ORDER I.A. Ansari, J. 1. Heard Mr. SB Mukherjee, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S.P. Mahanta, learned counsel, for the petitioner, and Mr. VK Jindal, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. L. Lyngdoh, learned counsel, for the Opposite party. 2. The challenge in this Revision is posed to the Order, dated 13.5.2003, passed, in Misc Arbitration Case No. 14(T)02, by the learned Assistant to the Deputy to the Commissioner, Shillong. 3. By an Arbitral award, dated 21.8.2001, the Opposite party was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 102.55 lakhs with simple interest thereon at the rate of 19.5% on and from 3.4.1993. The Opposite party filed, on 21.3.2002, an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1996) alongwith an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing the application under Section 34. On 17.5.2002 Money Execution Case No. 7(T)2003 was registered in the Court of the learned Assistant to the Deputy to the Commissioner, at Shillong, on the basis of an application for execution of the award made by the petitioner. The petitioner also served a notice Under Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, on the opposite party demanding payment of Rs. 102.55 lakhs. By the impugned Order, dated 13.5.2003, passed in Misc Arbitration Case No. 14(T)02 the learned Assistant to the Deputy to the Commissioner, at Shillong, allowed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act made by the Opposite party. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has, now, filed the present Revision in terms of Rule 36A of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937, read with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. By the order, dated 15.9.2003, passed in this Revision, this Court, while admitting the Revision, stayed further proceedings of Misc. Arbitration Case No. 14(T)2002 aforementioned. 5. The short question, which, as already indicated hereinabove, raised in the present Revision is this : whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, are applicable to an application made under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside an award. 6. The answer to the above question is fully covered by the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Popular Const. Co. 6. The answer to the above question is fully covered by the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Popular Const. Co. reported in (2001) 8 SCC 470 , wherein the Court has laid down that the language used in the Proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 excludes the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 7. Section 34 of the Act 1996 lays down that an application for setting aside an award may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the Arbitral award. The Proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 34 states that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of days but not thereafter. The expression "but not thereafter", as mentioned in the case of Union of India v. Popular Const. Co. of Sub-section (3) of Section 34 and the proviso to Sub-section, (3) of Section 34. 8. Turning tot he facts in the present case, I find that it is not in dispute that the application for setting aside the award under Section 34 was made by the opposite party beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 34. Hence, by taking resort to the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay in making the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 could not have been condoned. Contrary, however, to this position of law, the learned Court below has, by the impugned order dated 13.5.2003, condoned the delay in making the application under Section 34. The impugned order is, contrary to the expressed provisions of law and cannot be allowed to stand good on record. 9. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this Revision is allowed and the impugned order dated 13.5.2003, aforementioned is hereby set aside. 10. With the above observations and directions, this Revision stands disposed of. Revision allowed