N. KUMAR, J. ( 1 ) THE question that arises for consideration in this Writ Petition is, whether the remedy provided under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are unavailable to the workmen of LIC, consequent to insertion of sub-section (2) (cc), (2a), (2b) and (2c) by way of amendment to section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to this Writ Petition are as hereunder: one Sri N. Kesar Singh was an employee of the LIC having been appointed as a building supervisor in the year 1962. He came to be dismissed from the service on 21. 5. 1985 for the proved misconduct after holding a domestic enquiry under the provisions of the Life Insurance corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. The said N. Kesar Singh raised an industrial dispute through the Union. The Central Government referred the matter to the Central government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court in reference No. CR No. 72/87 which was registered on 12. 1,1987. After service of notice the said Kesar Singh filed his claim statement on 5. 2. 1987 and LIC filed its counter statement on 20. 5. 1987. The record discloses that the said kesar Singh filed an application. A. No. I on 21. 5. 1987 for grant of interim relief. Similarly, he filed. A. No. II on 13. 8. 1987 and. A. No. III on 4. 4. 1990 for the same relief. No orders were passed on the said applications. On the question of preliminary issue regarding the validity of domestic enquiry, LIC filed an affidavit of the enquiry officer on 15. 7. 1987 and requested the court to take the same as his evidence. The Labour Court rejected the said evidence and held in the absence of any evidence adduced by the LIC regarding the validity of domestic enquiry it has to be held that the domestic enquiry is not valid and legal and posted the case for evidence of the lic to justify the order of dismissal. This order came to be passed on 5. 8. 1987. The said order was challenged by the LIC before this Court in W. R. No. 12453/1987 and in the said Writ petition an interim order was passed staying all further proceedings. This order came to be passed on 5. 8. 1987. The said order was challenged by the LIC before this Court in W. R. No. 12453/1987 and in the said Writ petition an interim order was passed staying all further proceedings. It appears that on an application filed for vacating the stay order, this Court directed the LIC to pay the workman a sum of Rs. 3,500 p. m. , as interim relief subject to the result of the Writ Petition and the interim order of stay was continued. Subsequently in yet another application filed by the workman, the aforesaid stay order was modified to the extent that the said stay order would not come in the way of the workman moving the Labour Court for seeking an interim relief. Thereafter, on 9. 6. 1990 the workman died. The same was reported to the Court on 11. 10. 1990, His widow filed an application to come on record which was allowed. Thereafter, she filed an application. A. No. V for grant of interim relief. The said application was opposed by the LIC. The Tribunal on consideration of the rival contentions rejected the said application by its order dated 17. 7. 1993. The reasons given by the Labour Court was that the domestic enquiry held by the LIC was set aside by the Tribunal as not valid and the deceased Kesar Singh was paid a sum of Rs. 61, 726. 00 as terminal benefits. Under these circumstances, it held that the wife of the deceased workman is not entitled to any interim relief. The said order was not challenged and it became final. W. P. No. 12453/1987 was disposed of on 30. 6. 1995 with an observation that it is open to the employer to tender such evidence to establish the validity of the domestic enquiry. All that is necessary is to issue direction to the Labour Court to dispose of the reference as early as possible after rendering finding on the validity of the domestic enquiry taking note of the contentions of the respective parties. In view of the aforesaid matter when the matter was taken up before the labour Court on the question of validity of domestic enquiry, the LIC filed an application. In view of the aforesaid matter when the matter was taken up before the labour Court on the question of validity of domestic enquiry, the LIC filed an application. A. No. VI contending that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute in view of the amendment effected to Section 48 of the LIC Act, 1956 and they requested the Labour Court to decide the jurisdictional question first before proceeding with the matter on merits. No objections were filed to the said application. The learned Judge of the Labour Court after hearing the learned Counsel for the LIC has passed the impugned order on 12. 4. 1999 holding that the amendment under Section 48 of the LIC Act do not oust the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act and accordingly dismissed the said application. Further, he proceeded to record a finding that the domestic enquiry held by LIC is not in accordance with the settled principles of law and accordingly he set aside the entire domestic enquiry and he held that the domestic enquiry held is not valid and legal. Further, he took note of the fact that. A. Nos. II and iii filed by the deceased workman for interim relief had not been disposed of and that the. A. No. V filed by the wife of the deceased workman had been dismissed on 17. 7. 1993 and the said order would not amount to res judicata and the wife of the deceased applicant was entitled to file application showing changed circumstances and though no such application is filed as he had set aside the domestic enquiry suo motu, he proceeded to grant an interim relief of a sum of Rs. 2,000. 00 per month from 1. 1. 1990 to 31. 12. 1998 and at the rate of Rs. 3,500. 00 per month from 1. 1. 1999 till the disposal of the reference. Aggrieved by the said order, the LIC has preferred this writ Petition. ( 3 ) SRI V. C. Bhrahmarayappa, the learned Counsel appearing for the LIC, assailing the impugned order passed by the Labour Court contended that the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 is a self contained Act and Section 48 of the said Act provides for provisions to make regulations and also to make rules. ( 3 ) SRI V. C. Bhrahmarayappa, the learned Counsel appearing for the LIC, assailing the impugned order passed by the Labour Court contended that the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 is a self contained Act and Section 48 of the said Act provides for provisions to make regulations and also to make rules. Section 49 of the Act empowers the Corporation to make Regulations in respect of matters enumerated in sub-section (2) (a) to (m ). In exercise of that power conferred on it the Corporation has made the Regulations called the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 which provides for recruitment and other conditions of service including holding of domestic enquiry and imposition of penalties. As a consequence of the amendment effected to Section 48 of the Act inserting sub-section (2) (oo), (2a), (2b) and (2c) the regulations framed by the Corporation have now become deemed rules under Section 48 of the said Act. The said provisions has the effect of excluding the provisions of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 to the disputes between the workmen and the Corporation. In fact the supreme Court in the case of A. V. NACHANE AND ORS. V. UNION OF INIDA AND ORS. , AIR1982 SC 1126 , (1982 )I LLJ110 SC , (1982 )1 SCC205 , [1982 ]2 scr246 and in the case of M. VENUGOPAL V. DIVISIONAL MANAGER, LIC OF INDIA and ORS. , AIR1994 SC 1343 , [1994 (68 )FLR443 ], JT1994 (1 )SC 281 , (1994 )I LLJ597 SC , 1994 (0 )MPLJ415 , 1994 (1 )SCALE264 , (1994 )2 SCC323 , [1994 ]1 SCR433 , 1994 (3 )SLJ206 (SC ), 1994 (2 )UJ73 (SC ), (1994 )1 UPLBEC413 dealing with the effect of amendment of Section 48 of the Act has held that the amended provision excludes the application of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, he contends this reference made and entertained under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act is not maintainable and the labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference, as such the impugned order passed in such an invalid reference is liable to be quashed. Secondly, he contended that the Labour Court committed a serious error in passing an order for payment of interim maintenance when there was no such request made or pending consideration and without hearing the petitioner before passing such order and further it has no jurisdiction to pass suo motu order as it did and, therefore, the order passed directing payment of interim maintenance is one without jurisdiction, passed in violation of principles of natural justice and, is therefore liable to be quashed. ( 4 ) PER contra, Sri M. C. Narasimhan, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, sought to support the impugned order. He contended that in the entire scheme of the LIC Act there is no provision for resolution of dispute between the workmen and the Corporation. Whereas the sole object in passing Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is for such resolution of disputes and for maintenance of industrial peace. The effect of amendment to Section 48 is only to the effect that where specific provisions are made under the LIC Act and those provisions if they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is the provisions of the LIC Act which prevails and the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are not attracted. As there is no provision for resolution of Industrial Disputes in the LIC Act, Industrial Disputes Act is attracted and the reference made is valid and the Labour Court was fully justified in entertaining the reference. ( 5 ) THOUGH no application is filed for interim relief, having regard to the facts which are clearly set out in the impugned order, the order directing payment of interim relief is just and equitable and this Court in its discretionary jurisdiction should not interfere with such equitable orders and, therefore, he contends there is no merit in this Writ Petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. ( 6 ) IN view of the aforesaid points and the rival contentions, the points that arise for consideration in this Writ Petition are as under: (i) Whether the amendment brought to Section 48 of the LIC Act excludes the jurisdiction of the industrial Disputes Act to a dispute between the workmen and the management arising out of the provisions of the LIC Act?, (ii) Whether the order passed by the Labour Court awarding interim relief is vitiated? ( 7 ) RE. ( 7 ) RE. Point No. (1):- The Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 was incorporated to provide for the nationalisation of life insurance business in India and to provide for the regulation and control of the business of the Corporation and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The object of passing the said enactment was to ensure absolute security to the policy holder in the matter of his life insurance protection, to spread insurance much more widely and in particular to the rural areas, and as a further step in the direction of more effective mobilisation of public savings. Whereas, the Industrial Disputes Act was enacted to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. It provides for the machinery and procedure for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. ( 8 ) THE LIC Act was amended by LIC Amendment Act inter alia inserting Clause (cc) in Section 48 (2) and also inserting Section 48 (2c ). The insertion of Clause (cc) in Section 48 (2), enabled the Central Government to make rules providing for the terms and conditions of service of employees and agents of LIC. Section 48 (2a) was inserted providing that the regulations and other provisions as in force immediately before the commencement of the LIC Amendment Act, with respect to the terms and conditions of service of employees of the Corporation, shall be deemed to be rules made under Section 48 (2) (cc) and shall, subject to other provisions of Section 48, have effect accordingly. Section 48 (2c) which was also inserted by the LIC Amendment Act, inter alia provided that provisions of Section 48 (2) (cc) and any rules made thereunder shall have effect, notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument for the time being in force. ( 9 ) PROVISIONS of the LIC Act as amended by the LIC Amendment Act came up for consideration of the Supreme Court in M. VENUGOPAL V. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, LIFE insurance CORPORATION OF INDIA, MACHILIPATNAM AIR1994 SC 1343 , [1994 (68 ) FLR443 ], JT1994 (1 )SC 281 , (1994 )I LLJ597 SC , 1994 (0 )MPLJ415 , 1994 (1 )SCALE264 , (1994 )2 SCC323 , [1994 ]1 SCR433 , 1994 (3 )SLJ206 (SC ), 1994 (2 )UJ73 (SC ), (1994 )1 UPLBEC413. In that case, service of a probationer was terminated without giving any notice in terms of the contract of employment on the ground that he failed to achieve the target stipulated within the extended period of probation. The Supreme court held that his termination before the expiry of the extended period cannot be assailed for want of compliance with Section 25f of the. D. Act as the terms of contract entitled the corporation to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the Probationer in case he failed to achieve necessary target and such termination effected under Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be "retrenchment" within Section 2 (oo) of the. D. Act. The Supreme Court held: "the amendments introduced in Section 48 of the LIC Act have clearly excluded the provisions of. D. Act, so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48 (2) (cc ). The result whereof will be that termination of the service of the Appellant shall not be deemed to be a retrenchment" within the meaning of Section 2 (oo), even if clause (bb) had not been introduced in the said section. Once Section 2 (oo) is not attracted, there is no question of application of section 25f on basis of which the termination of the Service of the Appellant can be held to be invalid. The termination of the Service of the Appellant during the period of probation is in terms of the order of appointment read with Regulation 14 of the Regulations, which shall be deemed to be now Rules under Section 48 (2) (cc) of the LIC Act. " ( 10 ) IN LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA V. RAGHAVENDRA SESHAGIRI rao KULKARNI, AIR 1998 SC 327 the service of a probationer was terminated in terms of the provisions in the letter of appointment enabling discharge from service without notice or reasons. The termination order was quashed by the High Court. Allowing the appeal of LIC, the Supreme court held: "the requirement to hold a regular departmental enquiry before dispensing with the services of a probationer cannot be invoked in the case of a probationer especially when his services are terminated by an innocuous order which does not cast any stigma on him. But it cannot be laid down as a general rule that in no case can an enquiry be held. But it cannot be laid down as a general rule that in no case can an enquiry be held. If the termination is punitive in nature and is brought about on the ground of misconduct, Article 311 (2) would be attracted and in that situation it would be incumbent upon the employer, in the case of Government service, to hold a regular departmental enquiry. In any other case also, specially those relating to statutory corporation or government instrumentalities, a termination which is punitive in nature cannot be brought about unless an opportunity of hearing is given to the person whose services, even during the period of probation, or extended period, are sought to be terminated. " The Supreme Court further held that where a Clause in letter of appointment of employee on probation clearly stipulated that he could be discharged from service at any time during the period of probation without any notice or without assigning any cause, and he was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14 (4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of india (Staff) Regulations, 1960, such termination could not be held to be bad on the ground that it amounted to retrenchment as defined in Section 2 (oo) of ID Act and as the requirements of section 25f of ID Act was not complied with. The Supreme Court observed: "it may be pointed out that Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 (Act 1 of 1981) which came into force on 31st of January, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2a) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. . . For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the measuring of Section 2 (oo) of the ID Act cannot be entertained. " ( 11 ) A Division Bench of this Court in the case of LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF india V. CHANDRA NAIK AND ANR. , W. A. 7710/99 C/w 7711/99 D. D. 13. 2. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the measuring of Section 2 (oo) of the ID Act cannot be entertained. " ( 11 ) A Division Bench of this Court in the case of LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF india V. CHANDRA NAIK AND ANR. , W. A. 7710/99 C/w 7711/99 D. D. 13. 2. 2003 dealing with similar contention after noticing the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court held as under : "16 A careful reading of the said two decisions makes it clear that the entire ID Act is not made inapplicable to employees of LIC. Only those provisions of the. D. Act which are in conflict with the provisions of the Rules framed or Regulations deemed to be Rules made under Section 48 (2) (cc) of the LIC Act are excluded. . . . . Therefore, the decisions in Venugopal and raghavendra Kulkarni cannot be interpreted as totally excluding the. D. Act. The exclusion is only of such provisions of the. D. Act which are in conflict with the provisions of the. D. Act which are in conflict with the provisions framed under Section 48 (2) (cc ). Where the subject matter of a dispute between a workman and LIC is not covered by any of the provisions of the rules framed under Section 48 (2) (cc) or Regulations deemed as Rules under Section 48 (2c), there can be no bar for reference of such dispute to adjudication of the Tribunal. It is significant to note that neither Section 48 (2) (cc) nor any other provision of the LIC Act make Section 10 of the. D. Act inapplicable to employees of LIC. Section 2 (a) specifies the Central Government as the appropriate Government in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by Life Insurance Corporation of India. We therefore answer point No. (a) by holding that provisions of. D. Act will continue to apply to regard to matters not covered by the LIC Act and the rules made thereunder. " ( 12 ) THE Industrial Disputes Act as well as the Life Insurance Corporation Act both have been framed by the Parliament. Section 48 of the LIC Act is the rule making provision under which the Central Government is empowered to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act. " ( 12 ) THE Industrial Disputes Act as well as the Life Insurance Corporation Act both have been framed by the Parliament. Section 48 of the LIC Act is the rule making provision under which the Central Government is empowered to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the LIC Act sets out the matters in respect of which rules have been provided for. Section 49 of the LIC Act provides for making of regulations by the corporation with the previous approval of the Central Government. Similarly sub-section (2) of section 49 sets out the matters in respect of which such regulations may be made. Sub-section (3) of Section 49 makes it mandatory that after framing of the regulations the same has to be placed before each house of the Parliament and only after approval of the Parliament it becomes effective. By virtue of the power vested in the Corporation under Clause (b) and (bb) of sub-section (2) of Section 49 of the LIC Act and with previous approval of the Central government the Life Insurance Corporation (Staff) Regulations Act, 1960 were made which was approved by the Parliament and thereafter it was gazetted and it came into force from 1. 7. 1960. ( 13 ) THE Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment Ordinance) 1981 came to be promulgated on 31st January 1981 which later became Act after it was passed by the Parliament. By the said amendment in sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Principal Act a new sub-clause (cc) was inserted with retrospective effect from 20th June 1979. Clause (cc) relates to "the terms and conditions of service of the employees and agents of the Corporation including those who became employees and agents of the Corporation on the appointed day under this Act". Three new sub-sections (2a), (2b) and (2c) were added to Section 48. The said provisions read as under: (2a) : The regulations and other provisions as in force-immediately before the commencement of the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, with respect to the terms and conditions of service of employees and agents of the Corporation including those who became employees and agents of the Corporation on. The said provisions read as under: (2a) : The regulations and other provisions as in force-immediately before the commencement of the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, with respect to the terms and conditions of service of employees and agents of the Corporation including those who became employees and agents of the Corporation on. the appointed day under this Act, shall be deemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub-section (2) and shall, subject to the other provisions of this section, have effect accordingly. (2b): The power to make rules conferred by clause (cc) of sub-section (2) shall include (i) the power to give retrospective effect to such rules; and (ii) the power to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal, the regulations and other provisions referred to in sub-section (2a), with retrospective effect, from a date not earlier than the twentieth day of June, 1979. (2c) : The provisions of clause (cc) of sub-section (2) and sub-section (2b) and any rules made under the said clause (cc) shall have effect, and any such rule made with retrospective effect from any date shall also be deemed to have had effect from that date, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authority and notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) or any other law of any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument for the time being in force. " ( 14 ) CERTAIN consequential changes were also made in Section 49 of the Act. In Clause (b) of section 49 (2) the words "and the terms and conditions of such employees or agents" were omitted. This was necessary because the terms and conditions of service of employees and the agents with regard to which the Corporation was empowered to make regulations by Section 49 (1) of the Principal Act is now a matter included in clause (cc) of Section 48 (2) as one of the matters covered by rule making authority of the Central Government under Section 48 (1) of the act. The Amendment Act also omitted Clause (bb) from Section 49 (2 ). Clause (bb) also include the terms and conditions of the services of the persons who had become employees of the corporation under Section 11 (1) of the Act. The Amendment Act also omitted Clause (bb) from Section 49 (2 ). Clause (bb) also include the terms and conditions of the services of the persons who had become employees of the corporation under Section 11 (1) of the Act. The terms and conditions of service of such persons are now included in the new clause (cc) of Section 48 (2 ). Sub-section 2 (c) of Section 48 provides that the rules made under clause (cc) of sub-section (2) and sub-section 2 (b) will have the effect notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authority and not withstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other law or any agreement, settlement, award or instrument for the time being in force. The effect is that after the rules are made regarding the terms and conditions of service, the industrial dispute raised in respect of matters dealt with by the rules have to be decided in accordance with the rules and to that extent the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act will cease to be applicable. The constitutional validity of the said amendment has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of A. V NACHANE AND ANR. V. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. AIR1982 SC 1126 , (1982 )I LLJ110 SC , (1982 )1 SCC205 , [1982 ]2 scr246. It is in this back ground we have to see whether the aforesaid Amendment Act takes away the remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act to a dismissed employee. ( 15 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA V. D. J. BAHADUR AND ORS. , AIR 1990 SCC 2181 after elaborately considering both the enactments, the purpose for which they were enacted and the object sought to be achieved has held that the industrial Disputes Act deals with industrial disputes, provides for conciliation, adjudication and settlements and regulates the rights of parties and the enforcement of awards and settlements. When reference is made of a dispute under Section 10 or Section 10a the legal process springs into action. Under Section 16 an award is made after a regular hearing if a conciliation under section 12 does not ripen into a settlement and a failure report is received. When reference is made of a dispute under Section 10 or Section 10a the legal process springs into action. Under Section 16 an award is made after a regular hearing if a conciliation under section 12 does not ripen into a settlement and a failure report is received. The award is published under Section 17 (1) and acquires finality by virtue of Section 17 (2) unless under section 17a (1) the appropriate. Government declares that the award shall not be enforceable. A bird's eye view of the ID Act reveals the statutory structure and legal engineering centering round dispute settlement in industries according to the rule of law and away from right with fists or economic blackmail. The LIC Act is not a law for employment or disputes arising therefrom, but a nationalisation measure which incidentally, like in any general take-over legislation, provides for recruitment, transfers, promotions and the like. It is special vis-a-vis nationalisation of life insurance but general regarding contracts of employment or acquiring office buildings. The ID Act is a special statute devoted wholly to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes which provides definitionly for the nature of industrial disputes coming within its ambit. It creates an infra-structure for investigation into, solution of and adjudication upon industrial disputes. It also provides the necessary machinery for enforcement of awards and settlements. From alpha to omega the ID Act has one special mission - the resolution of industrial disputes through specialised agencies according to specialised procedures and with special reference to the weaker categories of employees coming within the definition of workmen. Therefore with reference to industrial disputes between employers and workmen the ID Act is a special statute and the LIC Act does not speak at all with specific reference to workmen. On the other hand, its powers relate to the general aspects of nationalisation, of management when private business are nationalised and a plurality of problems which, incidentally, involve transfer of service of existing employees of insurers. The workmen qua-workman and industrial disputes between workmen and the employer as such are beyond the orbit of and have no specific or special place in the scheme of the LIC Act. And whenever there was a dispute between workmen and management, the ID Act mechanism was resorted to. The workmen qua-workman and industrial disputes between workmen and the employer as such are beyond the orbit of and have no specific or special place in the scheme of the LIC Act. And whenever there was a dispute between workmen and management, the ID Act mechanism was resorted to. Therefore it was held that the ID Act holds where disputes erupt and the LIC Act guides where other matters are concerned. ( 16 ) IN the aforesaid VENUGOPAL's case after noticing these judgments the Supreme Court with reference to the amended provisions held that the framers of the Corporation Act through amendments have given the provisions of the Corporation a over-riding effect over the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, so far as provisions relating to the terms and conditions of employment which are in conflict with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Unless the said attempt is held to be ultra vires being in conflict with any of the provisions of the constitution, it was open to the Parliament to treat the employees and agents of the Corporation, as a separate class for purpose of fixing their terms and conditions of service. Further it was held that the amendments introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act have clearly excluded the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act so far as they are in conflict with rules framed under section 48 (2) (cc ). ( 17 ) THEREFORE from the aforesaid discussion and having regard to the law declared by the supreme Court what emerges is, even though the Industrial Disputes Act is a special legislation, is a special statute devoted only to an Industrial Dispute for which purpose it creates an infrastructure for investigation into, solution of and adjudication upon industrial disputes it also provides the necessary machinery for enforcement of awards and settlements from alpha to omega if in the rules made under sub-section 2 (cc) of Section 48 there is any provision for resolution of disputes between workmen and the Corporation the provisions of the Industrial disputes Act stands clearly excluded. The right to raise an industrial dispute in respect of matters dealt with by the rules is taken away and to that extent the provisions of the Industrial Disputes act will cease to be applicable. The right to raise an industrial dispute in respect of matters dealt with by the rules is taken away and to that extent the provisions of the Industrial Disputes act will cease to be applicable. However, if the rules do not provide for the resolution of the disputes between the workmen and the Corporation then these amended provisions have no application at all. A workman who has been dismissed from service or whose service conditions are affected has a fundamental right to challenge any such illegal action and has a claim for adjudication of his dispute. If the LIC Act as amended does not provide any such forum or mechanism, then the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act comes to his rescue and the industrial dispute is to be adjudicated under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Matters covered under sub-section 2 (c) of Section 48 would have primacy notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act. If the rules framed under Clause (cc) does not provide for any adjudicative machinery in regard to the industrial disputes Section 2 (c) does not prohibit adjudication of such industrial disputes under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes act. Neither Section 48 (2) (cc) or any other provisions of the LIC Act makes Section 10 of the industrial Disputes Act inapplicable to the employees of LIC. Similarly the rules framed under section 48 (2) (cc) do not provide for adjudication of an industrial dispute. Therefore the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act will continue to apply to the matters not covered by the lic Act and the rules made thereunder. Under the circumstances the contention that the industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain a reference made by the Government is without any substance. ( 18 ) IN VENUGOPAL's case the services of a probationer was terminated without giving notice in terms of contract employment. The question is whether such a termination fall within the mischief of Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Regulation 14 and the rules framed under section 48 (2) (cc) of the LIC Act provides for termination of such employment without notice. The said provisions were in direct conflict with the definition of retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Regulation 14 and the rules framed under section 48 (2) (cc) of the LIC Act provides for termination of such employment without notice. The said provisions were in direct conflict with the definition of retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The question was whether the employee of LIC can complain that his termination was contrary to the provisions contained in Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is in that context the Supreme Court said that there is conflict between the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the rules and regulations framed under the LIC Act which has the force of law. It is the provisions of the LIC Act which prevails and over rides the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. As such the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are not applicable to such an employee. In that decision the question whether the labour Court under the ID Act has jurisdiction to go into the said industrial dispute or not did not arise for consideration. What was considered was whether the termination of venugopal falls within the definition of retrenchment under the ID Act. It was held, it is not so, because the Rules provided for such termination which would have over riding effect on the provisions of the ID Act. ( 19 ) THE substantive law which applies to a dispute between a workman of the corporation and its management is the law contained in the rules if it is in conflict with the provisions of the industrial Disputes Act. The forum to decide such dispute is the forum prescribed under the industrial Disputes Act. e. labour Court only. The Labour Court in deciding such dispute has to decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions contained in the rules and regulations framed under the LIC Act ignoring the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act if there is a conflict between the two. Admittedly, in the regulations and the rules framed under the LIC Act after the aforesaid amendment, no provision is provided for resolution of disputes between the workmen and the corporation. Admittedly, in the regulations and the rules framed under the LIC Act after the aforesaid amendment, no provision is provided for resolution of disputes between the workmen and the corporation. In the absence of any specific provisions and in the absence of any provision excluding the jurisdiction of the forum constituted under the provisions of the industrial Disputes Act there is no conflict between the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the LIC Act in so far as adjudicative machinery is concerned. It is only when there is a conflict that the LIC Act prevails over the Industrial Disputes Act. When there is no conflict and when there is no specific provision providing for adjudication of disputes under the LIC Act or rules and regulations framed thereunder including the amendment as referred to supra the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act in so far as adjudication of the industrial dispute between the workmen and the corporation is attracted and the labour Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the reference, adjudicate upon the dispute and award appropriate reliefs to the parties. ( 20 ) RE: POINT NO. (ii) It is not in dispute that the workman died on 9. 6. 90. His wife has been brought on record she filed an application. A. V for grant of interim relief. The Tribunal rejected the said application by order dated 17. 7. 93 on the ground that N. Kesar Singh was paid a sum of rs. 61,726/- as terminal benefits and therefore his wife is not entitled to any interim relief. The said order has become final as the same having not been challenged. It is thereafter the Writ petition No. 12453/87 was disposed of on 30. 6. 95 giving an opportunity to the LIC to tender evidence regarding validity of the domestic enquiry. The matter was taken up for consideration by the labour Court. At that juncture the LIC filed. A. VI contending that the labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. On consideration of the contentions by the impugned order the labour Court has rightly held that it has the jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. But while disposing of the said application it took note of the fact that. A. I, II and III filed by deceased workman for interim relief has not been disposed of and the application filed by the wife of deceased. But while disposing of the said application it took note of the fact that. A. I, II and III filed by deceased workman for interim relief has not been disposed of and the application filed by the wife of deceased. A. V has been dismissed on 17. 7. 93 and thereafter suo motu the labour has proceeded to grant the interim relief at the rate of Rs. 2000-00 per month from 1. 1. 90 to 31. 12. 98 and Rs. 3500-00 per month from 1. 1. 99 till the disposal of the dispute. Admittedly there was no application for the interim relief by the wife of the deceased workman on the date of the impugned order. The Corporation was not heard in so far as the grant of this interim order is concerned as it involves financial implications. The application filed by the wife of deceased has already been dismissed and the said order had become final. The labour Court has no suo motu power to grant the interim relief without notice and hearing the employer. Whatever may be the circumstances of the case and the sympathy the Court has for the widow of the deceased, the exercise of power by the labour Court should be within the four corners of law and in accordance with law. Orders cannot be passed in violation of the principles of natural justice without hearing the person affected, without even notice to him while disposing of altogether a different matter. Therefore that portion of the impugned order granting interim maintenance cannot be sustained in law and is liable to be quashed and accordingly it is quashed. Hence I pass the following order. (a) The remedy provided under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is available to the workmen of Life Insurance Corporation of India. (b) The Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain a reference made to it in respect of industrial dispute of an employee of the Life Insurance corporation of India under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act notwithstanding the insertion of sub-section (2) (cc), (2a), (2b) and (2c) by way of amendment to Section 48 the lic Act. (c) The interim maintenance awarded by the labour Court is hereby quashed.