S.K. KAR, J. — Being dissatisfied with and aggrieved by the order dated 6.5.2002 of the Learned District Judge, Karimganj, passed in Misc. Case No. 61/2001 (arising out of T.S. No. 209/01), this revision petition has been filed by the plaintiff of the suit concerned. The impugned order has vacated the order of injunction granted earlier and confirmed later on 12.12.2001 by the original Court directing the Opposite party/defendants of the suit not to impose any bar/restriction in respect of supply of cigarettes as per requirement of the petitioner/plaintiff and also not to make any .alternative arrangement for supply to other persons or for marketing of cigarettes through persons other than the petitioner within the district of Karimganj. 2. Briefly stated, suit for the petitioner/ plaintiff in this context is that plaintiff-firm is a whole-sale dealer of cigarettes for the whole district of Karimganj, manufactured by ITC(defendant No. 3) and marketed through its management agents, the defendants 1 and 2. That as per 'contract and understanding with the defendant' and 'terms of arrangement' cigarettes of different brands* were being supplied to the petitioner, order for which being placed in the prescribed format alongwith requisite remittance. That petitioner deposited a sum of rupees fifteen lacs and invested huge amount for the required infrastructures and the business started from 5.7.2001. But next after 12.9.2001 defendants stopped the supply in an arbitrary way and mischievous manner threatening heavy loss in business of the petitioner and the reputation of the plaintiff-firm. That attempts were being made by the defendants/ Opp. parties to make alternative supply of cigarettes to persons other than the petitioner/ plaintiff. Hence petitioner/plaintiff prayed for declaration that it is entitled to continue the business with defendant No. 3(Opp. Party) and sought interim injunction. 3. The opposite parties/defendants of the suit filed the written objection-statement contending, inter alia, that the suit is a misconceived and not maintainable in its present frame and also is devoid of cause of action. That the petitioner was not appointed whole-sale dealer of the cigarettes for district of Karimganj. That petitioner was only a customer of the O/P No. 3 and was supplied with the goods as per order placed by the petitioner and the status of petitioner was in no way different than that of any other customer. That the petitioner was not appointed whole-sale dealer of the cigarettes for district of Karimganj. That petitioner was only a customer of the O/P No. 3 and was supplied with the goods as per order placed by the petitioner and the status of petitioner was in no way different than that of any other customer. That the demand made by the petitioner by placing order was liable to be rejected wholly or in part without assigning any reason. That each and every order placed for supply was an independent transaction of sale and customers are in habit of placing orders in standard from supplied by the O.P. No. 3. That excepting a sum of Rs. 2.52 lakhs deposited for purchase of goods no amount was lying with the O.P. No. 3 to the credit of the petitioner. That there was no stipulation or agreement between the parities for making investment as claimed by the petitioner and opposite parties are not under any legal obligation to ensure uninterrupted supply of goods to the petitioner. That the petitioner paid a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five lacs) by way of bribery to one of the erstwhile employee of the O.P and this was admitted by Subroto Deb, a partner of the petitioner firm, vide a letter addressed to the Manager of the Opposite party No. 3 admitting his guilt. That it was decided by the O.R No. 3 not to have further business with the petitioner. That there was no compulsion for O.R No. 3 to continue business with the petitioner, or as a matter of fact, with any other customer. That as per the 'conditions of sale' attached to format of order, order is to be placed for supply of cigarettes, even if the petitioner was a whole-seller having a code number. The opposite party No. 3 could not be compelled by the petitioner as per its assessed requirement to continue business to the exclusion of all other parties in the district Karimganj. That no legal right exists in favour of the petitioner to give it cause of action for the suit. That the contract in question was not an enforceable contract under the provision of Specific Relief Act and therefore, under the facts and circumstances of the case, even if the facts are admitted, there is no legal scope for getting an order of injunction, much less a mandatory one. That the contract in question was not an enforceable contract under the provision of Specific Relief Act and therefore, under the facts and circumstances of the case, even if the facts are admitted, there is no legal scope for getting an order of injunction, much less a mandatory one. 4. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered the submissions made and perused the relevant materials on the case records including the LCRs those were called for. I have been referred by the parties to some citations, (1) AIR 1982 Gau 69 , (2) (1992) 1 SCC 719 , (3) AIR 1988 Delhi 324, (4) (1991) 1 SCC 533 , (5) (1993) 4 SCC 622 etc. 5. It is contended during hearing of this petition by the present petitioner/plaintiff that lower appellate court failed to consider material documents while reversing the order of the trial court without complying with the statutory provision of Order LXI, Rule 31 of CPC. That the fact that the petitioner was the whole-sale dealer and that there was the implied contract to that effect on the strength of Section 9 of the Indian Contract Act was ignored. That a sum of rupees 13 lacs and odd was invested by the petitioner but the dealership was terminated without any notice what-so-ever, causing inconvenience to petitioner and it will suffer irreparable loss for the discontinuation of the dealership. That getting assurance from the opp. parties to continue the dealership the petitioner employed persons who will be thrown out of employment leading to social catastrophe etc. etc. On the other hand the opposite parties/ defendants of the suit reiterated what was stated in the objection-statements before the original court below and submitted that the revision petition has no merit and is liable to be rejected. 6. In a revision petition the revisional court is required to examining only the relevant questions of law or mixed questions of law and facts that may arise, against the following yard-stick- '(a) Whether the court below exercised a jurisdiction not invested in it by law. 6. In a revision petition the revisional court is required to examining only the relevant questions of law or mixed questions of law and facts that may arise, against the following yard-stick- '(a) Whether the court below exercised a jurisdiction not invested in it by law. or, (b) Whether the court has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or, (c) Whether it acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity,' The question of exercising or not exercising jurisdiction is not coming here directly for a decision as the impugned order was passed by the appellate court in due exercise of its appellate powers to re-examine the entire case on merits. There is nothing to show that it was not so done. However, whether injunction is to be granted or not is again a question of exercise of jurisdiction in q mixed question of law and facts. 7. The next question coming for answering is whether there was any case of illegality or material irregularity in the impugned order which reversed the findings of the trial court on merit. 8. I have carefully examined the impugned order dated 06.05.02 of the learned District Judge, Karimganj. In his judgment learned judge upheld the submissions of the present opposite parties/defendants of the suit (appellants before him) viz., (i) that there was no contract between the parties concerned to appoint plaintiff of the suit as a whole-sale dealer for district of Karimganj, vis-à-vis article 14 of the 'condition of sale' appended to format for placing orders, and plaintiff could produce no evidence of any type of substantiate its plea to that effect. (ii) that mandatory injunction requires a higher standard of proof, in so far prima facie case is concerned, than that which is required for a prohibitory injunction and court of origin granted mandatory injunction apparently being oblivious of this requirement of law. (iii) that without prejudice to the case of the defendants, even if it is accepted for the time being that there was such a contract as pleaded in the plaint, still than as per the bar of law given by Section 14(1)(c) and 41(e) of the specific Relief Act such a contract cannot be specifically enforced and the alternative remedy is to sue for damages/compensation including penalty, if any. (iv) that there were no papers to show any demand from defendant for making of deposits, investing infrastructures etc. to seek immediate relief by invoking power of court to grant injunction etc. 9. I have also examined the order dated 12.12.01 of the Trial Court making the ad-interim injunction absolute. In order to cut-short the argumentation, the oft repeated cardinal principles of granting or refusing injunction, as discussed by Hon'ble Apex Court, may be quoted from the cited law, (1992) 1 SCC 719 ; Dalpat Kumar and Another vs. Prahlad Singh and others. It said- “5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence adduced by affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant to temporary injunction. Prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bonafide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit." So, here also the petitioner/plaintiff is under the legal obligation to trace out its right to sue before seeking for ad-interim injunction. 10. The quintessence of the pleading on plaint here, in order to trace out any right to sue, is that, by the conduct of the parties concerned, petitioner .is to be treated as whole-sale dealer of cigarettes manufactured by defendant No. 3 and as per 'contract and understanding' he deposited rupees fifteen lacs with the defendants for the purpose and parties thereto acted accordingly from 5.7.2001 till 12.09.2001. But thereafter the supply was discontinued by defendants without any apparent cause for which this declaratory suit was presented to declare that 'plaintiff is entitled to continue business with defendant No. 3 as whole-sale dealer of cigarettes and that activities of defendant No. 1 and 2 are contrary to the standing principal of business between 'them' etc. So, it is a suit based on law of contract. In contractual liabilities, one either sues for specific performance of contract or for damages for breach of it as per the relevant laws. But how comes a declaratory suit ? Sec. 34 of Specific Relief Act provides for filing declaratory suits which is quoted as below- "34. Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so." The present suit, thus, may not be a declaratory suit on equitable ground. For all practical purpose the present suit, on the basis of its frame, may be a suit for breach of contract etc. For all practical purpose the present suit, on the basis of its frame, may be a suit for breach of contract etc. Sec. 41 (e) of the Specific Relief Act rules that injunction cannot be granted to prevent breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. And what contracts cannot be specifically performed are given by provisions of Section 14(1) of the same act. I find learned appellate court has discussed these matters clearly and nothing concrete could be pointed out to assail such findings. AIR 1988 Delhi 324 has been placed in service in this context. In that case (i.e., in S.K. Gupta -Vs- Hyderabad Allwyn Limited) court held- "5.* * * * * under S.41(e) of the Act an injunction cannot be granted in a suit filed to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. Thus, once it is found that the contract cannot be specifically enforced because it is covered by S.14(l)(c) of the Act, no injunction can be granted to prevent the breach of such a contract." 11. From plaintiff's/petitioner's own averments on the plaint it is a case of breach of contract, notwithstanding its nature of agreement and manner of performance, and hence remedy is given under the Indian Contract Act, 1872(IX of 1872) chapter VI, Ss. 73 to 75 by suing for compensation in case of breach but not for specific performance, as the case may be. Petitioner has admitted in pleading that contract in question was at least u/s 9(implied contract). Be that as it may, the petitioner also tried to get benefit of law pronounced by this court and reported in the case of Bindeshwar Narayan Singh and others- Vs-Managing Committee, Shri Sundarmal Hindi School and others; AIR 1982 Gauhati 69 where it was held- "16. The power of the appellate court in the matter of injunction is rather circumscribed. The appellate court would be slow to interfere with the exercise of discretion and would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it may have come to a contrary conclusion. The appellate court would be slow to interfere with the exercise of discretion and would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it may have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court's exercise of discretion." 12. In the instant suit learned Trial Court brought a case of 'natural justice' to grant relief which is not permissible and trial court thus, miserably failed to deduct any prima facie case for the declaratory suit and the specific right of the plaintiff for issue of mandatory injunction. Even if the petitioner/ plaintiff was a whole-sale dealer there is no law to retain such status in perpetuity or claim any vested interest. Then again, the judgment of Trial Court patently failed to discuss the question of balance of convenience and irreparable loss and disposed of these two cardinal principles by a single sentence. Hence, interference of Higher Court was needed and is justified. I would conclude, without lengthening the discussions, that the impugned order does not suffer infirmities to declare it as invalid, illegal or materially irregular. 13. In the result, petition is rejected. Stay order, if any, would stand vacated. 14. Before parting with this petition it is hereby made clear that any comments of this court with respect to merit of the suit, rights of the parties concerned will be limited to the grounds of passing this order and will not be in any way binding on the trial court while trying the suit on merit. 15. No costs. Return the L.C.Rs.