M. M. DAS, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals have been preferred against the orders refusing to grant interim injunction during the pendency of the suit for specific performance of contract. ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to narrate the facts of the case in short. The father of the present appellant filed title Suit No. 44 of 1994 before the Subordinate judge, now Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar praying for specific performance of contract or in alternative for recovery of consideration money of Rs. 4. 5 lakhs. The case of the plaintiff is that, land measuring Ac. 0. 150 decimals out of Ac. 4. 360 decimals appertaining to plot No. 1294 under Khata No. 140 situated in mouza nayapalli, Bhubaneswar, originally belonged to one Dr. Susilnath Bastia who by a registered sale deed dated 20-3-1985 sold the same to defendant No. 1-Dr. Johenes alias joe Mass. It is alleged that defendant No. 1 while possessing the said property entered into an agreement for sale of the same to the plaintiff on 5-2-1993 and received a sum of Rs. 4. 00 lakhs as part payment of the consideration money, from the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, it was stipulated in the agreement that the said defendant No. 1 will execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within six months from the date of the agreement after receiving the balance consideration money of Rs. 50,000/ -. The plaintiff further pleaded that it was undertaken by defendant No. 1 that after execution of the agreement, defendant No. 1 will not alienate the said property to any other person so long as the contract subsists and that pursuant to the said agreement, possession of the property was delivered to the plaintiff who is possessing the same. It is alleged that during the pendency of the suit, defendant No. 1 has executed and registered sale deed No. 484 dated 3-2-1994 in favour of defendant No. 2 who is the sole respondent in M. A. No. 426 of 1995 and respondent No. 1 in F. A. O. No. 174 of 2003. During the pendency of the suit, it appears that defendant No. 2 entered into a collaboration agreement with defendant no. During the pendency of the suit, it appears that defendant No. 2 entered into a collaboration agreement with defendant no. 3 who is respondent No. 2 in FAO No. 174 of 2003 for development of the said land and for raising a market complex. The said defendant No. 3 having applied to be im-pleaded as a party before the Court below, has been impleaded as defendant No. 3 in the suit. All the defendants have entered appearance and filed their respective written statements. Defendant No. 1 has inter alia pleaded that the agreement to sell alleged to have been executed by him is-a forged and fabricated document as he was not present in india but was in USA on the alleged date of execution of the agreement. He has further pleaded that he has sold the said property in favour of defendant No. 2 by registered sale deed dated 3-2-1994 and has delivered possession of the property to defendant No. 2. The case of defendant No. 2 is that after purchase of property from defendant No. 1, he obtained possession of the same from him and the agreement of sale alleged to have been executed by defendant No. 1 is a forged one. Defendant No. 3 after being impleaded as a party while denying the plaint allegations, adopted the written statement filed by defendant No. 2. The original plaintiff i. e. father of the appellant filed Misc. Case No. 63 of 1994 along with the plaint, praying for interim injunction against defendants under Order 39, rules 1 and 2, CPC. The said Misc. Case was dismissed on 27-7-1995, against which m. A. No. 426 of 1995 was filed. During the pendency of the said M. A. , the original plaintiff having expired, his widow Laxmi Dei was substituted on 25-3-1998. The present appellant filed an application before the Court below on 22-4-1999 to be impleaded as a party and was impleaded as a plaintiff. Laxmi Dei widow of the original plaintiff expired on 15-10-2001 leaving the appellant as the sole plaintiff. On 19-8-2002, the appellant filed interim application No. 470 of 2002 before the Court below, under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC praying therein to restrain the opp. party (Shyam Sundar hans) from coming upon the disputed land or from raising construction thereon so as to change the nature of the suit land. On 19-8-2002, the appellant filed interim application No. 470 of 2002 before the Court below, under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC praying therein to restrain the opp. party (Shyam Sundar hans) from coming upon the disputed land or from raising construction thereon so as to change the nature of the suit land. A counter to the said interim application was filed by the opposite parties. After hearing the parties on the said application for injunction, the Court below by order dated 22-2-2003 dismissed the same. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has preferred f. A. O. No. 174 of 2003. ( 3 ) IT is, therefore, clear that both M. A. Nos. 426 of 1995 and F. A. O. No. 174 of 2003 have been filed against the two separate orders passed in two separate applications for interim injunction in the same suit rejecting the prayer to grant interim injunction. The prayers made in both the applications before the Court below were similar. ( 4 ) HEARD Mr. Baug, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. J. Patnaik, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 2 in F. A. O. No. 174 of 2003 and mr. M. M. Sahoo, learned counsel appearing for the sole respondent in M. A. No. 426 of 1995 and respondent No. 1 in F. A. O. No. 174 of 2003. ( 5 ) IT is contended by Mr. Baug, learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Court without appreciating the facts of the case in its proper perspective and without taking into consideration the order dated 27-9-1996 passed by this Court in Misc. Case No. 955 of 1995 arising out of M. A. No. 426 of 1995, has passed the impugned order. It is further contended that in view of the agreement to sell executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff-appellant, the Court below should have held that the appellant has disclosed a prima facie case and the balance of convenience is in his favour for granting the order of interim injunction as otherwise if the respondents are permitted to raise construction over the disputed land it will cause irreparable injury to the appellant. ( 6 ) IN reply, both Mr. Sahoo and Mr. Patnaik, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that by order dated 27-9-1996 passed in Misc. ( 6 ) IN reply, both Mr. Sahoo and Mr. Patnaik, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that by order dated 27-9-1996 passed in Misc. Case No. 955 of 1995 this court only granted interim injunction, restraining the respondent-Shyam Sundar hans from selling, transferring or alienating the suit property in any way or manner till the hearing of the said misc. case. They, therefore, submitted that the trial Court has not committed any illegality in dismissing the application for injunction filed by the appellant by the impugned order. It was further submitted on behalf of the respondents that the appellant has candidly admitted that the respondents are in possession of the property and have already raised a multistoried building over the said land. ( 7 ) ORDER 39, Rule 1, CPC lays down the circumstances under which a temporary injunction can be granted in a suit. Unless the circumstances laid down in this rule exists, a Court has no jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction. Granting an order of injunction under Order 39, Rule 1, CPC is purely a discretion of the Court and law is well settled that this discretion vested in the covirt, like any of the discretionary power, can be exercised in accordance with reason and on sound judicial principles. The settled principles of law governing exercise of the discretion conferred by this rule are to the effect that a person who seeks a temporary injunction must satisfy the Court as to the existence of the following conditions :-First, that there is a prima facie case raised in the suit which is required to be tried and that on the facts before the Court there is probability of the petitioner being entitled to the relief asked for by him, secondly, that the Court's interference is necessary to protect the petitioner from that species of injury which the Court calls ir reparable, before the legal right of the petitioner can be established on trial, and thirdly, that the comparative mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur by withholding the injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise from granting it. Thus, in other words the petitioner is to establish that he has a prima facie case and that in the event the interim injunction is refused, he will suffer irreparable injury and the balance of convenience is in his favour. Thus, in other words the petitioner is to establish that he has a prima facie case and that in the event the interim injunction is refused, he will suffer irreparable injury and the balance of convenience is in his favour. In order to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff-petitioner is not required to establish his title. It would be sufficient for him to show that he has a fair question to raise with regard to the existence of his right and that till such question is decided finally it is required to preserve the property in status quo. Lack of proof of any of the conditions will disentitle the party praying for interim injunction from getting such an order. While deciding an application under Order 39, rules 1 and 2, CPC the Court should not express any opinion on the merits of the case of the respective parties. ( 8 ) I have perused the impugned orders both in M. A. No. 426 of 1995 and F. A. O. No. 174 of 2003. The questions with regard to the genuineness of the agreement to sell relied upon by the plaintiff and the validity of the sale deed executed by the defendant no. 1 in favour of the defendant No. 2 after filing of the suit, are to be gone into while deciding the suit finally. After examining the respective pleadings and the documents available on record, I find that the plaintiff though has raised a fair question, required to be decided in the suit but as admittedly the defendant No. 2 is in possession of the property and the entire claim of the plaintiff is based on an agreement to sell, which by itself does not confer any right on the plaintiff over the disputed property, the balance of convenience is not in favour of granting an order of injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC nor withholding such an order will cause irreparable injury to the plaintiff-appellant. ( 9 ) THE appeals are, therefore, devoid of merits and are, accordingly, dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs. The lower Court record be sent back forthwith. Appeals dismissed.