Judgment Viney Mittal, J. 1. The plaintiff, having remained concurrently unsuccessful before the courts below, has approached this Court through the present regular second appeal. 2. Plaintiff, Banarsi Dass, filed a suit for possession by way of redemption with regard to the shop in dispute. It was averred by him that he is the owner of the shop in question which he had mortgaged with possession in favour of the defendant for a consideration of Rs. 17,000/- vide a registered mortgage deed dated January 29, 1981 with the stipulation that the said mortgage would not be redeemed for a period of 10 years. Later on April 9, 1986, he had filed an earlier suit for possession by way of redemption. However, vide judgment and decree dated June 5, 1988, the said suit was dismissed as pre-mature. Accordingly, the plaintiff maintained that the period of 10 years stipulated in the mortgage deed having expired on January 28, 1991, and the defendant having not delivered the possession to him inspite of a notice being served on this regard, the present suit was filed by the plaintiff for possession by redemption on payment of the mortgage amount of Rs. 17,000/-. A further claim of Rs. 100/- per day was made for recovery of mesne profits from the date of filing of the suit till the delivery of possession. 3. The suit was contested by defendants, Gian Chand. In the written statement filed by him, the ownership of the plaintiff with regard to the shop in dispute was admitted. However, it was denied by him that he was a mortgagee of the shop. It was claimed that the aforesaid mortgage deed was fake, sham and a paper transaction and was merely a camouflage for the tenancy created by the plaintiff in his favour. The defendant, however, admitted that the plaintiff had taken Rs. 17,000/- from him as an advance in order to keep him under pressure and that he was entitled to recover back the aforesaid amount from the plaintiff. 4. The defendant further maintained that the plaintiff had leased out the shop in dispute to him but with a view to avoid the protection of the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act and with a view to override the same, he had termed the said transaction as a mortgage. 4. The defendant further maintained that the plaintiff had leased out the shop in dispute to him but with a view to avoid the protection of the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act and with a view to override the same, he had termed the said transaction as a mortgage. It was specifically claimed that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties with regard to the shop in dispute and in fact the mortgage deed was in reality a lease deed whereby the plaintiff had leased out the shop in question to him. 5. The learned trial Court on the basis of the evidence available on the record held that the document Ex.P1 dated January 29, 1981 was duly executed between the parties and the plaintiff had received an amount of Rs. 17,000/- from the defendant. However, it was held that the aforesaid transaction was merely a camouflage for the tenancy which had been created by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant and the real intention of the plaintiff was to sidetraek the provisions of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act when he executed the said deed Ex.P1. Accordingly, it was held that the said transaction was a sham transaction and the relationship between the parties was that of a landlord and tenant. It was also noticed by the learned trial Court that the plaintiff while appearing as PW5 had admitted that the shop in dispute was previously with Laxman Dass at a monthly rent of Rs. 50/ and later on it came into possession of one Kishan Lal as tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 67/-. Thereafter, he obtained the possession of the shop in question from Kishan Lal through execution proceedings through the court of Rent Controller and after taking the possession of the same, delivered the possession thereof to the defendant after about 8-10 days of its vacation by Kishan Lal. The learned trial Court also noticed that the plaintiff had admitted that he had mortgaged his other shops with Prem Chand Singla and with M/s Punjab Traders and the aforesaid shops were also in possession of the tenants and he had got those shops vacated after filing ejectment applications against the earlier tenants and after a protracted litigation for about 4 years. From these circumstances, the learned trial Court inferred that it was evident that the shop in question was got vacated by the plaintiff after a great difficulty in ejectment proceedings against the previous tenant and, thereafter, he thought it proper to mortgage the shop in question as well as other shops by executing mortgage deeds. 6. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, it was held that the mortgage deed Ex.P1 is a sham transaction and since the defendant was a tenant in the shop in dispute under the plaintiff, therefore the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as well. Accordingly, the suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed. 7. The plaintiff took up the matter in first appeal. The learned first appellate Court re-appraised the entire evidence. On such re-appraisal, the learned first appellant Court also found that transaction Ex.P1 between the parties and the real intention between the parties was to create a tenancy agreement. It was held that the said document Ex.P1 was in fact a camouflage with a view to avoid the provisions of the Rent Act. 8. Certain observations made by the learned Appellate Court may be noticed: "In the instant case, there is a great disproportion between the amount advanced and the value of the property. The shop in question is situated in Sirhind Mandi a thickly commercial area. It has not been denied by the plaintiff that the shop is not less than the value of Rs. 3/4 lacs. It is a matter of common knowledge that the property of the value of Rs. 3/4 lacs in a year 1981 could increase with the passage of time. If the property was of such a huge value then the same could not be mortgaged for a sum of Rs. 17,000/- only which could hardly bring an income of Rs. 170/- P.M. on account of interest @ 12 p.a. The plaintiff has also admitted that he has already been letting out this property to the various persons and initially Lachhman Dass was his tenant @ Rs. 50/- p.m. and thereafter Krishan Lal became tenant @ Rs. 67/- p.m. in the shop in question. Thereafter, after taking possession of the shop in question, he mortgaged the property with the defendant. All this goes to show that the mortgage deed Ex.P1 was only a sham transaction." 9. 50/- p.m. and thereafter Krishan Lal became tenant @ Rs. 67/- p.m. in the shop in question. Thereafter, after taking possession of the shop in question, he mortgaged the property with the defendant. All this goes to show that the mortgage deed Ex.P1 was only a sham transaction." 9. The learned first appellate Court also noticed that it was proved on the record that the plaintiff is a man of means and had admitted that one of his shops is mortgaged with Prem Chand Singla since 1986 for a consideration of Rs. 5,000/- and earlier to that the said shop was also on rent. It was also admitted by the plaintiff that one of his shops is under mortgage with M/s. Punjab Traders for a sum of Rs. 9,000/- since the year 1985. Earlier to that the said shop was in the possession of M/s Hari Soap Factory as a tenant. He had got the aforesaid shop vacated after initiating litigation against the said tenant. Another shop of the plaintiff was on rent with Chuni Lal and he had filed an ejectment application against him. 10. On the basis of the aforesaid findings recorded by the learned first appellate Court, the claim made by the plaintiff was negated by the learned Additional District Judge as well. Accordingly, his appeal was also dismissed. 11. Still remaining dissatisfied, the plaintiff has approached this Court through the present regular second appeal. 12. I have heard Shri Sudeep Mahajan, the learned counsel for the appellant and Shri S.N. Chopra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent and with their assistance have also gone through the record of the case. 13. In my considered view, there is no merit in the present appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. 14. Shri Sudeep Mahajan, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has argued that once the defendant had entered into possession of the shop in question on the basis of the mortgage deed Ex.P1, then subsequently he could not wriggle out of the same and was bound by the terms and conditions of the said mortgage deed. For this purpose, Shri Mahajan has placed reliance upon Ramdhan Puri v. Bankey Bihari Saran and Ors.) A.I.R. 1958 Supreme Court 941, Jayasingh Dhayanu Mhoprekar and Anr. v. Krishna Babaji Patil and Anr., A.I.R. 1985 Supreme Court 1646. 15. For this purpose, Shri Mahajan has placed reliance upon Ramdhan Puri v. Bankey Bihari Saran and Ors.) A.I.R. 1958 Supreme Court 941, Jayasingh Dhayanu Mhoprekar and Anr. v. Krishna Babaji Patil and Anr., A.I.R. 1985 Supreme Court 1646. 15. It has further argued by Shri Mahajan that the right of redemption vested in the mortgagor was a statutory and legal right which cannot be extinguished by any agreement made at the time of mortgage as part of the mortgage transaction. 16. On the other hand, Shri S.N.Chopra, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant-respondent has argued that the entire evidence led by the plaintiff itself shows that the transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant was not a mortgage. According to Shri Chopra, the mortgage deed Ex.P1 had been so termed by the plaintiff merely with a view to avoid the application and protection of the Rent Act to the defendant. Shri Chopra has also relied upon the document Ex.D1 dated June 8, 1986, which is a family partition between plaintiff Banarsi Das and his three sons, wherein it had been recited that property No. 4 (shop in dispute) was on rent with Gian Chand. According to Shri Chopra once the plaintiff had himself admitted in the aforesaid partition deed that the defendant was his tenant over property No. 4 (shop in dispute,) then the plaintiff could not be heard to claim that the defendant was only a mortgagee. 17. Further, Shri Chopra has argued that the Court could always examine the real intention of the parties executing a document and the nature and intent of the transaction can be gathered by the Court from the terms of the document itself. According to Shri Chopra, in such a situation, even the bar created under Sections 91/92 of the Evidence Act would not be attracted. For the aforesaid propositions, Shri Chopra has relied upon Smt. Gangabai v. Smt. Chhabubai, A.I.R. 1982 Supreme Court 20; Bakhshi Jawant Singh v. Smt. Pushpa Devi and Ors., (1988-1)90 P.L.R. 498; M/s Saran Singh Wary am Singh v. Panna Lal, 2001(2) Rent Control Reporter 243 (P&H) and Narain Dass v. Mulkh Raj Gulati and Ors., (2003-3)135 P.L.R, 443. 18. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contention raised by the learned counsel for the parties. 19. 18. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contention raised by the learned counsel for the parties. 19. The first contention of Shri Mahajan that the defendant cannot be heard to claim that the transaction in question was a tenancy agreement and not a mortgage deed since he had himself entered into possession of the same on the basis of the said document, is without any merit. There is no dispute about the fact that the document Ex.P1 was duly entered between the parties. Of course the defendant cannot be heard to deny the ownership of the plaintiff with regard to the suit property. He has not done so. The defendant can also not be heard to claim any title or interest in himself contrary to the title of the plaintiff. Even this has not been done by the defendant. The defendant is merely trying to elucidate and explain the nature of transaction which was entered between him and the plaintiff and his plea is that in fact the aforesaid document was a sham document, when it described the relationship between the parties as that of mortgagor and mortgagee. According to the defendant, the real intention between the parties was to create a tenancy agreement. 20. In my considered view such a plea was always available to the defendant and it was for the courts to interpret the document to find out the real intention of the parties for executing a document. The observations made by the Hon ble Supreme Court in Smt. Gangabai s case (supra) may be noticed with advantage; "It is clear to us that the bar imposed by sub-section (1) of Section 92 applies only when a party seeks to rely upon the document embodying the terms of the transaction. In that event, the law declares that the nature and intent of the transaction must be gathered from the terms of the document itself and no evidence of any oral agreement or statement can be admitted as between the parties to such document for the purpose of contradicting or modifying its terms. The sub section is not attracted when the case of a party is that the transaction recorded in the document was never intended to be acted upon at all between the parties and that the document is a sham. The sub section is not attracted when the case of a party is that the transaction recorded in the document was never intended to be acted upon at all between the parties and that the document is a sham. Such a question arises when the party asserts that there was a different transaction altogether and what is recorded in the document was intended to be of no consequence whatever. For that purpose oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties...." Similar law was laid down by this Court in the case of Bakhshi Jaswant Singhs case (supra) and Narain Dosss case (supra). 21 At this stage, the relevant terms of the document Ex.P1 which have also been noticed by the learned first appellate Court may also be noticed: (i) The mortgagee will not sub-let the shop; (ii) The mortgagee will not make any addition or alteration in the shop in question. The tenure of the mortgage will be 10 years; (iii) The mortgagor will not be entitled to get the shop vacated before the expiry of 10 years; (iv) The mortgagee will be liable to pay all the taxes; The judgments relied upon by Shri Sudeep Mahajan do not apply to the facts of the present case and as such have no application. 22 It is also proved on the record that the plaintiff is a man of means. While appearing as his own witness, the plaintiff has admitted that his various shops were earlier on rent with various tenants. Some of the shops were got vacated by him from the tenants and thereafter he delivered the possession of the same to new persons creating a mortgage. 23. It is thus apparent that the plaintiff, having suffered protracted litigation, with his earlier tenants, thought of a device to override the provisions of the Rent Act and gave the shop in question to defendant by executing a document Ex.P1. This document, though described as a mortgage deed, was in fact the creation of a tenancy between the plaintiff and the defendant. 24. One more fact which has already been noticed by the learned first appellate Court, may also be noticed at this stage. 25. The shop in question is situated in Sirhind Mandi. This document, though described as a mortgage deed, was in fact the creation of a tenancy between the plaintiff and the defendant. 24. One more fact which has already been noticed by the learned first appellate Court, may also be noticed at this stage. 25. The shop in question is situated in Sirhind Mandi. The same is located in thickly commercial area. The value of the shop is not less than Rs. 3/4 lacs. This it was unimaginable that such a shop could be mortgaged by the plaintiff merely for a sum of Rs. 17,000/-. In fact the aforesaid amount of Rs. 17,000/- was mentioned since interest at the rate of 12% on the aforesaid amount would bring an income of Rs. 170/- per month. The said shop was earlier on rent with Kishan Lal at Rs. 67/- per month and the same was let out to the defendant for a monthly income of Rs. 170/-. The circumstances speak for themselves. 26. The findings recorded by the two courts below have not been shown to be erroneous in any manner. No misreading of evidence or non-reading of any evidence has been pointed out by Shri Sudeep Mahajan, the learned counsel for the appellant. 27. No question of law, much less any substantial question of law arises in the present appeal. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in the present appeal. The same is accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.