JUDGMENT Ranjan Gogoi, J. 1. The quest in the present exercise in appeal is to determine the correct principles that would govern the entitlement of a government employee to arrear salary in a situation when the employer himself, in recognition of the wrongful denial of promotion, has granted retrospective promotion to such employee. 2. The above question arises in the following facts : - The respondents in both the appeals were serving as assistant teachers in different High Schools of the State. By an order dated 12.10.1992, persons who were juniors to the respondents-petitioners were promoted to the post of Assistant Headmaster/Assistant Headmistress and the said batch of promotees were again promoted to the post of Headmaster/Headmistress by a subsequent order dated 25.11.1995. Claiming to be seniors and eligible, the respondents-petitioners filed representations before the Government and by an order dated 19.02.1996, the respondents-petitioners along with others were retrospectively promoted to the posts of Assistant Headmaster/Headmistress with effect from 05.11.1992, i.e., the date from which the promotion of the juniors were made effective. Furthermore, by the same order dated 19.02.1996, the respondents-petitioners were also promoted to the post of Headmaster/Headmistress with effect from 29.11.1995. The order dated 19.02.1996 contemplated grant of arrear salary to the respondents-petitioners on account of their belated promotions and for other consequential benefits as if the respondents-petitioners were holding the promoted posts with effect from such date/dates that their juniors were promoted. However, by a subsequent notification dated 24.07.1996, the benefit of arrear pay given to the respondents-petitioners in the post of Headmaster/Headmistress with effect from 05.11.1992 and in the posts of Headmaster/Headmistress with effect from 29.11.1995 was sought to be taken away and the promotions made with effect from the said dates were attempted to be made notional. Aggrieved, the two writ petitions, out of which the present appeals have arisen, were Filed. 3. The learned Single Judge after an elaborate consideration of the cases of the respective parties by the judgment and order dated 11.08.1998 took the view that the retrospective promotion of the respondents should carry the benefit of arrear salary. In this regard the learned Single Judge took note of the fact that the reason(s) for denying promotion to the respondents-petitioners i.e., that they did not possess the B.Ed. degree, was non-existent inasmuch as such qualification was acquired by the respondents-petitioners on the relevant date. In this regard the learned Single Judge took note of the fact that the reason(s) for denying promotion to the respondents-petitioners i.e., that they did not possess the B.Ed. degree, was non-existent inasmuch as such qualification was acquired by the respondents-petitioners on the relevant date. The denial of promotion was, therefore, held to be unjustified. The learned Single Judge further held that though the respondents-petitioners did not inform the authority about the degree obtained by them, yet the authority was equally to be blamed for failing to notice that said fact inasmuch as the respondents-petitioners had acquired their degrees while in service. On the aforesaid basis and taking the view that a retrospective promotion normally entails grant of arrear salary for the period for which the promotion was withheld, the learned Single Judge concluded the writ petitions by holding that the respondents-petitioners would be entitled to arrear salary for such period. Accordingly the notification dated 24.07.1996 Was interfered with. Aggrieved, the State has filed the present appeals. 4. We have heard Mr. T.K. Roy learned Advocate General for the appellant-State and Mr. A.M. Lodh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-petitioners. 5. The arguments advanced by the respective parties being elaborate and exhaustive and several precedents having been cited by the learned counsels, a brief note of the respective arguments is considered necessary. The learned Advocate General appearing for the appellant-State in support of the challenge made in the appeals has contended that the undisputed facts of the case reveal that the respondents-petitioners had not rendered any service for the period for which back wages/arrear salaries were claimed and granted by the learned Single Judge. The respondents-petitioners not having worked, they would not be entitled to any arrear salary on the principle of no work no pay, contends the learned Advocate General. The provisions of F.R. 17 have also been pressed into service to contend that it is only with effect from the date of assumption of charge of an office that an incumbent is entitled to the salary attached to that office. The learned Advocate General has contended that not only the respondents-petitioners would not be entitled to arrear salary on the application of principle of no work no pay, no such benefit will also flow to the respondents-petitioners in equity. The learned Advocate General has contended that not only the respondents-petitioners would not be entitled to arrear salary on the application of principle of no work no pay, no such benefit will also flow to the respondents-petitioners in equity. The respondents-petitioners were superseded as at the relevant point of time as they had not intimated to their employer that they had acquired the B.Ed. degree. Such a degree was a condition of eligibility for promotion to the higher posts in question and if the petitioners had acquired the said degree it was incumbent on them to inform the concerned authority. However, as soon as the said fact came to the knowledge of the employer State, the situation was remedied and the order dated 19.02.1996 was issued. However, by the said order arrear salary was wrongly granted to the respondents-petitioners as they were not entitled to receive the same. The subsequent order dated 24.07.1996 was issued to correct the aforesaid error. The learned Advocate General has relied on several decisions of the Apex Court to contend that the principle of 'no work no pay' must be construed by this court to be an absolute principle admitting of no exception and on application of which a government servant would not be entitled to the benefit of back wages/arrear salaries unless he had rendered service during the period in question. Particular emphasis has been laid by the learned Advocate General on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of A.K. Soumini v. State Bank of Travancore and Anr., reported in. Three other judgments referred to by the Apex Court in para 8 of the judgment in the case of A.K. Soumin (supra) has also been pressed into service by the learned Advocate General in support of the above proposition. 6. Controverting the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant-State, Mr. A.M. Lodh, the learned senior counsel for the respondents-petitioners, has argued that the principle of 'no work no pay' is not an absolute principle having universal application and knowing no exception. According to Mr. Lodh, exceptions to the aforesaid principle have been judicially recognised and it is for the court to determine whether in the given facts of a case a departure from the general principle of 'no work no pay' should be made. In support, a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. According to Mr. Lodh, exceptions to the aforesaid principle have been judicially recognised and it is for the court to determine whether in the given facts of a case a departure from the general principle of 'no work no pay' should be made. In support, a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. K.V. Jankiraman and Ors., reported in has been relied upon. The aforesaid decision has also been relied upon by Mr. Lodh to contend that F.R. 17 will have no application in a case where an employer wrongfully prevents an employee from performing his duties. Another decision of the Apex Court in the case of J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India and Anr., reported in has also been pressed into service. Lastly, it has been contended by Mr. Lodh that the respondents-petitioners not having been given any prior opportunity before the notification dated 24.07.1996 was issued, the same would be in violation of the basic principles of natural justice. 7. The arguments advanced on behalf of the rival parties have been duly considered. Before proceeding to discuss the various contentions raised by the rival parties, this court considers it convenient to answer the question raised by the respondents-petitioners with regard to the notification dated 24.07.1996 being in violation of the principles of natural justice. The notification dated 24.07.1996 does have certain serious implications and consequences for the respondents-petitioners. It entails curtailment of benefits earlier granted and may also have the effect of recovery of the amounts received by the respondents-petitioners. In such a situation, certainly, the respondents-petitioners can have a legitimate grievance if they were not heard and no opportunity was given to them before the aforesaid notification dated 24.07.1996 was issued. However, at the entitlement of the respondents-petitioners to arrear salary has been considered on merit by the learned Single Judge and the said question has been elaborately argued before us in the present appeal, this court does not find it appropriate to declare the notification dated 24.07.1996 to be bad on the aforesaid account. 8. This would bring us to a consideration of the question as to the scope and applicability of the principle of 'no work no pay' as argued by the learned Advocate General. 8. This would bring us to a consideration of the question as to the scope and applicability of the principle of 'no work no pay' as argued by the learned Advocate General. The principle of 'no work no pay' is a wholesome principle conceived by the Courts to avoid unnecessary burden on the public exchequer and to avoid grant of windfalls to a litigant. The principle of 'no work no pay' has been steadily built up by the courts over the years keeping in view the public interest while at the same time due care and caution have been taken to ensure that the said principle does not become a weapon of offence at the hands of the employer to the detriment of the rights of the employees. The arguments advanced by the learned Advocate General as to the universality of the application of the doctrine can hardly be accepted; if the doctrine is so construed, the potential for disastrous consequences would be both imminent and inherent. Neither is any such universality of the doctrine or principle of 'no work no pay' is discernible in the judgments of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned Advocate General which judgments will have to be noticed, even if it be briefly, in view of the strenuous arguments made by the learned Advocate General. In A.K. Soumin's case (supra), that facts in which the claim for arrear salary was refused by the Apex Court must be noticed. The employee in that case was not found eligible for promotion as she had not received the minimum marks in the interview segment of the selection. Contending that the requirement of obtaining minimum marks in the interview was not correct, the employee had moved the High Court which agreed with the contentions advanced. The Apex Court, for the reasons assigned, did not approve the view taken by the High Court but as in the mean time nearly 10 years had elapsed and the employee concerned had also not participated in the subsequent selections in view of the favourable verdict of the High Court, the Apex Court directed notional promotion in favour of the employee. Notional promotion having been given, the employee staked a claim for arrear salary which was answered by the Apex Court in the negative by holding that when her notional promotion itself was an act of gratis, no entitlement for arrear salary can be recognised in the employee. The Apex Court in A.K. Soumini's case (supra) did not lay down any such principle as has been contended by the learned Advocate General; rather the judgment of the Apex Court admits the possibility of a departure from the principle of 'no work no pay" in a given situation. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. O.P. Gupta and Ors., reported in the claim of arrear salary was negatived by the Apex Court on the special facts of that case which this court understands to be that the directions for preparation of a fresh seniority list was made on 7.8.1990 in C.A. No. 3837 of 1990 (Sushil Kr. Arora v. State of Haryana) after a protracted litigation. It is only thereafter that the concerned persons were found eligible for promotion w.e.f. the deemed dated i.e. 01.01.1983. In fact in State of Haryana and Ors. v. O.P. Gupta and Ors. there is reference to a decision in the case of Union of India and Gupta and Ors. v. V. K. Jankiraman and Ors. where a claim of arrear salary was allowed when an employee was found to be entitled to promotion being exonerated in a departmental proceeding. In Virender Kumar v. Avinash Chandra Chadha and Ors., reported in the claim of arrear salary was made by the concerned employees on the strength of certain directions issued by the High Court for redetermination of the seniority on the basis of the quota and rota rule. The Apex Court took the view that such directions cannot furnish a reasonable basis for a claim of arrear salary. The said view expressed by the Apex Court in para 15 of the judgment conclusively determined the issue in so far as the claim of arrear salary is concerned and, therefore, the views expressed in para 16 of the judgment, on which reliance has been placed by the learned Advocate General must be necessarily be understood in the light of the contents of the preceding paragraph, i.e., para 15 of the judgment. Similarly in the case of Paluru Ramkrishnaiah and Ors. Similarly in the case of Paluru Ramkrishnaiah and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in no general principle with regard to the applicability of the doctrine of 'no work no pay' as contended by the learned Advocate General has been laid down by the Apex Court. In this regard what must be noticed are the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India and Anr. (supra) Union of India and Ors. v. K.V. Jankiraman and Ors. (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents-petitioners. The aforesaid two judgments, in fact, make it clear that there will be exceptions to the principle of 'no work no pay" and it is for the court to consider whether the facts of the given case would call for the application of the general principle or its exceptions, as may be. 9. What emanates from the above discussions is that whether a given case arrear salary should be paid to an employee has to be essentially determined by taking into account the reasons why promotion was refused/denied at the earlier stage. If the reasons for such refusal/denial are bona fide though the same may be subsequently proved to be legally wrong, arrear salary may be refused but where the reasons for which the promotion was withheld/denied are palpably incorrect or, as may be, an act of arbitrary exercise of power, arrear salary must be granted. This, in the considered view of this court, is the correct position in law. 10. Applying the above parameters to the fact of the present case what is found from the materials on record is that promotion to the respondents-petitioners was denied and they were allowed to be superseded by their juniors on the ground that the respondents-petitioners had not possessed the B.Ed. degree at the relevant time. The aforesaid reason, as subsequent facts revealed, was non-existent inasmuch as all of the respondents-petitioners had acquired the B.Ed. degree while in service. However, the said fact was not within the knowledge of the employer as a result of which a mistake had occurred resulting in denial of promotion to the respondents-petitioners. As soon as the aforesaid mistake came to light, the situation was remedied and retrospective promotions were conferred including arrear pay. degree while in service. However, the said fact was not within the knowledge of the employer as a result of which a mistake had occurred resulting in denial of promotion to the respondents-petitioners. As soon as the aforesaid mistake came to light, the situation was remedied and retrospective promotions were conferred including arrear pay. However, by the impugned notification dated 24.07.1996 such retrospective promotions was made notional to mean that all service benefits to the respondents-petitioners are to be conferred except monetary benefits by way of payment of arrear salary. 11. The finding of the learned Single Judge in this regard as recorded in the judgment under challenge is that no document on record has been brought by any parties to show whether the vital piece of information that the respondents-petitioners had obtained the B.Ed. degree was brought to the notice of the authority in time or not. The learned Single Judge proceeding further recorded that as the respondents-petitioners had undergone the course while in service, there was an obligation on the part of the authority to obtain the necessary information before denying promotions to the respondents-petitioners. On the basis of the aforesaid fact, the learned Single Judge thought it proper to hold that while the respondents-petitioners were negligent in not informing the authority that they had acquired the required degree, some amount of lapses on the part of the authority can also not be overruled. 12. The arguments advanced by Mr. Lodh, the learned senior counsel for the respondents-petitioners that the respondents-petitioners had averred in the rejoinder affidavit that they have informed the authority of their acquiring the B.Ed. degree and that as the authority is the custodian of all the records, the respondents could not have any role to play in the matter of updating their service records, must be considered now. Merely because an averment is made in the affidavit, unless the same is supported by the required documents, the court cannot be expected to proceed on the basis of such an averment. If the respondents-petitioners had informed the authority about acquiring the B.Ed. degree as claimed, surely they should have placed before the court the requisite and supporting document in this regard. If the respondents-petitioners had informed the authority about acquiring the B.Ed. degree as claimed, surely they should have placed before the court the requisite and supporting document in this regard. It is only on production of such records before the court, which records must necessarily be in possession of the respondents-petitioners, that the court would be able to judge the correctness of the government's action in not updating the service records of the respondents-petitioners. The primary duty of informing the employer that the employee had acquired the eligibility for promotion must be understood to be that of the employee. After all it is the employee who is likely to benefit from the promotion. At the same time, there is some responsibility in this regard in the employer also, particularly in a case when a large number of employees are being superseded on the ground that they do not possess the required qualification. 13. The actions of the employer in not making necessary enquiries as to whether the concerned employees had obtained the necessary qualification while in service and whether such inaction could amount to negligence and if so of what proportion and the consequences thereof are questions that need not be dealt with by this court in the present proceedings. The present writ proceedings, it must be noticed, does not seek any compensation from the employer for any such alleged lapses on their part. What the respondents-petitioners seek in the present writ proceedings is an interference with the order by which their rights to arrear salary has been curtailed. Such a claim of arrear salary following the retrospective promotions as already held by us will depend on the facts of each case and in the present case what has to be determined is whether the actions of the government in refusing denying promotion at the relevant time was bona fide and justified. There is nothing on record to suggest that the actions of the employer at the relevant point of time was not bona fide. In fact, in the present case, the employer himself granted retrospective benefit upon realisation of the mistake. The mistake that occurred was on account of the failure of the respondents-petitioners to perform what this court understands and perceives to be the primary duty of the employee i.e., to inform the employer that they have acquired the requisite qualification. In fact, in the present case, the employer himself granted retrospective benefit upon realisation of the mistake. The mistake that occurred was on account of the failure of the respondents-petitioners to perform what this court understands and perceives to be the primary duty of the employee i.e., to inform the employer that they have acquired the requisite qualification. In such a situation without going into the question of the entitlement of, the respondents-petitioners to any claim for compensation for the lapses, if any, on the part of the employer, we find it difficult to share the view of the learned Single Judge that the respondents-petitioners are entitled to arrear salary following their retrospective promotions. 14. For the aforesaid reasons the judgment and order dated 11.8.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge will have to be reversed. We accordingly do so and allow the appeals filed by the State. 15. Before parting with the records, this court would like to make it clear that in so far as the Writ Appeal No. 86 of 1998 arising out of C.R. No. 397 of 1996 is concerned, a disputed question of fact has arisen, i.e., as to whether the writ petitioner, Sri Badal Deb Barma, has been discharging the duties in the post of Headmaster prior to the notification dated 19.02.1996 and that such duties have been discharged by the writ petitioner, Sri Badal Deb Barma, from the year 1991. In view of the disputed question raised by the pleadings of the parties, we do not consider it appropriate to go into the said question and leave the same to be determined by the authority. If the writ petitioner, Sri Badal Deb Barma, on verification, is found to have been working as Headmaster, the directions contained in the present judgment shall not apply to him and he will be entitled to arrear salary. Appeal allowed