L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision petition is filed against the order dated 31. 1. 2004 in la. No. 506 of 2003 in O. P. No. 73 of 2002 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, miryalaguda. Through the order under revision, the Trial Court dismissed the application filed under Section 5 of the limitation Act to condone delay of 122 days in presenting the application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of civil Procedure. ( 2 ) THE respondent is the husband of the petitioner. He filed O. P. No. 73 of 2002 in the Trial Court under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking divorce on the ground that the petitioner was a patient suffering from the disease of epilepsy, her behaviour was violent and that her conduct has become unbearable for him. O. P. was decreed ex parte on 12. 3. 2003. The petitioner filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of civil Procedure to set aside the ex parte decree. Since there was delay of 122 days in presenting the said application, she filed LA. No. 506 of 2003 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. She pleaded that as soon as she received the notice in O. P. , she engaged an advocate and filed vakalat on 19. 12. 2002. She stated that on account of ill-treatment by the respondent, she has gone pilgrimage to places like Bhadrachalam and Srisailam for mental peace and that she was not informed of the progress in the O. P. , since her advocate also left for united States. ( 3 ) THE respondent resisted the application, denying the contents of the affidavit. He pleaded that the petitioner actively pursued O. S. No. 467 of 2002 pending in the Court of Junior Civil Judge at the same place and absence of an advocate is not a ground for condonation of delay. He contended that each day s delay was not properly explained. The Trial Court discussed the matter extensively with reference to various judgments rendered by this Court and the Supreme Court. It accepted the version of the respondent and dismissed the LA. ( 4 ) MR. He contended that each day s delay was not properly explained. The Trial Court discussed the matter extensively with reference to various judgments rendered by this Court and the Supreme Court. It accepted the version of the respondent and dismissed the LA. ( 4 ) MR. K. Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the delay occurred on account of the fact that the petitioner as well as her advocate were out of station and that there was no negligence on their part in pursuing the proceedings. He contends that the trial Court proceeded with undue haste in decreeing the O. P. ex parte and that the view taken by it in the order under revision cannot be sustained in law. He also contends that when the effort is to ensure that the parties, be, given an opportunity to seek adjudication on merits, particularly in matrimonial matters, there was no justification for the Trial Court in taking a hyper-technical view of the matter. ( 5 ) SRI M. Venkatram Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that except taking certain general pleas, the petitioner did not substantiate her claim for condonation of delay. He submits that the contention of the respondent that the petitioner attended the Court on several dates between March and August, 2003 remained unrebutted. He places reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in P. K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another AIR 1998 sc 2276 , and the judgment of this Court in New India Assurance Company Limited, hyderabad v. G. Sarada Prasad and others, 2001 (2) ALD 161 (DB ). ( 6 ) THE respondent filed O. P. against the petitioner under Section 13 of the hindu Marriage Act. His principal contention was that the petitioner is suffering from epilepsy and her behaviour is violent. The respondent himself is a medical practitioner. He would be in a better position to appreciate the plight and mental disturbance of a person suffering from such a disease and the capacity of such persons to take independent decisions. He has chosen to implead the petitioner independently and not through any near relative. That, however, is a different aspect. As soon as she received notice, the petitioner filed vakalat on 19. 12. 2002 and engaged an advocate. He has chosen to implead the petitioner independently and not through any near relative. That, however, is a different aspect. As soon as she received notice, the petitioner filed vakalat on 19. 12. 2002 and engaged an advocate. In less than three months, the Trial Court decreed the O. P. ( 7 ) THE only basis for granting a decree for divorce was the affidavit filed by P. Ws. l and 2, Ex. Al, a letter and Exs. A2 and A3, which are medical prescriptions. It is rather unfortunate that such evidence weighed with the Presiding Officer, herself being a woman, and a decree was granted without any consideration or appreciation of the matter. Time and again, the Supreme court held that even where the defendant in a suit remained ex parte, the Trial Court is not relieved of its obligation to record findings of various aspects that fall for consideration. Absence of the defendant by itself does not entitle a Trial Court to grant a decree as prayed for. Such a course of action would be contrary to the very adjudicatory process. That, however, is a different aspect touching on the merits of the decree. ( 8 ) THE petitioner approached the court with an application to condone the delay of 122 days explaining the circumstances, under which, the delay had occurred. She specifically pleaded that she went to various places on pilgrimage in search of mental peace and that her advocate was also out of the country. ( 9 ) IT was not as if the O. P. was pending on the file of the Trial Court for years together or that the petitioner had approached several years after the ex parte decree. If a purely pedantic approach is to be adopted in such matters, Section 5 of the Limitation Act becomes almost irrelevant. It is true that there are judgments to the effect that each day s delay is to be explained. At the same time, there are judgments to the effect that the effort of the Court should, as far as possible, be to enable the parties to get the adjudication of the matter on merits. ( 10 ) THE petitioner and respondent lived together for about 30 years. The respondent wanted to bring an end to the matrimonial life after three decades. ( 10 ) THE petitioner and respondent lived together for about 30 years. The respondent wanted to bring an end to the matrimonial life after three decades. The Court was required to be cautious and careful in dealing with such matters. Such a caution and care is not evident, even in traces in the ex parte decree dated 12. 3. 2003. The wrong committed by the Court in passing the ex parte decree in such casual manner could have been redeemed to certain extent, by permitting the petitioner to contest the matter, obviously by condoning the, not so long a delay of 122 days. Instead, the matter was examined from a purely doctrinal approach. The learned Judge has taken the view that the pilgrimage said to have been undertaken by the petitioner should not have taken more than seven days. He ought to have visualized the matter from the perspective of the petitioner and purpose of visit of the places rather than taking into account the average speed of travelling. The various dates of hearing in O. S. No. 467 of 2002 said to have been filed by the petitioner are subsequent to the ex parte decree. The allegation that the Counsel for the petitioner was not in country for quite a long time remained unrebutted. In the totality of the circumstances, this Court finds that the delay ought to have been condoned. ( 11 ) ACCORDINGLY, the civil revision petition is allowed. Consequently, LA. No. 506 of 2003 is also allowed. To avoid further delay and complication in the matter, la. filed under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall stand ordered and the O. P. No. 73 of 2002 be restored to file. The Trial Court is directed to give an opportunity to the petitioner to file the counter, on or before 21. 6. 2004, if not already filed. It shall undertake counselling before proceeding with the trial of the matter. If the counselling fails, the Court shall give an opportunity to both the parties and decide the matter on merits.