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2004 DIGILAW 496 (GAU)

Iqbabul Haque v. State of Assam

2004-08-30

BIPLAB KUMAR SHARMA

body2004
JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma, J. 1. Retirement of the Petitioner from service, which is alleged to be pre-matured on the basis of the corrected date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate and the related issues as to how far such correction can bind the employer and even if it is said to be binding or is acted upon, the manner and method in which such correction is to be carried out towards correction of the already recorded date of birth in the service book are the questions involved in this writ petition. 2. The facts are not in dispute. The Petitioner passed the matriculation examination from Gauhati University in the year 1961. His age as on 1.3.61 was recorded in the matriculation certificate as 16 years 6 months. His date of birth on that basis is 1.9.44. However, a correction was carried out in the matriculation certificate by the authorities of the University on 10.9.73 certifying the age of the Petitioner as on 1.3.61 as 14 years 1 month and on that basis his date of birth became 1.3.47. Before such correction was made in the matriculation certificate, the Petitioner had entered the services of the Respondents by joining as Subordinate Engineer on 19.5.73. Thus naturally, while declaring his credentials before appointment, the Petitioner declared his date of birth as 1.9.44 and obtained the employment on that basis. 3. It is the case of the Petitioner that on the basis of the correction made in the matriculation certificate relating to his age, necessary correction was carried out in the service book under the entry relating to date of birth in which his date of birth already stood recorded as 1st September, 1944 on the basis of the earlier age recorded in the certificate. The Executive Engineer, PWD (R and B), Electrical Dim, Guwahati made such correction on 30.5.74 by putting a line on the original entry "1st September, 1944" and inserting 1st March, 1946. 4. The aforesaid correction carried out in the service book replacing the earlier date of birth of the Petitioner as 1.3.46 on the basis of the correction made in the matriculation certificate was also wrong, which the Petitioner claims to be a clerical mistake. As per the correction made, the date of birth of the Petitioner comes to be 1.3.47. His retirement from service on that basis falls on 1.3.2005. As per the correction made, the date of birth of the Petitioner comes to be 1.3.47. His retirement from service on that basis falls on 1.3.2005. However, he has been made to retire with effect from 1.3.2004 making a grievance against which the Petitioner has initiated the instant writ proceeding. It is the pure and simple case of the Petitioner that the correction made in the matriculation certificate as regards his age having been accepted by the Respondents by way of necessary correction in the service book, the clerical mistake in making the correction as 1.3.46 instead of 1.3.47 ought to have been rectified allowing the Petitioner to serve his full tenure instead of asking him to go on retirement pre-maturely. 5. The Respondents have filed their affidavit taking the plea that the correction made in the service book by the Executive Engineer was without the due procedure and that the said Executive Engineer had no authority to do so. In fact an objection has been raised by the Audit. They have denied that the correction made in the entry relating to date of birth from 1.9.44 to 1.3.46 was a clerical mistake. According to them such correction was made as per instruction of the Petitioner. In paragraph 11 of the affidavit, it is the stand of the Respondent that when the Petitioner was asked to submit all relevant certificates, he submitted the same on 15.3.2001 (Annexure-B to the affidavit) declaring his date of birth as 1.3.46. Throughout his service career, he never raised any objection relating to such recorded date of birth as shown in the various gradation lists. 6. The Petitioner has filed an affidavit-in-reply to the said affidavit reiterating the stand in the writ petition. According to him the correction made in the service book relating to the date of birth was due to oversight both on the part the Respondents as well as the Petitioner. Thus it is the claim of the Petitioner that he is entitled to continue in service upto 1.3.2005 and that he has been made to retire from service prematurely with effect from 1.3.2004. 7. Dr. Y.K. Phukan, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Ms. G. Deka, learned Advocate made submissions on the basis of the stand in the writ petition and the affidavit-in-reply. During his elaborate argument, he placed reliance on several decisions in support of the case of the Petitioner. 7. Dr. Y.K. Phukan, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Ms. G. Deka, learned Advocate made submissions on the basis of the stand in the writ petition and the affidavit-in-reply. During his elaborate argument, he placed reliance on several decisions in support of the case of the Petitioner. He submitted that the authorities of the Respondents having accepted the correction made in the matriculation certificate, they are bound to record the correct date of birth in the service book and to grant the service benefits to the Petitioner on that basis. Dr. Phukan, placed reliance on the following decisions: AIR 1997 SC 2055 (Union of India v. C. Rama Swamy) AIR 1997 SC 1986 (Commissioner of Police v. Bhagwan V. Lahane) (2000) 8 SCC 696 (G.M. Bharat Cooking Coal v. Shib Kumar) (2003) 6 SCC 483 (State of U.P. v. Gulaichi) 1998 (4) GLT 322(Moirangthem Irabot Singh v. State of Manipur) 2002 (2) GLT 94 (State of Mizoram v. C. Lalkima) 8. Mr. J. Roy, learned standing counsel, PWD on the other hand made submissions controverting the claim of the Petitioner. He submitted that the correction made in the matriculation certificate is not binding on the Respondents. He submitted that the Petitioner having entered the services of the Respondents declaring his date of birth as 1.9.44 on the basis of the age recorded in the matriculation certificate, he cannot take advantage of the subsequent correction made in the said certificate, more particularly when the Respondents were not party to the process initiated and completed towards such correction by the Gauhati University authority. Referring to the provisions of SR 8 (c) of the FR and SR, he submitted that the correction made in the service book of the Petitioner by the Executive Engineer was un-authorised and thus not binding on the Respondents. Even otherwise also, the Petitioner having accepted his date of birth as per the correction made as 1.3.46, he is estopped from claiming the same to be 1.3.47 and such claim is barred by limitation, the principles of delay and latches and waiver, extoppel and acquiescence, he submitted. 9. Mr. Roy, learned Counsel placed reliance on the following decisions: (1994) 6 SCC 302 (State of Tamilnadu v. T.V. Venugopalan) (1995) 2 SCC 82 (Chief Medical Officer v. Khadeer Khadri) (1995) 4 SCC 172 (Burn Standard Co. 9. Mr. Roy, learned Counsel placed reliance on the following decisions: (1994) 6 SCC 302 (State of Tamilnadu v. T.V. Venugopalan) (1995) 2 SCC 82 (Chief Medical Officer v. Khadeer Khadri) (1995) 4 SCC 172 (Burn Standard Co. Ltd. v. Dinabandhu Majumdar) (1997) 4 SCC 647 (Union of India v. C. Ramaswamy) (1996) 7 SCC 421 (Union of India v. R.S. Sarma) (1970) 3 SCC 624 (State of Assam v. Daksha Prasad Deka) (2000) 8 SCC 696 (G.M. Bharat Cooking Coal v. Shib Kumar) 2003 (2) GLT 241 (Abdul Khalique Laskar v. All Assam Public Health Employees Association) 2002 (2) GLT 94 (State of Mizoram v. C. Lalkima) AIR 1991 SC 308 (Director of Technical Education v. Smt. K. Sita Debi) (2003) 6 SCC 483 (State of U.P. v. Gulaichi) 2004 (1) GLT 261(Gladis Lamare v. State of Meghalaya) 10. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and the materials placed on records. There is no dispute relating to the facts stated in the writ petition. The Petitioner entered the services of the Respondents on 19.5.73 and his date of birth was recorded in the service book as 1.9.44 on the basis of the age recorded in the matriculation certificate dated 12.9.61 and as declared by him, as a token of acceptance of which, the Petitioner also put his signature. The service book was opened on 7.7.73. The Executive Engineer under whom the Petitioner was serving inserted the new date of birth of the Petitioner as 1.3.46 by drawing a line over the original entry 1.9.44. However, no authority for doing so has been mentioned either in the service book or in the records produced on behalf of the Respondents. It is in this context, the learned Counsel for the Respondents referred to the provisions of SR 8 (C), which reads as follows: Commissioner and Heads of Department may alter the recorded date of birth in the case of non-gazetted Government servants; provided they are satisfied after enquiry, that the previous date was incorrect. 11. The "Heads of Department", as per the provisions of SR 4 (4) of the FR and SR means any authority, which the Provincial Government may by order declare to be the head of a department for the purpose of those rules. 11. The "Heads of Department", as per the provisions of SR 4 (4) of the FR and SR means any authority, which the Provincial Government may by order declare to be the head of a department for the purpose of those rules. A list of the authorities who have been declared to be the heads of departments is given in Appendix-5. A reference to Appendix-5, which contains the list of Heads of Department, does not indicate the Executive Engineer as the Head of the Department. It is the Chief Engineer who has been prescribed and described as the Head of Public Works Department in which the Petitioner was employed. Thus the question necessarily arises as to whether in terms of SR 8 (C) of the FR and SR, the correction carried out by the Executive Engineer who is admittedly not the Head of the Department would be binding on the Respondents. It is in this context, stand has been taken in the affidavit that the correction made by the Executive Engineer was unauthorized and thus not binding on the Respondents. 12. I have verified the records. The records do not reveal anything relating to the manner and method in which the correction was made in the service book. Nothing is indicated suggesting that the correction was made on the basis of the correction in the matriculation certificate. It is only a matter of presumption coinciding the correction made in the matriculation certificate that the correction was made in the service book based on such correction in the matriculation certificate. There is also no explanation as to why such correction was made as 1.3.46 instead of 1.3.47 and as to why such correction made way back in the year 1974 was allowed to stand and the Petitioner raised no objection over the years. It is only on 1.3.2004, the writ petition was filed claiming one more year of service based on the correction made in the matriculation certificate. On 1.3.2004, the Petitioner was made to retire from service on the basis of the corrected age recorded in the service book, which is 1.3.46. 13. It is in the aforesaid backdrop the issues raised in the writ proceeding are to be answered. On 1.3.2004, the Petitioner was made to retire from service on the basis of the corrected age recorded in the service book, which is 1.3.46. 13. It is in the aforesaid backdrop the issues raised in the writ proceeding are to be answered. The admitted position is that the purported correction made in the service book of the Petitioner relating to date of birth was by the Executive Engineer who was not the Head of the Department. Thus on the face of it the correction made by the said Executive Engineer and that too without any reference to any authority was without any competence and jurisdiction. SR 8 (C) of the FR and SR empowers only the Commissioner and the Heads of the Departments to make correction in respect of entry relating to date of birth in the service book and that too upon satisfaction after enquiry that the previous date was incorrect. 14. It is the Chief Engineer, who is the Head of Public Works Department and not the Executive Engineer who might at the relevant time happened to be the controlling officer of the Petitioner. It was incumbent on his part to refer to the matter to the Chief Engineer, he being the Head of the Department. It is in this context the general proposition relating to such a procedure to be followed emphasizes that if a thing is required to be done in a particular way it should be done in that way. This general principle has been stated illuminatingly in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor and latter by the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh as reported in AIR 1936 PC 253 and AIR 1964 SC 358 respectively. This being the position of fact as well as law, the correction made by the Executive Engineer is certainly not binding on the Respondents and if that be so, the Petitioner was to retire from service on the basis of the earlier date of birth recorded in the service book which was 1.9.44. On that basis his date of retirement fell on 1.9.2002. 15. The Petitioner continued in his service beyond 1.9.2002 based on the correction made by an incompetent authority. The correction made was 1.3.46 to the replacement of the earlier date of birth which was 1.9.44. It is not discernible as to on what basis and authority such correction was carried out. 15. The Petitioner continued in his service beyond 1.9.2002 based on the correction made by an incompetent authority. The correction made was 1.3.46 to the replacement of the earlier date of birth which was 1.9.44. It is not discernible as to on what basis and authority such correction was carried out. However, it is the assertion of the Petitioner that such correction was made, though erroneously, on the basis of the correction made in the matriculation certificate. As per the said correction made, the date of birth of the Petitioner is 1.3.47 and not 1.3.46. It is on that basis, the Petitioner has projected his case that there was bonafide clerical mistake in correcting the date of birth as 1.3.46 instead of 1.3.47 and claims further one year of service with the grievance that he has been made to retire pre-maturely based on such mistaken correction. Thus three different dates of retirement concern the Petitioner i.e. 1.9.2002, 1.3.2004 and 1.3.2005. 16. As per the stand of the Respondents in the affidavit, the Petitioner was to retire from service with effect from 1.9.2002 and at any rate with effect from 1.3.2004 and that he cannot claim one more year of service. As regards the correction made in the service book, it has already been held that such correction was without jurisdiction and if that be so the actual date of retirement of the Petitioner was 1.9.2002. If the correction of the date of birth in the service book as 1.3.46 carried out in 1974 as has all along been accepted by the Petitioner, even by his letter dated 15.3.2001 is taken into consideration, then his date of retirement is 1.3.2004 and in fact he has been made to retire on that date. In such a situation, necessarily the question will arise as to whether the Petitioner can claim one more year of service and the Respondents can deny the same. If the correction made in the service book was without any jurisdiction, there is no question of favouring the Petitioner some more years of service on that basis and consequently the Petitioner cannot claim to be in service upto 1.3.2005. In fact he was to retire from service with effect from 1.9.2002. 17. I now examine the case laws relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. In fact he was to retire from service with effect from 1.9.2002. 17. I now examine the case laws relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. In the case of C. Ramaswamy (supra) on which the learned Counsel for the Respondent has also placed reliance, the Apex Court held that it will not be unreasonable to presume that when a candidate, at the first instance, communicates a particular date of birth there is obviously his intention that his age calculated on the basis of that date of birth should be taken into consideration by the appointing authority for adjudging his suitability for a responsible office. The Apex Court in that case held that the principle of estoppel would apply and the authorities concerned would be justified in declining to alter the date of birth. learned Counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance on this decision to bring home his point that the Petitioner is entitled to seek change in case of bonafide mistake in recording the date of birth. The Apex Court has emphasized that such mistake must be bonafide resulting in wrong recording of date of birth at the time of appointment. Same is not the case here. The Petitioner upon declaration of his date of birth as 1.9.44 got employment under the Respondents and got the same corrected through an incompetent authority. In this connection the observations of the Apex Court in paragraphs 25 and 26 are quoted below: 25. In matters relating to appointment to service various factors are taken into consideration before making a selection or an appointment. One of the relevant circumstances is the age of the person who is sought to be appointed. It may not be possible to conclusively prove that an advantage had been gained by representing a date of birth which is different than that which is later sought to be incorporated. But it will not be unreasonable to presume that when a candidate, at the first instance, communicates a particular date of birth there is obviously his intention that his age calculated on the basis of that date of birth should be taken into consideration by the appointing for adjudging his suitability for a responsible office. In fact, where maturity is a relevant factor to assess suitability, an older person is ordinarily considered to be more mature and, therefore, more suitable. In fact, where maturity is a relevant factor to assess suitability, an older person is ordinarily considered to be more mature and, therefore, more suitable. In such a case, it cannot be said that advantage is not obtained by a person be cause of an earlier date of birth, if he subsequently claims to be younger in age, after taking that advantage. In such a situation, it would be against public policy to permit such a change to enable longer benefit to the person concerned. This being so, we find it difficulty to accept the broad proposition that the principle of estoppel would not apply in such a case where the age of a person who is sought to be appointed may be a relevant consideration to assess his suitability. 26. In such a case, even in the absence of a statutory rule like Rule 16A the principle of estoppel would apply and the authorities concerned would be justified in declining to alter the date of birth. If such a decision is challenged the Court also ought not to grant any relief even if it is shown that the date of birth, as ordinarily recorded, was incorrect because the candidate concerned had represented a different date of birth to be taken into consideration obviously with a view that would be to his advantage. Once having secured entry into the service, possibly in preference to other candidates, then the principle of estoppel would clearly be applicable and relief of change of date of birth can be legitimately denied. 18. In the case of Bhagwan v. Lahane (supra), the Apex Court refused to accept the contention of the Respondent that the age recorded in the school leaving certificate was incorrect. In that case also the Apex Court noticing the fact that the school leaving certificate was produced by the Respondent and the entry in the service book was made on that basis refused to accept the plea of the Respondent that the same was an obvious clerical error. This case also does not help the case of the Petitioner, rather it helps the case of the Respondents. 19. The case of G.M. Bharat Cooking Coal (supra) on which the learned Counsel for the Respondents has also placed reliance, does not help the case of the Petitioner in any manner. This case also does not help the case of the Petitioner, rather it helps the case of the Respondents. 19. The case of G.M. Bharat Cooking Coal (supra) on which the learned Counsel for the Respondents has also placed reliance, does not help the case of the Petitioner in any manner. The Apex Court placed reliance on the case of Dinabandhu Majumdar (supra) on which the learned Counsel for the Respondents has placed reliance, exclusively quoted the observations made in that case and observed in paragraph 17 of the judgment as follows: 17. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in appeal and reject the writ application of Respondent 1 filed in the High Court. Since Respondent 1 had continued in service of Appellant 1 beyond 25.4.1991, the date of his superannuation on the basis of his declared age entered in his "Service and Leave Record" because of the judgment and order of the High Court, now set aside, he shall not be entitled to any service benefits other than the salary drawn by him for the period beyond 25.4.1991. 20. In the case of Gulaichi (supra), the Apex Court made the following observations in paragraph 7, 8 and 9. The Apex Court place reliance on the decision in Daksha Prasad Deka (supra) on which the learned Counsel for the Respondents has placed reliance. 7. Usually, no interference is called for when findings of fact are recorded by the trial/appellate Courts and the High Court, more so, when the issue is decided in second appeal. But where the Courts below lose sight of statutory provisions or act on irrelevant or in-admissible materials, and ignore relevant materials, interference is not impermissible. 8. Normally, in public service, with entering into the service, even the date of exit, which is said as the date of superannuation or retirement, is also fixed. That is why the date of birth is recorded in the relevant register or service-book relating to the individual concerned. This is the practice prevalent in all services, because every service has fixed the age of retirement, it is necessary to maintain the date of birth in the service records. That is why the date of birth is recorded in the relevant register or service-book relating to the individual concerned. This is the practice prevalent in all services, because every service has fixed the age of retirement, it is necessary to maintain the date of birth in the service records. But, of late a trend can be noticed, that many public servants, on the eve of their retirement raise a dispute about their records, by either invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or by filing applications before the Administrative Tribunals concerned, or even filing suits for adjudication as to whether the dates of birth recorded were correct or not. 9. Most of the States have framed statutory rules or in absence thereof issued administrative instructions as to how a claim made by a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth in the service record is to be dealt with and what procedure is to be followed. In many such rules a period has been prescribed within which if any public servant makes any grievance in respect of error in the recording of his date of birth, the application for that purpose can be entertained, the sole object of such rules being that any such claim regarding correction of the date of birth should not be made or entertained after decades, especially on the eve of superannuation of such public servant. In the case of State of Assam v. Daksha Prasad Deka this Court said (at SCC pp 625-26, para 4) that the date of compulsory retirement. Must in out judgment, be determined on the basis of the service record and not on what the Respondent claimed to be his date of birth, unless the service record is first corrected consistently with the appropriate procedure. In the case of Govt. of A.P. v. M. Hayagreev Sarma, the A.P. Public Employment (Recording and Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984 were considered. The public servant concerned had claimed correction of his date of birth with reference to the births and deaths register maintained under the Births, deaths and Marriages Registration Act, 1886. In the case of Govt. of A.P. v. M. Hayagreev Sarma, the A.P. Public Employment (Recording and Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984 were considered. The public servant concerned had claimed correction of his date of birth with reference to the births and deaths register maintained under the Births, deaths and Marriages Registration Act, 1886. The Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal corrected the date of birth as claimed by the Petitioner before the Tribunal, in view of the entry in the births and deaths register ignoring the Rules framed by the State Government referred to above. It was inter alia observed by this Court: (SCC p. 685, para 7) 7. The object underlying Rule 4 is to avoid repeated applications by a Government employee for the correction of his date of birth and with that end in view it provides that a Government servant whose date of birth may have been recorded in the service register in accordance with the rules applicable to him and if that entry had become final under the rules prior to the commencement of 1984 Rules, he will not be entitled for alteration of his date of birth. In Executive Engineer v. Rangadhar Mallik, Rule 65 of the Orissa General Finance Rules was examined which provides that representation made for correction of date of birth near about the time of superannuation shall not be entertained. The Respondent in that case was appointed on 16.11.1968. On 9.9.1986, for the first time, he made a representation for changing his date of birth in his service register. The Tribunal issued a direction as sought for by the Respondent. this Court set aside the order of the Tribunal saying that the claim of the Respondent that his date of birth was 27.11.1938 instead of 27.11.1928 should not have been accepted on the basis of the documents produced in support of the said Respondent at the time of his appointment and he had also put his signature in the service roll accepting his date of birth as 27.11.1928. The said Respondent did not taken any step nor made any representation for correcting his date of birth till 9.9.1986. In the case of Union of India v. Harnam Singh, the position in law was again reiterated and it was observed: (SCC p. 167, para 7). 7. The said Respondent did not taken any step nor made any representation for correcting his date of birth till 9.9.1986. In the case of Union of India v. Harnam Singh, the position in law was again reiterated and it was observed: (SCC p. 167, para 7). 7. A Government servant who has declared his age at the initial stage of the employment is, of course, not precluded from making a request later on for correcting his age. It is open to a civil servant to claim correction of his date of birth, if he is in possession of irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth as different from the one earlier recorded and even if there is no period of limitation prescribed for seeking correction of date of birth, the Government servant must do so without any unreasonable delay. An application for correction of the date of birth should not be dealt with by the Courts, Tribunals or the High Court keeping in view only the public servant concerned. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many offices who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may also lose the promotion forever. Cases are not unknown when a person accepts appointment keeping in view the date of retirement of his immediate senior. This is certainly an important and relevant aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the Court or the Tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the Respondent and that too within a reasonable time as provided in the rules governing the service, the Court or the Tribunal should not issue a direction or make a declaration on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued or declaration made, the Court or the Tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of the date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. If no rule or order has been framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application has to be filed, then such application must be within at least a reasonable time. The applicant has to produce the evidence in support of such claim, which may amount to irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth. Whenever any such question arises, the onus is on the applicant, to prove about the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service book. In many cases it is a part of the strategy on the part of such public servant to approach the Court or the Tribunal on the eve of their retirement, questioning the correctness of the entries in respect of their date of birth in the service-books. By this process, it has come to the notice of this Court that in many cases, even if ultimately their applications are dismissed, by virtue of interim orders, they continue for months, after the date of superannuation. The Court or the Tribunal must therefore, be slow in granting an interim relief or continuation in service, unless prima facie evidence of unimpeachable character is produced because if the public servant succeeds, he can always be compensated, but if he fails, he would have enjoyed undeserved benefit of extended service and thereby caused injustice to his immediate junior. 21. In the case of Moirangthem Irabot Singh (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court held that in the event of any wrong committed in the arithmetic of calculation, it will not be fair to deny the correct answer to the writ Petitioner. This decision has pressed into service to bring home the point that a bonafide mistake occurred in making the correction as 1.3.46 in place of 1.9.44 and that the same should have been 1.3.47 which is ex-facie evident as per the correction made in the matriculation certificate. This decision has pressed into service to bring home the point that a bonafide mistake occurred in making the correction as 1.3.46 in place of 1.9.44 and that the same should have been 1.3.47 which is ex-facie evident as per the correction made in the matriculation certificate. In the instant case when the very basis of the correction made in the service book was illegal, there is no question of extending any further benefit to the Petitioner on the basis of the alleged mistake committed towards making the correction. 22. In the case of C. Lalkima (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that in the event of making any alteration to the recorded date of birth in the service book, same can only be done following the principles of natural justice. It is not understood as to how this Court comes into operation with the issues raised in this writ proceeding. It is not a case of making any alteration to the recorded date of birth to the detriment of the Petitioner without putting him to any notice. It is rather other way round. The recorded date of birth of the Petitioner was altered without any notice to the Head of the Department. 23. I now deal with the decisions on which the learned Counsel for the Respondents has placed reliance. In the case of T.B. Venugopalan (supra) the Apex Court once again emphasise that the inordinate delay in making the application for correction of date of birth itself a ground for rejecting the correction of the date of birth. It went on to say that the Government servant having declared his date of birth as entered in the service register to be correct, would not be permitted at the fag end of his service to raise a dispute as regards the correctness of the entries in the service register. This decision has been placed into service to thwart the claim of the Petitioner that a correction is required to be made in the service book by way of altering the date of birth from 1.3.46 to 1.3.47. The Petitioner even after illegal correction of his date of birth in the service book from 1.9.44 to 1.3.46 way back in 1974 never made any effort to get the same corrected, rather he admitted by his aforesaid representation made in 2001 that his date of birth is 1.3.46. The Petitioner even after illegal correction of his date of birth in the service book from 1.9.44 to 1.3.46 way back in 1974 never made any effort to get the same corrected, rather he admitted by his aforesaid representation made in 2001 that his date of birth is 1.3.46. Thus he allowed the date of birth to remain unaltered for the last 30 years without raising any objection and approached this Court on 1.3.2004 the date on which he was made to retire from service. The fatal effect of delay in seeking correction of recorded date of birth in the service book has been reiterated in the case of Khadeer Khadri and R.S. Sarma (supra). 24. The Division Bench judgment of this Court in Abdul Khaleque Laskar (supra) squarely covers the instant case. As in the instant case, in that case also the correction was made by the Joint Director of Health Services without any approval of the Head of the Department i.e. the Director of Health Services. The Division Bench held that as per the provisions of SR 8 (C) of the FR and SR, the Joint Director could not have approved the change of date of birth of the Appellant. The Division bench affirmed the judgment of the learned Single Judge by which apart from the infirmity in respect of the approval as per the provisions of the SR 8 (C), the delay in approach was held to be fatal. 25. In the case of Gladis Lamare (supra) a Single Judge of this Court refused to entertain the claim made at the fag end of the service career for correction of date of birth recorded in the service book. In the case of Daksha Prasad Deka (supra) the Apex Court held that the date of compulsory retirement under FR 56 (a) must be determined on the basis of the service record and not on what the Respondents claimed to be his date of birth, unless the service record is first corrected consistent with the appropriate procedure, (emphasis supplied). 26. In the case of Smt. K. Sita Devi (supra) the Apex Court pointed out that in absence of the employer to a proceeding for correction of date of birth, the results of the proceeding allowing the correction is not binding on the employer. 26. In the case of Smt. K. Sita Devi (supra) the Apex Court pointed out that in absence of the employer to a proceeding for correction of date of birth, the results of the proceeding allowing the correction is not binding on the employer. In the instant case, the Petitioner entered the services of the Respondents making a declaration that his date of birth is 1.9.44 and the Respondents upon acceptance of the same employed the Petitioner. It was only thereafter the University authority made correction in the matriculation certificate which resulted in alteration of the date of birth from 1.9.44 to 1.3.47. The Petitioner claims that it was on that basis correction was made in the service book correcting the date of birth as 1.3.46, which in fact ought to have been 1.3.47. The Respondents were not party to the process towards correction of age originally recorded in the matriculation certificate and thus are not bound to accept such correction. It is in this context, the Apex Court has laid down the law as noticed above. 27. Having noticed the aforesaid factual as well as legal aspect of the matter, I have no hesitation to hold that the Petitioner is not entitled to continue in service upto 1.3.2005 taking his date of birth to be as 1.3.47. The correction made in the service book by the Executive Engineer being unauthorized, the Petitioner also cannot get the benefit of service beyond 1.9.2002, except the salary and other allowances he has already drawn. The Respondents allowed the Petitioner to continue in his service upto 1.3.2004 and to that extent there was somewhat tacit approval on the part of the Respondents. In such a situation, there is no question of denial of the benefits such as salary and allowances which the Petitioner has already drawn. However, the period from 1.9.2002 to 1.3.2004 will not be counted for any other purpose like pensionary and other retirement benefits and the Petitioner will be entitled to such benefits taking his date of retirement from service on attaining the age of superannuation with effect from 1.9.2002. The correction made by the Executive Engineer being without jurisdiction and authority is inconsequential. 28. The writ petition stands dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed