unquoted shares of the assessee, which, according to him, is an investment company. He points out from the paper book at page 5 being a part of the assessment order and page 17 being part of the appellate order where the assessee-company was held to be and described as an investment company. According to Mr. Khaitan, this is not in dispute. However, Mr. Chowdhury does not admit the same to be undisputed and according to Mr. Chowdhury, there is no finding that the assessee was an investment company. ( 5 ) THE application that has been filed has since been given a nomenclature of review. But in the course of his argument Mr. Khaitan had in his usual fairness, pointed out that within the scheme of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, there is no scope of review. This is the settled principle of law. ( 5 ) THE application that has been filed has since been given a nomenclature of review. But in the course of his argument Mr. Khaitan had in his usual fairness, pointed out that within the scheme of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, there is no scope of review. This is the settled principle of law. But the absence of power of review does not preclude the High Court or the Supreme Court while dealing with wealth-tax matters from carrying out rectifications, which is permissible to the income-tax authorities Under Section 154 or 254 of the Act. He attempted to point out that the order, which he is seeking is in the realm of rectification and not a review. ( 6 ) ACCORDING to him, the first question is that Rule 1d, as is apparent from the scheme and revealed from the expression, does not include investment companies and managing agency companies for the purpose of valuing unquoted equity shares in terms of Rule ID of the 1957 Rules. In order to establish this proposition, no amount of argument is necessary, neither is there any scope of forming two opinions with regard thereto nor does it require any amount of interpretation of the provision contained in Rule 1d. Therefore, while applying Rule 1d, the omission to note that the assessee was an investment company is a mistake apparent on the face of the record, which had since been missed by the court while passing the operative part of the order dated September 4, 2001, passed by this court in AWT No. 3730 of 1993, a reference Under Section 27 (1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. ( 7 ) THE second question that has been raised is whether such a mistake could be corrected within the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court Under Section 27 (1) of the 1957 Act or, in other words, in the absence of any specific provision conferring power of review or rectification on the High Court, whether the High Court in exercise of its power inherent in it, can rectify such mistake. Though, however, he points out that this power inherent in the court is not a power, which is conceived of and recognised by Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the CPC) nor that conferred upon it Under Section 114 read with Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. Though, however, he points out that this power inherent in the court is not a power, which is conceived of and recognised by Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the CPC) nor that conferred upon it Under Section 114 read with Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. According to Mr. Khaitan, in view of the power that inheres in the High Court, the High Court is empowered to rectify the mistake, which is staring on the face of the record, to establish which no amount of argument is necessary and in respect whereof no two opinions can be formed. Therefore, he prays that the mistake be corrected by treating the application as one for rectification. ( 8 ) MR. Chowdhury, learned counsel opposing the application on the other hand, points out that though investment company and managing agency company has been tendered to be exempted from the operation of Rule 1d but it does not mean that Rule 1d does not apply at all for the purpose of valuing unquoted equity share of an investment company or a managing agency company. The principle has not been finally laid down or decided in the decision in Bharat Hari Singhania. The question is still open and, therefore, it is susceptible to different opinions and not one as contended by Mr. Khaitan. Thus it cannot come within the purview of rectification. However, he admits that the High Court has power to rectify. But the High Court can neither review nor amend which is outside the scope and ambit of rectification in the absence of any power of review conferred on it by the statute and in the absence of inherent power conceived Under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. ( 9 ) ACCORDING to him, in the order dated September 4, 2001, the learned Division Bench directed the valuation under Rule 1d of the unquoted equity share of the assessee consciously and had accepted the view that the question has not been finally decided and, therefore, the same principle can be followed in the case of an investment company as well. Therefore, there is no scope for rectification of the alleged mistake since it was not a mistake, at best assuming but not admitting, it is a mistaken judgment, which cannot be corrected on review nor can it be rectified even in exercise of inherent jurisdiction if there be any. Therefore, the application should be dismissed. ( 10 ) BOTH learned counsel had relied on various decisions to support their respective contentions to which we shall be referring at the appropriate stage. The first question : ( 11 ) THE first question we are called upon to decide is as to whether the mistake or the error is apparent on the face of the record. This we can do only on the basis of the reading of Rule 1d. In case it travels to the question of interpretation of Rule 1d, in that event, it would not be a mistake eligible for correction. If it requires long drawn argument to establish the said mistake then also we cannot rectify. If it reveals that two opinions are possible then also it cannot be rectified. ( 12 ) IN order to appreciate the situation, we may quote Rule 1d as hereafter :"1d. The market value of an unquoted equity share of any company, other than an investment company or a managing agency company, shall be determined as follows :. . . " ( 13 ) THE expression used in the said rule is clear and unambiguous. The principle has been enunciated that unquoted equity shares of companies other than investment company and managing agency company shall be valued in the manner provided in Rule 1d. Therefore, in no uncertain terms Rule 1d has excluded its application in respect of the valuation of unquoted equity shares of an investment or managing agency company. This does not require any amount of interpretation since the expression is clear and unequivocal in respect of which there does not appear to be anything, which may cast any doubt upon the mind of anyone who reads it, nor even on the mind of a simple man without any legal background or training. It does not conceive of forming any two opinions that the investment and managing agency companies are excepted from the application of Rule 1d. ( 14 ) NOW let us examine whether this was omitted to be taken note of in the order dated September 4, 2001. It does not conceive of forming any two opinions that the investment and managing agency companies are excepted from the application of Rule 1d. ( 14 ) NOW let us examine whether this was omitted to be taken note of in the order dated September 4, 2001. The Division Bench in the order had noticed the decision in Bharat Hari Singhania and quoted the relevant portion therein which specifically mentions the phrase "other than an investment company and managing agency company". Therefore, in Bharat Hari Singhania, it was specifically mentioned that this Rule 1d is mandatory and has to be followed in every case where unquoted equity share of a company are to be valued except those of an investment company or a managing agency company or in other words the unquoted equity shares of a company other than an investment company or a managing agency company are to be valued following Rule 1d mandatorily. The theme of the said order in Bharat Hari Singhania does not leave any scope for any doubt with regard to the exception of the said investment company and managing agency company and it was not concerned with the same. ( 15 ) WHETHER the same principle would be followed in respect of the investment company and managing agency company is not a question to be answered in this case at our hand. Rule 1d, as framed in the scheme of the Rules itself by clear expression excepted investment companies and managing agency companies. In the operative part of the order, it was held that the question had become one of academic interest, as the unquoted shares are to be valued in accordance with Rule 1d after the decision in Bharat Hari Singhania. ( 16 ) IN order to appreciate the meaning of the operative part of the said order, we may quote the same as hereafter :"in the light of the decision of their Lordships what should be included and what should be excluded for maintainable profits for the purpose of valuing the shares on yield method is of academic interest, after the decision of their Lordships, all the unquoted shares should be valued as per Rule 1d of the Wealth-tax Rules. " ( 17 ) THIS operative part of the order was passed following the decision in Bharat Hari Singhania and, therefore, the omission to mention companies other than an investment company or a managing agency company would not mean that this order had intended to apply Rule 1d in respect of an investment company and managing agency company as well. An order has to be read in the context in which it is passed. It has to be understood in the spirit in which it has been delivered. Such an exercise can be undertaken only after reading the judgment as a whole. Each part of the judgment is to be reconciled. The part of the order cannot be read out of context or spirit of the judgment. Going through the judgment as a whole, we do not find that the Division Bench had ever intended to lay down the principle contrary to Rule 1d by inducting the same principle of valuation for valuing unquoted shares of investment and managing agency companies. Therefore, it appears that the Division Bench had omitted to note the finding given in the assessment order and the appellate order to the effect that both those orders were dealing with an investment company. This appears to have been lost sight of. Thus, it appears that the operative part of the order would be applicable only in respect of companies other than an investment company and managing agency company and it has to be applied in respect of the assessee unless it is an investment company. ( 18 ) ON record it appears particularly from the assessment order and the appellate order that both the authorities had proceeded on the basis that the assessee was an investment company. Therefore, in our view, the learned Division Bench had omitted to notice that the assessee was an investment company in respect of which Rule 1d was not held to be mandatory. Once the Rule 1d is held to be mandatory, it is mandatory in all respect and it would apply in respect of companies which have been brought within the purview of Rule 1d and if Rule 1d excepts investment company and managing agency company, then it means that the exception is also a mandatory one. Now how it is to be valued is not the subject matter of decision in this case. Now how it is to be valued is not the subject matter of decision in this case. It is also not before us to hold whether the assessee-company is an investment company or not. It is only the law that has been laid down which we are to deal with and find out whether there is any mistake apparent on the face of the record, which, in our view, is a case present. ( 19 ) MR. Khaitan had referred to the decision in Bharat Hari Singhania and relied upon paragraphs 12, 23 and 34 in order to point out that it had dealt with companies other than an investment company and managing agency company to which due attention was paid in the said judgment. In one place it was held that Rule 1d is not ineffective or invalid. From the decisions cited by learned counsel for the assessees, it cannot be said that the Wealth-tax Officer has any option to follow or not to follow the said rule. He has to follow and apply the said rule in each and every case where he has to value the unquoted equity shares of a company and the contention that it is merely directory and can be followed at the choice of the Wealth-tax Officer or the assessee, in the case of a going concern cannot be accepted. While summarising the conclusion in Bharat Hari Singhania, the investment company and managing agency company were excepted from the mandatory application of Rule 1d. ( 20 ) THIS decision has laid down the principle clearly and unambiguously. It had excepted investment company, etc. In the orders passed by the learned Tribunal and the appellate authority the assessee has been described as an investment company. Therefore, the omission to note the same is surely an error or mistake apparent on the face of the record. ( 21 ) MR. Khaitan has also relied upon an unreported judgment in Brij Mohan Thapar v. CWT in Matter No. 1583 of 1989 decided by the Division Bench of this court on May 7, 1993, relying on which Mr. Khaitan wanted to support that the principle of Rule 1d is clear, unambiguous and needs no arguments. We are, as discussed above, in full agreement with the view taken therein. ( 22 ) NOW turning to the second question, viz. Khaitan wanted to support that the principle of Rule 1d is clear, unambiguous and needs no arguments. We are, as discussed above, in full agreement with the view taken therein. ( 22 ) NOW turning to the second question, viz. , whether this court can rectify the above mistake, we may examine the scope of jurisdiction exercised by the High Court Under Section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. Admittedly, the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court Under Section 27 is an advisory jurisdiction. It is neither original nor appellate. The nature of jurisdiction exercised Under Section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act is identical with that Under Section 256 of the Income-tax Act. The Wealth-tax Act has not conferred power of review upon the High Court. Unless the power of review is specifically conferred by the statute, the High Court cannot assume such jurisdiction. But, at the same time, it cannot be said that matters ancillary to the exercise of such jurisdiction cannot be exercised. In other words, in order to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it, the High Court has power to do all such things ancillary to the exercise of the power such as granting adjournment or extending time to file paper book or restoring matters dismissed in default, etc. These are powers that inhere in the High Court. Therefore, if the High Court finds that there are errors apparent on the face of the record within the meaning of rectification, the High Court can do the same, particularly when the situation arose on account of the court's mistake or omission ; inasmuch as one cannot suffer due to the court's omission. ( 23 ) IN K. Ahamad v. CIT as referred to by Mr. Khaitan, it was held that Section s 152 and 151 of the Civil Procedure Code are inapplicable when the court exercises a jurisdiction answering a question referred to at the instance of the assessee or the Department. Therefore, the court does not have any inherent power. Section 151 does not confer any inherent power but it recognises or saves the inherent power. Therefore, the court does not have any inherent power. Section 151 does not confer any inherent power but it recognises or saves the inherent power. Even without that section the High Court has power to rectify any error if it creeps in the order and if there are accidental errors or omissions the court has jurisdiction to correct those errors and rectify those omissions on the principle that no act of court shall ever injure a party. It was further held that the court has inherent jurisdiction to correct errors and omissions arising from accidental slips. In Surajmull Choteylal v. CIT, this court noted the Kerala decision in the case of K. Ahamad [1974] 96 ITR 29 [fb] and accepted the proposition that the High Court had power to rectify errors crept in the judgment. ( 24 ) WE have no doubt that this inherent power exists in the High Court from the very nature of its constitution and purpose. It is paramount that courts must do justice and if any error arising from accidental slips or omissions creep into judgments, which can result in injustice, such injustice must be removed. ( 25 ) IN CIT v. Bansi Dhar and Sons, it was held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts is purely advisory, it is not that of a civil court exercising original, or any appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, the power and jurisdiction of the High Courts, and in certain cases of the Supreme Court, are those which are expressed and conferred upon them and also those which inhere in the exercise of that jurisdiction or are ancillary or those which subserve the exercise of that function and jurisdiction of giving advice. In the process the apex court in the said judgment had noted the decision of the Kerala Full Bench in K. Ahamad [1974] 96 ITR 29 and had held that the power that was exercised was for properly giving advice. It has also noted the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sridhar v. CWT. It has also noted the decision in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, wherein it was held that the power inheres in the court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. It has not been conferred on the court but this "inherent power" is in the court. It has also noted the decision in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, wherein it was held that the power inheres in the court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. It has not been conferred on the court but this "inherent power" is in the court. After discussing these decisions, the apex court ultimately held that the special jurisdiction of the High Court Under Section 256 is not deprived of judicial character or of its inherent power. Though Under Section 256 of the 1961 Act, the High Courts do not exercise any jurisdiction conferred upon them by the Civil Procedure Code or the Charters or by the Acts establishing the respective High Courts, in respect of certain matters, jurisdiction exercised by the High Court can be separate from the concept of inherent powers or incidental powers in exercising jurisdiction Under Section 256 of the 1961 Act which is a special jurisdiction of a limited nature conferred not by the Civil Procedure Code or by the Charters or by the special Acts constituting such High Courts but by the special provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the limited purpose of obtaining the High Court's opinion on question of law. In giving that opinion properly, if any question of incidental and ancillary nature arises, in that event, it cannot be said that the court lacks such power, however, such incidental powers cannot be so construed as to confer any power, contrary to the scheme of the 1961 Act by reason whereof we may say that review cannot be entertained. However, the Supreme Court in this decision has expressed that it is in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Sridhar v. CWT and the views of the Calcutta High Court in Dwarka Prasad Bajaj v. CIT. ( 26 ) IN Pierce Leslie India Ltd. v. CIT [1988] 174 ITR 626 (Karn), it was held that in exercise of power Under Section 256 the High Court does not have any power of review until and unless such power for review has been expressly conferred on the High Court and there being no such conferment the power of review cannot be exercised. It had noted the decision in Roop Narain Ramchandra (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1972] 84 ITR 181, by the Allahabad High Court and held that the High Court had no inherent power to recall an order made in a reference Under Section 256 of the Act and the provisions of Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, were not applicable. It had also noted the decision in Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. CIT and then held that there was nothing in the provisions of the Act which expressly or by necessary implication, prevents the High Court from exercising its inherent power to recall an order made and to dispose of the reference on the merits. The court also pointed out that where there was no express or implied prohibition for recalling an earlier order made because of the absence of the party and to dispose of the reference on the merits, the court has the inherent power to do so and can do so if the party shows sufficient cause. After passing an order the High Court does not become functus officio and in the absence of any prohibition, express or implied, it could exercise its inherent power to entertain an application for recalling an order made earlier. It had also discussed the decision of the Supreme Court in Bansi Dhar and Sons and had dealt with the said question taking aid of the illustrations referred to therein and held that the court had inherent power to set aside the order made in a reference Under Section 256 (1), on the ground that the order made was palpably erroneous or has resulted in miscarriage of justice and set aside the order if it is found to be so and to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. ( 27 ) IN M. M. Thomas v. State of Kerala, power to review : has since been recognised by the Supreme Court while dealing with Section 8c of the Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971. Relying on this principle Mr. Khaitan attempted to draw analogy that even if the application is not properly couched even then the court can grant relief. He relied on paragraph 12 of the said decision, wherein it was held that the application for review did not mention that there was any concession made by the Government counsel. Relying on this principle Mr. Khaitan attempted to draw analogy that even if the application is not properly couched even then the court can grant relief. He relied on paragraph 12 of the said decision, wherein it was held that the application for review did not mention that there was any concession made by the Government counsel. So far as the Forest Tribunal is concerned, its power of review can be traced to Section 8c. Unless law confers power of review the inferior courts and Tribunals cannot exercise any such power of review. Thus, the absence of power of review is limited to the courts of subordinate jurisdiction and this does not apply to the High Court and the Supreme Court. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we need not go to this extent since it is a settled proposition of law that while exercising jurisdiction Under Section 256, Income-tax Act, the High Court cannot assume power of review. ( 28 ) IN CIT v. Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. [1935] 3 ITR 188 (Cal) relied upon by Mr. Khaitan it was held that though the original side jurisdiction does not contain any such jurisdiction which is a special one conferred by the Income-tax Act and that in exercise of such special jurisdiction the High Court has to frame its own rules and guided by the principle of doing justice. In Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. CIT, it was held that the court was not functus officio in entertaining the application for rehearing the reference and disposing of the same on the merits which was relied upon in the decision cited earlier. In CIT v. Ashok Kuamr Jain, cited by Mr. Khaitan the above principle was supported. ( 29 ) THE provisions contained in Section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act are identical with those of Section 256 of the Income-tax Act. In both the cases, the High Court exercises the same advisory jurisdiction in relation to the respective matters covered under the respective statutes. Therefore, the principle enunciated with regard to Section 256 of the Income-tax Act would be equally applicable in respect of cases Under Section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act. The principles discussed above, in principle, fully apply in cases related to Section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act. ( 30 ) WHEREAS Mr. Therefore, the principle enunciated with regard to Section 256 of the Income-tax Act would be equally applicable in respect of cases Under Section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act. The principles discussed above, in principle, fully apply in cases related to Section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act. ( 30 ) WHEREAS Mr. Chowdhury has relied upon the decision in Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh, wherein, the extent of power of review was discussed. Mr. Chowdhury had relied upon paragraph 7 (page 642) of the said decision. In the said decision, it was held that:"in Drew v. Willis, Ex parte Martin [1891] 1 QB 450 (CA), Lord Esher M. R. pointed out that 'no court (and I would add no authority) has. . . a power of setting aside an order which has been properly made unless it is given by statute': in another case Hession v. Jones [1914] 2 KB 421 Bankes J. pointed out that the court, under the statute, has no power to review an order deliberately made after argument and to entertain a fresh argument upon it with a view to ultimately confirming or reversing it and observed : 'then as to the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Before the Judicature Acts the courts of common law had no jurisdiction whatever to set aside an order which had been made. The Court of Chancery did exercise a certain limited power in this direction. All courts would have power to make a necessary correction if the order as drawn up did not express the intention of the court, the Court of Chancery however went somewhat further than that, and would in a proper case recall any decree or order before it was passed and entered ; but after it had been drawn up and perfected no court or judge had any power to interfere with it. This is clear from the judgment of Thesiger LJ. in the case of In re, St. Nazaire Co. [1879] 12 Ch D 88 (CA ). ' the same principle was laid down by the Madras High Court in Anantharaju Shetty v. Appu Hegade, AIR 1919 Mad 244, in which Seshagiri Aiyar J. , observed : 'it is settled law that a case is not open to appeal unless the statute gives such a right. The power to review must also be given by the statute. ' the same principle was laid down by the Madras High Court in Anantharaju Shetty v. Appu Hegade, AIR 1919 Mad 244, in which Seshagiri Aiyar J. , observed : 'it is settled law that a case is not open to appeal unless the statute gives such a right. The power to review must also be given by the statute. Prima facie a party who has obtained a decision is entitled to keep it unassailed, unless the Legislature had indicated the mode by which it can be set aside. A review is practically the hearing of an appeal by the same officer who decided the case. There is at least as good reason for saying that such power should not be exercised unless the statute gives it, as for saying that another tribunal should not hear an appeal from the trial court unless such a power is given to it by statute'. The same principle has been affirmed by the Judicial Committee in Baijnath Ram Goenka v. Nand Kumar Singh [1913] 40 Ind App 54 (PC), in which a mahal was sold for arrears of revenue. Two appeals to set aside the sale were preferred to the Commissioner under the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, Section 88, as amended by the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, 1868. One of these appeals was by the respondent, a co-shares of the mahal, and was dismissed on the ground that the auction purchaser had not been made a defendant. A second appeal was preferred by the other co-sharers in the mahal, and in this appeal the Commissioner on March 28, 1900, made an order annulling the sale on the ground of an irregularity in the sale notice. This order related to the entire mahal. On June 21, 1900, the Commissioner having come to the conclusion that his order of March 28, 1900 was wrong in law, reviewed it, and made an order upholding the sale. The respondent thereupon brought the suit giving rise to the appeal to the Judicial Committee praying for a declaration that the order of June 21, 1900, was ultra vires and illegal. The Additional Subordinate Judge declared that the order setting aside the sale was a final order and was not open to review. The High Court concurred with the decision of the Additional Subordinate Judge. The Additional Subordinate Judge declared that the order setting aside the sale was a final order and was not open to review. The High Court concurred with the decision of the Additional Subordinate Judge. While dismissing the appeal of the defendant-appellant, Lord Atkinson said : 'their Lordships are clearly of opinion that the order of March 28, 1900, was final and conclusive, and that, so far as the Commissioner was concerned, he had no power to review that order in the way in which he has reviewed it'. " ( 31 ) THE same principle has been reiterated by the apex court in Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Namyanmo Khanderao Jambekar Judgment, CA's Nos. 791 to 798 of. In that case the power of the Collector to review his earlier order was considered in the light of Section 76a of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bombay Act LXVII of 1948), which provided that where no appeal has been filed within the period provided the Collector may, suo motu or on a reference made at any time, call for the record of any enquiry or the proceedings and pass such order thereon as he deems fit. In this context, the apex court had held that on a reference the orders (page 1466):"passed by the Collector in the exercise of his revisional powers were quasi-judicial and were final. The Act does not empower the Collector to review an order passed by him Under Section 76a. In the absence of any power of review, the Collector could not subsequently reconsider his previous decisions and hold that there were grounds for annulling or reversing the Mahalkari's order. The subsequent order dated February 17,1959, re-opening the matter was illegal, ultra vires, and without jurisdiction. The High Court ought to have quashed the order of the Collector dated February 17,1959, on this ground". ( 32 ) IN the context of the present case, this decision has no manner of application. Inasmuch as it is a settled proposition of law that the power of review unless conferred by the statute cannot be exercised by any authority other than the High Court. ( 32 ) IN the context of the present case, this decision has no manner of application. Inasmuch as it is a settled proposition of law that the power of review unless conferred by the statute cannot be exercised by any authority other than the High Court. That apart the principle that has been enunciated therein speaks of a separate proposition of law and the question of review does not arise in the present case since the High Court can exercise such ancillary power, as discussed before, while dealing with reference Under Section 256. The distinction, which we prefer to draw, is the distinction between the words "review" and "rectify". Though, the High Court cannot have jurisdiction to review but yet in order to rectify the injury caused on account of mistake on the part of the High Court, the High Court has power inherent to rectify such mistake and to do justice when such mistake does not require long drawn arguments to establish and where there are no two opinions. ( 33 ) THE other decision cited by Mr. Chowdhury is Devandra Pal Singh v. State, N. C. T of Delhi, The said decision was dealing with article 137 in relation to review by the Supreme Court in connection with certain criminal matters wherein it was held that there is no power of review. The criminal matter stands on a different footing where the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically prohibits exercise of any power by a court after the final order is passed which rendered the court functus officio for all purposes. Therefore, on the facts, this decision is distinguishable. ( 34 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the learned Division Bench had omitted to note that the assessee-company is an investment company as noted in the assessment order and the appellate order and as such omitted to mention the exception in its application in the operative part of the order which stands rectified by incorporation of the exception other than an investment company and managing agency company which has to be read in the said operative part according to the context and spirit of the said judgment. However, it would be open to the Department to contend that the assessee is not an investment company subject to such objection that might be taken by the assessee in establishing its case in order to apply the principle of Rule 1d which is otherwise accepted and where the valuation made is different to what is provided in Rule 1d. ( 35 ) IN the result, the application succeeds. The order dated September 4, 2001, stands rectified/modified to the extent indicated above. However, there would be no difference in the answer, which goes against the assessee only subject to the above observations. ( 36 ) THERE will, however, be no order as to costs.