JUDGMENT S. N. Srivastava, J.—Order of District Judge Mathura passed under Section 92, C.P.C. has been taken in challenge in this Court by means of the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Sri Keshav Deo Sharma who is elected President of the Temple known as Sri Nand Rai Ji Maharaj, Nand Kila, Gokul Mandir Samiti, Gokul District Mathura. The dispute in the instant petition revolves round ‘resignations’ submitted by 7 elected members in the election held on 17.5.2002. 2. The affairs of the Temple known as Sri Nand Rai Ji Maharaj Nand Kila Gokul Mandir Samiti, Gokul District Mathura and five other temples dovetailed to it are managed by the Committee under the scheme prepared under Section 92, C.P.C. In accordance with it, election was held on 17.5.2002 in which 15 member were declared elected. It would transpire from the record that subsequently, 7 members so elected tendered their resignation on 21.5.2002 to the District Judge Mathura inasmuch as by that time, President had not been elected to head the Trust. On 22.5.2002 election of office bearers took place in which Keshav Deo Sharma was elected as President and Nand Kishore as Secretary. On President being elected, District Judge Mathura, transmitted resignations of all the seven members to the elected President. It would also appear that election of office bearers was given approbation by the District Judge on 23.5.2002. It is also evident from the averments in the writ petition that in the meeting held on 22.6.2002 headed by Secretary of the Committee, the resignations of all the seven members were accepted and nomination of one members was proposed and papers relating thereto were submitted to the District Judge for approval by the Secretary of the Committee. The newly elected President petitioner No. 1 did not give approbation to the proposed nomination by the Committee on the ground that no meeting had in fact been convened on 22.6.2002 and that the nomination of seven members was highly illegal. One of the ground assigned in the objection was that resignation submitted by seven members had been withdrawn on 25.11.2002 and as such since there was no vacancy, no nomination could be proposed by the Committee headed by Secretary. The District Judge, Mathura in turn held by means of order dated 28.1.2004 that vacancy had occurred due to resignation of seven members. The District Judge, Mathura in turn held by means of order dated 28.1.2004 that vacancy had occurred due to resignation of seven members. The District Judge however did not lend approval to the nomination proposed and directed Dr. Mukesh Nath Samadhia District Government Counsel (Crl.), Election Officer, to commence fresh proceeding for election of seven members for the rest of the period of the Committee. It is in the above backdrop that the petitioner who is the elected President, has assailed the impugned order of the District Judge, Mathura. 3. I have heard Sri R. K. Jain senior advocate, assisted by Rahul Jain for the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner premised his submission by stating that resignation was not given by seven members to proper authority, i.e., the President who is competent under the Constitution. He further canvassed that resignations so submitted required approval by the Committee of Management, which was not done in the instant case. He further canvassed that before the resignation could be acted upon all the seven members had withdrawn their resignation and by this reckoning, no vacancy was there and the order passed by the District Judge under Section 92 directing to hold fresh election in relation to 7 vacancies on posts of members, is impaired in law. The learned counsel drew attention to para 6 of the Constitution of the Trust the substance of which is that any office bearers or member could submit resignation by written information and since resignation had not been submitted to the President but was addressed to the District Judge, it could not have been treated to be valid resignation. It was further urged that before being acted upon the resignation had been withdrawn and hence the impugned order cannot be sustained in law. The learned counsel also addressed the Court on the aspect that resignation was provoked by some compelling circumstances and as such it could not be counted to be a voluntary act and by this reckoning, it could not be given the veneer of a valid resignation nor such resignation could be cognized as valid resignation in law. The learned counsel also addressed the Court on the aspect that resignation was provoked by some compelling circumstances and as such it could not be counted to be a voluntary act and by this reckoning, it could not be given the veneer of a valid resignation nor such resignation could be cognized as valid resignation in law. It was further urged by him that before the resignations could be acted upon, withdrawal applications had already been filed and besides those very persons had participated in the election of President, no vacancy could be said to have occurred and by this reckoning the impugned order is vitiated in law. The learned counsel placed credence on various decisions in vindication of his stand including the decisions in Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, AIR 1978 SC 694 ; Moti Ram v. Param Deo, (1993) 2 SCC 725 and Abha Atri v. State of U. P., 2003 (1) UPLBEC 772. Per contra, learned standing counsel propped up the order on the premises that those seven members elected as members had tendered their resignation to the District Judge as there was no President at that time but the same was sent by District Judge on 23rd May, 2002 immediately after election of the President and as such it constitutes compliance with clause 6 of the Constitution of the Trust which envisages that any office bearer or member of the Committee can resign his post by notifying to the President in writing. The learned standing counsel further contended that there is no provision in the Constitution of the Trust requiring acceptance of the resignation and so far as resignation from the post of membership of the Committee is concerned, it is a unilateral act and cannot be stretched to mean a bilateral action requiring tendering of resignation on one hand and its acceptance on the other hand by the competent authority. 4. 4. In connection with the above submission, I would like to delve into clause 6 of the Constitution of Trust, which runs as under : “Koi Padadhikari Ya Samiti Ka Sadasya Adhyaksha Ko Likhit Soochna De Kar Apne Pad Ko Tyag Sakta Hai.” It is clear from the material on record that on the date on which resignations were tendered by the seven members, there was no elected President to deal with the resignations and in consequence, the resignations so submitted by the members were submitted to the District Judge who, immediately after election of the President, sent the same to elected President on 24.5.2000. It would also appear from a perusal of the order of the District Judge dated 28.1.2004 that the District Judge consequent upon considering clause 6 of the Constitution held the view that those members ceased as members with effect from 24.5.2002 on which date the resignations reached the elected President by the District Judge and consequently directed re-election in relation to seven posts of member who had demitted their respective offices. In the circumstances, the question that begs consideration is (1) whether the Constitution of the Trust contemplates requirement of approval on the resignations by any authority under the Constitution of the Trust? (2) Whether the resignation could be made effective from the date it reached the elected President and whether it could be made effective only after acceptance by the Trust or the elected President? and (3) whether any withdrawal application could be made subsequently by the members who had resigned the membership by written notice. 5. The first and foremost question that I propose to deal with, is whether resignation tendered by a member could be treated as effective from the date it reached the President or it requires acceptance or approval by the Committee or the President before it could be treated as accepted. In connection with this proposition, clause 6 of the scheme is crystal clear and leaves no manner of doubt. It in no Delphic terms spells out that any member could resign his post by notice in writing to the President, which impliedly means a unilateral act of written notice and does not entail requirement of bi-lateral act of acceptance as a necessary consequence. It in no Delphic terms spells out that any member could resign his post by notice in writing to the President, which impliedly means a unilateral act of written notice and does not entail requirement of bi-lateral act of acceptance as a necessary consequence. I have scanned the entire scheme and there is nothing therein to point to the fact that it warrants requirement of any approval by the society or by elected President. The bare perusal does indicate that it does not envisage any action of acceptance of resignations so submitted either by the Committee or by the President before it could be made effective from the date it reached the President. Since there was no elected President at the time of tendering of resignation, it was accordingly submitted to the District Judge who rightly transmitted the same to the President on 24.5.2002 soon after his election as President and by necessary implication, it would be deemed to have taken effect from the date it reached the elected President. As stated supra, since there is nothing any where in the provisions warranting acceptance by the society or the President, there arises no question of any power of refusal or disapproval of the resignation by the President or Secretary within the Constitution of the Trust. 6. The Court does not propose to generalise about the effect of resignation in the instant case without the aid and assistance of the precedents on the point and therefore, I endeavour to squeeze out the functional meaning of the expression “resign the office” from the following decisions in order to arrive at a firm view as to the effect of resignation by the elected member in the instant case. In order to appreciate and consider as to what constitutes the conditional or unconditional resignation letter, reference may be made to a decision of this Court in Jwala Prasad v. State of U. P., AIR 1954 All 638, the Court held the letter to be unconditional since the employee strongly expressed that after the expiry of the crucial date he would consider himself free from the responsibilities of his office. The Court held that his resignation did not depend on the acceptance or otherwise of the other party and in the circumstances servant was held to have no absolute right to withdraw his resignation. 7. The Court held that his resignation did not depend on the acceptance or otherwise of the other party and in the circumstances servant was held to have no absolute right to withdraw his resignation. 7. In another decision in Shanker Dutt Shukla v. President Municipal Board, Auraiya, AIR 1956 All 70 . In this case the Court observed that if the resignation is conditional, i.e., to take effect from a future date and there is no stipulation that the applicant would consider himself free from all responsibilities after the crucial date whether or not his resignation was accepted the applicant has every right to withdraw his application before that date. It was further observed that where in a case a municipal servant sent letter of resignation to the President on 24.2.1955 which was to come into effect from 1.4.1955, there was in the eye of law no resignation in existence at all till that date and in that event it was open to the applicant to write to the President before that date asking him not to consider his resignation application which was dated 1.4.1955. The Court further observed that it was not a case of unconditional resignation and the applicant had a right to withdraw his application before it became operative from 1.4.1955. The Court relying on Jai Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 581 , wherein Supreme Court held that it is open to a servant who has expressed a desire to retire from service and applied to the superior officer to give him the requisite permission, to change his mind subsequently and ask for the cancellation of the permission but he can be allowed to do so as long as he continues in service and not after it has terminated, observed that though the facts of the case are distinguishable from the present case, but the observation referred to above do lend support to the contention that it is open to a servant to withdraw his resignation before it becomes actually operative. 8. In Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Mishra (supra), the Apex Court expatiated on the expression ‘resign the office’. 8. In Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Mishra (supra), the Apex Court expatiated on the expression ‘resign the office’. In construing the words ‘resign his office’ in proviso (a) to Article 217 (1) of the Constitution, the Apex Court held that a High Court Judge’s intention to resign his office of a Judge on a future date cannot sever him from the office of the Judge or terminate his tenure and so withdrawal of his resignation within the intended date was held to be justified on the ground that the Constitution does not bar such withdrawal. The Apex Court also dwelt upon Dictionary meaning of the word ‘Resignation’ which means the spontaneous relinquishment of one’s own right. The Apex Court also referred to the Maxim “Resionatio est juris propii spontanea refutatio”. In relation to an office, the Apex Court observed that it connotes the act of giving up or relinquishing the office. To ‘relinquish the office means to ‘cease to hold’ the office, or to ‘lose hold of’ the office. It was further ruled by the Apex Court that the general principle regarding resignation is that in the absence of a legal, contractual or constitutional bar, a prospective resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the office tenure of the resignor. This general rule is equally applicable to Government servants and constitutional functionaries. This case is distinguishable because the status of the members is not comparable to that of a High Court Judge a constitutional functionary whose case is covered by Article 217 of the Constitution. Moreover, it was a case of prospective resignation from a future date and by this reckoning also, it does not apply to the facts of the present case. 9. Yet another ex cathedra decision dealing with resignation letter has been rendered by the Apex Court in Raj Kumar v. Union of India, 1968 (3) SCR 857 . Moreover, it was a case of prospective resignation from a future date and by this reckoning also, it does not apply to the facts of the present case. 9. Yet another ex cathedra decision dealing with resignation letter has been rendered by the Apex Court in Raj Kumar v. Union of India, 1968 (3) SCR 857 . In this decision the substance of what the Apex Court held is extracted below : “But when a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his services normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority, and in the absence of any law or rule governing the conditions of his service to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus paenitentiae but not thereafter.” 10. The next case to be considered is Moti Ram v. Param Dev and another, (1993) 2 SCC 725. In this case, the Apex Court held that so far as resignation of the Chairman is concerned, there is no requirement of approval or any further act by the person who has appointed him but so far as membership is concerned it could be effective only after notification. The Apex Court therefore, held that resignation from the office of Chairman of the Board will be effective from the date the Chairman has resigned but he will continue to hold the post of the member as no notification was issued. In paragraph 18 of this decision, the Apex Court observed that “A contract of employment, however, stands on a different footing wherein the act of relinquishment is of bilateral character and resignation of an employee is effective only on acceptance of the same by the employer. In so far as Government employees are concerned, there are specific provisions in the service rules which require acceptance of the resignation before it becomes effective.” This case is inapplicable inasmuch as the Service Rules required acceptance of the resignation before it becomes effective. In so far as Government employees are concerned, there are specific provisions in the service rules which require acceptance of the resignation before it becomes effective.” This case is inapplicable inasmuch as the Service Rules required acceptance of the resignation before it becomes effective. This case does not support the case of the petitioners and rather, supports the view I am taking in this case that the resignation did not require acceptance in view of provisions of Clause 6 of the Constitution of the Trust and is effective from the date it was presented to the President. Therefore, this decision too does not help the petitioner. 11. In Abha Atri (Dr.) v. State of U. P. and others, 2003 (1) UPLBEC 772, it was held that the resignation must be unconditional and with an intention to operate as such. The letter in this case contained threatened offer to resign on account of feeling of frustration not resignation actual and simple. The Apex Court ruled that the letter was treated as resignation and was accepted without proper consideration of the matter in right perspective and it was set aside. This decision has been rendered in different perspective and hence it cannot be imported for application to the facts of the present case. 12. In the above perspective it is clear that the status of a Government servant or as in the instant case, the status of the members of the Trust is not comparable to that of a constitutional functionary whose case is covered by Article 217 of the Constitution. The law is also settled that prospective resignation could be withdrawn before it is effective or if the Rule or Scheme requires any approval before it is effectuated. Resignations pertaining to the Government servant governed by Service Rules are distinguishable from resignation by an elected office. In case of resignation from a Government servant which does not require any approval either under the Service laws or under the Constitution for being acted upon, it is to be deemed to be effective from the date it actually reached the proper authority while in case of elected member, as in the present case, if scheme or any other provisions governing the elected office does not contemplate requirement of any approval, it will be effectuated on the date it is presented to the authority under the scheme. Since in the present case, the scheme does not necessitate or require any approval either from the society or from elected President, all the seven members ceased to be member on the date on which their resignations reached the President. 13. Having considered the decisions aforestated, I now proceed to consider and squeeze out the intendment of the provisions contained in clause 6 of the Constitution of the Trust. The word ‘resignation’ in its etymological sense means a formal letter, notice, etc. affirming that one has resigned or wishes to reign a position, office, etc. I have been taken through the letter of resignation of one of the elected members, namely Kunj Bihari who won the election on ‘car’ symbol. From a phraseology of this letter, it appears that the aforestated member was ostensibly smitten by his conscience that at least five candidates elected were related in some way or the other with the employees of the Temple and in the circumstances as stated in the resignation letter, they conveyed their intention to demit their respective office. The aforestated letter does not stipulate any condition and it impliedly conveys that the aforestated member expressed his intention to resign the post ostensibly “with immediate effect” without stipulating anything as a condition precedent for resignation. It is further borne out from the letter that the resignation letter was submitted to the District Judge owing to the fact that President had not been elected by that time. In the end, the elected member conveys that his resignation may be accepted and election be held afresh. As stated supra, the provisions of clause 6 of the Constitution merely stipulates notifying in writing to the President and does not warrant bilateral act of acceptance from the President before it could be made effective. From a perusal of the letter it is manifested that the member strongly expressed his intention to resign his office which considering the provisions of clause 6 does not depend upon the acceptance or otherwise of the other party. On the aspect of unilateral and bilateral aspect the Apex Court in J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Ltd. v. State of U. P., (1990) 4 SCC 27 , observed as under : “There is no requirement that the resignation of a member should be accepted by any authority. On the aspect of unilateral and bilateral aspect the Apex Court in J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Ltd. v. State of U. P., (1990) 4 SCC 27 , observed as under : “There is no requirement that the resignation of a member should be accepted by any authority. What is required is that a member who wishes to resign his office as member should give notice in writing to the Government of Himachal Pradesh and such resignation takes effect when it is notified in the Official Gazette by the Government of Himachal Pradesh. This indicates that the act of relinquishment of the office of a member of the Board is bilateral in character inasmuch as the resignation takes effect only when such resignation is notified in the Official Gazette by the Government..................” In the aforesaid case, Section 7 envisaged that any member may resign his office by giving notice in writing to the Government of Himachal Pradesh and on such resignation being notified in the Official Gazette by the Government of Himachal Pradesh shall be deemed to have vacated his office. In the instant case, Clause 6 of the Constitution merely recites information in writing to the President and does not provide for its acceptance. In the circumstances, it does not follow that resignation entailed bilateral act of submission and its acceptance. Rather, it speaks of unilateral act of notifying in writing to the President and nothing further. 14. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is clearly manifested that any of the members resigning from membership did not file any objection or did not urge anything before the District Judge that any one of them resigned under duress or compulsion or even involuntarily or any one of them did not intend to resign etc. The petitioner No. 1 alone, who is an elected President, has taken up cudgel against the order of District Judge, Mathura directing election afresh against 7 posts of members. The authority of an elected President has to be grasped from the provisions of the Constitution of the Trust. When the Constitution of the Trust itself postulates that the members wishing to resign has to notify in writing, it cannot be interpreted to mean that it required acceptance by the elected President before being acted upon. The authority of an elected President has to be grasped from the provisions of the Constitution of the Trust. When the Constitution of the Trust itself postulates that the members wishing to resign has to notify in writing, it cannot be interpreted to mean that it required acceptance by the elected President before being acted upon. It is settled principle that an authority is said to be express when it is given by words spoken or written while an authority is said to be implied when it is said to be inferred from the circumstances of the case. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be inferred that authority of the President required written acceptance to make the resignation effective. Merely on the ground that he is elected President and resignation has to be notified in writing to him, it cannot be said that he was an authority vested with the power to accept resignation before it could be acted upon nor in the facts and circumstances of the case, having regard to the provisions of Clause 6 of the Constitution of Trust it can be said that it was implied that resignation required to be accepted before being made effective. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be said to be an aggrieved person. Any of the members neither filed objection nor challenged the order of the District Judge. It is also clear from the above that there was no circumstance warranting the fact that the elected members resigned under duress or out of their free will but they took into account the circumstances which were that at least five members were related to the employees of the trust in some way or the other and in that circumstances, they tendered their resignations. The ratio flowing from the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners have been dealt with above and in view of the discussion aforestated, none of the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners can be imported or applied to the facts of the present case. 15. In the above conspectus all the three questions are answered against the petitioners. In the result, the petition being bereft of merit is accordingly dismissed in limine. Stay order shall stand vacated accordingly.