Judgment :- P. Sathasivam, J. Petitioner is the wife of the detenu. The detenu by name A. Shahul Hameed was detained by the first respondent by detention order dated 06.05.2003 with a view to prevent him from smuggling goods in future under Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (in short "COFEPOSA Act"). 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as respondents. 3. After taking us through the grounds of detention and other materials, the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that in the light of the specific averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, in the absence of counter affidavit by first respondent, this petition has to be allowed, for which he relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ranbir Singh vs. T. George Joseph reported in 1990 S.C.C. 613. With reference to the said contention, it is to be noted that the second respondent - Ministry of Finance, Government of India has filed a counter affidavit with reference to the representation sent and the rejection order passed on 13.06.2003. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for respondents 1 and 3 would submit that even in the absence of a counter affidavit, if materials are available on record to show that the detenu had indulged in smuggling goods, the detention order can be sustained. For that, he relied on an unreported decision of this Court rendered in HCP.No.1790 of 1999 dated 16.06.2000. In the Supreme Court decision (Ranbir Singh case) referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Central Government as well as the State Government did not file a counter affidavit. As a matter of fact, the Central Government has not chosen to enter appearance. The main allegation that the petitioner therein made a representation to the State Government and the State Government failed to consider the same, has remained uncontroverted. In that circumstance, after accepting the stand of the petitioner, the detention order was quashed. In the case before us, though the first respondent has not filed a counter affidavit, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has secured all the relevant records and placed before us to sustain the order of detention. In that circumstance, after accepting the stand of the petitioner, the detention order was quashed. In the case before us, though the first respondent has not filed a counter affidavit, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has secured all the relevant records and placed before us to sustain the order of detention. Accordingly, we are of the view that judgment of the Supreme Court in Ranbir Singh case (1990 S.C.C. (Cri.) 613) relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the case on hand and we hold that the failure to file counter affidavit by the first respondent - detaining authority in this case would not vitiate the order of detention; hence, we reject the said contention. 4. The other contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the detaining authority has passed the detention order without application of mind. In other words, according to him, the detaining authority was not having sufficient time to consider all the materials to arrive at such conclusion. In support of the above claim, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the detenu came from Sharja, arrived at Trichy International Airport on 25.04.2003, he was arrested at 17.30 hours, remanded to judicial custody till 08.05.2003 by the Judicial Magistrate, Trichy at 10.50 p.m. on 25.04.2003, bail petition filed on 28.04.2003, the same was dismissed on 02.05.2003, second bail petition filed on 03.05.2003 and the order of detention was passed on 06.05.2003. He also contended that on the same day three detention orders were passed by the detaining authority. By pointing out that since the time was very short including the holiday which intervened, the detaining authority was not having sufficient time to consider all the relevant materials. In such a circumstance, according to him, the detention order is vitiated and liable to be quashed. For the said contention, he very much relied on the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of P.A. Syed Mohideen vs. Jt. Secretary, Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi reported in 1991 Criminal Law Journal 2679. In such a circumstance, according to him, the detention order is vitiated and liable to be quashed. For the said contention, he very much relied on the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of P.A. Syed Mohideen vs. Jt. Secretary, Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi reported in 1991 Criminal Law Journal 2679. With reference to the said claim, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has brought to our notice that there is no intervening holiday during the said period as claimed and the detaining authority had relied only 8 documents (68 pages) and there was sufficient time for him to satisfy himself before passing the detention order. In the light of the above information and on going through the factual details in the above referred decision, we accept the stand taken by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and reject the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. A perusal of grounds of detention, the detention order and others materials shows that the detaining authority has taken into consideration all the materials and the State Government also satisfied itself that the detenu indulged in smuggling goods and detained him under the provisions of COFEPOSA Act with a view to prevent him from indulging in smuggling goods in future. In those circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the detaining authority neither applied his mind nor not having sufficient time to consider all the materials. 5. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Central Government has hastily disposed of the representation of the detenu. With reference to the said contention, it is useful to refer to the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent. 5. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Central Government has hastily disposed of the representation of the detenu. With reference to the said contention, it is useful to refer to the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent. It is seen from the counter affidavit that representation dated 04.06.2003 of the detenu was forwarded by the Superintendent, Central Prison, Trichy in his letter dated 04.06.2003, which was received in the COFEPOSA Unit of the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi on 06.06.2003; parawar remarks on the representation were called for from the sponsoring authority, namely Additional Director General, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Chennai on 06.06.2003; the comments on the representation sent by the sponsoring authority to the Deputy Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu, Public (Law and Order) Department, Chennai with copy to the Under Secretary (COFEPOSA), Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi, were received in the COFEPOSA Unit on 13.06.2003; the case file of the detenu was submitted to the Deputy Secretary (COFEPOSA) on 13.06.2003; the Deputy Secretary (COFEPOSA) perused the case and put up the file to the Joint Secretary, COFEPOSA on the same day and the Joint Secretary, in turn, submitted the file to the Special Secretary and Director General CEIB, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi on 13.06.2003 itself. The Special Secretary and Director General, CEIB, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi considered the representation on behalf of Central Government and rejected the same as being devoid of merits on 13.06.2003 itself and the detenu was intimated about the rejection of his representation dated 04.06.2003 by memorandum dated 13.06.2003. Merely because the representation was considered and rejected in 9 days, it cannot be claimed that the Central Government had taken hasty decision. The particulars furnished clearly show that based on the representation, remarks were called from the respective authorities, detailed note was prepared, sent to various Officers and ultimately the said representation was rejected as being devoid of merits. In such a circumstance, we reject the said contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the detenu was not supplied with translated copies of Customs Declaration Card, Passport with endorsements, Boarding pass and Air Ticket. In such a circumstance, we reject the said contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the detenu was not supplied with translated copies of Customs Declaration Card, Passport with endorsements, Boarding pass and Air Ticket. In the light of the said contention, he has referred to those documents and taken us through the detention order where those documents were referred to. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor points out that those documents, though supplied to the detenu along with the detention order, are not "relied upon" documents. In any event, according to him, the whole passport has not become a "relied upon" document, as only a stray reference to the said passport has been made. Apart from the Passport, the other documents referred to above are standard/printed public documents and failure to supply the translation of those documents has not deprived the detenu to make an effective representation. First of all, the petitioner himself does not say that the said documents are "relied upon" documents. As rightly pointed out by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, how the printed entries or printed stamps could be said to be "relied upon" documents. They are clearly not so. Merely because the documents were supplied along with the detention order, all of the same do not become "relied upon" documents. The grounds to be communicated to the detenu would contain all the basic facts and materials which have been taken into consideration in making the order of detention and on which the detention order has been passed. The documents, translation of which have not been supplied to the detenu could not be called "relied upon" documents. They are the documents which were merely supplied to the detenu with the grounds of detention. Except those documents such as passport, etc. on which a stray reference has been made, copies of all other "relied upon" documents have been supplied to the detenu in Tamil language. In this regard, it is apt to quote the conclusion of the Full Bench decision of this Court rendered in HCP.No.798 of 2001 dated 16.04.2002, wherein, after rejecting a similar contention, the Full Bench has held that it would be a travesty to seek the translation of the endorsements made on the VISA and the passport. In this regard, it is apt to quote the conclusion of the Full Bench decision of this Court rendered in HCP.No.798 of 2001 dated 16.04.2002, wherein, after rejecting a similar contention, the Full Bench has held that it would be a travesty to seek the translation of the endorsements made on the VISA and the passport. Similarly, it would also be a travesty to seek the translation of the conditions found in the passport or the cautions printed in it. Therefore, it cannot be said under any circumstance that these are the "relied upon" documents. They could at the most be suggested as "referred to" documents. It is settled law that once the documents are not "relied upon" documents and are only "referred to" documents, then, the detenu would have to show "prejudice" caused to him. We fail to see as to what prejudice has caused to the detenu by not providing the translation of the standard/printed public documents, contents of which are common. Accordingly, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner deserves to be rejected. 7. The next contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the detaining authority failed to consider the impact of seizure of the passport of the detenu. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel has relied on the case of Rajesh Gulati vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi reported in 2002 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1627. In the said decision, the Supreme Court after holding that none of the instances of smuggling by the appellant as stated in the detention order described the appellant as having travelled without a passport for the purpose of smuggling and in view of the fact that the detaining authority noted that the appellant's passport was with the Customs Department, concluded that the finding of the detaining authority that it would be possible for the appellant to continue his activities, is based on no material but was a piece of pure speculation and on this ground, set aside the order of detention. In this regard it is relevant to note that in our case the grounds of detention show that the State Government also satisfied itself that on the facts and materials referred to, the detenu, if released on bail, is likely to indulge in such activities and further recourse to normal criminal law would not have the desired effect of effectively preventing him from such activities, though his passport has been impounded. As rightly pointed out by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the seizure of passport would not prevent his normal activities. We are satisfied that the detaining authority has considered the said aspect, including the impact of seizure of passport. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the incident, namely smuggling of goods on 25.04.2003 being a single and solitary incident is not sufficient for clamping the detention order under COFEPOSA Act. First of all, even according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the "single incident" referred to by him relates to the visit in the year 2003. There is no information regarding his earlier visits. While answering the said contention, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik vs. Union of India reported in 1992 (1) S.C.C. 1 , would contend that even on a solitary incident depending on the potentialities of the detenu, in the absence of no antecedents, the detention order can be passed. In para-6, Their Lordships have concluded, " 6. The next submission is that there were no antecedents and that this being the solitary incident the detention is unwarranted. It is again a question of satisfaction of the detaining authority on the basis of material placed before it. Even a solitary incident which has been detected may speak volumes about the potentialities of the detenu and merely on the ground that there were no antecedents the dentition order cannot be quashed. The authorities cannot and may not in every case salvage the antecedents but as noted above even a solitary incident may manifest the potentialities of a detenu in the activities of smuggling. " In the light of the above legal position, we are satisfied that the detaining authority has considered the potentialities of the detenu and arrived at a conclusion that the detention is warranted. " In the light of the above legal position, we are satisfied that the detaining authority has considered the potentialities of the detenu and arrived at a conclusion that the detention is warranted. Inasmuch as the detaining authority has arrived at such conclusion based on satisfactory materials placed before it, we reject the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 9. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is delay in considering the representation of the petitioner. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has produced records, which show that the representation of the petitioner dated 02.06.2003 was received on 05.06.2003, remarks called for on the same day itself and received on 11.06.2003; file sent to Public Department on 12.06.2003; circulated to Under Secretary on 16.06.2003, to the Secretary on 17.06.2003 and finally to the Minister concerned on 18.06.2003. After consideration, the representation was rejected on the same day itself. We do not find any delay in considering the representation. In the light of what is stated above, we do not find any merit in the petition; consequently, the same is dismissed.