RAJENDRA MENON, J. ( 1 ) AS common questions are involved in all these three petitions and challenge made is to a common award dated August 10, 2003 passed by the Labour Court, all the three petitions are being disposed of by this common order. Respondent employees in all these three cases were working in the Establishment of the petitioners which has its manufacturing unit in industrial Area Banmore. ( 2 ) IT is the case of the petitioners that respondent- employees committed serious act of misconduct on May 26, 1991 inasmuch as they assaulted one Kalyan Singh an employee of the petitioner's establishment who was on duty at the relevant time. Because of this an FIR was lodged. Respondent-employees were prosecuted for having committed offences under Sections 307 and 506 of the Indian Penal code. A charge-sheet was also issued to them and after conducting departmental enquiry, their services were terminated. ( 3 ) ON a dispute being raised, the dispute was referred for adjudication to the Labour court No. 2 Gwalior vide Annexure R-l/a on june 30, 1992 filed in W. P. No. 69/2001. Similar orders of reference have been passed in the other cases also to the Labour Court. Statement of claim was filed by the respondent-employees, petitioner filed their written statement, issues were framed and by an order dated November 30, 1999 annexure-P/12, a preliminary issue with regard to validity of the Departmental enquiry conducted by the petitioner was decided. It was held by the Labour Court that the enquiry conducted by the employer is illegal and, therefore, quashed the same. However, liberty I was granted to the petitioners to prove the allegations levelled against the employees by adducing evidence before the Labour Court. Accordingly, petitioners examined four witnesses in support of the allegations made in the charge-sheet. Respondent- employees examined themselves and on the basis of the evidence that have come on record, by the impugned award, Labour Court has held that the misconduct alleged against the employees' are not proved and, therefore, directed for their reinstatement with full back wages. The aforesaid award is challenged in this petition. ( 4 ) SHRI R. D. Jain, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted as under: (i) The finding recorded by the Labour court is perverse, it is contrary to the evidence available on record and, therefore, the award is unsustainable. The aforesaid award is challenged in this petition. ( 4 ) SHRI R. D. Jain, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted as under: (i) The finding recorded by the Labour court is perverse, it is contrary to the evidence available on record and, therefore, the award is unsustainable. (ii) Labour Court has committed material irregularity in awarding the back wages and in the facts and circumstances of the case, -it was submitted by him that no back wages could be awarded. (iii) The Labour Court while deciding the dispute has relied upon the statement recorded by some of the witnesses of the criminal case. Relying on such statement is contrary to the provisions of Section 33 of the Evidence Act and, therefore, statement recorded in the criminal case cannot be read as evidence in these proceedings. (iv) The order of reference Annexure-P/1 is made in the name of the company represented through its Director, no statement of claim was filed by the. Company and as there was no reference against the Factory Manager, the award passed against the Company without the factory Manager being party in the reference is unsustainable. (v) It was submitted by Shri R. D. Jain, learned senior counsel that as three references were made to the Labour Court, the Labour Court should have decided each i case separately instead, common evidence was recorded in one of the case and by considering the same, the other cases have been decided. It is argued that this procedure followed is unsustainable. ( 5 ) TAKING me through the statement of witnesses recorded before the Labour Court as contained in Annexure P/7, P/8, P/9 and P/10 it was emphasised by Shri R. D. Jain, learned senior counsel that in the light of its evidence, finding recorded by the Labour Court is unsustainable. In support of his contention learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments, Neelankantan and others v. Mallika Begum, AIR 2002 SC 827 : 2002 (2) SCC 440 , Madan Pal Singh v. State of U. P. and others AIR 2000 SC 537 : 2000 (1) SCC 683 : 2000-I-LLJ-528. In support of his contention learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments, Neelankantan and others v. Mallika Begum, AIR 2002 SC 827 : 2002 (2) SCC 440 , Madan Pal Singh v. State of U. P. and others AIR 2000 SC 537 : 2000 (1) SCC 683 : 2000-I-LLJ-528. ( 6 ) REFUTING the aforesaid, Shri B. P. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-employee in all cases argued that this Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over an award passed by the Labour Court and by re-appreciating the evidence come to a different conclusion. Placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of M. P. State road Transport Corporation and others v. Devendra Kumar Pandey and others 2003-IV-LLJ (Suppl)-835 (NOC) (MP) : 2002 (4) M. P. L. J. 546 it was argued by Shri Singh, learned counsel that no case for interference is made out. By referring to the evidence adduced by the parties it was submitted by Shri Singh that the contention of perversity in the finding is unsustainable. It was also argued by him that in view of the Rule 6 (2) of the M. P. Industrial disputes Rules, proceedings conducted on behalf of the Company through its agent namely the Factory Manager is proper and therefore the objection raised with regard to reference being answered without hearing the company is unsustainable. ( 7 ) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. ( 8 ) BEFORE adverting to (sic) the merits of the dispute, it is thought appropriate to deal with point Nos. 3, 4 and 5 raised by Shri R. D. Jain, learned senior counsel as they are preliminary objections with regard to tenability of the award passed by the Labour Court. ( 9 ) THE question of considering the: evidence recorded in the criminal proceedings and applicability of Section 33 of the Evidence act cannot be a ground for holding the award to be illegal. The Labour Court has assessed the evidence adduced before it by the parties: and on assessment of the evidence has recorded its conclusion with regard to allegations levelled in the charge-sheet, in fact, the Labour court has exercised its power under Section 10 (2-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act and has adjudicated the dispute on merit with regard to commission of misconduct by the employees. Reference to the statement of one witness namely Shri Ram Chandra recorded in the criminal case for the purpose of pointing out contradictions in his statement cannot be termed as so grave error so as to vitiate the entire proceedings. Even if the statement of ram Chandra in the criminal case is ignored, the other material and evidence available on record has been assessed by the Labour Court to record its findings. Merely because the statement of one witness recorded in the criminal case is considered it cannot be a ground to hold that the entire finding of the labour Court is illegal. In view of the same, the objection with regard to consideration of statement of witness recorded in the criminal case is not such a grave irregularity committed by the Labour Court on the basis of which the award can be quashed. Accordingly, this objection cannot be sustained. ( 10 ) THE grounds raised vide point Nos. 4 and 5 are too technical in nature, even otherwise the Factory Manager has appeared in the proceedings and the written statement filled by the petitioners is verified and signed by the factory Manager. The Factory Manager having participated in the proceedings and the company having not objected to the reference being illegal on the ground of non impleading of proper parties it is not appropriate to quash the award on such a technical ground. The company having participated in the proceedings through its Factory Manager, at this stage, this objection cannot be sustained. ( 11 ) AS far as recording of common evidence is concerned, no such objection was raised before the Labour Court when the proceedings took place. The witnesses were cross-examined and petitioner consented to the said procedure being followed by the Labour court. In that view of the matter, there is no substance in this objection also. ( 12 ) AS far as the question of perversity in the finding of the Labour Court is concerned, it is to be kept in mind that while considering the tenability and legality of an award passed by the Labour Court in a proceedings under industrial Disputes Act, this Court does not sit over the same as an appellate authority and by re-appreciating the evidence cannot come to a conclusion different from that of a Labour court. Exercise of jurisdiction by this Court is limited to the extent of seeing as to whether on the basis of the evidence and material adduced before it, Labour Court has recorded a reasonable finding. A finding recorded on reasonable appreciation of evidence cannot be interfered with by this Court. If the finding recorded by the Labour Court with regard to issue Nos. 2 and 3 regarding the misconduct conducted by the employees are concerned, I am of the considered view that the said finding is a reasonable finding which cannot be interfered with by this Court. It is to be taken note of that before terminating the services of the employees, a departmental enquiry was conducted and the services were terminated on the basis of the findings recorded on the departmental enquiry. When the matter was referred to the Labour Court a preliminary issue was framed with regard to the illegality or otherwise of the departmental enquiry and vide order dated November 30, 1999 annexure-P/12 it has been held that enquiry conducted by the management is legal. This order passed by the Labour Court is not challenged. There is no averment made in the petition challenging this order nor is it the case of the petitioner that the finding recorded with regard to illegality in the enquiry is unsustainable. That being so, the assessment of misconduct committed by the employees has to 5 be made on the basis of the evidence led before the Labour Court in support of the allegations levelled in the charge-sheet. The evidence adduced in the departmental enquiry cannot be considered for the purpose of proving the 10 misconduct before the Labour Court, in view of the fact that the enquiry has been held to be vitiated. That being so, the Labour Court has rightly considered the statement of witnesses recorded before it to come to a conclusion as 15 to whether the allegations levelled in the charge-sheet are proved or not. ( 13 ) IN the proceedings held before the labour Court four witnesses have been examined. The witnesses are Shri B. K. Chaudhary PW-1, Yuvraj Singh Tomar PW-2, shri Ram Chandra PW-3 and Shri K. D. Gupta pw-4. As far as PW-1 is concerned, he was manager and it is his contention that he has not seen the incident alleged in the charge-sheet. The witnesses are Shri B. K. Chaudhary PW-1, Yuvraj Singh Tomar PW-2, shri Ram Chandra PW-3 and Shri K. D. Gupta pw-4. As far as PW-1 is concerned, he was manager and it is his contention that he has not seen the incident alleged in the charge-sheet. That being so, there are only three witnesses who have seen the incident, witness No. 4 says that he was not present whereas PW-2 and pw-3 stated that they are eye-witnesses to the incident. Labour Court after considering all these witnesses have held that statement of pw-2 and PW-3 cannot be accepted and after considering the statement of K. D. Gupta pw-4, it has come to the conclusion that the charges are not proved. However, in doing so the Labour Court has also taken note of the fact that there are certain discrepancies in the statement of witnesses recorded before the labour Court and it differs from that given in the Criminal Court. By assessing the evidence and by corroborating the statements given by various witnesses, Labour Court has recorded a finding that misconduct is not proved. ( 14 ) EVEN though, during the course of hearing, R. D. Jain, learned senior counsel vehemently tried to emphasise that this is a perverse finding, the fact remains that assessment made by the Labour Court to draw at a conclusion cannot be said to be perverse to 50 such an extent that no reasonable man can come to such a conclusion. In fact, Labour Court has assessed the evidence and has recorded a reasonable finding. Even if some different conclusion can be drawn on the basis of evidence that has come on record by the Labour court cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its limited jurisdiction. ( 15 ) SCOPE of interference in such matters by exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was considered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan and others AIR 1964 SC 477 , and in para 7 of the aforesaid judgment, it is indicated as under:"7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or Tribunals, these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said findings, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a findings of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. In dealing with this category of cases, however we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the: said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a Writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. " ( 16 ) CONSIDERING the case in hand and the submission made by Shri R. D. Jain, learned senior counsel with regard to perversity in the' findings in the backdrop of the aforesaid enunciation of law, I am afraid, it cannot be said that the finding recorded by the Labour court can be interfered with by this Court. Labour Court has considered all the evidence led before it and has recorded a finding that the charges against the employees are not proved. As indicated hereinabpve, a close scrutiny of the aforesaid findings indicates that the same is not perverse nor is it liable to be interfered with on the ground that they are based on no evidence. Jurisdiction of this Court in such matters is limited. This Court accordingly exercises a supervisory jurisdiction and not an appellate one. On consideration, it is held that no case has been made out warranting interference into the findings recorded by the labour Court. ( 17 ) APART from this, it is to be taken note of that respondent- employees were arrested for having committed offences and in the criminal case also they were acquitted vide judgment dated November 18, 1992 Annexure-P/11. Referring to the observations made by 5 learned District and Sessions Judge in para 14 of the judgment dated November 18, 1992 it was argued by Shri Jain that learned Criminal court has observed that it seems that the complainant and accused-person have compromised the matter and, therefore, they have not stated anything against the accused-person, it is submitted by Shri Jain that it clearly indicates that the respondents are guilty of the misconduct alleged against them. I am afraid merely on the basis of some observations made by the Criminal Court, no such conclusion can be drawn by this Court. It was for the petitioners to have proved the misconduct by leading evidence before the labour Court. The Labour Court, therefore cannot be said to have committed any illegality in assessment of evidence and in recording the findings with regard to the misconduct. It is the considered view of this Court that assessment of the Labour Court cannot be said to be perverse to such an extent that it can be interfered with. ( 18 ) FINALLY, Shri Jain submitted that the reference was made in the year 1992 and the award was passed only in the year 2000. It was argued by Shri Jain that in accordance with the provisions of Section 10 (2-A) of the industrial Disputes Act, the reference has to be answered within three months and as the reference was not answered within the stipulated period of three months, payment of back wages for eight years cannot be justified. Apart from making this submission no material has been produced before this court to show that the matter was kept pending before the Labour Court for eight years because of the respondents. Delay in conclusion of the proceedings before the labour Court can be a ground for denying back wages to the employees only if the delay is attributable to the workman concerned. There is nothing available on record nor is it the case of the petitioner that the proceedings were kept pending before the Labour Court due to reasons which can be attributed to the employees. Back wages can be denied on the ground of delay only if delay is proved and the reasons for such delay is attributable to the workman concerned. There being nothing on record to hold that the respondents- employees were solely responsible for the delay. The arguments advanced by learned senior counsel for denying back wages to the employees is unsustainable. ( 19 ) IN view of the aforesaid and for the reasons indicated therein, I find no substance in the petition. ( 20 ) ACCORDINGLY, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs. ( 21 ) A photocopy of the order shall be placed in the connected cases. .