V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner-Education Trust has filed this writ petition seeking for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 19-6-2004 passed by the 2nd respondent in No. LND (S) CR 223. 97-98 at Annexure-G urging various grounds. ( 2 ) THE case of the petitioner is that 57 acres of land in Sy. No. 225 of Somanahalli was granted permanently and 33 acres of land in the said survey number was leased in its favour for a period of 10 years by the State Government vide Government Order No. RD 153 LBG 62, dated 3-5-1962 for the purpose of development of agriculture along with the Education Activity. Pursuant to the said grant, it has constructed various buildings for the purpose of setting up of engineering and Diploma Colleges and High Schools. On an earlier occasion, petitioner had filed W. P. No. 26259 of 1991 when under the guise of "ashraya Scheme" some people tried to enter the property of the petitioner on the ground that sites have been allotted to them by the ashraya Committee. This Court disposed of the said writ petition on 29-10-1997 with a direction to the first respondent to consider the request of the petitioner for extension of the lease in respect of 33 acres of land. Subsequently, on the report sought for in this regard by the first respondent, the then Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore, has submitted a report in favour of the petitioner recommending for extension of the lease of land in question as per Annexure-E. Thereafter, despite the directions issued by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition, the matter is still pending consideration before the first respondent. In the meantime, the "ashraya committee" got their name entered in the record of rights for 33 acres of land in Sy. No. 225 of somanahalli and on the petition filed by the petitioner, after due enquiry the name of Ashraya committee was deleted and the name of the petitioner was restored. Once again, the 3rd respondent herein as member of Ashraya Committee, filed an application before the 2nd respondent for grant of 33 acres of land in the said survey number for their Committee and the 2nd respondent issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner. Once again, the 3rd respondent herein as member of Ashraya Committee, filed an application before the 2nd respondent for grant of 33 acres of land in the said survey number for their Committee and the 2nd respondent issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner. The petitioner appeared and filed its written submissions as per Annexure-F contending that R2 has no jurisdiction to conduct such an enquiry in respect of the land in question and that he is not the Competent Authority to initiate proceedings in the matter. Further, it is stated that even though the pendency of its representation before the first respondent and the directions issued by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition were brought to the notice of the 2nd respondent, he has not considered the same and proceeded to pass an order as per Annexure-G in exercise of his power under Section 71 of the KLR Act read with Rule 97 of the KLR Rules of 1966 to appropriate 33 acres of land in Sy. No. 225 of somanahalli for the Rajiv Gandhi Housing Corporation and further directed the first respondent to terminate the lease. Hence, the present writ petition is filed. It is stated that after filing of this writ petition, the 2nd respondent has issued Annexure-H, dated 10-8-2004 wherein the Tahsildar is authorised to survey the land and secure possession of 33 acres of land from out of the entire campus and hand over to Rajiv Gandhi Housing Centre. Hence the petitioner has filed. A. No. I of 2004 seeking to restrain the respondents, their officers or agents or anybody claiming under them from proceeding further pursuant to the impugned orders produced at Annexures-G and H. ( 3 ) IT is contended by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. S. P. Shankar appearing for the petitioner that the 2nd respondent has no authority to recommend the Government to terminate the lease of the land in question as it affects the valuable right of the petitioner-institution to continue in occupation as its possession is juridical after efflux of time of lease period. S. P. Shankar appearing for the petitioner that the 2nd respondent has no authority to recommend the Government to terminate the lease of the land in question as it affects the valuable right of the petitioner-institution to continue in occupation as its possession is juridical after efflux of time of lease period. The learned Senior counsel contends that the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar pradesh v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh, AIR1989 SC 997 , jt1989 (1 )SC 118 , 1989 (1 )SCALE106 , (1989 )2 SCC505 , [1989 ]1 SCR176 , 1989 (1 ) UJ474 (SC ), with all four applicables to the fact situation and therefore he has submitted that the impugned orders at Annexures-G and H are liable to be quashed. It is further contended that even though by efflux of time the lease period pertaining to the land in question expired in the year 1972, the inaction on the part of the Government confers a right to the petitioner to hold over the land in question which valuable statutory right of it cannot be deprived of by the 2nd respondent by recommending to the Government to terminate the lease of the land in question. It is further contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the petitioner's institution is doing the governmental function of imparting education to the students and as such the 2nd respondent has committed an error in recommending to terminate the lease of land and de-reserve the very same land for the Ashraya Scheme and that the 2nd respondent has not heard the petitioner before passing the impugned order and as such the same is in violation of the principles of natural justice, hence the same is liable to be quashed. ( 4 ) NONE of the above said contentions are tenable in view of the undisputed facts namely that the reserved Gomal land of 33 acres was granted by way of lease in favour of the petitioner for a period of 10 years, which period had expired by efflux of time long back. ( 4 ) NONE of the above said contentions are tenable in view of the undisputed facts namely that the reserved Gomal land of 33 acres was granted by way of lease in favour of the petitioner for a period of 10 years, which period had expired by efflux of time long back. The Government has viewed the same as a silent spectator without taking any steps either to dispose of the representation or taking any action under Section 39 read with Section 94 of the Karnataka Land revenue Act, 1964 (in short, called as 'klr Act') though it has got a statutory duty to do so. ( 5 ) THE contention of the petitioner that after the lease period is over, its possession in respect of the land in question is juridical possession and also acquired the right of holding over placing reliance upon Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is wholly unsustainable in view of the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Ashoka Marketing Limited v. Punjab national Bank, AIR1991 SC 855 , [1992 ]74 Compcas482 (SC ), jt1990 (3 )SC 417 , 1990 (2 )SCALE200 , (1990 )4 SCC406 , [1990 ]3 SCR649. The Apex court in the said case has examined the rights of the parties of that case with reference to the provisions of Section 2 (e) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the Delhi Rent Control Act. Further, the Apex court has referred to its various earlier decisions, particularly the case of Life Insurance corporation of India v. D. J. Bahadur, AIR1980 SC 2181 , 1980 lablc1218 , (1981 )I LLJ1 SC , (1981 )1 SCC315 , [1981 ]1 SCR1083 , and it is held as follows.-" in determining whether a statute is a special or a general one, the focus must be on the principal subject-matter plus the particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may be general and for certain other purposes it may be special and we cannot blur distinctions when dealing with finer points of law". Dealing with the contention urged in that case with reference to the Transfer of Property Act, it is held that the Public Premises Act is also a special enactment and should prevail over the transfer of Property Act. Dealing with the contention urged in that case with reference to the Transfer of Property Act, it is held that the Public Premises Act is also a special enactment and should prevail over the transfer of Property Act. In view of the law laid down in the aforesaid case, Section 111 of the transfer of Property Act is not applicable to the fact situation for the reason that the grant of lease in favour of the petitioner-institution is under the repealed Land Revenue Code prior to the karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 has came into force. After 1964 Act has come into force under Section 202 of the said Act, the action taken by the State Government under the repealed code are saved under Section 202 of the Act and the grant of lease of agricultural land in favour of petitioner is governed by the Land Grant Rules, 1969. ( 6 ) IN view of the law laid down in Ashoka Marketing Limited's case, the leased land after the expiry of lease period belongs to the Government. The procedure prescribed under Section 39 of the KLR Act for evicting the persons who are in unauthorised occupation after lease period expires has to be followed in view of Section 94 (3) of the KLR Act which relevant provision reads as hereunder: " (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act 3 of 1962), the person unauthorizedly occupying any such land shall also be summarily evicted by the Deputy Commissioner and any crop including trees, raised in the land shall be liable to forfeiture, and any building or other construction erected thereon shall also, if not removed by him after such return notice as the deputy Commissioner may deem reasonable, be liable to forfeiture or to summary removal". Thus Section 39 of the Act shall be construed as special provision prevailing over the KPP (EOUO) Act, 1974, in view of Section 94 (3) and the decision of the Apex Court. Thus Section 39 of the Act shall be construed as special provision prevailing over the KPP (EOUO) Act, 1974, in view of Section 94 (3) and the decision of the Apex Court. The contention urged by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the petitioner that after the lease period is over, the petitioner continued to be in juridical possession cannot be accepted by this Court in view of the definition of unauthorized occupation under Section 2 (g) of the KTP (EOUO) Act, 1974, which reads thus: "section 2 (g ).--"unauthorised Occupation" in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises, without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever". ( 7 ) IN the instant case, it is an undisputed fact that the grant of lease of land in question expired in the year 1972 and thereafter according to the admission of the petitioner itself, its representation is pending consideration before the first respondent for extension of lease period. Therefore, the petitioner has continued to be in unauthorized occupation of the land in question and as such the petitioner has to be evicted in the manner as contemplated under Section 39 of the KLR Act read with the relevant KLR Rules of 1966. That stage is not yet reached as the State Government and its officers are required to initiate proceedings in this regard against the petitioner. ( 8 ) THE submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel placing reliance upon the decision in dharmander Prasad Singh's case, in support of his contention is not tenable in law for the reason that the decision is wholly inapplicable to the fact situation of the present case as the first respondent or any other authorized person under the provision of Section 39 is required to take possession of the land in question from the petitioner by following the procedure as contemplated in the above provision. ( 9 ) THE contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the recommendation made by the 2nd respondent in his report to terminate the lease of land is not warranted. ( 9 ) THE contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the recommendation made by the 2nd respondent in his report to terminate the lease of land is not warranted. Of course, since the lease is over by efflux of time, question of terminating a non-exist lease does not arise at all. But, action has to be taken to evict the petitioner from the land. ( 10 ) THE further contention urged by the learned Senior Counsel is that the 2nd respondent has no part to play as there was no direction sought against him in the earlier writ petition and as such there was no need for him to submit his report recommending the termination of lease of the land in question. This contention also cannot be accepted by this Court for the following reasons. ( 11 ) THE grant of lease or extension of lease of Government land depends upon various factors such as eligibility of the person or institution, whether such land is required for any other laudable purpose for the Government to fulfill its constitutional obligations, the potentiality of the land etc. The observations of this Court in W. P. No. 26259 of 1991, DD: 29-10-1997, copy of which is produced as Annexure-D is as follows.- "there is no positive response from the Government whether they have considered such representations so far though they were made long back in the year 1991 and thereafter. The court is unable to know the purpose of owning 33 acres of land on the outskirts of Bangalore city which has initially started a High School for rural boys, has started polytechnic and now wants to establish an Engineering College. The Court is unable to understand the service motive of such institution who are aspiring to start Engineering and Medical Colleges. It is difficult having regard to the existing situation in the State of Karnataka that such institutions are being proposed for service motive. However, it is for the Government to take into consideration all these factors before considering the application that are pending before it in this regard. Since the authorities are sitting over the question of lease or grant, as the case may be for the last six years, it is quite justifiable and reasonable to grant a writ of mandamus". However, it is for the Government to take into consideration all these factors before considering the application that are pending before it in this regard. Since the authorities are sitting over the question of lease or grant, as the case may be for the last six years, it is quite justifiable and reasonable to grant a writ of mandamus". These facts are examined by the Deputy Commissioner, who is the custodian of the records pertaining to the Government lands of the District. The Secretary to the Government has to consider the representation of either the petitioner or any other eligible person and for that purpose he must necessarily depend upon the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner has acted to safeguard the Government Land which is his statutory duty. Therefore, the contention urged in this regard that the second respondent should not have submitted his report or passed the impugned order must fail. ( 12 ) THE ground urged that the orders produced at Annexures-G and H could not have been passed by second respondent as they are premature, also cannot be accepted by this Court. There is no impediment under the provisions of the KLR Act, particularly in the instant case to take suitable action in respect of the land in question, as the petitioner is in unauthorised occupation of the vast extent of Government land after 1972 onwards. Power is vested with the Deputy commissioner under Section 71 of the KLR Act to sanction for assignment of land. Having regard to the enormous growth of the population in and around the area where the land in question is situated from the year 1972 the aspirations of the people are required to be met by the government, as held by the Apex Court in the case of Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr. , AIR1973 SC 1451 , (1973 )3 SCC719 , 1973 (5 )UJ403 (SC ), for good governance of the people of the country by the responsible government. Though there is a serious lapse on the part of the Government being slept over the matter for over a period of 32 years, now it has woken up from the slumber. ( 13 ) IT is the Constitutional obligation of the responsible Government to provide houses to the sc/st persons of the locality who constitute the weaker sections of the Society. ( 13 ) IT is the Constitutional obligation of the responsible Government to provide houses to the sc/st persons of the locality who constitute the weaker sections of the Society. Though the karnataka House Sites Act of 1972 is enacted by the State Legislature, the avowed object and intentment of the said Act for providing house sites to the houseless and site less people is not fully implemented by the Executives for the reasons best known to them. The Government after taking into consideration the relevant fact that on account of enormous growth in population and usage of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes, the cattle-strength in the area in question must have reduced and there is great demand for houses sites by the weaker sections of the society. Therefore, the second respondent must have felt that the continuation of the Gomal land has become unnecessary and therefore he has though fit to de-reserve the land in exercise of his power under the provisions of the KLR Act and Rules and planned for forming the house sites and distribute the same to the weaker Sections of the Society. In such a situation, the 2nd respondent has rightly exercised his statutory power under the provisions of the Act and Rules in the aid of implementing the State Government's constitutional obligation to the people of the area in question. In that direction, rightly, the Deputy Commissioner has passed the order. ( 14 ) IN this regard, in the recommendation made by respondent 2 to the State Government vide annexure-G he has rightly observed thus: "keeping in view the above observations of the Hon'ble High Court and in the present circumstance it is well-known fact that, such institutions have become commercial rather than service minded. The first respondent-institution is one of the well-established institutions in the state. These institutions are collecting capitation fee and donations from the students. Apart from this, the first respondent-institution has not utilized the land measuring 33 acres for the purpose for which it was originally leased in its favour and it is left fallow. Added to this, as already said the lease period has expired in the year 1972 itself about 30 years back and it has not been renewed. There is violation of the provisions of Rule 19 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 and the terms and conditions under the lease agreement. Added to this, as already said the lease period has expired in the year 1972 itself about 30 years back and it has not been renewed. There is violation of the provisions of Rule 19 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 and the terms and conditions under the lease agreement. The first respondent-institution has already been granted a huge extent of 57 acres of land in Sy. No. 225 of Somanahally Village, uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk. In such a circumstance it would not be desirable and necessary either to grant or lease the said extent of 33 acres of land for a further period in favour of the first respondent-institution" From the above it is clear that the petitioner has not utilized the 33 acres of land for the purpose for which it was leased. As a result of this these 33 acres of land had been kept fallow for the last 30 years and the agriculture produce that could have been raised from this land has not been raised. The petitioner-Education Trust having enjoyed the property for over a period of 41 years and being in unauthorized occupation of the same for more than 32 years, it cannot turn round and contend that the orders passed by second respondent affect its so-called right. It does not lie in the month of an unauthorized occupant to assert its so-called right against the Government in respect of the public property. In this regard, it is necessary to refer to the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, AIR2000 SC 3715 , (2001 )1 GLR434 , 2000 (7 )SCALE34 , (2000 ) 10 scc664 , [2000 ]supp4 SCR94 , which decision is referred to in BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Ors. , AIR2002 SC 350 , [2002 ]108 compcas193 (SC ), (2002 )1 Complj205 (SC ), [2002 (1 )JCR339 (SC )], JT2001 (10 )SC 466 , (2002 )I LLJ550 SC , 2001 (8 )SCALE541 , (2002 )2 SCC333 , [2002 ]35 SCL182 (SC ), 2002 (2 )SCT12 (SC ) of the former decision is extracted, while reads thus: "229. It is now well-settled that the Courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of p0olicy decision. It is now well-settled that the Courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of p0olicy decision. Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is the type of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed, are part of policy-making process and the Courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision so undertaken. The Courts, no doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and people's fundamental rights are not transgressed upon except to the extent permissible under the Constitution". ( 15 ) THE law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred case is extracted in this order to make an observation that de-reservation order of the land by the respondent 2 and transfer of the same to the Ashraya Scheme managed by the Rajiv Gandhi Housing Centre for allotment of sites to the weaker sections of the Society of that area cannot be at any stretch of imagination said as illegal and affects the so-called right of the petitioner, when it is in unauthorized occupation of the land in question, having enjoyed the property for over a period of 41 years. Further, out of 90 acres of land, 57 acres is granted in favour of the petitioner's institution. The responsible State Government in the State is required to answer and fulfil the aspirations of the weaker sections of the Society and if it does not respond to the popular demand of the weaker sections of the Society in discharge of its constitutional obligation to them, the hundreds of people who are house less and site less in the area in question in whose favour the fundaments-rights are guaranteed under Part III and the constitutional rights conferred under Part iv of the Constitution of India will be affected as both the rights would constitute human rights of the weaker section of the Society. Therefore, the petitioner which is an unauthorized occupant of the land in question cannot question the orders of the Deputy Commissioner as per annexures-G and H. Therefore, there was no need to hear the petitioner by the second respondent before passing the orders. Therefore, the petitioner which is an unauthorized occupant of the land in question cannot question the orders of the Deputy Commissioner as per annexures-G and H. Therefore, there was no need to hear the petitioner by the second respondent before passing the orders. ( 16 ) THE petitioner, which is an unauthorized occupant, of the land in question is not an affected person and it cannot claim for grant of land as a matter of right. ( 17 ) FOR the reasons stated supra, this is a fit case for awarding exemplary costs. ( 18 ) WITH the above observation, this writ petition is dismissed with costs of Rs. 2,500 payable by the petitioner to the Government.